Case: 23-1862 Document: 23 Page: 1 Filed: 12/06/2023
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
MAXWELL JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2023-1862
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:21-cv-00801-LAS, Senior Judge Loren A. Smith.
______________________
Decided: December 6, 2023
______________________
MAXWELL JONES, Houston, TX, pro se.
EBONIE I. BRANCH, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
BRIAN M. BOYNTON, DEBORAH ANN BYNUM, PATRICIA M.
MCCARTHY.
______________________
Before LOURIE, PROST, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
Case: 23-1862 Document: 23 Page: 2 Filed: 12/06/2023
2 JONES v. US
PER CURIAM.
Maxwell Jones appeals an order of the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims denying his Rule 60(b) 1 motion for relief
from a judgment. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Jones sued the government in the Court of Federal
Claims in January 2021. He alleged in his complaint that
he was wrongfully discharged from the Army as a result of
an improper General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand
(“GOMOR”) that was included in his official personnel rec-
ord. He requested relief in the form of reinstatement, back
pay, and correction of his military records, including re-
moval of the GOMOR.
In June 2021, the Court of Federal Claims stayed
Mr. Jones’s case in light of concurrent proceedings at the
Army Board for Correction of Military Records (“Board”).
In July 2021, the Board granted Mr. Jones partial relief by
removing the GOMOR from his official personnel record.
Later, in a revised decision, the Board granted Mr. Jones
full relief, including reinstating him to Active Guard Re-
serve status and authorizing back pay and allowances.
After the Court of Federal Claims was notified of the
revised Board decision, the government moved to dismiss
Mr. Jones’s complaint, arguing that it was moot because
the Board had given Mr. Jones all the relief he had re-
quested from the court. In February 2022, the court
granted the government’s motion, dismissed the complaint
as moot, and entered judgment accordingly. See Order
at 1, Jones v. United States, No. 1:21-cv-801 (Fed. Cl.
Feb. 24, 2022), ECF No. 23 (“The court agrees that the
1 Unless otherwise noted, the Rules referenced in
this opinion are the Rules of the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims.
Case: 23-1862 Document: 23 Page: 3 Filed: 12/06/2023
JONES v. US 3
[Board]’s corrected decision has granted all the relief
sought in plaintiff’s complaint, leaving no justiciable issues
upon which this court can render a decision.” (cleaned up)).
In September 2022, Mr. Jones filed a motion under
Rule 60(b) seeking relief from that judgment. The court
thereafter held several status conferences with the parties,
which culminated in an order that Mr. Jones “file a brief
detailing his outstanding allegations and identifying the
corresponding relief.” Order at 1, Jones v. United States,
No. 1:21-cv-801 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 21, 2023), ECF No. 46.
In his court-ordered brief, Mr. Jones (1) questioned the
authenticity of the revised Board decision, (2) alleged that
he was still owed back pay, and (3) alleged that the
GOMOR had not been removed from his official personnel
record. The government’s response brief addressed each
contention. First, it characterized Mr. Jones’s suggestion
that the revised Board decision was inauthentic as “no
more than an unsubstantiated conspiracy theory . . . .
wholly unsupported by the record.” Def.’s Corrected Resp.
to Pl.’s Mar. 6, 2023 Filing at 6, Jones v. United States,
No. 1:21-cv-801 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 7, 2023), ECF No. 53. The
government deemed the suggestion particularly implausi-
ble given that Mr. Jones’s official personnel record also con-
tained a memorandum explaining why the Board’s decision
was revised. Id. (referencing GApp’x 2 19–20). Second, the
government explained that Mr. Jones was not owed back
pay because any back pay had to be reduced by his separa-
tion payment and offset by his civilian earnings since his
discharge—leaving him with no back pay owed. Id. at 7–8.
Third, the government explained that, although the
GOMOR itself was removed from Mr. Jones’s official per-
sonnel record, Army regulations required that Board deci-
sions remain in that record. That meant that the revised
2 “GApp’x” refers to the appendix included with the
government’s informal brief.
Case: 23-1862 Document: 23 Page: 4 Filed: 12/06/2023
4 JONES v. US
Board decision referencing the GOMOR had to stay (though
the government represented that it was placed in a re-
stricted folder). Id. at 11–12.
The Court of Federal Claims heard oral argument after
this round of briefing, and in May 2023, it denied
Mr. Jones’s Rule 60(b) 3 motion. The court noted that
Mr. Jones had “identifie[d] no mistake, newly discovered
evidence, or fraud, nor d[id] he demonstrate . . . any other
reason that justifies relief.” GApp’x 2 (addressing standard
for Rule 60(b) relief). Although the court did not explicitly
reference Mr. Jones’s suggestion that the revised Board de-
cision was inauthentic, it explained in detail why
Mr. Jones’s allegations concerning owed back pay and the
GOMOR lacked merit. As to the former, the court ex-
plained that Mr. Jones had “accrued $92,401.56 of back pay
and allowances for the separation period” but that the De-
fense Finance and Accounting Service “was required to de-
duct $92,401.56 from that amount for separation pay
already paid out to plaintiff, an offset for plaintiff’s civilian
earnings during the separation period, and other smaller
deductions.” GApp’x 2. To do otherwise, the court ob-
served, would award Mr. Jones “an unearned windfall” in-
stead of returning him “to the same position he would have
had if he had not been separated from military service.”
GApp’x 2 (cleaned up) (citing Department of Defense
3 Mr. Jones’s motion had also cited Rule 59 as sup-
porting relief, but the Court of Federal Claims concluded
that the potentially relevant provision of that rule could
not apply because Mr. Jones had filed his motion well out-
side the applicable 28-day timeframe. GApp’x 1 n.1 (citing
Rule 59(e)). The Court of Federal Claims therefore evalu-
ated the motion only under Rule 60(b). See id. Mr. Jones
does not dispute that treatment, so we will likewise evalu-
ate the motion and the Court of Federal Claims’ order only
under Rule 60(b).
Case: 23-1862 Document: 23 Page: 5 Filed: 12/06/2023
JONES v. US 5
Financial Management Regulation Volume 7A, ch. 1,
¶ 3.1.6, titled “Corrections of Military Record”). As to the
latter, the court credited the declaration of a Paralegal Spe-
cialist with the Army Legal Services Agency and found
that, although “[t]hree documents in a restricted folder . . .
reference the removal of the GOMOR . . . , the GOMOR it-
self is gone.” GApp’x 3 (emphasis in original) (referencing
GApp’x 34–36). The court further explained that Army reg-
ulations required that Board decisions and records of pro-
ceedings remain in Mr. Jones’s record. See GApp’x 3 (citing
Army Regulation 600-8-104). The court accordingly denied
Mr. Jones’s Rule 60(b) motion and denied all other pending
motions as moot. GApp’x 3.
Mr. Jones timely appealed the Court of Federal Claims’
order denying his Rule 60(b) motion. 4 We have jurisdiction
under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
DISCUSSION
We review the Court of Federal Claims’ denial of a Rule
60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. E.g., Progressive
4 Although some statements in Mr. Jones’s informal
briefing suggest that he considers the underlying February
2022 dismissal judgment to be within the scope of this ap-
peal, we lack jurisdiction to review that judgment because
this appeal was filed well beyond 60 days after that judg-
ment. See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, No. 21-1831,
2022 WL 1232118, at *3–5 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 2022) (as
modified) (nonprecedential). And “an appeal from denial of
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 60(b) relief does not bring
up the underlying judgment for review.” Browder v. Dir.,
Dep’t of Corr. of Ill.,
434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978); see Peretz,
2022 WL 1232118, at *4 (applying this principle in the con-
text of Rule 60(b) of the Court of Federal Claims). We will
therefore not review the February 2022 dismissal judg-
ment.
Case: 23-1862 Document: 23 Page: 6 Filed: 12/06/2023
6 JONES v. US
Indus., Inc. v. United States,
888 F.3d 1248, 1255 (Fed. Cir.
2018). “A court abuses its discretion when (1) its decision
is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary[,] or fanciful; (2) the de-
cision is based upon an erroneous construction of the law;
(3) its factual findings are clearly erroneous; or (4) the rec-
ord contains no evidence upon which the . . . court could
have rationally based its decision.” Shell Oil Co. v. United
States,
896 F.3d 1299, 1306–07 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (cleaned
up).
Mr. Jones fails to demonstrate that the Court of Fed-
eral Claims abused its discretion in denying his Rule 60(b)
motion. To begin, he insists that the revised Board decision
was “forged,” and he criticizes the Court of Federal Claims
for not specifically addressing that contention. See Appel-
lant’s Informal Br. 2–6. Yet, although the court’s order did
not discuss this contention specifically, cf. GApp’x 2 (con-
cluding generally that Mr. Jones had not identified fraud),
none of Mr. Jones’s arguments persuade us that its treat-
ment of this issue was so unsatisfactory as to give rise to
an abuse of discretion in denying Rule 60(b) relief. Simi-
larly, while Mr. Jones continues to object to the reduction
of his back pay, see Appellant’s Informal Br. 8–9, and to
documents referencing the GOMOR remaining in his offi-
cial personnel record, see
id. at 5–6, his arguments either
lack meaningful engagement with the Court of Federal
Claims’ reasoning, are unsupported, or are undeveloped.
For example, he argues that “
10 U.S.C. §§ 1174 [and]
1174a” “prohibit[] any collection of severance or separa-
tion[] pay [to] be deducted from a service member[’]s sal-
ary.”
Id. at 9. But he does not provide any explanation of
how these statutory provisions support his assertion, and
on their face, it is not clear that they do.
In sum, the abuse-of-discretion standard is deferential.
And considering Mr. Jones’s arguments—particularly
against what appears to have been a diligent, sustained ef-
fort by the Court of Federal Claims to ensure that his sali-
ent concerns were heard and addressed—we cannot say
Case: 23-1862 Document: 23 Page: 7 Filed: 12/06/2023
JONES v. US 7
that the court abused its discretion by denying Rule 60(b)
relief.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Jones’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm. 5
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
5 Mr. Jones filed a motion (ECF No. 20) seeking to
supplement the appellate record and offer materials for
this court’s judicial notice. The government did not file a
response opposing this motion. We grant the motion (albeit
only insofar as it seeks to supplement the record on appeal
and make materials available for this court to potentially
judicially notice), but it does not change our disposition of
this appeal.
