Powers v. City of Richmond ( 1995 )

Opinion

KENNARD, J.

The Legislature has provided that actions seeking disclosure of documents under the Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.; hereafter the PRA) may be brought and tried in superior court, and thus are within that court’s original jurisdiction. (Id., §§ 6258-6259.) The Legislature has further provided that superior court decisions in PRA cases are not appealable but instead are “immediately reviewable by petition to the appellate court for the issuance of an extraordinary writ.” (Id., § 6259, subd. (c), hereafter § 6259(c).)

We granted review in this case to decide whether section 6259(c)— making a petition for extraordinary writ the exclusive mode of appellate review in PRA actions—violates our state Constitution and in particular section 11 of article VI, which states that, except when a judgment of death has been pronounced, the “courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction when superior courts have original jurisdiction . . . We conclude that section 6259(c) does not violate the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the state Constitution.

I

Donna R. Powers, then a candidate for city council, requested that defendant City of Richmond disclose all expenditures by the mayor, the city council, and the city manager during the second half of fiscal year 1990-1991. The city supplied the requested information in the form of a computer-generated report. Powers and certain of her supporters (hereafter collectively plaintiffs) then requested the same information for the first half of fiscal year 1990-1991. This time, the city refused to generate a computer report and instead gave plaintiffs access to a check register in which the requested information was intermingled with information concerning the expenditures of other city departments and agencies.

Plaintiffs then began an action in superior court under the PRA to compel the city to prepare and release a computer-generated report containing only the requested information. After hearing evidence, the trial court ruled for the city. Plaintiffs then sought review in the Court of Appeal both by a petition for a writ of mandate and by direct appeal.

After soliciting and considering informal opposition concerning the merits of plaintiffs’ PRA request, the Court of Appeal denied plaintiffs’ writ petition summarily—that is, without holding a hearing and without issuing a written opinion. The city then moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ appeal as barred under section 6259(c). In opposing the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs argued that section 6259(c) violates the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the state Constitution (art. VI, § 11) to the extent it bars direct appeal of a final order of the superior court in a proceeding in which the superior court exercises original jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal issued an opinion granting the motion to dismiss. The court interpreted the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the state Constitution as granting the Courts of Appeal power to review final judgments and orders in all proceedings (except death penalty cases) in which superior courts exercise original jurisdiction, but also as not requiring any particular form or mode of this appellate review. Concluding that extraordinary writ petitions and direct appeals are alternative modes of appellate review, the Court of Appeal held that the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the state Constitution does not deprive the Legislature of authority to specify that appellate review of superior court orders in PRA cases shall be by means of petition for extraordinary writ rather than by direct appeal.

II

Plaintiffs contend that the California Constitution, in section 11 of article VI, confers on litigants a right of direct appeal from final orders and judgments in proceedings in which superior courts exercise original jurisdiction. In their view, this constitutional right of appeal necessarily includes the rights to oral argument, a decision on the merits, and a written opinion explaining the basis of the appellate court’s decision.¹

The issue plaintiffs raise requires that we construe our state Constitution. In construing constitutional provisions, the intent of the enacting body is the paramount consideration. (Davis v. City of Berkeley (1990) 51 Cal.3d 227, 234 [272 Cal.Rptr. 139, 794 P.2d 897].) To determine that intent, courts look first to the language of the constitutional text, giving the words their ordinary meaning. (Ibid.; see also, Bowens v. Superior Court (1991) 1 Cal.4th 36, 48 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 376, 820 P.2d 600]; Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299].) We begin, then, with the text of the constitutional provision on which plaintiffs rely:

“The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction when judgment of death has been pronounced. With that exception courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction when superior courts have original jurisdiction^[2] and in other causes prescribed by statute. [¶] Superior courts have appellate jurisdiction in causes prescribed by statute that arise in municipal courts in their counties. [¶] The Legislature may permit appellate courts to take evidence and make findings of fact when jury trial is waived or not a matter of right.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11.)

Nothing in the text of this provision conveys an intention to confer on litigants a right of direct appeal in cases within the original jurisdiction of the superior courts. Giving the words their ordinary meaning, the provision serves to establish and allocate judicial authority, not to define or guarantee the rights of litigants. Indeed, the provision nowhere mentions direct appeals or a “right of appeal.”

The state Constitution does indeed establish a number of litigant rights, but it does so in article I, entitled “Declaration of Rights,” rather than in article VI, entitled “Judicial.” For example, section 16 of article I states: “Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all. . . .” Had the people of this state intended to give similar constitutional status to a “right of appeal,” it is reasonable to assume that they would have used equally direct language and would have placed the right in article I with the other personal rights.

Plaintiffs may be understood to argue that the term “appellate jurisdiction” - means the power to decide direct appeals and that by giving the Courts of Appeal authority to decide direct appeals in all civil cases brought in superior court, the Constitution implicitly grants litigants a right to bring direct appeals in those same civil cases.

The ordinary meaning of “appellate jurisdiction” is broader than the meaning plaintiffs would ascribe to it. A legal dictionary defines “appellate” as “[p]ertaining to or having cognizance of appeals and other proceedings for the judicial review of adjudications.” (Black’s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 97, col. 2, italics added.) The same dictionary defines “appellate jurisdiction” as “[t]he power vested in an appellate court to review and revise the judicial action of an inferior court” and as “the power of review and determination on appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or other similar process.” (Id. at p. 98, col. 1, italics added.)

The United States Supreme Court has declared that the “essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction” is “that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause.” (Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 [2 L.Ed. 60, 73].) Applying this definition, the high court has concluded that appellate jurisdiction includes review by writ, including the writ of habeas corpus. (Ex Parte Watkins (1833) 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568, 572 [8 L.Ed. 786, 788].) Courts in other states have given similar definitions of the term “appellate jurisdiction.” (See, e.g., Ward School Bus. Mfg., Inc. v. Fowler (1977) 261 Ark. 100 [547 S.W.2d 394, 395] [“the review of an order or decree of an inferior court”]; Lane v. State (1944) 154 Fla. 853 [19 So.2d 366, 368] [“ ‘the power to take cognizance of and review proceedings in an inferior court irrespective of the manner in which they are brought up, whether by appeal or writ of error’ ”]; In re Constitutionality of House Bill No. 222 (1936) 262 Ky. 437 [90 S.W.2d 692, 693, 103 A.L.R. 1085] [quoting the Marbury definition of “appellate jurisdiction”]; Rudnick v. City of Jamestown (N.D. 1990) 463 N.W.2d 632, 636 [“the power of a superior court to review and revise a decision that has been rendered by an inferior court or tribunal”]; Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals (Okla. 1979) 595 P.2d 416, 419 [“that power and jurisdiction to review and correct those proceedings of inferior courts brought for determination in the manner provided by law”]; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State (1907) 107 Tex. 1 [106 S.W. 326, 331] [“ ‘the power and authority conferred upon a superior court to rehear and determine causes which have been tried in inferior courts’ ”].)

As these authorities amply establish, the ordinary and widely accepted meaning of the term “appellate jurisdiction” is simply the power of a reviewing court to correct error in a trial court proceeding. By common understanding, a reviewing court may exercise this power in the procedural context of a direct appeal, a writ petition, or otherwise. Thus, a provision conferring “appellate jurisdiction” does not necessarily or strongly imply a right of litigants to bring direct appeals.

We conclude that textual analysis, which is the best indicator of the intended meaning of a constitutional provision, does not support plaintiffs’ contention that the “appellate jurisdiction” provision confers on litigants a right to a direct appeal in cases within the original jurisdiction of the superior courts. To declare such a right would “violate the cardinal rule that ‘The Constitution is to be interpreted by the language in which it is written, and courts are no more at liberty to add provisions to what is therein declared in definite language than they are to disregard any of its express provisions.’ ” (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 799 [268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934], quoting People v. Campbell (1902) 138 Cal. 11, 15 [70 P. 918].)

We might well stop here. This court has stated that resort to extrinsic aids to interpret a constitutional provision is justified only when the Constitution’s language is ambiguous. (Delaney v. Superior Court, supra, 50 Cal.3d 785, 798; ITT World Communications, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (1985) 37 Cal.3d 859, 868 [210 Cal.Rptr. 226, 693 P.2d 811].) Although we find no ambiguity in article VI, section 11, nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, we shall test our construction against those extrinsic aids that bear on the enactors’ intent.

1966 Constitutional Revision

The provision we construe here—California Constitution, article VI, section 11—was enacted in substantially its present form³ in 1966, when the previous article VI was repealed and its provisions revised and redistributed. This comprehensive revision was largely drafted by the California Constitutional Revision Commission,⁴ and a court may consult the commission’s official reports to determine the intent and objective of ambiguous provisions. (Mosk v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474, 495 [159 Cal.Rptr. 494, 601 P.2d 1030].) An examination of the records of the commission’s official proceedings reveals that its basic objective in revising article VI was “to delete provisions which were redundant, obsolete, or unnecessary for inclusion in the Constitution, such as procedural matters which could be prescribed or provided for by statute or court rule.” (Mosk v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 496.) By removing “unnecessary” provisions from article VI, and allowing those matters to be regulated by statute, the commission’s revisions of article VI effectively broadened the scope of the Legislature’s control over judicial procedures.

In its report recommending adoption of section 11 of article VI, the commission gave this explanation for its proposal: “This section collects those parts of existing Sections 4, 4b, 4e, and 5 that deal with appellate jurisdiction. Some of the existing sections contain detailed references to instances of appellate jurisdiction. The Commission deleted those references as unnecessary in the Constitution except in death penalty cases where, because of the extreme nature of the penalty, jurisdiction was given to the Supreme Court. [¶] The phrase ‘on questions of law alone,’ as a description of appellate jurisdiction in criminal causes when judgment of death has been rendered was deleted as unnecessary since this is the ordinary scope of review in appellate courts.” (Cal. Const. Revision Com., Proposed Revision (1966) p. 91.)

We have diligently researched all available records of the commission’s proceedings and reports bearing on the “appellate jurisdiction” provision, and we have found therein not a single reference to a litigant’s “right of appeal” and nothing that would suggest in any way that the commission understood or intended that the “appellate jurisdiction” would confer on litigants a right to a direct appeal.

The new article VI as drafted by the commission and approved by the Legislature was submitted to the voters as Proposition 1-a at the General Election held on November 8, 1966. Because the voters at this election are the enactors of the provision we here construe, their intent governs. (Delaney v. Superior Court, supra, 50 Cal.3d 785, 798.) For further evidence of their intent, we consider the arguments presented in the ballot pamphlet, which are “accepted sources from which to ascertain the voters’ intent.” (Id. at p. 801.)

We have closely examined the ballot pamphlet for the election of November 8, 1966, and in particular those parts dealing with Proposition 1-a. The ballot pamphlet contains no mention of any “right of appeal” under the state Constitution and no suggestion that the “appellate jurisdiction” provision would have an effect not discernible from the “plain meaning” of its words.

Once again, we might well stop here. Having found no support for plaintiffs’ proposed construction in either the language of the “appellate jurisdiction” provision or in sources contemporary with that provision’s enactment, we would certainly be justified in declining to consider more remote and speculative evidence of the enactors’ intent. But plaintiffs and the dissent argue that in adopting article VI, section 11, the voters may be presumed to have intended that the words “appellate jurisdiction” carry the meaning they had in earlier constitutional provisions as authoritatively construed by the courts. They rely on the rule that the “adoption of constitutional language similar to that in a former constitutional provision is presumed to incorporate authoritative judicial construction of the former language.” (Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 8 [118 Cal.Rptr. 21, 529 P.2d 53].) To assess the strength of this argument, we will review the historical antecedents of article VI, section 11, to determine whether, in 1966, the term “appellate jurisdiction” had an “authoritative judicial construction” that embraced a right to a direct appeal.

1849 Constitution

The earliest antecedent of the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the present state Constitution appears in the 1849 Constitution as article VI, section 4. It provided:

“The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases when the matter in dispute exceeds two hundred dollars, when the legality of any tax, toll, or impost or municipal fine is in question, and in all criminal cases amounting to felony or questions of law alone. And the said Court, and each of the Justices thereof, as well as all district and county judges, shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus at the instance of any person held in actual custody. They shall also have power to issue all other writs and process necessary to the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction, and shall be conservators of the peace throughout the state.”

At the Constitutional Convention of 1849,⁵ there was spirited debate about the merits of limiting this court’s appellate jurisdiction to cases “when the matter in dispute exceeds two hundred dollars.” (See Rep. of the Debates, Cal. Const. Convention 1849, pp. 225-233; hereafter 1849 Debates.) Opponents of this restriction argued that it favored the wealthy,⁶ while the proponents argued that it would protect rich and poor alike from the costs of excessive litigation and that the Supreme Court’s time should not be taken up with relatively minor matters.⁷

Because several of the delegates framed the issue as whether litigants in cases involving $200 or less should have a “right of appeal,”⁸ we have carefully examined these statements to determine what the delegates understood that term to mean. Although the delegates never expressly defined the term “right of appeal,” its meaning as used in the convention proceedings is fairly summarized by the remark of one delegate (Mr. Norton) that if a case were to be wrongly decided by a trial court, a litigant “should have the right to go to the highest tribunal to get justice” or the “right to go to a higher tribunal and have that decision reversed.” (1849 Debates, supra, at p. 227.)⁹ Significantly, the debate concerning the $200 limitation contains no discussion of review by petition for extraordinary writ as a procedure separate and distinct from the “right of appeal.” Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the delegates appear to have assumed that if as to a particular matter there was no “appellate jurisdiction”—and hence no “right of appeal”—then the trial court’s judgment would be final and unreviewable.¹⁰ In short, our examination of the constitutional debates persuades us that when the delegates spoke of a “right of appeal,” they used the term “appeal” to include all forms of appellate review, including but not limited to direct appeal.

This would not be an unusual or improper use of the term “appeal.” As a legal term, “appeal” is generally defined as “[r]esort to a superior (i.e., appellate) court to review the decision of an inferior (i.e., trial) court or administrative agency” (Black’s Law Dict., supra, p. 96, col. 2) or, in the words of Justice Story, as “a complaint to a superior court of an injustice done by an inferior one” (U.S. v. Wonson 28 Fed. Cas. 745, 748 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16750), citing 4 Blackstone’s Commentaries 312). Like the term “appellate jurisdiction,” the word “appeal” is not necessarily limited to direct appeals, but may include also writ petitions and other procedural devices.

This court first had occasion to construe the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the 1849 Constitution in People ex rel. Mulford v. Turner (1850) 1 Cal. 143 (hereafter Turner). There, a trial court had made an order expelling three attorneys from the bar for defiant behavior. The expelled attorneys petitioned this court to reverse the order by issuing a writ of mandate. Because the 1849 Constitution had not given this court original jurisdiction in mandate proceedings, there was a question of this court’s power to entertain the petition. This court concluded that it had received power to issue the writ from the part of the 1849 Constitution’s “appellate jurisdiction” provision that expressly granted this court authority “to issue all other writs and process necessary to the exercise of [its] appellate jurisdiction.” (1849 Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4.) Thus, this court recognized at an early date that an appellate court exercises “appellate jurisdiction” when it entertains an original proceeding in mandate for the purpose of reviewing an order or judgment of a trial court.

The “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the 1849 Constitution was again before this court in Haight v. Gay (1857) 8 Cal. 297 (hereafter Haight). In that case, the defendants “sued out a writ of error” after this court had dismissed their appeal for failure to timely file the appellate record. This court granted a motion to quash the writ, relying on a statute that made direct appeal the exclusive means of appellate review for the challenged judgment, thereby barring use of the writ of error as an avenue of appellate review. The defendants contended that by restricting this court’s ability to review the judgment, the statute violated the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the 1849 Constitution. This court rejected the defendants’ attack on the constitutionality of the statute with these words:

“The appellate power of the Supreme Court is given by the fourth section of the sixth article of the Constitution, which expressly empowers this Court to issue all writs and process necessary to the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The Legislature, therefore, can pass no act impairing the exercise of this appellate power. [¶] But while the Legislature cannot substantially impair the right of appeal, it is certainly competent to regulate the mere mode in which this right must be asserted. The Constitution only empowers this Court to issue such writs and process as may be necessary to the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; if this appellate jurisdiction can be exercised without this process, then it cannot be necessary, and should not be issued.” (Haight, supra, 8 Cal. 297, 300, italics added, original italics omitted.)

Like the delegates to the 1849 Constitutional Convention, this court appears to have viewed the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the 1849 Constitution as conferring or implying a “right of appeal,” but this court likewise recognized that there was more than one “mode” in which this “right of appeal” might be exercised. Viewing the “writ of error” and direct appeal as alternative modes of appellate review, we concluded that the Legislature had constitutional authority to determine which mode would be permitted, so long as it did not thereby impair the exercise of the appellate power.

1862 Amendment

In 1862, the 1849 Constitution was amended to provide for appellate jurisdiction in “all cases at law ... in which the demand, exclusive of interest or the value of the property in controversy amounts to three hundred dollars” and “all cases in equity” as well as “cases at law which involve the title or possession of real estate” and “all cases arising in the Probate Courts.” (Cal. Const, of 1849, art. VI, § 4.)

The view that the Legislature had at least some authority to specify the manner in which courts exercised jurisdiction conferred by the 1849 Constitution received additional support in Ex Parte Harker (1875) 49 Cal. 465. There, the petitioners had been taken into custody, in a civil case, under a writ of ne exeat.¹¹ They argued that this use of the common law writ violated a statute restricting the means for making arrests in civil cases. The opposing side argued that the power to issue the writ was implicit in the constitutional grant of original jurisdiction. This court ordered the petitioners discharged from custody, stating that “the mere procedure by which jurisdiction is to be exercised may be prescribed by the Legislature, unless, indeed, such regulations should be found to substantially impair the constitutional powers of the Courts, or practically defeat their exercise.” (Ex Parte Harker, supra, 49 Cal. at p. 467.) Thus, this court construed a provision of the 1849 Constitution conferring “original jurisdiction” as limiting the Legislature’s power to specify procedures for the exercise of that jurisdiction, but it defined that limit in terms of an effect on judicial powers and not in terms of how it might advantage or disadvantage litigants. As we shall see, this court later adopted the same view in construing the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the 1879 Constitution.

1879 Constitution

California adopted a new Constitution in 1879. Article VI, section 4, of that Constitution provided:

“The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases in equity, except such as arise in Justices’ Courts; also, in all cases at law which involve the title or possession of real estate, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or municipal fine, or in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to three hundred dollars; also, in cases of forcible entry and detainer, and in proceedings in insolvency, and in actions to prevent or abate a nuisance, and in all such probate matters as may be provided by law; also, in all criminal cases prosecuted by indictment, or information in a Court of record on questions of law alone. The Court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and habeas corpus, and all other writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Each of the Justices shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus to any part of the State, upon petition by or on behalf of any person held in actual custody, and may make such writs returnable before himself, or the Supreme Court, or before any Superior Court in the State, or before any Judge thereof.”

This provision was the subject of debate at the 1878-1879 Constitutional Convention. (See 2, 3 Debates & Proceedings, Cal. Const. Convention 1878-1879, pp. 962-966, 1333; hereafter 1879 Debates.) Much of the debate concerned the $300 “amount in controversy” limitation on this court’s appellate jurisdiction. As had occurred at the 1849 convention, some of the delegates framed the debate in terms of whether civil litigants in matters involving relatively small sums of money ought to have a “right of appeal,” a term that the delegates did not pause to define.¹² The same term was also used in debating the scope of this court’s appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases.¹³ Once again, the absence of any discussion of the relative merits of writ petitions and direct appeals as alternative modes of appellate review, and the apparent assumption of the delegates that a trial court’s judgment would not be reviewable at all if a litigant was denied a “right of appeal,”¹⁴ strongly support the conclusion that the delegates used the term “right of appeal” expansively to encompass all forms of appellate review.

As we have seen, the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the 1849 Constitution had received an authoritative judicial construction when the 1879 Constitutional Convention performed its labors. This court had established in Turner, supra, 1 Cal. 143, that this court exercised “appellate jurisdiction” when it entertained an original writ proceeding to review an order or judgment of a trial court. And in Haight, supra, 8 Cal. 297, this court had established that review by writ and review by direct appeal were alternative modes for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and that the Legislature had constitutional authority to determine which mode would be available, provided it did not thereby impair the exercise of appellate power. When they adopted language similar to the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the 1849 Constitution, the enactors of the 1879 Constitution may be deemed to have incorporated this authoritative judicial construction.

The 1879 Constitution’s grant of “appellate jurisdiction” to this court was held to be self-executing in People v. Jordan (1884) 65 Cal. 644 [4 P. 683]. There, the People appealed from a judgment for the defendant after the trial court had sustained a demurrer to an indictment charging a misdemeanor. The defendant moved to dismiss the appeal. He argued, among other things, that the appeal would not lie because the Legislature had established an appeal procedure only for those criminal prosecutions “amounting to felonies,” and had established no procedure for appellate review of misdemeanor prosecutions. (Id. at p. 645.)

This court rejected the defendant’s argument, holding that because the 1879 Constitution had granted this court appellate jurisdiction in “all criminal cases prosecuted by indictment,” the Legislature could not defeat that power by failing to establish a procedure for its exercise. We said: “[W]hen a certain jurisdiction has been conferred on this or any court, it is the duty of the court to exercise it; a duty of which it is not relieved by the failure of the legislature to provide a mode for its exercise.” (People v. Jordan, supra, 65 Cal. 644, 646.)

Because the Legislature had not authorized review by extraordinary writ, we did not consider whether appellate review in that form would have satisfied the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the 1879 Constitution. Significantly, however, we referred to the Legislature’s failure to provide “a mode” for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction (People v. Jordan, supra, 65 Cal. 644, 646), thereby necessarily implying that more than one such mode was possible. In context, the word “mode” could refer only to a distinct procedure for obtaining appellate review (such as direct appeal or extraordinary writ petition) and not merely to procedural rules governing direct appeals.

A reference to a “right of appeal” under the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the 1879 Constitution appears in this court’s decision in People v. Perry (1889) 79 Cal. 105 [21 P. 423], but again the context discloses that the reference was to appellate review generally rather than to the specific procedure known as a direct appeal. The case involved a contest between two individuals claiming the same seat on San Francisco’s Board of Health. The claimants litigated the dispute in a special superior court proceeding that the Legislature had established to resolve such contests. The claimant who lost in the superior court appealed to this court. The other claimant (who had prevailed in superior court) argued that the appeal did not lie because the special superior court proceeding was not among the proceedings over which the 1879 Constitution gave this court appellate jurisdiction.

This court rejected the contention, reasoning that the special proceeding was simply a form of quo warranto.¹⁵ This court stated: “[A]nd we think this court retains jurisdiction of the case, notwithstanding the legislature may have changed the procedure, enlarged the remedy, and given it a new name. To hold otherwise would be to admit a power in the legislature to abridge our jurisdiction, and take from parties the right of appeal, by the easy device of a change of procedure, in many cases where the right and jurisdiction are unquestioned.” (People v. Perry, supra, 79 Cal. 105, 108, italics added, original italics omitted.)

This court had occasion to construe the term “appellate jurisdiction” in In re Jessup (1889) 81 Cal. 408 [22 P. 742]. The Legislature had enacted a statute requiring a vote of five of this court’s seven justices to grant a rehearing. To determine the constitutionality of the statute, we examined the provision of the 1879 Constitution granting this court appellate jurisdiction. We said: “[T]he only possible controversy is as to the extent of the power implied ex vi terming¹⁶ by the phrase ‘appellate jurisdiction.’ That this embraces the right to review the final judgments of the courts of original jurisdiction,—the right, in other words, to reverse, affirm, or modify them, and to enforce by some appropriate mandatory process the judgment of the appellate tribunal,—will scarcely be denied.” (In re Jessup, supra, 81 Cal. 408, 465; see also Maxson v. Superior Court (1899) 124 Cal. 468, 473-474 [57 P. 379].) This definition of “appellate jurisdiction”—as the power or “right” of one court to correct error in a decision, order, or judgment of another court—is consistent with common legal usage, as we have seen.

This court’s decision in In re Jessup, supra, 81 Cal. 408, is significant also because it further supports the conclusion that a court may exercise “appellate jurisdiction” by means other than direct appeal. Quoting from Ex Parte Harker, supra, 49 Cal. 465, 467, we reiterated that “ ‘the mere procedure by which jurisdiction is to be exercised may be prescribed by the legislature, unless, indeed, such regulations should be found to substantially impair the constitutional powers of the courts, or practically defeat their exercise.’ ” (In re Jessup, supra, 81 Cal. 408, 470, italics omitted.)

1904 Amendment

In 1904, article VI, section 4 of the Constitution was amended to establish the Courts of Appeal and to transfer from this court to those courts “appellate jurisdiction on appeal from the Superior Courts in all cases at law in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to three hundred dollars, and does not amount to two thousand dollars; also, in all cases of forcible and unlawful entry and detainer (except such as arise in Justices’ Courts), in proceedings in insolvency, and in actions to prevent or abate a nuisance; in proceedings of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition, usurpation of office, contesting elections and eminent domain, and in such other special proceedings as may be provided by law (excepting cases in which appellate jurisdiction is given to the Supreme Court); also, on questions of law alone, in all criminal cases prosecuted by indictment or information in a court of record, excepting criminal cases where judgment of death has been rendered.”

This court retained appellate jurisdiction over all cases in equity, cases involving title to or possession of real estate, the legality of any tax, or where the amount in controversy was $2,000 or more, and in “such probate matters as may be provided by law.” (Cal. Const, of 1879, art. VI, § 4, as amended Nov. 8, 1904.)

The scope of the Legislature’s authority to regulate appellate procedures was again before this court in In re Sutter-Butte By-Pass Assessment (1923) 190 Cal. 532 [213 P. 974] (hereafter Sutter-Butte). Having authorized a drainage district to issue bonds and to assess benefited property for revenue to service the bonds, the Legislature established a special validation proceeding under which three superior court judges in the most affected county would determine the validity of an assessment. The Legislature further provided that “[t]he decision of a majority of said court shall be final and conclusive, and no motion for a new trial of said proceeding shall be allowed, and no appeal from the judgment given and made by said court shall be had.” (Stats. 1919, ch. 520, § 8, p. 1094.)

When property owners affected by one such assessment attempted to appeal a validation decision to this court, the drainage district moved to dismiss the appeal. This court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the statute making the three-judge ruling nonappealable was invalid as violating the “right of appeal” implicit in the constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction over cases concerning the validity of assessments. This court declared that “litigants have a constitutionally guaranteed right of appeal in all litigated matters within the express jurisdiction of appellate courts.” (SutterButte, supra, 190 Cal. 532, 536.) We further stated that “if the proceeding before us is included in that class of cases . . . over which appellate jurisdiction has been given by the constitution the appellants have a constitutionally guaranteed right of appeal of which they cannot be deprived.” (Id. at p. 537.)

As in the 1849 and 1878-1879 constitutional debates concerning the “amount in controversy” limitations, and as in People v. Jordan, supra, 65 Cal. 644 and People v. Perry, supra, 79 Cal. 105, the issue before this court in Sutter-Butte, supra, 190 Cal. 532, was not whether the Legislature could specify a procedure other than direct appeal by which this court or the Courts of Appeal could exercise constitutionally conferred “appellate jurisdiction,” but whether the Legislature could eliminate all procedures for the exercise of that jurisdiction. We are persuaded that this court’s use of the term “right of appeal” in that context carried the same meaning as in the 1849 and 1878-1879 constitutional debates and in this court’s earlier decisions in People v. Perry, supra, 79 Cal. 105, 107, and in Haight, supra, 8 Cal. 297, 300,—that is, a right to some effective procedural vehicle by which to invoke the constitutionally conferred appellate jurisdiction. We do not conclude, as plaintiffs would have us do, that the term was intended to refer only to direct appeals.

1928 Amendment

In 1928, the “appellate jurisdiction” provisions of the 1879 Constitution were again amended. As amended, the Constitution gave the Courts of Appeal appellate jurisdiction “on appeal from the superior courts (except in cases in which appellate jurisdiction is given to the supreme court) in all cases at law in which the superior courts are given original jurisdiction; also, in all cases of forcible or unlawful entry or detainer (except such as arise in municipal, or in justices’ or other inferior courts); in proceedings in insolvency; in actions to prevent or abate a nuisance; in proceedings of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, usurpation of office, removal from office, contesting elections, eminent domain, and in such other special proceedings as may be provided by law; also, on questions of law alone, in all criminal cases prosecuted by indictment or information, except where judgment of death has been rendered.” (Cal. Const, of 1879, art. VI, § 4b, as adopted Nov. 6, 1928.)¹⁷

Any lingering uncertainty about whether the “appellate jurisdiction” provisions of the 1849 and 1879 Constitutions conferred on civil litigants a right to a direct appeal was dispelled by this court’s opinion in Trede v. Superior Court (1943) 21 Cal.2d 630 [134 P.2d 745]. There, a building and loan association brought a superior court action for the return of association assets that the Building and Loan Commissioner had seized. After losing the case in superior court, the association appealed. While the appeal was pending, the commissioner applied to the superior court for authorization to liquidate the association’s assets. One of the association’s investors objected to the application, but the superior court overruled her objections. The investor, later joined by the association, then sought a writ of prohibition from this court, asserting that the association’s appeal would be rendered meaningless if the commissioner liquidated the assets before the appeal was decided. They argued that the Building and Loan Association Act (Stats. 1931, ch. 269, pp. 483-554), to the extent it authorized asset liquidation pending appeal, was an “unreasonable exercise of the police power.” (Trede v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.2d 630, 632.)

This court rejected the argument and denied the writ. Although nothing in this court’s opinion indicates that the association had relied on a constitutional right of appeal, this court nonetheless addressed that subject, with these words: “There is no constitutional right to an appeal; the appellate procedure is entirely statutory and subject to complete legislative control.” (Trede v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.2d 630, 634.) This court cited no authority for the stated propositions, nor did we mention the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the state Constitution or any of the cases construing that provision. But the statement may not be dismissed as dictum. The petitioners had argued that once the commissioner had liquidated the association’s assets, their appeal would be rendered meaningless. We did not dispute that liquidation would have this result, but concluded, in effect, that petitioner’s right of appeal, because it was entirely statutory in origin, did not prevail over the commissioner’s statutory authority to liquidate the assets. If the right of appeal derived from the Constitution, this reasoning could not have sufficed.

Plaintiff’s position is further undermined by this court’s decision in Modern Barber Col. v. Cal. Emp. Stab. Com. (1948) 31 Cal.2d 720 [192 P.2d 916] (hereafter Modern Barber). The case arose under the Unemployment Insurance Act (Stats. 1935, ch. 352, p. 1226 et seq.), which required employers to contribute to an unemployment compensation fund according to the number of persons they employed. The California Employment Stabilization Commission (the agency charged with administering the act) had found that the students, proprietor, and bookkeeper of a barber college were all its employees. To challenge these findings, the college petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate.

The question on appeal in this court was whether the barber college could maintain the mandate action without first paying the contributions. A provision of the act (§45.11, subd. (d)) made a suit for refund the exclusive means of challenging the commission’s decision, but the college contended that the statute was unconstitutional, arguing that it both denied employers due process of law and interfered with the constitutional grant of original jurisdiction to superior courts in mandate actions. We rejected both grounds, concluding, as to the second, that the statute did not interfere with the constitutional grant of original jurisdiction because the Legislature had general authority to define rights such as the right to make a prepayment challenge of a tax, whether by mandate or otherwise. As this court put it, “Except as the Constitution otherwise provides, the Legislature has complete power to determine the rights of individuals” and also “to regulate and circumscribe the methods and means of enjoying those rights, so long as there is no interference with constitutional guaranties.” (Modern Barber, supra, 31 Cal.2d 720, 726.)

Further developing this idea, we added:

“The fallacy of petitioner’s position is again exposed when we consider the law governing appeals. The Constitution (art. VI, §§ 4, 4b) provides that the Supreme Court and the District Courts of Appeal ‘shall have appellate jurisdiction on appeal from the Superior Court. . . .’ In interpreting this provision, the courts have held that the Legislature has the power to declare by statute what orders are appealable, and, unless a statute does so declare, the order is not appealable. (Gale v. Tuolumne County Water Co., 169 Cal. 46 [145 P. 532]; see Trede v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.2d 630, 634 [134 P.2d 745]; cf. Byers v. Smith, 4 Cal.2d 209 [47 P.2d 705] [express constitutional right of appeal in cases involving removal from public office]; In re SutterButte By-Pass Assessment, 190 Cal. 532 [213 P. 974] [express constitutional right of appeal in cases involving legality of tax assessments].)” (Modern Barber, supra, 31 Cal.2d 720, 728.)

In assessing the significance of this statement, it may be useful to examine the authorities this court cited. In Gale v. Tuolumne County Water Co., 169 Cal. 46 [145 P. 532], this court dismissed an appeal from a contempt judgment on the authority of Tyler v. Connolly (1884) 65 Cal. 28 [2 P. 414], in which this court had held that no appeal would lie from a contempt judgment because contempt proceedings were not among the categories of cases over which the 1879 Constitution had granted this court appellate jurisdiction (id. at p. 30). After “[c]onceding that the legislature may confer appellate jurisdiction on this court in cases not provided for in the Constitution,” we concluded that the Legislature had not done so for contempt judgments, but on the contrary had provided, in Code of Civil Procedure section 1222, that judgments in contempt proceedings are “final and conclusive.” (Tyler v. Connolly, supra, 65 Cal. at p. 30.) The cases of Trede v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.2d 630, and Sutter-Butte, supra, 190 Cal. 532, we have already discussed. Byers v. Smith (1935) 4 Cal.2d 209 [47 P.2d 705] (hereafter Byers), was a mandate proceeding by an elected city attorney to ensure continued payment of his salary, and to prevent election or appointment of a replacement, pending the outcome of his appeal from a superior court judgment removing him from office on grounds of misconduct. This court granted the requested relief, noting that the 1928 constitutional amendment had conferred appellate jurisdiction on the Courts of Appeal “ ‘in proceedings of . . . removal from office’ ” and that some means of staying the judgment was necessary to ensure that the appeal would provide the officeholder an effective remedy. (Id. at p. 212.) After noting that under former Political Code section 996 an office became vacant upon the holder’s removal, this court observed, with a citation to Sutter-Butte, supra, that “the legislature has not the power, either through direct enactment or indirect device, to destroy or abridge the right of an appeal constitutionally granted.” (Byers, supra, 4 Cal.2d at p. 214.)

Because Modern Barber's entire discussion of the “right of appeal” was dictum, intended only to illustrate the general principle that the Legislature has authority “to regulate and circumscribe the methods and means of enjoying . . . rights, so long as there is no interference with constitutional guaranties” (Modern Barber, supra, 31 Cal.2d 720, 726), it is not authority on the issue we face here; therefore, extensive analysis is not warranted. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that in Modern Barber, this court, although not purporting to overrule our earlier decisions in Byers, supra, 4 Cal.2d 209, and Sutter-Butte, supra, 190 Cal. 532, did appear to suggest that the “constitutional right of appeal” mentioned in those cases extended only to proceedings specifically mentioned in the constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction, and not to proceedings encompassed by jurisdictional grants phrased in more general terms.

In addition to Trede v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.2d 630, a number of cases decided before the November 1966 General Election declared that there was no constitutional right of appeal or (what amounts to the same thing) that the right of appeal is wholly statutory. (See, e.g., Lund v. Superior Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 698, 709 [39 Cal.Rptr. 891, 394 P.2d 707] [stating that “no order or judgment in a civil action is appealable unless it is embraced within the list of appealable orders provided by statute”]; In re Conley (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 755, 759 [53 Cal.Rptr. 321] [stating that “there is no constitutional right to an appeal”]; City of Los Angeles v. Schweitzer (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 448, 452 [19 Cal.Rptr. 429] [same]; Efron v. Kalmanovitz (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 149, 157 [8 Cal.Rptr. 107] [same]; Kadota Fig Assn. v. Case-Swayne Co. (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 815, 823 [167 P.2d 523] [stating that “[t]he right of appeal is statutory”]; Jackson v. Jackson (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 837, 839 [163 P.2d 780] [stating that “[t]he right of appeal is purely statutory”]; Leftridge v. City of Sacramento (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 516, 526 [139 P.2d 112] [stating that “[t]he right of appeal is statutory”]; Strauch v. Bieloh (1936) 16 Cal.App.2d 278, 280 [60 P.2d 582] [stating that “[t]he right of appeal is entirely statutory”].)

Reflecting this widespread understanding, a respected guide to California civil procedure in use at the time of the November 1966 General Election, expressed a similar view, in these words: “There is no constitutional right to an appeal or other review of a judicial decision, and the Legislature therefore has power to change the procedure, limit the right, or even abolish the right altogether.” (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) Appeal, § 1, p. 2141, original italics.) The same work also noted, however, that “if appellate jurisdiction is conferred by the California Constitution, it cannot be destroyed or abridged by legislative action or inaction . . . .” (Ibid.)

Having traced the constitutional antecedents of the current “appellate jurisdiction” provision, we return to the question whether, at the time of the November 1966 General Election, there was an “authoritative judicial construction” (see Sarracino v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d 1, 8) of the term “appellate jurisdiction” as conferring on litigants a right of direct appeal. As we have seen, there are no cases directly in point. Before the 1966 General Election, neither this court nor the Courts of Appeal were ever called upon to determine the constitutional validity of a legislative scheme making review by extraordinary writ the exclusive mode of appellate review of a superior court proceeding within the appellate jurisdiction of this court or the Courts of Appeal. Because the positive authority of an appellate opinion is coextensive only with the facts presented by the case (Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 734-735 [257 Cal.Rptr. 708, 771 P.2d 406]), the absence of any case presenting these facts necessarily means that there was no “binding judicial construction” of the “appellate jurisdiction” language as it applies to this issue.

Furthermore, although some early cases referred to a constitutional “right of appeal,” they appear to have used that term to encompass a right to appellate review generally, and later cases either implied that the constitutional right of appeal was limited to superior court proceedings expressly mentioned in the “appellate jurisdiction” provision or denied the existence of any constitutional right of appeal. Given this uncertainty and conflict in the case law, we conclude that in 1966 plaintiffs’ proposed construction of the “appellate jurisdiction” language—that is, that it confers on civil litigants a right of direct appeal—did not have the sanction of an authoritative judicial construction. For this reason, we reject plaintiffs’ proposed construction.

This conclusion is reinforced by consideration of cases decided after 1966. In those cases, we find no decisions affirming the existence of a “right of appeal” under the state Constitution, nor do we find references to the “appellate jurisdiction” provision as limiting the Legislature’s authority to determine which superior court judgments and orders are reviewable by direct appeal and which by extraordinary writ or other mode of review. We do find many pronouncements by California courts, including this one, that there is no constitutional right of appeal and that the right of appeal is wholly statutory in origin. (See, e.g., Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 696, 705 [238 Cal.Rptr. 780, 739 P.2d 140]; People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 709 [135 Cal.Rptr. 392, 557 P.2d 976]; In re Marriage of Griffin (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 685, 687 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 94]; Steen v. Fremont Cemetery Corp. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1226 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 780]; In re Taya C. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 1, 6 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 810]; Rao v. Campo (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1564 [285 Cal.Rptr. 691]; County of Monterey v. Mahabir (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1650, 1653 [282 Cal.Rptr. 924]; In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 228, 232 [260 Cal.Rptr. 453]; State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Hardin (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 501, 505 [259 Cal.Rptr. 433]; Uptain v. Duarte (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1258, 1261 [254 Cal.Rptr. 150]; In re T. M. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 314, 316 [253 Cal.Rptr. 535]; Reisman v. Shahverdian (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 1074, 1088 [201 Cal.Rptr. 194]; Redevelopment Agency v. Goodman (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 424, 432 [125 Cal.Rptr. 818]; Draus v. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 485, 489 [68 Cal.Rptr. 154]; Woodman v. Ackerman (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 644, 649 [57 Cal.Rptr. 687].)

Although we recognize that none of these cases is directly on point, they nonetheless represent a significant consensus of judicial thinking on this topic over the past 30 years. We find nothing in any of these decisions to support plaintiffs’ contention. We also note that courts in other states with constitutions containing “appellate jurisdiction” provisions similar to article VI, section 11 of our state Constitution, have rejected the contention that this language confers on litigants a right of direct appeal. (See, e.g., Appeal of O’Rourke (1974) 300 Minn. 158 [220 N.W.2d 811].)

This does not mean, however, that the “appellate jurisdiction” provision imposes no restrictions on the Legislature’s authority to allocate appellate review as between direct appeals and extraordinary writ petitions. As we have seen, the plain language of the provision reveals that it is a grant of judicial authority and this form of grant has been interpreted to mean that, although the Legislature may regulate the mode of appellate review, it may do so only to the extent that it does not thereby “ ‘substantially impair the constitutional powers of the courts, or practically defeat their exercise.’ ” (In re Jessup, supra, 81 Cal. 408, 470, italics omitted; see also Haight, supra, 8 Cal. 297, 300.) If it could be demonstrated in a given case, or class of cases, that, for whatever reason, the Courts of Appeal or this court could not effectively exercise the constitutionally granted power of appellate review by an extraordinary writ proceeding, then such a proceeding could not constitutionally be made the exclusive mode of appellate review.

No such claim is made here, however, and we see no reason to conclude that extraordinary writ review is not a sufficient or effective appellate remedy in this or other PRA cases. Indeed, an examination of the history of § 6259(c), making petition for extraordinary writ the only mode of appellate review in PRA cases, shows that it was intended not to impair judicial power but to make the appellate remedy more effective for litigants seeking disclosure of public records.

Our opinion in Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325 [283 Cal.Rptr. 893, 813 P.2d 240] (hereafter Times-Mirror), explains the origin, evolution, and purpose of this provision:

“Prior to 1984, review of a trial court order either directing disclosure of a public record or refusing disclosure was by appeal. In 1984, however, the Legislature substituted a writ procedure for the appellate process by amending section 6259 to provide as follows: ‘In an action filed on or after January 1, 1985, an order of the court, either directing disclosure by a public official or supporting the decision of the public official refusing disclosure, is not a final judgment or order within the meaning of Section 904.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure from which an appeal may be taken, but shall be immediately reviewable by petition to the appellate court for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of review as defined in Section 1067 of the Code of Civil Procedure.’ (§ 6259, subd. (c); Stats. 1984, ch. 802, § 1, pp. 2804-2805.) . . . .

“[T]he legislative history of the 1984 amendment to section 6259, subdivision (c) reveals that the exclusive purpose of the amendment was to speed appellate review, not to limit its scope. The bill which contained the amendment, Senate Bill No. 2222, 1983-1984 Regular Session, was sponsored by a news organization, the California Newspaper Publishers’ Association. It was inspired by a case in which a newspaper had successfully sued in the superior court to obtain government records, but was forced to wait several years while the case was on appeal, by which time the story was no longer newsworthy.

“The perceived evil at which the bill was aimed, according to a Senate Judiciary Committee analysis, was ‘delays of the appeal process, [by means of which] public officials are frustrating the intent of the laws for disclosure . . . .’ ‘The sponsors of this bill,’ the analysis continued, ‘seek to correct an injustice they perceive due to . . . the potential for . . . public agencies to delay the disclosure of public documents.’ Accordingly, the amendment’s goal was ‘to prohibit public agencies from delaying the disclosure of public records by appealing a trial court decision and using continuances in order to frustrate the intent of the Public Records Act.’ (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2222 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.).)” (Times-Mirror, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1332-1335, original italics, fns. omitted.)

After the 1984 amendment, a Court of Appeal held that the scope of review in PRA actions under the writ of review was confined to jurisdictional issues, and thus was much narrower than the scope of review on direct appeal. (Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1102, 1109 [231 Cal.Rptr. 189].) Following this decision, the Legislature amended section 6259(c) to eliminate the reference to the “writ of review,” and to provide instead that superior court orders under the PRA “shall be immediately reviewable by petition to the appellate court for issuance of an extraordinary writ.” (Stats. 1990, ch. 908, § 2.) As we noted in Times-Mirror, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1335-1336, “[t]he amendment also added two new provisions: (1) the petition for extraordinary writ must be filed within ten days[¹⁸] after receipt of notice of the trial court order, and (2) no stay of the trial court order shall be permitted ‘unless the petitioning party demonstrates it will otherwise sustain irreparable damage and probable success on the merits.’ ”

As we explained in Times-Mirror, the 1990 amendment reinforces our conclusions about the legislative purpose underlying section 6259(c): “The effect of the 1990 amendment providing for review by ‘extraordinary writ,’ including presumably writ of mandate, is, of course, to make it plain that review of orders subject to the amendment is not confined to acts in excess of jurisdiction. The analysis of the bill prepared for the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary indicates that the recent amendment was a response to Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d 1102, and was intended to overrule that decision by ‘clarifying’ that the purpose of writ review is to speed appellate review, not to preclude review on the merits. As the analysis explains, ‘[T]he courts [(an apparent reference to Freedom Newspapers)] . . . have narrowly interpreted [the 1984 amendment] to review questions of jurisdiction and not broader as intended by the original statute. The bill expands the extraordinary writ by clarifying that courts can rule quickly on substantive issues.’ (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2272 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.), italics added.)” (Times-Mirror, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1336.)

Thus, the history of section 6259(c) reveals that the Legislature’s purpose in replacing review by direct appeal with review by extraordinary writ was in no sense to disadvantage litigants seeking review of PRA decisions or to constrict the power of the Courts of Appeal to correct errors in those decisions. Rather, the legislative objective was to expedite the process and thereby to make the appellate remedy more effective.

To achieve this objective, the Legislature eliminated direct appeals in PRA cases. Its reason for doing so becomes apparent when we examine certain rules governing extraordinary writs.

Generally, a judgment that is immediately appealable is not subject to review by mandate or other extraordinary writ. (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 369 [134 Cal.Rptr. 197, 556 P.2d 297]; Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 15 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839].) Mandate is available to review an appealable judgment only when the remedy by appeal would be inadequate or the issues presented are of great public importance and must be resolved promptly. (Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 801, 808 [114 Cal.Rptr. 577, 523 P.2d 617]; California Trial Lawyers Assn. v. Superior Court (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 575, 578-579 [231 Cal.Rptr. 725]; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.) A remedy by immediate direct appeal is presumed to be adequate, and a party seeking review by extraordinary writ bears the burden of demonstrating that appeal would not be an adequate remedy under the particular circumstances of that case. (Phelan v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363, 370 [217 P.2d 951].)

In light of these rules, the Legislature’s reason for eliminating direct appeals is readily apparent. Had the Legislature not abolished direct appeals in PRA cases, parties seeking review by extraordinary writ would have been required in each case to demonstrate the inadequacy of appeal. Litigation of this issue would have complicated the proceeding and introduced a risk that a Court of Appeal, not fully realizing the importance of speedy relief in many PRA cases, would erroneously deny an extraordinary writ petition on the ground that an adequate remedy existed by appeal. To keep the process simple and streamlined, and to remove a procedural barrier to review on the merits, the Legislature barred direct appeal of PRA decisions.

Plaintiffs may be understood to argue that appellate review by extraordinary writ petition is inherently less effective than a remedy by direct appeal because issuance of the extraordinary writs is discretionary whereas direct appeal guarantees a decision on the merits. The argument betrays a serious misunderstanding of the discretionary character of extraordinary writs.

Although appellate review by extraordinary writ petition is said to be discretionary, a court must exercise its discretion “within reasonable bounds and for a proper reason.” (Scott v. Municipal Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 995, 997 [115 Cal.Rptr. 620].) The discretionary aspect of writ review comes into play primarily when the petitioner has another remedy by appeal and the issue is whether the alternative remedy is adequate. (See, e.g., Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 901, fn. 3 [160 Cal.Rptr. 124, 603 P.2d 41] [stating that courts have discretion to deny extraordinary writ petitions “[b]ecause the law does provide other means of judicial review in such cases”].)

When an extraordinary writ proceeding is the only avenue of appellate review, a reviewing court’s discretion is quite restricted. Referring to the writ of mandate, this court has said: “ ‘Its issuance is not necessarily a matter of right, but lies rather in the discretion of the court, but where one has a substantial right to protect or enforce, and this may be accomplished by such a writ, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, he [or she] is entitled as a matter of right to the writ, or perhaps more correctly, in other words, it would be an abuse of discretion to refuse it.’ ” (Dowell v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 483, 486-487 [304 P.2d 1009], quoting Potomac Oil Co. v. Dye (1909) 10 Cal.App. 534, 537 [102 P. 677]; accord, May v. Board of Directors (1949) 34 Cal.2d 125, 133-134 [208 P.2d 661].) Accordingly, when writ review is the exclusive means of appellate review of a final order or judgment, an appellate court may not deny an apparently meritorious writ petition, timely presented in a formally and procedurally sufficient manner, merely because, for example, the petition presents no important issue of law or because the court considers the case less worthy of its attention than other matters.¹⁹

The Concurring Opinion

Invoking the principle of judicial self-restraint, Justices George and Arabian would decide only that section 6259(c) does not violate the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the state Constitution, without undertaking to construe that provision in any meaningful way. They decline to decide not only whether the provision gives litigants a constitutional right of appeal in other superior court proceedings, but also whether it would permit the Legislature to abrogate all forms of appellate review of superior court decisions in PRA actions.

Although courts should not fashion unnecessarily broad constitutional rules, courts must construe constitutional provisions when necessary to resolve issues properly presented. Recognizing that this court’s role in the judicial system is to settle “important questions of law” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(a)), and that, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, it is “emphatically ... the province and duty of the judicial department... to say what the law is” (Marbury v. Madison, supra, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (2 L.Ed. 60, 73]), we have used established methods of constitutional interpretation to determine whether, as plaintiffs contend, the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of our state Constitution confers on litigants a right of direct appeal from final judgments and orders in superior court actions, and we have concluded that it does not. As we have seen, this court has not hesitated in the past to affirm or deny the existence of a constitutional “right of appeal.” Indeed, we have spoken to this issue so many times, making so many apparently conflicting statements without careful analysis, that the time for a definitive construction should no longer be postponed. To suddenly turn coy on this issue, after decades of careless loquacity, is to shirk our constitutional obligation, to create or at least perpetuate uncertainty, and to invite needless litigation.

III

The Legislature, in section 6259(c), has provided that the mode of appellate review for superior court decisions in PRA cases shall be an extraordinary writ proceeding rather than direct appeal. To determine whether, as plaintiffs contend, the “appellate jurisdiction” provision of the state Constitution forbids this legislative choice, we have examined the text and history of this constitutional provision, including judicial decisions construing and applying its constitutional predecessors. We conclude that the “appellate jurisdiction” provision does not require the Legislature to provide for direct appeals in all cases within the original jurisdiction of the superior courts; that it permits some variation in and experimentation with the traditional procedures for appellate review of civil actions brought in the superior courts, provided always that the constitutional powers of the courts are not thereby impaired; and that in particular it does not afford litigants in PRA cases a constitutionally guaranteed right to a direct appeal.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.

Baxter, J., and Werdegar, J., concurred.

1 Subsequent references in this opinion to “direct appeals” should be understood in the sense intended by plaintiffs—that is, a procedure for appellate review that includes oral argument, a decision on the merits, and a written opinion.

[2] 2The state Constitution provides (in article VI, section 10) that superior courts have original jurisdiction “in habeas corpus proceedings,” in “proceedings for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition,” and in “all causes except those given by statute to other trial courts.”

3 Proposition 191, operative January 1, 1995, deleted a reference to “justice courts” in the second sentence of article VI, section 11.

4 The last sentence of the “appellate jurisdiction” provision, concerning appellate fact-finding, was not part of the draft that the commission submitted to the Legislature; the Legislature added this sentence before submitting the proposed revision to the voters.

5 To resolve an ambiguity in a constitutional provision, a court may consider the debates at the constitutional convention at which the provision was drafted. (State Board of Education v. Levit (1959) 52 Cal.2d 441, 462 [343 P.2d 8]; Story v. Richardson (1921) 186 Cal. 162, 165 [198 P. 1057, 18 A.L.R. 750]; Older v. Superior Court (1910) 157 Cal. 770, 776 [109 P. 478].) The debates are useful “less for the purpose of learning the opinion of particular members upon points of verbal construction than for informing ourselves historically of the evil which it was intended to guard against, or the benefit to be secured.” (Matter of Smith (1907) 152 Cal. 566, 569 [93 P. 191].) We have cautioned that the convention debates “furnish but an uncertain and often unreliable guide in the interpretation of Constitutions” because the spoken comments may not express the views “of those by whose votes a measure of importance is passed.” (People v. McCreery (1868) 34 Cal. 432, 453; accord, Pitts v. Reagan (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 112, 118 [92 Cal.Rptr. 27); Helping Hand Home v. San Diego (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 452, 457 [79 P.2d 778].)

6 For example, one delegate, Mr. Lippitt, asserted that the proposed rule would preclude the poor, whose disputes often involve less than $200, from final resolution of legal disputes by a “wiser” higher court and, thus, “will work oppressively upon the poor.” (1849 Debates, supra, at p. 226.) Similarly, Mr. Hastings said the restriction “strikes fatally at another unfortunate class of men—the poor.” (Id. at p. 227.) He added: “[I]f you deprive [a poor man] of the right of appeal,” he will remain subjected exclusively to the “County Court, . . . [which] is probably under the immediate influence of wealthy men .... The rich man’s influence operates almost unconsciously upon the members of the court. . . . But give the poor man the privilege of going further, and he goes to a Court that is beyond the influence of the wealthy man.” (Id. at p. 229.)

7 Mr. Noriego asserted that the limitation was necessary to preclude litigants from pressing an appeal in minor cases merely “to gratify a malicious feeling towards the opposite party.” (1849 Debates, supra, at p. 225.) Referring to the Supreme Court, another delegate, Mr. Jones, stated that “its time and attention should not be occupied by such small matters.” (Id. at p. 226.) Noting that many in California were “totally unacquainted with the technicalities of the law,” Mr. Noriego warned of “the abuses to which this right of appeal in petty cases would subject them.” (Id. at p. 228.) Mr. Ord also supported the limitation, echoing reasons advanced by Mr. Noriego: “[I]f you give the right of appeal in all cases, whatever the amount in controversy, the rich man can take his appeal.... It may cost the poor man ten times the amount of the original claim.” (Id. at pp. 228-229.)

8 References to a “right of appeal” are numerous. (See, e.g., 1849 Debates, supra, at pp. 225 [Lippitt], 227 [Norton], 228 [Hastings], 230 [Vermeule].) Some delegates framed the issue in terms of whether there should be a “right of appeal in all cases” (id. at pp. 227 [Hastings], 228 [Ord], 229 [Vermeule]) or whether instead the Constitution should bar “this right of appeal in petty cases” (id. at p. 228 [Noriego]).

9 To similar effect is the statement by Mr. Lippitt that “the poor have just as much right to carry up their disputes, and have them settled by the most competent tribunals, as the richest man in the land.” (1849 Debates, supra, at p. 226, italics added; see also ibid. [Mr. Sherwood’s reference to “the chance to go to a higher tribunal”].)

10 In the words of Mr. Lippitt, for example, the $200 limitation effectively tells “the poor man ... he shall not have the benefit of any higher tribunal than the District Court” and thereby “prohibits the application of the best talent and fairest judgment to all disputes under $200.” (1849 Debates, supra, at pp. 226, 229; see also id. at pp. 227-228 [remarks of Mr. Hastings].)

11 A writ of ne exeat “forbids the person to whom it is addressed to leave the country, the state, or the jurisdiction of the court.” (Black’s Law Dict., supra, p. 1031, col. 2; see also In re Marriage of Gray (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1239, 1244 [251 Cal.Rptr. 846].)

12 For example, Mr. McFarland stated that the provision “proposes to give the right to appeal in all cases in which the amount in dispute is three hundred dollars” and that “[i]t may be said that a man ought to have the right to appeal in any case.” (1879 Debates, supra, at p. 963.) Mr. McCallum argued in favor of “giving the right of appeal, or rather retaining the right of appeal, in all cases involving three hundred dollars and upwards.” (Ibid.)

13 Mr. Terry proposed an amendment, which the convention adopted, to extend the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in criminal matters to all cases “prosecuted by indictment, or information in a Court of record” rather than to all cases “amounting to felony” because under the latter language “the right of appeal depended, not upon the verdict of the jury, but upon the sentence of the Court.” (1879 Debates, supra, at p. 964.) Explaining the proposed amendment, he said: “I propose to extend the right of appeal to all cases prosecuted by indictment . . . .” (Ibid.) Arguing in support, Mr. Wilson said: “If a man is prosecuted by indictment, then the offense rises to such magnitude that it seems to me every citizen should have the right of appeal.” (Ibid.)

14 For example, Mr. McFarland, referring to cases involving small sums of money, said: “I believe that benefits would accrue to litigants in all that class of cases, if the decision of the Court below was final.” (1879 Debates, supra, at p. 963.) Shortly thereafter, he gave this explanation: “When all parties have an understanding that the judgment is final, that judgment will be much more apt to be right than where each party understands there is going to be an appeal.” (Ibid.) In closing, he observed: “. . . more justice can be done to the parties with the understanding that the trial shall be ended in the lower Court than where you grant an appeal.” (Ibid.)

Mr. Herrington made a similar remark: "... I believe that in every instance where a person is prevented from any further litigation it will be to his best interest that it shall be adopted and he prevented from taking any further steps.” (1879 Debates, supra, at p. 964.)

15 Quo warranto is a remedy “against any person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any public office, civil or military, or any franchise, or against any corporation, either de jure or de facto, which usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any franchise, within this state.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 803; see also Citizens Utilities Co. v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 399, 406 [128 Cal.Rptr. 582]; 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Extraordinary Writs, § 6, pp. 645-646.)

16 The Latin phrase “ex vi termini” means “[f]rom or by the force of the term” or “[f]rom the very meaning of the expression used.” (Black’s Law Dict., supra, p. 589, col. 2.)

17 The 1928 amendment eliminated the “amount in controversy” limitation on the appellate jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal. The Legislature could, however, set the “amount in controversy” limit for the original jurisdiction of the superior courts. Cases excluded from the superior courts’ original jurisdiction by this means would also, of course, be removed from the appellate jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal.

18 The time for filing the writ petition has since been expanded from 10 days to 20 days. (Stats. 1993, ch. 926, § 10.)

19 In his dissenting opinion, the Chief Justice asserts that the legislative history of section 6259(c) “forecloses” this conclusion (dis. opn. of Lucas, C. J., post, at p. 172) and reveals instead a legislative intent to invest the Courts of Appeal with discretion to summarily deny extraordinary writ petitions on grounds unrelated to the merits of the PRA action or to the formal or procedural sufficiency of the petition. The Chief Justice fails to say, however, what those additional grounds might be.

We disagree. The legislative history of section 6259(c) demonstrates the Legislature’s understanding that an appellate court may deny an extraordinary writ petition summarily— that is, without issuing an alternative writ or order to show cause, without affording the parties an opportunity for oral argument, and without issuing a written opinion—and that this power of summary denial distinguishes writ review from direct appeal. But the legislative history discloses no purpose to alter established rules of law governing extraordinary writs as articulated in Dowell v. Superior Court, supra, 47 Cal.2d 483, and May v. Board of Directors, supra, 34 Cal.2d 125, by expanding the grounds for summary denials of extraordinary writ petitions in PRA cases. Had the Legislature entertained such an intent, surely it would have specified the additional grounds in section 6259(c).