People v. Pedro T. , 8 Cal. 4th 1041 ( 1994 )

Opinion

WERDEGAR, J.

—In 1989 the Legislature amended Vehicle Code section 10851, effective January 1, 1990, to increase the maximum punishment for vehicle theft from three years to four. (Stats. 1989, ch. 930, § 11, p. 3259.) The 1989 legislation provided that the lesser, pre-1990 punishment would be reinstated as of January 1, 1993, unless the Legislature, before the latter date, otherwise directed. (Stats. 1989, ch. 930, § 12.5, p. 3266.) The Legislature did not so direct. Accordingly, the lesser punishment was reinstated as provided in the 1989 statute.

This case presents the question whether one who committed vehicle theft during the effective period of the provision for increased punishment, but whose conviction for that offense was not yet final as of the “sunset” date of that provision, can be sentenced thereunder. We answer this question in the affirmative, and conclude that In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948], cited as authority for a contrary position, does not govern this case. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

Factual and Procedural Background

On several occasions before April 23,1991, Pedro T. (the minor) had been found to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. On that date, the District Attorney of Riverside County filed a petition subsequent alleging that on April 13, 1991, the minor had escaped from Twin Pines Ranch. On June 20, 1991, the district attorney filed a second petition subsequent alleging, among other things, that the minor had violated Vehicle Code section 10851 by taking and driving a vehicle without the consent of the owner and with the intent to deprive the owner of possession of the vehicle. The minor admitted the truth of the April 23, 1991, petition. Following a trial on the June 20, 1991, petition, the court found the minor came within Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The court committed him to the California Youth Authority, but suspended execution of the commitment. The minor was placed on probation with various conditions, including placement at Twin Pines Ranch.

On August 22, 1991, the minor again escaped from Twin Pines Ranch. Five days later the district attorney filed a petition subsequent alleging misdemeanor escape (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 871). Following his rearrest some months later, the minor admitted the truth of the escape allegation. The court ordered him committed to the California Youth Authority for a term of six years and six months, using as the base term the four-year maximum term for vehicle taking under former Vehicle Code section 10851. The Court of Appeal affirmed. We granted review to decide whether the minor is entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment provided in the current version of Vehicle Code section 10851.

Discussion

The minor contends that once the sunset provision of the 1989 statute took effect, and the version of Vehicle Code section 10851 operative when the offense was committed expired pursuant to its terms, the ameliorative effect of the reinstated lesser punishment inured to the benefit of all persons, such as himself, whose convictions under the 1989 statute were not yet final. In support of his contention, he cites our decision in In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), certain legislative history, and Government Code section 9611.

Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, involved a prosecution for escape in violation of Penal Code section 4530. When the petitioner in Estrada committed the crime of escape, section 4530 provided that an escape or an attempted escape was punishable by at least a one-year period of imprisonment, to commence from the time the prisoner would otherwise be discharged from prison. (63 Cal.2d at p. 743.) At that time, Penal Code section 3044 provided that no person convicted of an escape could be paroled until he had served at least two calendar years after his return to prison after the conviction. (63 Cal.2d at p. 743.) After the petitioner’s escape, but before his conviction and sentence, Penal Code sections 3044 and 4530 were amended to reduce the penalties formerly imposed for escapes committed without force or violence. The petitioner in Estrada contended he was entitled to the benefit of the ameliorative amendments.

We agreed. “The problem, of course,” we observed, “is one of trying to ascertain the legislative intent—did the Legislature intend the old or new statute to apply? Had the Legislature expressly stated which statute should apply, its determination, either way, would have been legal and constitutional. It has not done so.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.) We looked to other considerations. “Paramount” among them was an appreciation that “[w]hen the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act.” (Id. at pp. 744-745.) We found “inevitable” the inference the Legislature must have intended that the new statute, imposing the new, lighter penalty the Legislature thenceforth deemed sufficient, apply in every case to which it constitutionally could apply. {Id. at p. 745.)¹ Thus, the amendatory act, we concluded, should apply to crimes committed before its effective date, provided the judgment of conviction is not yet final. (63 Cal.2d at p. 745.)

By extension, the minor argues that whenever the Legislature amends a statute to increase, for a specified period, the penalty for an offense, the court, absent a saving clause, cannot apply the increased penalty in a case, such as his, that arises out of an offense committed during the specified period, but is not final until after the amendment expires or “sunsets.” (See Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 747 [“The fact that the offender can be punished under the old law when the new law increases the punishment where there is an express or implied saving clause, certainly is not conclusive on the legislative intent where the new statute mitigates the punishment. If there is no saving clause he can and should be punished under the new law.”].) We are unpersuaded by the minor’s argument.

The basis of our decision in Estrada was our quest for legislative intent. Ordinarily when an amendment lessens the punishment for a crime, one may reasonably infer the Legislature has determined imposition of a lesser punishment on offenders thereafter will sufficiently serve the public interest. In the case of a “sunset” provision attached to a temporary enhancement of penalty, the same inference cannot so readily be drawn.

Here, in temporarily increasing the penalties for vehicle-taking, the Legislature determined the public safety required a three-year test of stricter punishments. In a preface to the statute, we find the following statement of purpose: “The Legislature finds and declares that the rapid increase in motor vehicle theft has reached crisis proportions .... [T]he escalating problem of vehicle theft is nurtured by the lack of any serious deterrent to this crime. . . . HU . . . [T]he Legislature believes that it is in the best interest for public safety to enhance the penalties for the crimes of vehicle theft and receiving stolen vehicles.” (Stats. 1989, ch. 930, § 1, pp. 3246-3247.) Far from determining that a lesser punishment for vehicle theft would serve the public interest, the Legislature expressly declared that increased penalties were necessary. Estrada is not implicated on these facts.

Nor does the general rule that penal statutes are to be construed as favorably to defendants as their language and circumstances permit (see, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 631 [87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617, 40 A.L.R.3d 420]) demand a different result. The general rule applies only when some doubt exists as to the legislative purpose in enacting the law. We find no such doubt here, given the Legislature’s express declaration of its aim of increasing deterrence of vehicle theft through enhancement of the applicable penalty.

Our conclusion is reinforced by consideration of the practical effect of a contrary rule. The utility of a three-year legislative experiment in enhanced penalties might be seriously undermined if those penalties, instead of applying to all offenders during the three years, could be imposed only on those whose convictions became final before the sunset date. The Legislature could reasonably assume that for a deterrent to work it must operate long enough and consistently enough to convey to the public an understanding that the heavier penalty will apply during the stated effective period of the legislation. Yet under the construction the minor urges, the three-year period would in effect be reduced to something indeterminate and much less, i.e., that period of time following the effective date of the amendment in which any particular conviction that occurred could become final before expiration of the three years. (See In re Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 593, 594 [136 Cal.Rptr. 718] [a judgment is not final until the time for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court has passed].) The validity, moreover, of any conclusions to be drawn from an experimental study of the deterrent effect of enhanced penalties could be weakened by the underinclusiveness of a sampling of offenders comprised only of those whose convictions happened to become final before the sunset date of the increased penalties.

Furthermore, as the Court of Appeal in this case reasoned, a rule that retroactively lessened the sentence imposed on an offender pursuant to a sunset clause would provide a motive for delay and manipulation in criminal proceedings. When the Legislature signals, years in advance, its intention to reduce the punishment for an offense, defendant and counsel have a strong incentive to delay the finality of a judgment in the hope of eventually receiving the lessened, postsunset term. The minor argues this reasoning is flawed, in that no offender could be certain the Legislature would not see fit to extend or repeal the sunset clause. But if delay or manipulation in this situation is indeed a mere gamble, as the minor urges, it nevertheless seems one a rational defendant very likely would take, regardless of inability to ensure the desired outcome. The Legislature could not have intended to encourage such machinations.²

Contrary to the minor’s argument, the principle announced in Bell v. Maryland (1964) 378 U.S. 226, 230 [12 L.Ed.2d 822, 826, 84 S.Ct. 1814]— “the universal common-law rule that when the legislature repeals a criminal statute or otherwise removes the State’s condemnation from conduct that was formerly deemed criminal, this action requires the dismissal of a pending criminal proceeding charging such conduct”—does not apply here. Viewed as a whole, the Legislature’s experiment in harsher penalties in no way signifies a determination that vehicle-taking is less blameworthy than previously thought.

Nor does People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 144, 858 P.2d 611] compel a different result. There, we stressed that considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory construction. (Id. at pp. 1212-1217.) We adhere to that view. But, as we have earlier explained, Estrada is not controlling here. Thus, the precepts of stare decisis do not come into play.

The minor points out the Legislature failed to extend or repeal the sunset provision. He urges us to infer it believed the temporary four-year maximum term under which he was sentenced to be unnecessary to the goal of deterrence, and consequently asks us, as in Estrada, to extend to him the benefit of the amelioration. But legislative inactivity after the passage of the sunset provision casts no light on the Legislature’s intent when it enacted the statute. It is axiomatic that in assessing the import of a statute, we must concern ourselves with the Legislature’s purpose at the time of the enactment. (See People v. Harvey (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 132, 138-139 [169 Cal.Rptr. 153].) The dissent, like the minor, appears to seek evidence of the Legislature’s intent in its inactivity at some indefinite time subsequent to passage of the 1989 version of Vehicle Code section 10851. Yet to seek a hypothetical legislative intent at some time after enactment of the statute would seem necessarily to disregard the probable legislative intent at the time of the enactment. We are directed to no authority sanctioning such an approach.

As we have seen, the Legislature’s aim in enacting the temporary sentence increases in Vehicle Code section 10851 is plain: to punish, more severely than before, persons who committed vehicle-taking within a three-year period. Even if we were to adopt the unorthodox approach advocated by the minor and espoused by the dissent, and were to embark on a search for hypothetical postenactment legislative intent based on legislative silence, our conclusion would remain the same. We have found no facts to suggest that, as of the time of the minor’s offense, the original legislative aim had somehow ceased to operate, and it is impossible to discern at what point, if any, during the period of legislative inactivity the Legislature might have determined to let its experiment in enhanced penalties terminate as to all criminal proceedings not yet final as of the sunset date. Much truer to the original legislative purpose, we believe, is a determination the provision for enhanced penalties shall apply to all vehicle thefts committed during its stated effective period.

Similarly unpersuasive is the fact the Legislature twice extended, and then repealed, the sunset clause in the statute governing limitations on the granting of probation for residential burglary. (Stats. 1980, ch. 42, § 4, p. 106; Stats. 1982, ch. 1294, § 3, p. 4784; Stats. 1984, ch. 1427, § 3, p. 5011; Stats. 1985, ch. 1388, § 1, p. 4915.) That the history of the residential burglary statute, as the minor observes, demonstrates the Legislature, when it chooses, knows how to deny to a sunset clause a future ameliorative impact is true. Likewise true is the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of this court’s decision in Estrada. (See People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 897 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288].) But that the Legislature, in order to preclude the future ameliorative effect of a sunset provision, is always bound to use the same method, or to enact an explicit saving clause, is not true. Despite broad language in Estrada regarding the necessity of express saving clauses, the dissent does not explain by what authority courts can dictate to legislative drafters the forms in which laws must be written to express the legislative intent.³ Rather, what is required is that the Legislature demonstrate its intention with sufficient clarity that a reviewing court can discern and effectuate it. We believe the very nature of a sunset clause, as an experiment in enhanced penalties, establishes—in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative purpose—a legislative intent the enhanced punishment apply to offenses committed throughout its effective period. Because in this case we find no indication of a contrary purpose underlying the Legislature’s use of a sunset provision in the 1989 version of Vehicle Code section 10851, we can infer the Legislature understood a difference existed between a limited-duration penalty increase and a permanent penalty amelioration, and so found a saving clause unnecessary. In other words, just as we find this situation distinguishable from Estrada, so could the Legislature.

Citing estimates, presented to the Legislature before it enacted the 1989 amendment to Vehicle Code section 10851, of the costs of longer prison terms anticipated to result from the amendment, the dissent supposes the Legislature might have concluded the fiscal impact would be too great to continue the lengthier sentences unless they clearly had a deterrent impact during the three-year period of experimentation. (Dis. opn., post, at p. 1059.) The dissent further suggests our decision usurps a legislative prerogative to determine the benefits and burdens of proposed statutes. (Ibid.) Like the dissent, we believe courts should avoid such arrogations of lawmaking power. The cited legislative history, however, fails to advance the dissent’s conclusion. The Legislature, after all, enacted the temporary penalty increases despite the predicted fiscal impact. We have no reason to suppose the Legislature, having enacted the amendment despite awareness of the potential costs, did not intend the enhanced penalties be imposed for offenses committed throughout the amendment’s predetermined effective period. If we may be accused of assuming a legislative prerogative in concluding the enhanced penalties may be so imposed, the dissent is liable to the same charge in urging they may not.

The minor contends Government Code section 9611 requires a different result. That statute provides as follows: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter [Government Code sections 9600 through 9612], whenever a provision of law is temporarily suspended, or is expressly or impliedly modified or repealed by a provision which is declared to be effective for only a limited period, the original provisions are not to be deemed repealed, but upon the expiration of the time of the temporary suspension or the effectiveness of the inconsistent provision, the original provision shall have the same force and effect as if the temporary provision had not been enacted.” We do not think the statute has so sweeping an effect as the minor argues. First, it does not require courts to pretend, after the “sunset” date has passed, a temporary enactment never existed. If the minor’s argument were extended to its logical conclusion, a defendant whose conviction under the temporary enactment became final before its expiration could argue for a reduction of sentence by means of a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed after the sunset date.⁴ But if that were so, the Legislature would be virtually precluded from ever enacting an effective temporary penalty enhancement, a result we cannot endorse. Second, the statute does not address, one way or the other, whether an offense committed before the sunset of a sentencing provision, but not finally adjudicated until after that date, is to be punished with the higher penalty. Government Code section 9611 plainly is aimed at preventing the inadvertent repeal of statutes when temporary modifications or suspensions of such statutes expire by their terms. The section does not purport to dictate judicial construction of statutes containing sunset clauses.⁵

The minor cites Beckman v. Thompson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 481, 487-489 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 60] (Beckman), in support of his reading of Government Code section 9611. We find that case distinguishable. Beckman discussed the effect of the sunset provision in Code of Civil Procedure section 410.30, the inconvenient forum statute. The provision was one of the 1986 amendments to section 410.30. (Stats. 1986, ch. 968, § 4, p. 3347.) The sunset provision read, in full, as follows: “This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,1992, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, which is enacted before January 1, 1992, deletes or extends that date. If that date is not deleted or extended then, on and after January 1, 1992, pursuant to Section 9611 of the Government Code, Section 410.30 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Section 1 of Chapter 601 [of] the Statutes of 1972, shall have the same force and effect as if this temporary provision had not been enacted.” {Ibid.) The sunset date occurred while the appeal in Beckman was pending. The Beckman court concluded it was required to apply the pre-1986 version of the inconvenient forum statute by virtue of the unmistakable expression of legislative intent and the general rule that, absent a vested right, an appellate court must apply the law as it exists when the appellate court renders its decision. (Beckman, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 489.) The legislative intention with respect to the inconvenient forum statute, and the interplay of its sunset clause with Government Code section 9611, could scarcely have been clearer. The decision in Beckman, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th 481, simply effectuated it. In this case we have no equivalent legislative directive, and, as noted above, the general saving clause in Government Code section 9611, standing alone, does not support the conclusion the minor urges.

The parties have filed supplemental briefing concerning the recent amendments to Vehicle Code section 10851 and related statutes criminalizing vehicle theft, and the minor urges these amendments support his contention the Legislature intended the lessened postsunset penalties of the 1989 statute apply in his case. Some 10 months after the “sunset” of former Vehicle Code section 10851, the Legislature repealed and reenacted Vehicle Code section 10851 with another sunset provision. From October 11, 1993, through December 31, 1996, conviction for violation of the statute results in a possible term of imprisonment of sixteen months, two years, or three years, or a fine of not more than $10,000, or both such imprisonment and fine. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) If the defendant has previously been convicted of two misdemeanor vehicle thefts, he or she is subject to a possible term of imprisonment for two, three, or four years. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (b).) If the defendant has previously been convicted of felony vehicle theft, the penalties are increased to a possible term of imprisonment for three, four, or five years, or a fine of not more than $10,000, or both such imprisonment and fine. (Pen. Code, § 666.5.) On January 1, 1997, the potential sentences for vehicle theft essentially revert to those that were available under the version of the vehicle-taking statutes operative January 1, 1993. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (g); compare Stats. 1993, ch. 1125, §§ 8, 11, 14, with Stats. 1989, ch. 930, §§ 8.1, 9.1, 11.1, pp. 3257-3260.)

Thus, to summarize: the 1993 legislation temporarily increased potential fines for nonrecidivists and possible imprisonment for recidivists, without either altering or explicating the language of the sunset clause common to both the statute under review and the statute in effect at the time this opinion is filed.

The currently operative statute, although certainly evincing a willingness to experiment further with enhanced penalties for vehicle-taking, does not directly reveal the Legislature’s intention with respect to the issue before us. After study, we conclude nothing in the current statute is inconsistent with our reasoning. We note in particular that the statute recites: “This act is an urgency statute necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety within the meaning of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into immediate effect. The facts constituting the necessity are: [U In order to reinstate vehicle theft statutes with enhanced penalties which were repealed on January 1, 1993, it is necessary that this act take immediate effect.” (Stats. 1993, ch. 1125, § 18.) Thus, although the Legislature did not reinstate the precise version of the enhanced penalties that were repealed on January 1, 1993, it did see fit to strengthen in certain respects the punishments that may be imposed through 1996, over those that had been available between January 1 and October 10, 1993.

Conclusion

The purpose of the temporary increase in penalties under the former law was to punish more severely, and thereby deter, vehicle thefts. Application of the temporarily increased penalties to those who, like Pedro T., were convicted of vehicle theft during the effective period of the enhanced penalties, even though their convictions were not final until after the sunset date, advances the purpose the Legislature sought to achieve. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

Lucas, C. J., Baxter, J., and George, J., concurred.

1 We found the legislative intent to be obvious “because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modem theories of penology. . . . [U . . . There is no place in the scheme for punishment for its own sake, the product simply of vengeance or retribution.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.) Since those words were written, however, the development of modem theories of penology has continued to unfold. (See Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (a)(1) [“The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.”].)

2 The minor also urges us to reject this reasoning because the dissenting opinion in Estrada unavailingly raised the same point. (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 753 (dis. opn. of Burke, J.).) To the contrary, the point is not meritless in this context, despite the failure of the dissenting justice to persuade a majority of the Estrada court. In Estrada we determined the Legislature intended that punishment in cases not yet final be ameliorated, in keeping with the statutory amendments. The dissent’s discussion of the probable untoward consequences of that ruling did not deter us from effectuating the legislative intent. By contrast, here we conclude the Legislature intended that all offenders who violated Vehicle Code section 10851 during the effective period of the enhanced penalties should receive the temporarily harsher punishment. Recitation of the untoward consequences of a contrary rule merely strengthens our conclusion.

3 The dissent cites Charrot v. Municipal Court (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 208, 209-210 [66 Cal.Rptr. 903] (Charrot) for the proposition that a saving clause is essential for a valid prosecution under a sunsetted criminal statute. (Dis. opn., post, at p. 1056.) Charrot differs from this case in certain important respects: the effect of the sunset provision was to decriminalize an offense of the malum prohibitum variety; and the opinion of the Charrot court reflects no indication of any urgent legislative intent to deter the temporarily banned conduct. The defendant in Charrot was accused of being a person who “ ‘did wilfully and unlawfully represent and permit a representation to be made on behalf of a cosmetological establishment and school of cosmetology that its place of business was a barbershop, made by use of a display of a device similar to a barber pole and otherwise,’ ” as prohibited by former Business and Professions Code section 7430.5. (260 Cal.App.2d at p. 209.) The Charrot court, following the rule of Estrada, sought and purported to find evidence of a legislative intent to abate prosecutions under the expired statute. In the present case, by contrast, vehicle theft remains a punishable crime, the Legislature’s deterrent aim in enacting the 1989 version of Vehicle Code section 10851 is clear, and our decision is intended fully to effectuate it. Charrot is not inconsistent with the conclusion we reach today.

4 Contrary to a suggestion by the minor’s counsel at oral argument, Government Code section 9608 would not necessarily dictate a different result. That statute provides as follows: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” (Ibid.) As discussed below (see fn. 5, post), and as acknowledged in the minor’s briefing, that statute is designed to save prosecutions for criminal acts committed before the effective date of any amendments increasing punishment therefor, inasmuch as the common law rule precluded such prosecutions. (See People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 299 [134 Cal.Rptr. 64, 555 P.2d 1313].)

5 The People urge that Government Code section 9608 supports their reading of legislative intent in this case. In Estrada we observed that, at common law, when a statute was passed that increased the punishment for a crime, a defendant who committed the proscribed act before the effective date of the new law could not be punished under the old law because it no longer existed, and he could not be punished under the new law because its attempted application would render it an ex post facto law. (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 747-748; People v. Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 299; see Sekt v. Justice’s Court (1945) 26 Cal.2d 297 [159 P.2d 17, 167 A.L.R. 833].) We reasoned that Government Code section 9608 “was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid this technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law, simply because the Legislature had decided to increase the punishment for his crime. [Citation.]” (People v. Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 299.) The People urge that Government Code section 9608, a saving clause of limited scope, operates to allow the application of the temporarily enhanced punishment in this case. The minor, on the other hand, contends that the effect of section 9608 was merely to avoid a bar on prosecution of violators of Vehicle Code section 10851 whose prosecutions were pending on January 1, 1990, when the temporarily increased punishment went into effect. We agree with the minor that, in light of the consistent historical understanding of Government Code section 9608, it cannot be dispositive of this case.