Canuto v. United States , 673 F. App'x 982 ( 2016 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    TERESITA A. CANUTO,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2016-2299
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal
    Claims in No. 1:16-cv-00414-NBF, Senior Judge Nancy B.
    Firestone.
    ______________________
    Decided: December 12, 2016
    ______________________
    TERESITA A. CANUTO, Northridge, CA, pro se.
    KRISTIN MCGRORY, Commercial Litigation Branch,
    Civil Division, United States Department of Justice,
    Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented
    by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,
    DEBORAH A. BYNUM.
    ______________________
    Before DYK, CLEVENGER, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
    2                                              CANUTO   v. US
    PER CURIAM.
    The Court of Federal Claims dismissed Teresita Ca-
    nuto’s claims for lack of subject of matter jurisdiction. We
    affirm the dismissal, along with the Court of Federal
    Claims’ denial of Ms. Canuto’s motion to amend her
    complaint as moot.
    BACKGROUND
    Ms. Canuto brings this suit against the United States.
    She alleges that, on numerous occasions, members of the
    U.S. military broke into her apartment, released sleeping
    gas to incapacitate her and her family, and sexually
    assaulted her. Ms. Canuto alleges that the perpetrators
    were acting under orders from the Office of the President.
    She seeks compensatory and punitive damages for the
    alleged assaults.
    This is the third suit Ms. Canuto has filed in the
    Court of Federal Claims making largely the same allega-
    tions of assault. In both prior cases, the Court of Federal
    Claims dismissed Ms. Canuto’s complaints for lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction, and this court affirmed each of
    those dismissals. See Canuto v. United States, 651 F.
    App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Canuto v. United States, 615
    F. App’x 951 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
    Ms. Canuto filed her complaint in the present case on
    April 1, 2016. She filed a motion to amend her complaint
    to include additional allegations of abuse on April 15,
    2016. The Court of Federal Claims sua sponte dismissed
    Ms. Canuto’s claims on May 4, 2016, finding a lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Federal Claims
    also denied Ms. Canuto’s motion to amend as moot. Ms.
    Canuto appeals the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal.
    We have jurisdiction to review the Court of Federal
    Claims’ rulings under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(3).
    CANUTO   v. US                                           3
    DISCUSSION
    A
    The Tucker Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
    (a)(1), “confers juris-
    diction upon the Court of Federal Claims over the speci-
    fied categories of actions brought against the United
    States.” Fisher v. United States, 
    402 F.3d 1167
    , 1172
    (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc portion). The categories are
    those “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
    Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or
    upon any express or implied contract with the United
    States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases
    not sounding in tort.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
    (a)(1).
    The Tucker Act does not, however, create a substan-
    tive cause of action. “[A] plaintiff must identify a sepa-
    rate source of substantive law that creates the right to
    money damages.” Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1172. “That source
    must be ‘money-mandating.’ ” Metz v. United States, 
    466 F.3d 991
    , 996 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Fisher, 402 F.3d at
    1172 (en banc portion)).
    Ms. Canuto’s complaint cites to a several sources of
    law as supporting her claims: the Posse Comitatus Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1385
    ; the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
    1970, 29 U.S.C § 651; 
    10 U.S.C. § 375
     (relating to regula-
    tions for preventing the use of the military for domestic
    law enforcement); the Telephone Records and Privacy
    Protection Act of 2006, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1039
    ; the Privacy Act
    of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 2679
    ; 
    10 U.S.C. § 939
     (relating to procedures for
    addressing property damage claims under Uniform Code
    of Military Justice); the Military Claims Act, 
    10 U.S.C. § 2733
    ; the Civil Rights Act, 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
    ; and various
    sections of Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution.
    The Court of Federal Claims found that none of the
    cited sources of law fit within the Tucker Act’s jurisdic-
    tional grant. Without addressing whether Ms. Canuto
    4                                             CANUTO   v. US
    satisfactorily alleged facts to state a claim under these
    various regulations, we agree that the Court of Federal
    Claims may not hear her claims.
    First, Ms. Canuto’s claims seeking damages for “re-
    peated assault . . . and battery,” are, at their core, tort
    claims. See Complaint at 1. The Tucker Act specifically
    excludes claims “sounding in tort” from the Court of
    Federal Claims’ jurisdiction. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
    (a)(1).
    Second, Congress has conferred to the district courts
    exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to the
    Federal Tort Claims Act, see 
    28 U.S.C. § 1346
    (b)(1);
    Robleto v. United States, 634 F. App’x 306, 308 (Fed. Cir.
    2015), and the Civil Rights Act, see Cunningham v. Unit-
    ed States, 479 F. App’x 974, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The
    Court of Federal Claims properly refused to hear Ms.
    Canuto’s claims rooted in these statutes.
    Finally, Ms. Canuto fails to establish that any of the
    remaining sources of law are money-mandating. “Not
    every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute,
    or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker
    Act. . . . [T]he claimant must demonstrate that the source
    of substantive law he relies upon can fairly be interpreted
    as mandating compensation by the Federal Government
    for the damages sustained.” United States v. Mitchell, 
    463 U.S. 206
    , 216–17 (1983) (quotation marks omitted). Even
    pro se claimants must meet this burden of proving the
    Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction. Sanders v. United
    States, 
    252 F.3d 1329
    , 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Ms. Canuto
    has not done so.
    We agree with the Court of Federal Claims, for the
    reasons stated in the thorough opinion below, that the
    other cited statutes and Constitutional provisions are not
    money-mandating. Most of them do not contemplate or
    provide for private causes of action, let alone require the
    payment of damages. See United States v. Navajo Nation,
    
    556 U.S. 287
    , 290 (2009) (“The . . . source of law need not
    CANUTO   v. US                                           5
    explicitly provide that the right or duty it creates is en-
    forceable through a suit for damages, but it triggers
    liability only if it can fairly be interpreted as mandating
    compensation by the Federal Government.” (quotation
    marks omitted)).
    In her appeal briefs, Ms. Canuto also argues that the
    Declaration of Independence serves as protection order
    against violence, threats, and harassment, thereby
    providing the basis for the Court of Federal Claims’
    jurisdiction. Ms. Canuto waived this argument by not
    first raising it before the Court of Federal Claims. See
    San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 
    639 F.3d 1346
    ,
    1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Also, the Declaration of Inde-
    pendence is not a money-mandating source of law.
    We have considered Ms. Canuto’s remaining argu-
    ments and find them unpersuasive. Thus, for the reasons
    stated above, the Court of Federal Claims properly dis-
    missed Ms. Canuto’s complaint for a lack of subject mat-
    ter jurisdiction.
    B
    Prior to dismissal, Ms. Canuto moved to amend her
    complaint to allege additional instances of assault. The
    Court of Federal Claims denied the motion as moot after
    dismissing the case.
    The denial of Ms. Canuto’s motion to amend was not
    an abuse of discretion. See Tamerlane, Ltd. v. United
    States, 
    550 F.3d 1135
    , 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Ms. Canu-
    to’s amended allegations did not identify additional or
    alternative legal bases on which the Court of Federal
    Claims could exercise jurisdiction. As such, the motion
    was futile and properly denied. See Foman v. Davis, 
    371 U.S. 178
    , 182 (1962) (identifying “futility of amendment”
    as a basis for denying leave to amend).
    6                                         CANUTO   v. US
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of
    Ms. Canuto’s complaint and denial of the motion to
    amend as moot.
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    No Costs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2016-2299

Citation Numbers: 673 F. App'x 982

Judges: Dyk, Clevenger, Stoll

Filed Date: 12/12/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024