Heinzelman v. Secretary of Health & Human Services , 681 F.3d 1374 ( 2012 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    STACEY HEINZELMAN,
    Petitioner-Appellee,
    v.
    SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
    SERVICES,
    Respondent-Appellant.
    __________________________
    2011-5127
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal
    Claims in case no. 07-VV-001, Judge Edward J. Damich
    _________________________
    Decided: June 13, 2012
    _________________________
    RICHARD GAGE, Richard Gage, P.C., of Cheyenne,
    Wyoming, argued for petitioner-appellee.
    LINDSEY POWELL, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litiga-
    tion Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of
    Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent-
    appellant. With her on the brief were TONY WEST, Assis-
    tant Attorney General, and THOMAS M. BONDY.
    __________________________
    Before BRYSON, PROST, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.
    HEINZELMAN   v. HHS                                       2
    O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.
    This case involves a dispute over the amount of com-
    pensation Petitioner Stacey Heinzelman (“Heinzelman”)
    is entitled to receive under the National Childhood Vac-
    cine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34
    (“Vaccine Act”). The Secretary of Health and Human
    Services (“the government”) appeals the final decision of
    the United States Court of Federal Claims, which af-
    firmed the special master’s decision that Petitioner’s
    compensation under the Vaccine Act should not be re-
    duced by the amount of benefits she is eligible to receive
    through Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”).
    See Heinzelman v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
    98 Fed. Cl. 808
     (2011); Heinzelman v. Sec’y of Health &
    Human Servs., No. 07-01V, 
    2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 333
    (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 18, 2010). Because we agree
    that SSDI benefits should not be taken into account in
    calculating Heinzelman’s “actual or anticipated loss of
    earnings” under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A), and that
    SSDI does not fall within any of the categories of author-
    ized offsets under § 300aa-15(g), we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Heinzelman was born in 1971. On December 10,
    2003, she received a flu vaccine, and within thirty days
    thereafter she was hospitalized for Guillain-Barre syn-
    drome (“GBS”) – a disorder affecting the peripheral nerv-
    ous system.
    Before Heinzelman developed GBS, she was employed
    full-time as a hairstylist earning $49,888 per year. At
    this stage in the proceedings, it is undisputed that, due to
    her injury, Heinzelman: (1) will never be able to work
    again; and (2) is eligible to receive SSDI benefits of ap-
    proximately $20,000 per year.
    3                                       HEINZELMAN   v. HHS
    On January 3, 2007, Heinzelman filed a petition for
    compensation under the Vaccine Act alleging that the flu
    vaccine caused her to develop GBS. In a December 2008
    decision, the special master found that Heinzelman
    proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the flu
    vaccine caused her injury and that she was entitled to
    compensation. Heinzelman v. Sec’y of Health & Human
    Servs., No. 07-01V, 
    2008 U.S. Claims LEXIS 434
    , *53-56
    (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 11, 2008). That decision is not
    at issue on appeal.
    In May 2010, the special master issued a separate rul-
    ing regarding the amount of compensation to which
    Heinzelman is entitled. In that decision, the special
    master rejected the government’s argument that
    Heinzelman’s eligibility for SSDI benefits should be
    considered in determining her compensation under the
    Vaccine Act. Specifically, the special master found that:
    (1) Heinzelman’s anticipated SSDI income should not be
    taken into consideration in calculating her “actual or
    anticipated loss of earnings” under § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A);
    and (2) SSDI is not a “federal . . . health benefits pro-
    gram” within the meaning of § 300aa-15(g), and therefore
    her compensation should not be offset based on her eligi-
    bility for SSDI benefits.
    On December 7, 2010, the special master entered final
    judgment awarding Heinzelman $1,133,046.08, plus an
    annuity to cover future medical expenses. Of the lump
    sum awarded, $900,000 was to compensate Heinzelman
    for her lost earnings. According to the government,
    Heinzelman’s lost earnings award would have been
    roughly $316,000 less had the special master taken her
    anticipated SSDI benefits into account.
    The government moved the Court of Federal Claims
    to review the special master’s final judgment awarding
    HEINZELMAN   v. HHS                                      4
    damages, which incorporated both the December 2008
    decision granting compensation under the Vaccine Act,
    and the May 2010 ruling regarding offset. In June 2011,
    the Court of Federal Claims affirmed the special master’s
    decisions in their entirety. In relevant part, the court
    agreed that SSDI benefits should not be taken into ac-
    count in determining Heinzelman’s compensation under
    § 300aa-15. The government timely appealed that issue
    to this court, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 42
    U.S.C. § 300aa-12(f).
    DISCUSSION
    The sole question on appeal is whether a petitioner’s
    compensation under the Vaccine Act should be reduced by
    the amount of SSDI benefits she is eligible to receive.
    Resolution of this question involves the interpretation and
    interplay between two provisions of the Vaccine Act:
    § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A) – which provides compensation for
    lost earning capacity – and § 300aa-15(g) – which offsets
    the compensation award where the petitioner is expected
    to receive payments under certain other programs. Be-
    cause statutory interpretation is a question of law, we
    review the trial court’s determination de novo. Aull v.
    Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
    462 F.3d 1338
    , 1342
    (Fed. Cir. 2006).
    Where, as here, the petitioner has suffered a vaccine-
    related injury after attaining the age of eighteen, and her
    earning capacity is impaired by that injury, her compen-
    sation under the Vaccine Act includes “compensation for
    actual and anticipated loss of earnings determined in
    accordance with generally recognized actuarial principles
    and projections.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A). The Act
    provides, however, that the Vaccine Program is “not
    primarily liable,” and that an award under the Vaccine
    Act is offset to the extent the petitioner is entitled to
    5                                       HEINZELMAN   v. HHS
    receive payments from certain specified programs. Spe-
    cifically, § 15(g) provides that:
    Payment of compensation under the Program
    shall not be made for any item or service to the
    extent that payment has been made, or can rea-
    sonably be expected to be made, with respect to
    such item or service (1) under any State compen-
    sation program, under an insurance policy, or un-
    der any Federal or State health benefits program
    (other than under title XIX of the Social Security
    Act [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.]) [Medicaid], 1 or (2)
    by an entity which provides health services on a
    prepaid basis.
    42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(g).
    On appeal, the government argues that the special
    master and the Court of Federal Claims erred in conclud-
    ing that SSDI benefits should not be considered in deter-
    mining compensation under the Vaccine Act. Specifically,
    the government argues that Heinzelman’s eligibility for
    SSDI benefits should have been considered either as part
    of the “lost earnings” calculation under § 300aa-
    15(a)(3)(A) or as an offset under § 15(g). In the alterna-
    tive, the government argues that § 300aa-15 of the Vac-
    cine Act is ambiguous, and that principles of sovereign
    1    The exception “(other than under title XIX of the
    Social Security Act),” i.e. Medicaid, was added to § 15(g)
    in 1989. Congress added this language to “specify that
    Medicaid is to be considered a second payor for health
    care costs to the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust
    Fund. Medicaid serves as a second payor to all other
    sources of payment for health care, including private
    litigation, and the compensation program is amended to
    follow that precedent.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-386, at 517
    (1989) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3018,
    3120.
    HEINZELMAN   v. HHS                                        6
    immunity weigh against exposing the federal government
    to further liability.
    In response, Heinzelman argues that: (1) § 300aa-
    15(a)(3)(A) does not authorize offsets to a petitioner’s lost
    wages award; (2) Congress did not include SSDI as one of
    the specifically enumerated offsets in § 15(g); and (3) the
    plain language of the Vaccine Act is unambiguous, such
    that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not compel a
    reading of the Act which is sympathetic to the govern-
    ment’s views. For the reasons explained below, we agree
    with Heinzelman on each point.
    A. Section 15(a)(3)(A)
    As noted, when certain qualifications are satisfied,
    § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A) authorizes “compensation for actual
    and anticipated loss of earnings.”         The question of
    whether “lost earnings” requires a deduction for SSDI
    benefits is a question of statutory interpretation, and our
    analysis begins with the language of the statute.
    Youngblood v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
    32 F.3d 552
    , 554 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
    Inc., 
    486 U.S. 281
    , 291 (1988)). When interpreting a
    statute, however, the court “must look not only at the
    particular statutory provision in question, but also at the
    language and design of the statute as a whole.” 
    Id.
     (citing
    K Mart Corp., 
    486 U.S. at 291
    ). It is a well-settled princi-
    ple of statutory interpretation that a “statute is to be
    construed in a way which gives meaning and effect to all
    of its parts.” Saunders v. Sec’y of Health & Human
    Servs., 
    25 F.3d 1031
    , 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing United
    States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 
    503 U.S. 30
    , 36 (1992) (noting
    the “settled rule that a statute must, if possible, be con-
    strued in such fashion that every word has some operative
    effect”)).
    7                                         HEINZELMAN   v. HHS
    Here, the Court of Federal Claims began its analysis
    by noting that “loss of earnings” is not defined in the
    statute. The court looked to Black’s Law Dictionary,
    which defines “earnings” as “[r]evenue gained from labor
    or services, from the investment of capital, or from as-
    sets.” Heinzelman, 98 Fed. Cl. at 816 (quoting Black’s
    Law Dictionary 548 (9th ed. 2009)). Using this definition,
    the court found that the starting point for the lost earn-
    ings calculation “is the amount of earnings during the
    past, present, and/or future loss periods.” Id.
    Looking to the relationship between § 300aa-
    15(a)(3)(A) and § 300aa-15(g), the Court of Federal Claims
    agreed with the special master that § 15(a) authorizes
    compensation, while § 15(g) takes it away in certain
    situations. Specifically, the court found that: (1) the focus
    of § 15(a)(3)(A) “is to establish a baseline for compensa-
    tion: earnings not earned because of the vaccine injury”;
    and (2) “SSDI provides a degree of mitigation of lost
    earnings, but does not change the calculation thereof.” Id.
    Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that
    Heinzelman’s SSDI benefits “should not be considered in
    the first instance” when calculating her “lost earnings”
    under § 15(a)(3)(A). 2 Id. at 817.
    2   The Court of Federal Claims also pointed to lan-
    guage in the legislative history providing that: “The
    Committee does not intend that the award be reduced
    because of other government benefits for which the in-
    jured person might be eligible.” Heinzelman, 98 Fed. Cl.
    at 817 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 908, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
    1986, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6362). As the
    government argues, however, this language is inapplica-
    ble as it appears to relate solely to awards for children
    injured by vaccines, and there is a specific formula for
    calculating lost earnings for children because they lack
    any meaningful work history.
    HEINZELMAN   v. HHS                                        8
    On appeal, the government argues that SSDI income
    must be considered in calculating Heinzelman’s “actual
    and anticipated loss of earnings” under § 15(a)(3)(A)
    because she “suffers no such loss to the extent that SSDI
    income received for the vaccine-related injury would
    substitute for income that [she] would otherwise have
    received from an employer.” Appellant’s Br. 13. Because
    Heinzelman previously earned $49,888 per year and is
    eligible for $20,412 per year in SSDI, the government
    claims that she has an anticipated loss of earnings of only
    $29,476 per year. According to the government, this
    interpretation is consistent with the Vaccine Act’s goal of
    placing petitioners in the position they would have been,
    but for the injury.
    In support of its position, the government relies pri-
    marily on a special master’s decision: Jelly v. Secretary of
    Health & Human Services, No. 94-646V, 
    1998 U.S. Claims LEXIS 87
     (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 6, 1998). 3 In Jelly,
    the special master addressed whether, in calculating the
    3    The government also cites Zatuchni v. Secretary of
    Health & Human Services, No. 94-58V, 
    2006 U.S. Claims LEXIS 127
     (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 10, 2006) and Ireton
    v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, No. 90-3975V,
    
    1994 U.S. Claims LEXIS 168
     (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug.
    11, 1994) – neither of which is particularly helpful to its
    position on this point. For example, in Zatuchni, the
    government argued that the petitioner’s lost earnings
    under § 15(a)(3)(A) needed to be adjusted for income
    taxes, employment taxes, and SSDI payments petitioner
    received because she was unable to work. 
    2006 U.S. Claims LEXIS 127
    , at *20-21. Because the petitioner
    “agreed that such adjustments must be made,” the issue
    was never adjudicated. Id. at *21. Accordingly, Zatuchni
    – which was a special master’s decision – is of little proba-
    tive value here. The government’s reliance on Ireton is
    misplaced because, as discussed below, that case refers to
    § 15(g).
    9                                        HEINZELMAN   v. HHS
    petitioner’s “lost earnings” under § 300aa-15(a)(3), he
    should reduce the petitioner’s gross earnings by the
    amount of taxes she likely would have paid had she
    received those earnings. 
    1998 U.S. Claims LEXIS 87
    , at
    *3. At the outset, the special master stated that “the
    obvious purpose of an award for ‘lost earnings’ under the
    Program is to put the petitioner in the same financial
    situation where she would have been ‘but for’ the vaccine-
    caused injury.” Id. at *5. Given this purpose, the special
    master noted that the tax reduction seemed “conceptually
    appropriate, in order to ensure that petitioner will receive
    only those amounts that she would have actually received
    had she been able to work.” Id. at *5-6. After reviewing
    the statutory context, the special master concluded that,
    “when an award for lost earnings is made under § 300aa-
    15(a)(3)(A) . . . only ‘after-tax’ lost earnings should be
    awarded.” Id. at *17.
    According to the government, “[j]ust as taxes must be
    taken into account in determining the amount of a peti-
    tioner’s lost wages, so must substitute income be consid-
    ered.” Appellant’s Reply 4. To the contrary, although this
    court has recognized that it is appropriate to deduct
    federal and state income taxes when “determining a lost
    earnings award under the Vaccine Act” – see Euken v.
    Secretary of Health & Human Services, 
    34 F.3d 1045
    ,
    1048 (Fed. Cir. 1994) – it does not follow that SSDI bene-
    fits should likewise be deducted. Indeed, nothing in the
    statute supports equating the two.
    First, in calculating “lost earnings,” it makes sense to
    consider net rather than gross earnings, since the amount
    received at any given point in an earnings history would
    necessarily be less taxes owed or deducted. This is consis-
    tent with the “generally recognized actuarial principles”
    incorporated into § 15(a)(3)(A). SSDI is not something
    which is netted out so as to reflect actual earnings, how-
    HEINZELMAN   v. HHS                                       10
    ever; it is a compensatory figure designed to compensate
    for a loss of actual earnings. Thus, if SSDI is to be con-
    sidered at all it would need to be characterized as an
    offset to earnings, an offset which would be deducted
    under § 15(g).
    Looking to the overall structure of the Vaccine Act, we
    agree with the special master and the Court of Federal
    Claims that § 15(a) gives compensation while § 15(g)
    provides for offsets where compensation is made via one of
    the enumerated programs. This reading flows from the
    text and structure of the statute, and is consistent with
    the underlying purpose of the Vaccine Act, which is “to
    provide compensatory damages for vaccine-related inju-
    ries.” Saunders, 
    25 F.3d at 1035
    .
    Treating SSDI payments as a deduction under § 15(a)
    is inconsistent with the well-established principle that we
    must “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a
    statute and should avoid rendering any of the statutory
    text meaningless or as mere surplusage.” Sharp v. United
    States, 
    580 F.3d 1234
    , 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting
    Duncan v. Walker, 
    533 U.S. 167
    , 174 (2001) (internal
    quotation marks omitted)). If, as the government argues,
    compensation program payments are factored into the lost
    earning calculation under § 15(a)(3)(A), then there would
    be no need for a separate provision – § 15(g) – that spe-
    cifically identifies the types of offsets that reduce the
    amount of compensation recoverable under the Vaccine
    Act. We are also mindful that we should “avoid constru-
    ing a statute in a way which yields an absurd result.”
    Hellebrand v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
    999 F.2d 1565
    , 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The government’s position
    is at odds with this principle, and we decline to adopt an
    approach that would have payments under certain com-
    pensation programs reduce the amount of lost earnings
    under § 15(a)(3)(A), while others – such as state workers’
    11                                       HEINZELMAN   v. HHS
    compensation program awards – are deducted under
    § 15(g). Simply, there is no textual support for the gov-
    ernment’s position that SSDI payments should reduce
    Heinzelman’s lost earnings compensation under
    § 15(a)(3)(A).
    Finally, the government argues that the legislative
    history supports its position that § 300-15(a)(3)(A) should
    take into account SSDI benefits. Specifically, the gov-
    ernment points to the following language in the legisla-
    tive history: “[p]ayment of compensation is not to be made
    for items or services for which payment has been made or
    can be expected to be made by other public or private
    entities.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-908, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
    (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6363. The
    government omits the very next sentence, however, which
    states: “Thus, if an insurance program or a health main-
    tenance organization pays or is obligated to pay for health
    care services, the Program is not to pay for these same
    services.” Id. In other words, closer review of the portion
    of the legislative history cited reveals that it does not
    specifically address lost earnings under § 15(a)(3)(A), and
    instead is geared towards the types of insurance programs
    and health maintenance organizations discussed under
    § 15(g). Accordingly, the legislative history does not alter
    our reading of the plain language of the statute. See
    Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 
    894 F.2d 392
    , 396
    (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that, where the “statutory lan-
    guage is unambiguous, we consider the legislative history
    of the Act, but only to determine whether a clear intent
    contrary to the plain meaning exists”).
    Because neither the text of the Vaccine Act nor the
    legislative history suggests that SSDI benefits should be
    deducted from a lost earning calculation under
    § 15(a)(3)(A), we agree with the Court of Federal Claims
    that Heinzelman’s eligibility for SSDI benefits should not
    HEINZELMAN   v. HHS                                        12
    be considered when deciding her “loss of earnings” under
    that provision.
    B. Section 15(g)
    Given our conclusion that SSDI benefits do not reduce
    the amount of lost earnings under § 15(a), we turn our
    attention to § 15(g), which enumerates when a petitioner
    is not entitled to compensation under the Vaccine Pro-
    gram because certain other programs provide compensa-
    tion. In relevant part, the statute requires an offset for
    payments made “under any State compensation program,
    under an insurance policy, or under any Federal or State
    health benefits program” other than Medicaid. § 300aa-
    15(g). 4 It is undisputed that the offset provision in § 15(g)
    only applies here if SSDI benefits qualify as a “Federal . . .
    health benefits program.” See Oral Argument at 5:20,
    available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-
    recordings/2011-5127/all (“I do believe that is the only
    category that federal social security disability insurance
    benefits would fall into.”). 5
    4   The statute provides, in part, that “[p]ayment of
    compensation under the Program shall not be made for
    any item or service” to the extent it has been made “under
    any State compensation program, under an insurance
    policy, or under any Federal or State health benefits
    program.” § 300aa-15(g) (emphasis added). When asked
    at oral argument whether wages are included within the
    reference to “any item or service,” counsel for the govern-
    ment responded: “Yes your honor. I do believe that the
    item or service language is broad enough to include the
    benefit at issue here.” Oral Argument at 1:50, available
    at             http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-
    recordings/2011-5127/all. Accordingly, the government
    waived any argument that lost wages do not qualify as an
    “item or service” under § 15(g).
    5   At oral argument, counsel further indicated that
    the government “is not taking the position that SSDI . . .
    13                                        HEINZELMAN   v. HHS
    The Court of Federal Claims affirmed the special
    master’s decision that SSDI does not qualify as a “Federal
    . . . health benefits program.” Specifically, the court found
    that: (1) SSDI is not a health benefits program “simply
    because it requires an applicant to have a physical dis-
    ability”; (2) unlike Medicare, “SSDI does not provide
    applicants with health insurance benefits”; (3) SSDI
    compensates applicants for loss of income since they are
    disabled and no longer able to work; and (4) “SSDI does
    not necessarily pay for an applicant’s medical expenses.”
    Heinzelman, 98 Fed. Cl. at 817. The court further noted
    that, just because § 15(g) exempts one Title of the Social
    Security Act – Medicaid – “does not mean that all other
    Titles should be considered ‘Federal . . . health benefits
    program’ offsets.” Id. Accordingly, the court agreed with
    the special master that Heinzelman’s SSDI payments
    should not offset the compensation she is entitled to
    receive under § 15(a).
    On appeal, the government contends that SSDI is a
    “Federal . . . health benefits program” because it is related
    to an individual’s health status. In particular, the gov-
    ernment argues that: (1) Congress acknowledged a rela-
    tionship between SSDI and health status, since an
    individual becomes eligible to receive Medicare benefits
    after twenty-four months of eligibility for SSDI benefits;
    and (2) the “Court of Federal Claims’ narrow reading of
    the phrase ‘health benefits program’ is . . . inconsistent
    with the principle that the Vaccine Program is generally a
    secondary payer.” Appellant’s Br. 19. The government’s
    arguments are not well-taken.
    As the Court of Federal Claims recognized, “SSDI is
    not a ‘Federal . . . health benefits program’ simply because
    comes under the rubric of an insurance policy under (g).”
    See Oral Argument at 21:22.
    HEINZELMAN   v. HHS                                         14
    it requires an applicant to have a physical disability.”
    Heinzelman, 98 Fed. Cl. at 817. This is particularly true
    given the nature of SSDI benefits. Although payment of
    SSDI benefits is predicated on the existence of a medical
    disability, SSDI compensation is unlike Medicare, Medi-
    caid, or other “health benefits,” in that it is paid to benefi-
    ciaries as compensation for their inability to earn income.
    The amount of compensation is based on the applicant’s
    earning history – not on the severity of her underlying
    medical condition. See Heinzelman, 
    2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 333
    , at *4 (“Based upon Ms. Heinzelman’s earning
    history, the amount of SSDI payment for which Ms.
    Heinzelman is eligible is $1,701 per month.”). And, the
    fact that a person becomes eligible for Medicare after
    twenty-four months of SSDI eligibility actually cuts
    against the government’s position, because it suggests
    that there are two separate programs: Medicare for health
    insurance and SSDI for compensation.
    According to the government, Vaccine Program
    awards have consistently “been offset based on a peti-
    tioner’s eligibility for other government benefits.” Appel-
    lant’s Br. 19-20.         To support this argument, the
    government directs our attention to Ireton v. Secretary of
    Health & Human Services, No. 90-3975V, 
    1994 U.S. Claims LEXIS 168
     (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 11, 1994),
    which is readily distinguishable on its facts.6
    6   The government also points to Metzger v. Secre-
    tary of Health & Human Services, No. 89-74, 
    1990 U.S. Cl. Ct. LEXIS 248
     (Cl. Ct. Spec. Mstr. June 15, 1990). In
    Metzger, there was evidence that the petitioner would be
    entitled to receive monthly Social Security Disabled Adult
    Child’s benefits which would “cover the costs of food,
    lodging and other basic living expenses.” Id. at *29. To
    avoid double recovery, the special master reduced the
    petitioner’s amount of residential placement benefits
    15                                        HEINZELMAN   v. HHS
    Although it appears that the government cites Ireton
    as an example of a case in which a special master offset a
    Vaccine award due to eligibility for workers’ compensa-
    tion, careful review of the decision reveals that it was
    focused primarily on a separate issue: whether the peti-
    tioner was entitled to assert a Vaccine Act claim where
    she previously filed a claim for benefits in a specialized
    workers’ compensation tribunal. See Ireton, 
    1994 U.S. Claims LEXIS 168
    , at *7. The special master concluded
    that the petitioner’s previous workers’ compensation filing
    did not qualify as a “civil action,” and thus did not pre-
    clude her from asserting a claim under the Vaccine Act.
    
    Id.
     As additional support for his decision, the special
    master noted that “any benefits that a petitioner has
    gained from a workers’ compensation system will simply
    act as an ‘offset’ to reduce the amount of the Program
    award.” Id. at *25.
    The government’s reliance on Ireton is misplaced.
    Unlike SSDI benefits, which are not included in § 15(g),
    workers’ compensation is a “State compensation program”
    which is specifically identified as an offset in the statute.
    Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for the government
    agreed that workers’ compensation is a “State compensa-
    tion program” under § 15(g). See Oral Argument at 15:07.
    Although there is some force to the government’s ar-
    gument that the Vaccine Program is generally a secon-
    under the Vaccine Act by the amount of residential bene-
    fits he would receive in Disabled Adult Child’s benefits.
    Id. That case – which is not binding on this court – is not
    particularly helpful here because: (1) residential place-
    ment benefits are governed by § 15(a)(1) rather than
    § 15(a)(3), and do not involve compensation for lost in-
    come; and (2) the special master did not explain the
    analysis under § 15(g).
    HEINZELMAN   v. HHS                                     16
    dary payor, we find that this general principle is insuffi-
    cient to overcome the lack of textual support for the
    government’s position in this appeal. Looking to the
    language of § 15(g), Congress specifically enumerated the
    types of funding sources that would offset compensation
    awards. In relevant part, Congress included payments
    under a “State compensation program” or “any Federal or
    State health benefits program.” If Congress had wanted
    to include SSDI benefits as an offset under § 15(g), it
    could have done so.
    For example, because SSDI benefits are compensatory
    in nature, Congress could have said that payments under
    “any Federal or State compensation program” reduce the
    amount of compensation under the Vaccine Program.
    Congress chose, however, to use only the word “State” –
    not “Federal.” It is well-established that, “[w]here Con-
    gress includes particular language in one section of a
    statute but omits it in another . . ., it is generally pre-
    sumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
    the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Keene Corp. v.
    United States, 
    508 U.S. 200
    , 208 (1993) (quoting Russello
    v. United States, 
    464 U.S. 16
    , 23 (1983)). While Congress
    certainly knew how to include both state and federal
    programs when it wanted to, as it used the phrase “Fed-
    eral or State health benefits program” later in the same
    provision, it declined to do so with respect to compensa-
    tion programs. See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo
    Nordisk A/S, 
    132 S. Ct. 1670
    , 1682 (2012) (“So if we
    needed any proof that Congress knew how to say ‘not any’
    when it meant ‘not any,’ here we find it.”); see also Bohac
    v. Dep’t of Agric., 
    239 F.3d 1334
    , 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
    (“This comparison illustrates that Congress knows how to
    provide damages for non-pecuniary losses, including pain
    and suffering, when it so desires.”).
    17                                       HEINZELMAN   v. HHS
    Based on the foregoing, we agree with the Court of
    Federal Claims that SSDI does not constitute a “Federal .
    . . health benefits program” under § 15(g). While we
    recognize that § 15(g) was designed to avoid overcompen-
    sation in certain circumstances where payments are made
    from other programs, we decline to read offsets into the
    statutory text that were not specifically included therein.
    Because nothing in the statute provides that SSDI bene-
    fits should be deducted from a compensation award under
    the Vaccine Act, we conclude that Heinzelman’s antici-
    pated SSDI payments should not offset the compensation
    she was granted under § 15(a).
    C. Sovereign Immunity
    In the alternative, the government argues that the
    Vaccine Act is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity
    such that, if the meaning of § 300aa-15 is unclear, it
    should be construed narrowly to limit the government’s
    waiver of immunity. See United States v. Nordic Vill.,
    Inc., 
    503 U.S. 30
    , 34 (1992) (“[T]he Government’s consent
    to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the
    sovereign . . . and not enlarged . . . beyond what the
    language requires . . .” (citation and internal quotations
    omitted)). Both the special master and the Court of
    Federal Claims found that, because there is no ambiguity
    in the statute, the doctrine of sovereign immunity does
    not apply. We agree.
    Because the plain language of the statute reveals that
    Congress did not include SSDI benefits as an offset to
    compensation under the Vaccine Act, resort to sovereign
    immunity principles is neither necessary nor proper. See
    Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 
    553 U.S. 571
    , 590 (2008)
    (“There is no need for us to resort to the sovereign immu-
    nity canon because there is no ambiguity left for us to
    construe.”); see also Zatuchni v. Sec’y of Health & Human
    HEINZELMAN   v. HHS                                    18
    Servs., 
    516 F.3d 1312
    , 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[W]e do not
    find that the government has offered a ‘plausible’ reading
    of the statute . . . as endorsement of its position would
    require us to ignore what we see as the plain reading of
    42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a) and (b) . . . . The doctrine of
    sovereign immunity does not require such a result.”
    (citation omitted)). Accordingly, the government’s reli-
    ance on the doctrine of sovereign immunity is misplaced.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, and because we find that
    the government’s remaining arguments are without
    merit, the final judgment of the Court of Federal Claims
    is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED