Estate of Hage v. United States , 685 F. App'x 927 ( 2017 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    ESTATE OF E. WAYNE HAGE AND ESTATE OF
    JEAN N. HAGE,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2016-1330
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal
    Claims in No. 1:91-cv-01470-MMS, Judge Margaret M.
    Sweeney.
    ______________________
    Decided: April 20, 2017
    ______________________
    MARK LEE POLLOT, Eagle, ID, argued for plaintiffs-
    appellants.
    ELIZABETH ANN PETERSON, Environment and Natural
    Resources Division, United States Department of Justice,
    Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also
    represented by JOHN C. CRUDEN.
    ______________________
    2                                      ESTATE OF HAGE   v. US
    Before DYK, MAYER, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    The estate of E. Wayne Hage and the estate of Jean
    N. Hage (collectively “the Hages”) appeal a final order of
    the United States Court of Federal Claims dismissing
    their complaint. See Estate of Hage v. United States, 
    113 Fed. Cl. 277
    , 279 (2013) (“Hage IV”). For the reasons
    discussed below, we affirm.
    DISCUSSION
    The relevant facts related to this dispute, which has
    been the subject of litigation since 1991, have been set
    out in exhaustive detail in multiple opinions from the
    Court of Federal Claims, see, e.g., Hage 
    IV, 113 Fed. Cl. at 279
    –80; Estate of Hage v. United States, 
    82 Fed. Cl. 202
    ,
    204–08 (2008) (“Hage II”); Hage v. United States, 51 Fed.
    Cl. 570, 572–74 (2002) (“Hage I”), and in a previous opin-
    ion from this court, see Estate of Hage v. United States,
    
    687 F.3d 1281
    , 1283–85 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Hage III”). In
    their current appeal, the Hages argue that Hage I and
    Hage II left unresolved certain issues related to their
    entitlement to compensation from the United States for a
    purported Fifth Amendment taking of their water rights.
    Specifically, the Hages contend that the Court of Federal
    Claims made a “finding” that a physical taking occurred
    when the government, using intimidation and threats of
    prosecution, prevented them from maintaining ditches on
    federal property, and that this finding was “undisturbed”
    by this court’s judgment in Hage III. The Hages further
    assert that the Court of Federal Claims, following this
    court’s remand, “should have recalculated and awarded
    [them] the amount of compensation” they are due as a
    result of this alleged physical taking by the United States.
    We find this argument unpersuasive for a number of
    reasons. First, nothing in Hage III even arguably sug-
    gested that the Hages were entitled, on remand, to liti-
    ESTATE OF HAGE   v. US                                   3
    gate the issue of whether the government could be held
    liable for a physical taking of their water rights. See
    Hage 
    III, 687 F.3d at 1286
    –92. Our remand order was
    clear and precise. We vacated the portion of the trial
    court’s judgment awarding compensation for the alleged
    regulatory taking of the Hages’ right to access and main-
    tain stream channels and ditch rights of way established
    pursuant to the Act of July 26, 1866, 43 U.S.C. § 661 (the
    “1866 Act”). See Hage 
    III, 687 F.3d at 1287
    –88. We
    determined, moreover, that the trial court erred in hold-
    ing that the government’s erection of fences around water
    sources on federal lands constituted a compensable tak-
    ing. See 
    id. at 1289–90.
    In addition, we held that the
    Hages’ claim for range improvements, under 43 U.S.C.
    § 1752(g), was not ripe because they had failed to exhaust
    their administrative remedies. See Hage 
    III, 687 F.3d at 1290
    –91.
    Although we remanded the case to the Court of Fed-
    eral Claims “for further proceedings consistent with [our]
    opinion,” 
    id. at 1292,
    nothing in our opinion or remand
    order suggested that the trial court should conduct fur-
    ther proceedings on the question of whether the govern-
    ment could be held liable for a physical taking of the
    Hages’ right to access and maintain the 1866 Act ditches.
    See Hage 
    IV, 113 Fed. Cl. at 282
    (“[I]f the Federal Circuit
    intended that this court open the record, receive addition-
    al evidence, and render new or additional findings of fact
    and conclusions of law, then the appellate court would
    have provided that clear instruction to the trial court. It
    did not do so and the reason is abundantly clear from
    reading the Federal Circuit’s decision—nothing more
    remains to be decided.”). Our mandate reversing and
    vacating the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims
    fully and finally resolved all issues presented on appeal,
    leaving no room for further proceedings on remand relat-
    ed to a purported physical taking of the Hages’ right to
    access the 1866 Act ditches. See TecSec, Inc. v. Int’l Bus.
    4                                       ESTATE OF HAGE   v. US
    Machs. Corp., 
    731 F.3d 1336
    , 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
    (“After our mandate issues, the mandate rule forecloses
    reconsideration of issues implicitly or explicitly decided on
    appeal.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));
    see also Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,
    
    757 F.3d 1366
    , 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“While the [trial]
    court was certainly free to take action consistent with the
    mandate, that does not mean that it was likewise free to
    disturb matters that were within the mandate.” (citation
    omitted)).
    Second, the Hages’ contention that they were entitled,
    on remand, to litigate the question of the government’s
    liability for a physical taking of their water rights is
    premised on a fundamental misapprehension regarding
    the nature of the appellate process. Contrary to the
    Hages’ assertions, our mandate reversing and vacating
    the trial court’s damages award did not leave “undis-
    turbed” any of the court’s findings related to that award.
    As an appellate court, we “review[] judgments, not state-
    ments in opinions.” Black v. Cutter Labs., 
    351 U.S. 292
    ,
    297 (1956); see also Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 
    713 F.2d 1530
    , 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983). When it appealed to
    this court after the Court of Federal Claims entered final
    judgment on the Hages’ claims, the government appealed
    that judgment in its entirety. See Brief for Defendant-
    Appellant, Hage III, 
    687 F.3d 1281
    (Nos. 2011-5001, 2011-
    5013), 
    2011 WL 860406
    , at *26 (“The [Court of Federal
    Claims’] award of compensation must be reversed in its
    entirety.”). The fact that we did not, in Hage III, specifi-
    cally address each purported finding made by the Court of
    Federal Claims does not mean that any such finding
    “survived” our judgment reversing and vacating the
    court’s damages award. See Sun-Tek Indus., Inc. v.
    Kennedy Sky Lites, Inc., 
    856 F.2d 173
    , 176 (Fed. Cir.
    1988) (“Although we review findings in connection with
    our review of judgments, we do not review findings inde-
    pendently.”); see also Jennings v. Stephens, – U.S. –, 135
    ESTATE OF HAGE   v. US                                      
    5 S. Ct. 793
    , 799 (2015) (“Courts reduce their opinions and
    verdicts to judgments precisely to define the rights and
    liabilities of the parties. . . . This Court, like all federal
    appellate courts, does not review lower courts’ opinions,
    but their judgments.”). As we have previously made clear,
    “[u]nless remanded by this court, all issues within the
    scope of the appealed judgment are deemed incorporated
    within the mandate and thus are precluded from further
    adjudication.” Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 
    166 F.3d 1379
    , 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
    Third, the Court of Federal Claims, in Hage II, con-
    cluded that it was appropriate to analyze the Hages’ claim
    for compensation based on the alleged denial of access to
    the 1866 Act ditches using a regulatory, rather than a
    physical, taking 
    rubric. 82 Fed. Cl. at 208
    , 210–14.
    According to the Hages, “the trial court identified one
    regulatory taking of waters not flowing through ditches in
    the upper reaches of the Hages’ grazing lands affecting
    primarily the Mosquito Creek area . . . and two classes of
    physical taking, one being a physical taking of stock water
    sources by the erection of actual physical barriers in the
    form of fences and the other being a physical taking of
    waters in ditches in the nature of a practical physical
    ouster by means of intimidation, threats, harassment and
    actual prosecution.” Supplemental Brief of Plaintiffs-
    Appellants at 5. Even accepting arguendo that the trial
    court “identified” a physical taking of water in the 1866
    Act ditches based on the government’s alleged harass-
    ment and threats of prosecution, see Hage 
    II, 82 Fed. Cl. at 208
    ; Hage 
    I, 51 Fed. Cl. at 580
    n.13, however, the court
    ultimately elected to analyze the Hages’ claim seeking
    compensation for the alleged denial of access to the ditch-
    es as a regulatory, rather than a physical, taking claim.
    See Hage 
    II, 82 Fed. Cl. at 208
    , 210–14.
    The trial court indicated that it had previously held
    “that the Government’s actions which physically prevent-
    ed [the Hages] from accessing their 1866 Act ditches
    6                                     ESTATE OF HAGE   v. US
    amounted to a physical taking,” 
    id. at 208,
    because the
    Hages argued that “the government ha[d] physically
    barred them from the land, with threat of prosecution for
    trespassing if they enter[ed] federal lands to maintain
    their ditches,” Hage 
    I, 51 Fed. Cl. at 580
    n.13. Recogniz-
    ing, however, that “there is no bright line between physi-
    cal and regulatory takings,” Hage 
    II, 82 Fed. Cl. at 208
    ,
    the court determined that it was appropriate to analyze
    the Hages’ claim for compensation based on the alleged
    denial of access to the 1866 Act ditches as a regulatory,
    rather than a physical, taking claim, 
    id. at 208,
    210–14;
    see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 
    503 U.S. 519
    , 534–35
    (1992) (explaining that a regulatory taking theory and a
    physical taking theory can be understood as two argu-
    ments in support of the same claim).
    The trial court concluded that the Hages were entitled
    to compensation because if the government had “not
    prevented their access to their various 1866 Act ditches,
    the water could have been put to use for agricultural
    purposes or could have been sold for quasi-municipal use.”
    Hage 
    II, 82 Fed. Cl. at 212
    . The court determined that
    the government had interfered with the Hages’ right to
    access the 1866 Act ditches, both by requiring special use
    permits for the use of heavy equipment to clear obstruc-
    tions from the ditches and by threatening to prosecute the
    Hages for trespass if they entered federal lands to main-
    tain the ditches. 
    Id. at 210–14.
    The Court of Federal
    Claims unequivocally concluded that the conduct that the
    Hages now assert was a physical taking—the govern-
    ment’s alleged harassment and threats of prosecution for
    trespassing—should be analyzed as part of the purported
    regulatory taking for which the court awarded compensa-
    tion. See 
    id. at 208,
    212–13 (applying the multi-factor
    regulatory takings standard set out in Penn Central
    Transportation Co. v. New York City, 
    438 U.S. 104
    , 123–
    36 (1978), in analyzing the government actions which
    allegedly prevented the Hages from maintaining the 1866
    ESTATE OF HAGE   v. US                                       7
    Act ditches); see also Tuthill Ranch, Inc. v. United States,
    
    381 F.3d 1132
    , 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The Penn Central
    factors critical to determining which regulatory actions
    constitute regulatory takings are simply inapplicable
    when analyzing a physical taking.”). In Hage III we
    vacated the regulatory taking determination, finding the
    claim not 
    ripe. 687 F.3d at 1287
    . Contrary to the Hages’
    assertions, nothing in Hage II or Hage III suggests that
    they are entitled to further proceedings on the question of
    whether the government’s alleged harassment and
    threats of prosecution are sufficient to support a viable
    physical taking claim. See Hage 
    IV, 113 Fed. Cl. at 282
    (“[I]f the trial court intended to conduct more proceedings
    to resolve an outstanding legal issue, it would have said
    so in its . . . decision. The prior judge assigned to this case
    labored diligently and provided numerous detailed deci-
    sions that explored every theory of liability raised in the
    complaint. Rather than suggest that future hearings
    might be necessary . . . the trial court directed the Clerk
    of Court to enter final judgment[] and to close the case.”
    (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted)).
    Finally, we find no merit in the Hages’ contention that
    this court was not, in the previous appeal, “given the
    opportunity to consider the trial court’s holding that a
    taking of waters in [the 1866 Act] ditches by a practical
    physical ouster had occurred.” Supplemental Brief of
    Plaintiffs-Appellants at 5. In the previous appeal, the
    Hages’ counsel specifically stated at oral argument that
    their claim for compensation based upon water flowing
    through the 1866 Act ditches should be analyzed as a
    physical taking claim. See Oral Arg. Tr. at 18:25–56,
    20:20–21:09, Hage III, 
    687 F.3d 1281
    , available at
    http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?/fl=20
    11-5001.mp3. We reject, therefore, the Hages’ argument
    that this court, in the previous appeal, was not aware of
    their claim that the government’s threat to prosecute
    8                                     ESTATE OF HAGE   v. US
    them for trespass if they entered federal lands to main-
    tain the 1866 Act ditches could be construed as a compen-
    sable physical taking. See Lowder v. Dep’t of Homeland
    Sec., 
    504 F.3d 1378
    , 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The failure to
    discuss particular contentions in a case, however, does not
    mean that the tribunal did not consider them in reaching
    its decision.”); Hartman v. Nicholson, 
    483 F.3d 1311
    , 1315
    (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“That the court did not specifically
    mention [an argument] in its opinion forms no basis for
    an assumption that it did not consider [it].” (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted)).
    We emphasize, moreover, that the Hages’ claim for a
    purported physical taking of their right to access the 1866
    Act ditches is foreclosed by the determinations we made
    in Hage III. The Hages contend that the Forest Service
    effected a “practical physical ouster” when it threatened
    to prosecute them for trespass if they entered federals
    lands with heavy equipment to maintain the 1866 Act
    ditches. See Supplemental Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants
    at 8. As we held in Hage III, however, the Forest Service
    had the right to require that those seeking to conduct
    ditch maintenance using heavy equipment obtain special
    use 
    permits. 687 F.3d at 1287
    –88. We further deter-
    mined that there was no credible “evidence suggesting
    that the disputes between the Forest Service and the
    Hages would cause the Forest Service to deny the Hages
    special use permits to perform ditch maintenance.” 
    Id. at 1288.
        Given that there was no showing that the Hages could
    not have secured the requisite special use permits, the
    government’s threat to prosecute them for trespass if they
    entered federal property without first obtaining such
    permits could not possibly give rise to a viable “practical
    physical ouster” claim. “[T]he sole question governing
    physical takings is whether or not the government has
    physically occupied the plaintiff’s property.”     Tuthill
    
    Ranch, 381 F.3d at 1136
    ; see 
    Yee, 503 U.S. at 527
    (“The
    ESTATE OF HAGE   v. US                                    9
    government effects a physical taking only where it re-
    quires the landowner to submit to the physical occupation
    of his land.” (second emphasis added)). Where, as here,
    the government merely restricts the use of an individual’s
    property—instead of occupying that property—that
    individual has not suffered a physical taking. See Loretto
    v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
    458 U.S. 419
    ,
    432 (1982) (emphasizing that the issue of whether there
    has been an actual physical occupation is the critical
    inquiry in assessing whether a physical taking has oc-
    curred); Tuthill 
    Ranch, 381 F.3d at 1137
    (explaining that
    “[p]hysical invasions short of an occupation and regula-
    tions that merely restrict the use of property may qualify
    as regulatory takings, but not as physical takings”); see
    also United States v. Locke, 
    471 U.S. 84
    , 104 (1985) (em-
    phasizing that “[a]lthough owners of unpatented mining
    claims hold fully recognized possessory interests in their
    claims,” the government “maintains broad powers over
    the terms and conditions upon which the public lands can
    be used, leased, and acquired”).
    CONCLUSION
    Accordingly, the final order of the United States Court
    of Federal Claims dismissing the Hages’ complaint is
    affirmed.
    AFFIRMED