Case: 22-2003 Document: 38 Page: 1 Filed: 12/20/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
CRISPIN TORRES,
Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
Respondent
______________________
2022-2003
______________________
Petition for review of an arbitrator’s decision in No. AR-
20-17 by Samuel Vitaro.
______________________
Decided: December 20, 2023
______________________
HOWARD BRANDON ZAKAI, Granger & Associates LLC,
New York, NY, argued for petitioner. Also represented by
RAYMOND R. GRANGER.
ELINOR JOUNG KIM, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by
BRIAN M. BOYNTON, TARA K. HOGAN, PATRICIA M.
MCCARTHY.
______________________
Before MOORE, Chief Judge, REYNA and HUGHES,
Circuit Judges.
Case: 22-2003 Document: 38 Page: 2 Filed: 12/20/2023
2 TORRES v. DHS
HUGHES, Circuit Judge.
Crispin Torres appeals an arbitration decision sustain-
ing his removal from the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity. Because the arbitrator did not provide substantial
evidence for why Douglas factors 6 and 10 weighed in favor
of removing Mr. Torres from the agency, we vacate the de-
cision and remand to the arbitrator for proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.
I
A
In February 2009, Mr. Torres began working for the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Enforcement and Re-
moval Operations. He was originally employed as an Im-
migration Enforcement Agent, which was later converted
into a Deportation Officer position. As a Deportation Of-
ficer, Mr. Torres was responsible for the detention and re-
moval of non-citizens who were determined to be in the
United States without authorization. As part of his duties,
Mr. Torres escorted non-citizens to their home countries
pursuant to orders of removal from the United States.
In April 2019, Mr. Torres was directed to escort a non-
citizen from Las Vegas, Nevada, to Santiago, Chile. Per his
supervisor-approved travel authorization, Mr. Torres was
scheduled to travel from Las Vegas to Santiago on April 16,
2019, return from Santiago to Las Vegas on April 18, 2019,
and report to work on April 19, 2019. However, without au-
thorization, Mr. Torres changed his flight and flew back to
Las Vegas approximately 24 hours earlier on April 17,
2019, to spend time with his family on April 18, 2019. To
conceal his unauthorized travel and leave of absence, Mr.
Torres reported to work on April 19, 2019, to make it ap-
pear as if he had just returned from Santiago as originally
scheduled. Despite knowingly disobeying his travel orders,
Mr. Torres also submitted three false certified records in
Case: 22-2003 Document: 38 Page: 3 Filed: 12/20/2023
TORRES v. DHS 3
connection with his travel authorization. Mr. Torres falsi-
fied and submitted for pay a G-391 form that listed his au-
thorized overtime, a travel voucher that included receipts
for expenses (per diem), and a certification of the number
of hours of work performed on WebTA, a web-based time-
keeping and attendance system. Following the incident,
Mr. Torres acknowledged that he committed the charged
misconduct involving falsification of certified records and
absence without leave. He accepted responsibility and ex-
pressed remorse. Mr. Torres had no prior disciplinary rec-
ord and his job evaluations had been “[e]xcellent” or “[f]ully
[s]uccessful.”
B
On April 24, 2020, Acting Deputy Field Office Director,
Tracey L. Cammorto, proposed Mr. Torres’s removal based
on three specifications of Falsification of Certified Records
(Reason 1) and two specifications of Absence without Leave
(Reason 2). Mr. Torres replied to the proposed removal by
letter dated May 21, 2020, and orally with his attorney on
June 3, 2020, before the deciding official, Sylvester M. Or-
tega, Acting Field Office Director, Field Operations, En-
forcement and Removal Operations.
On August 10, 2020, after reviewing the case file and
considering Mr. Torres’s written and oral statements, the
deciding official sustained Reasons 1 and 2 and all the spec-
ifications, finding removal reasonable. In determining the
appropriate penalty, the deciding official reviewed the
Douglas factors, emphasizing the nature and seriousness
of Mr. Torres’s misconduct, especially due to the higher
standard of conduct expected of a law enforcement officer.
Douglas v. Veterans Admin.,
5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305–06
(1981). The official found Mr. Torres’s misconduct to be
particularly serious because he knowingly submitted three
different false certified records over a ten-day period be-
tween April 19, 2019, and April 29, 2019. J.A. 1073–78. The
deciding official found it especially aggravating that Mr.
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4 TORRES v. DHS
Torres’s offenses were part of a ruse to make it appear he
had completed his foreign escort detail according to sched-
ule and concealed his unauthorized early return. The de-
ciding official ultimately found that due to the seriousness
of his misconduct, Mr. Torres was not a good candidate for
rehabilitation. The deciding official emphasized that Mr.
Torres’s misconduct was “deliberate, intentional and exhib-
ited a lack of truthfulness toward the Agency.” J.A. 1077.
He further stated, “I have no confidence in his ability to
perform his duties given the lack of truthfulness in his
dealings with the Agency upon the return from his inter-
national travel.”
Id. The deciding official notified Mr.
Torres of his decision by letter on August 10, 2020, which
Mr. Torres refused to sign. On August 11, 2020, Mr. Torres
was removed from his position.
Mr. Torres’s union then invoked arbitration. On April
23, 2021, a hearing was held online. Three witnesses testi-
fied at the hearing: (1) Mr. Torres; (2) the deciding official,
Mr. Ortega; and (3) Mr. Torres’s supervisor, Matthew
Cantrell. J.A. 7, 1081. On May 30, 2022, the arbitrator,
Samuel A. Vitaro, issued his opinion and award, determin-
ing there was a preponderance of the evidence for the
charged misconduct and that Mr. Torres’s removal was rea-
sonable.
This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A).
II
This court applies the same standard of review to an
arbitrator’s decision as it does to appeals from decisions of
the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). See
5 U.S.C.
§ 7121(f); Dunn v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs.,
98 F.3d 1308,
1311 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Pursuant to
5 U.S.C. § 7703(c), we
may reverse an arbitrator’s decision only if it is “(1) arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures re-
quired by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
Case: 22-2003 Document: 38 Page: 5 Filed: 12/20/2023
TORRES v. DHS 5
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” Sistek v. Dep’t of
Veterans Affs.,
955 F.3d 948, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting
§ 7703(c)). We review legal decisions de novo and findings
of fact for substantial evidence. Salmon v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
663 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Bolton v. MSPB,
154
F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Substantial evidence
means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Simpson v.
Off. of Pers. Mgmt.,
347 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938)).
III
Although Mr. Torres argues that the arbitrator’s deci-
sion was an abuse of discretion, we review the arbitrator’s
findings of facts for substantial evidence. See Sistek, 955
F.3d at 953. The MSPB has articulated twelve factors—the
Douglas factors—to be considered when determining the
reasonableness of a penalty imposed against a federal em-
ployee. See Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305–06. Mr. Torres con-
tends that the arbitrator incorrectly assessed those factors
in determining whether the penalty DHS imposed upon
Mr. Torres was appropriate. We agree.
Specifically, Mr. Torres argues that there was not sub-
stantial evidence to support the arbitrator’s decision that
Douglas factors 6 and 10 weighed against him. Under
Douglas factor 6, the arbitrator examined the “consistency
of the penalty with those imposed upon other employees for
the same or similar offenses.” Id. at 305. Before providing
his analysis, the arbitrator found the deciding official’s re-
view of this factor to be too limited. Thus, the arbitrator
broadened his examination by considering the four compar-
ator discipline cases presented by Mr. Torres. See J.A. 77;
J.A 111–33. The arbitrator concluded Mr. Torres failed to
meet his burden to first show sufficient similarity between
the nature of the misconduct and other factors to establish
disparate treatment. J.A. 17. But, each of the four
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6 TORRES v. DHS
comparator discipline cases involved a law enforcement of-
ficer’s misrepresentations to ICE and are relevant to Mr.
Torres’ discipline. See J.A 111–33.
One comparator discipline case, which the arbitrator
stated was the “most similar” to Mr. Torres’s misconduct,
involved a GS-13 Criminal Investigator and Special Agent
who was given a 14-day suspension for three specifications
of “making misstatements or misrepresentation” and two
specifications of “absence without leave.” J.A. 112. In that
case, the investigator was absent from work on May 15,
2017, and the morning of May 16, 2017. J.A. 116. When
questioned, the employee stated he was working surveil-
lance on May 15, 2017, despite being at home. Id. He also
indicated he had driven a government-owned vehicle
through an E-Z pass toll that same day, but later admitted
he did not. Id.
Mr. Torres argues that the arbitrator unreasonably re-
jected this comparator case, since it involved misrepresen-
tations and absence without leave “under circumstances
objectively far more serious” than Mr. Torres’s case. Appel-
lant’s Br. at 28–33. Yet, the arbitrator attempted to distin-
guish the case by stating that that there was “no evidence
that the agency in that case relied on Giglio-impairment, a
critical aggravating factor in [Torres’s] case.” J.A. 17. Gi-
glio v. United States requires a law enforcement officer tes-
tifying against a defendant to disclose their own prior
misconduct to allow the jury to determine the credibility of
the law enforcement officer’s testimony. See
405 U.S. 150,
154–55 (1972). A Giglio-impaired officer is a law enforce-
ment officer who would be required to make such a disclo-
sure to a jury when testifying in a trial.
Id.
While Mr. Torres may now be considered Giglio-im-
paired, the arbitrator did not discuss any evidence as to
why Mr. Torres’s potential Giglio impairment warranted a
different disciplinary finding from other ICE law enforce-
ment officers under Douglas factor 6, especially when other
Case: 22-2003 Document: 38 Page: 7 Filed: 12/20/2023
TORRES v. DHS 7
Giglio-impaired officers in similar circumstances have only
been suspended. See J.A. 112–19. Giglio impairment can
be a basis for removal of law enforcement officers, particu-
larly ones who routinely testify as part of their official du-
ties, but the government has not suggested that Giglio
impairment must aways result in removal. Nor could it,
since there is evidence on the record here of other similarly
impaired agents that were not removed.
In particular, the arbitrator never explained why an
ICE special agent with law enforcement duties would not
be Giglio-impaired while Mr. Torres, another ICE law en-
forcement agent, would be. And the agency’s apparent de-
cision not to rely on Giglio impairment in the comparator
discipline case is insufficient alone to render it non-similar.
The agency is not entitled to selectively choose when to rely
on Giglio impairment without further explanation.
Here, the arbitrator failed to consider whether Mr.
Torres is even routinely required to testify in court. Alt-
hough his position description includes testifying in court,
it does not appear that the actual duties performed by Mr.
Torres as a Deportation Officer involve regularly testifying.
Thus, the arbitrator should have provided a more fulsome
review, including a presentation of substantial evidence, to
justify his determination that Douglas factor 6 weighed
against Mr. Torres. J.A. 83, 91.
Moving to Douglas factor 10, the arbitrator examined
the “potential for the employee’s rehabilitation.” 5 M.S.P.R.
at 305. In a single paragraph, the arbitrator concluded that
Mr. Torres “had no potential for rehabilitation, in light of
the seriousness of the falsification misconduct.” J.A. 18.
But as Mr. Torres noted, on at least one separate occasion,
DHS imposed only a 14-day suspension on a DHS law en-
forcement officer who had committed the same category of
offenses as Mr. Torres: making misstatements or misrep-
resentations and being absent without official leave. See
J.A. 112–19. While the arbitrator cursorily discussed the
Case: 22-2003 Document: 38 Page: 8 Filed: 12/20/2023
8 TORRES v. DHS
issue of Mr. Torres’s potential Giglio impairment when
considering Douglas factor 6, he did not explain why Mr.
Torres, under Douglas factor 10, is beyond rehabilitation
when Mr. Torres presented cases where potentially Giglio-
impaired law enforcement officers with similar offenses re-
mained in federal service. Accordingly, the arbitrator did
not provide substantial evidence to support why Mr. Torres
had no potential for rehabilitation and, therefore, whether
the penalty should be mitigated.
While no Douglas factor is necessarily dispositive in
considering the penalty applied to a federal employee, our
court requires that Douglas factors significant to the case
be reviewed thoroughly. See Malloy v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
578 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (vacating and remanding an
MSPB decision because mental health impairments were
not discussed when analyzing Douglas factor 11). Here,
Douglas factors 6 and 10 are significant because they high-
light similar comparator discipline cases and examine
whether Mr. Torres could be rehabilitated to return to his
duties despite possibly being Giglio-impaired. Accordingly,
we vacate the decision of the arbitrator and remand for the
arbitrator to consider Mr. Torres’s evidence that his im-
posed discipline is inconsistent with similarly situated fed-
eral employees and that his rehabilitation is possible by
reapplying the Douglas factors
IV
We have considered the rest of the parties’ arguments
and find them unpersuasive. We therefore vacate the arbi-
trator’s decision and remand for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
COSTS
Costs to petitioner.
