People v. Cook , 60 Cal. 4th 922 ( 2015 )


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  • Filed 2/5/15
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
    THE PEOPLE,                          )
    )
    Plaintiff and Respondent, )
    )                            S215927
    v.                        )
    )                      Ct.App. 4/2 E054307
    VICTORIA SAMANTHA COOK,              )
    )                       Riverside County
    Defendant and Appellant.  )                Super. Ct. No. SWF10000834
    ____________________________________)
    When a defendant is convicted of a crime, the sentence for that crime may
    sometimes be enhanced if the defendant “personally inflicts great bodily injury on
    any person.” (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a).)1 Defendant was convicted of
    three counts of gross vehicular manslaughter. We must decide whether the
    sentence for the gross vehicular manslaughter of one victim may be enhanced for
    defendant‟s infliction of great bodily injury on other victims. The question
    requires us to interpret section 12022.7, subdivision (g), which provides that the
    1      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
    indicated. Penal Code former section 12022.7, the provision at issue here, was
    repealed in 2010, operative January 1, 2012. (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 4.) Current
    section 12022.7 was enacted in 2010, operative January 1, 2012 (Stats. 2010, ch.
    711, § 5) and “continues former Section 12022.7 without change” (Nonsubstantive
    Reorganization of Deadly Weapons Statutes (June 2009) 38 Cal. Law Revision
    Com. Rep. (2009) p. 341).
    1
    enhancement “shall not apply to murder or manslaughter” or “if infliction of great
    bodily injury is an element of the offense.”
    We conclude that subdivision (g) of section 12022.7 means what it says:
    Great bodily injury enhancements do not apply to a conviction for murder or
    manslaughter. A defendant convicted of murder or manslaughter who also
    commits crimes against other victims may be convicted of those additional crimes
    and, to the extent the sentencing laws permit, punished separately for them. But
    the sentence for manslaughter may not be enhanced for the infliction of great
    bodily injury as to anyone. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
    Appeal to the extent it held defendant‟s manslaughter conviction is subject to any
    great bodily injury enhancement.
    I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The facts of the crime are largely irrelevant to the sentencing issue before
    us. In essence, on June 2, 2009, while driving a Ford Fusion, defendant Samantha
    Victoria Cook was involved in an automobile accident in which three persons
    were killed and a fourth seriously injured. The evidence supported a jury finding
    that defendant caused the accident by speeding and driving recklessly.
    A jury found defendant guilty of three counts of gross vehicular
    manslaughter, one count each for the three persons who died. (§ 192, subd.
    (c)(1).) As to the first count, the jury also found true three allegations that
    defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury. Two of the great bodily injury
    allegations related to the two victims who died and were the subject of the other
    two manslaughter convictions. The third related to the person who was injured but
    survived. This person was not the subject of any other charge or conviction.
    The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for a total of nine years
    eight months, consisting of the midterm of four years for the first manslaughter
    conviction, one year four months (one-third of the midterm) for each of the other
    2
    two manslaughter convictions, and three years for the great bodily injury
    enhancement as to the victim who was injured but survived. The court struck the
    punishment for the great bodily injury enhancements as to the victims who died.
    On appeal, defendant argued that section 12022.7, subdivision (g), prohibits
    all of the great bodily injury enhancements. The Court of Appeal upheld the
    enhancement as to the surviving victim, but reversed the enhancements as to the
    manslaughter victims. We granted the Attorney General‟s petition for review,
    which presented only the question of whether the Court of Appeal erred in
    reversing the enhancements as to the manslaughter victims. We later requested
    and received supplemental briefing on the additional question of whether any great
    bodily injury enhancement was proper.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Background
    Section 12022.7, subdivision (a), provides: “Any person who personally
    inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the
    commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and
    consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three years.”
    Subdivisions (b), (c), (d), and (e) of that section, which do not apply in this case,
    provide longer enhancements for the infliction of specified kinds of great bodily
    injury. Subdivision (f) of that section defines “ „great bodily injury.‟ ” Section
    12022.7, subdivision (g), the provision we are interpreting, provides: “This
    section shall not apply to murder or manslaughter or a violation of Section 451
    [arson] or 452 [unlawfully causing a fire]. Subdivisions (a), (b), (c), and (d) shall
    not apply if infliction of great bodily injury is an element of the offense.”
    No one disputes that section 12022.7, subdivision (g), prohibits enhancing a
    manslaughter or murder conviction for inflicting great bodily injury on the person
    3
    who is the subject of that conviction. The question before us is when, if ever, a
    manslaughter conviction may be enhanced for the infliction of great bodily injury
    on other victims during the commission of the manslaughter. Here, during the
    commission of manslaughter as to one of the victims, defendant killed (and thus
    inflicted great bodily injury on) two other victims and inflicted great bodily injury
    on another victim, who survived. We must decide whether defendant‟s sentence
    for one of the manslaughter convictions may be enhanced for any of the other
    great bodily injuries defendant inflicted and, if so, which ones.
    Several cases have considered when, if ever, a great bodily injury
    enhancement may attach to a murder or manslaughter conviction, with
    inconsistent results. We will first review the cases. Then we will consider what
    the proper rule should be.
    B. The Cases
    Until recently, to the extent they confronted this question, the cases
    generally assumed or stated that section 12022.7‟s great bodily injury
    enhancement simply does not apply to murder or manslaughter. For example, in
    deciding a different question, the Court of Appeal in People v. Valencia (2000) 
    82 Cal. App. 4th 139
    , 143, stated that “a section 12022.7 great bodily injury
    enhancement may not enhance a murder conviction.”
    Closer on point is People v. Beltran (2000) 
    82 Cal. App. 4th 693
    (Beltran).
    There, the defendant, while fleeing from the police in a vehicle, collided with
    another vehicle, killing one person and seriously injuring a second. He was
    convicted of evading a pursuing peace officer causing serious injuries to others
    (Veh. Code, § 2800.3) and vehicular manslaughter. As to the Vehicle Code count,
    the jury found true two great bodily injury enhancements — one for the deceased
    victim, who was the subject of the vehicular manslaughter conviction, and one for
    4
    the surviving victim. No great bodily injury enhancement was alleged as to the
    vehicular manslaughter count. The Court of Appeal considered whether the
    enhancements as to the Vehicle Code count were valid. It noted that “[u]nder
    section 12022.7 [former] subdivision (f) [now subdivision (g)] the enhancements
    could not be based on Beltran‟s count 3 conviction of vehicular manslaughter.
    The only basis for the enhancements is the count 1 conviction of evading a peace
    officer under Vehicle Code section 2800.3.” (Beltran, at p. 696.) But the court
    also found that the enhancements were invalid as to the Vehicle Code violation
    because infliction of great bodily injury is an element of that offense. For this
    reason, it reversed both great bodily injury enhancements. It drew no distinction
    between the enhancement for the deceased victim and that for the surviving
    victim.
    The first case to permit a great bodily injury enhancement to attach to a
    manslaughter conviction was People v. Verlinde (2002) 
    100 Cal. App. 4th 1146
    (Verlinde). There, the defendant was involved in an accident in which one person
    was killed and two seriously injured. As relevant here, she was convicted of gross
    vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. As to the manslaughter conviction, the
    jury also found true two great bodily injury enhancements, one each for the two
    surviving victims. The Court of Appeal reversed one of the enhancements for
    reasons not relevant here, but upheld the second enhancement. It rejected the
    defendant‟s argument that neither enhancement was valid under section 12022.7,
    subdivision (g).
    The Verlinde court explained why, in its view, the great bodily injury
    enhancement could properly attach to the manslaughter conviction. “Section
    12022.7 does not define a separate offense, but rather is a legislative attempt to
    punish more severely those crimes that result in great bodily „on any person.‟
    (§ 12022.7, subd. (a); see also People v. Parrish (1985) 
    170 Cal. App. 3d 336
    , 344.)
    5
    The language of section 12022.7, subdivision (g) does not limit application of the
    statute to this vehicular manslaughter case where, in addition to the homicide
    victim, two other victims suffered great bodily injury. The statutory exemption for
    murder and manslaughter is intended to bar imposition of an enhancement for the
    injuries inflicted on the homicide victim, who obviously has suffered great bodily
    injury. Thus, the statutory exemption prevents prohibited dual punishment for the
    same crime. (See § 654.) „When a defendant engages in violent conduct that
    injures several persons, he may be separately punished for injuring each of those
    persons, notwithstanding section 654. [Citation.]‟ (People v. Champion (1995) 
    9 Cal. 4th 879
    , 934-935.) Verlinde‟s argument is inconsistent with a fundamental
    objective of our penal justice system, namely „that one‟s culpability and
    punishment should be commensurate with the gravity of both the criminal act
    undertaken and the resulting injuries.‟ (People v. Hill (1994) 
    23 Cal. App. 4th 1566
    , 1574.) Furthermore, a fundamental principle of statutory construction is
    that the language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so
    would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.
    (Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 
    21 Cal. 3d 102
    , 113.)” 
    (Verlinde, supra
    , 100
    Cal.App.4th at pp. 1168-1169.)
    Section 12022.7‟s application to murder or manslaughter next arose in
    People v. Weaver (2007) 
    149 Cal. App. 4th 1301
    (Weaver). There, the defendant
    pleaded guilty to gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd,
    (a)) and admitted the truth of a great bodily injury enhancement allegation. The
    enhancement did not concern the subject of the manslaughter conviction, but
    rather, another victim who survived. Relying on 
    Verlinde, supra
    , 
    100 Cal. App. 4th 1146
    , the Court of Appeal upheld the enhancement. It “note[d] the express
    language of section 12022.7, subdivision (a) does not limit its application to a
    specific victim of a felony offense. Rather, it applies to great bodily injuries
    6
    sustained by „any person other than an accomplice.‟ (§ 12022.7, subd. (a), italics
    added.)” (Weaver, at p. 1330.) It found section 12022.7‟s language “sufficiently
    broad to include persons other than the victim of a victim-specific felony offense
    who sustain great bodily injury during the defendant‟s commission of that
    offense.” (Ibid.) “Furthermore,” the court noted, “it is generally appropriate that a
    defendant be subject to greater punishment for committing an offense if his or her
    commission of that offense causes injuries to multiple persons. [Citations.] It is
    consistent with our criminal justice system to impose greater punishment on
    Weaver for the great bodily injuries she personally inflicted on [the surviving
    victim] during her commission of the section 191.5, subdivision (a) offense that
    caused [the deceased victim‟s] death.” (Id. at p. 1331.)
    Weaver also found support for its conclusion in People v. Oates (2004) 
    32 Cal. 4th 1048
    , where we upheld multiple enhancements under former section
    12022.53, subdivision (d) (enhancement for discharging a firearm and causing
    great bodily injury), and in People v. Ausbie (2004) 
    123 Cal. App. 4th 855
    , where
    the Court of Appeal upheld multiple great bodily injury enhancements for a single
    conviction of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, a
    crime that does not require, as an element, the actual infliction of great bodily
    injury. 
    (Weaver, supra
    , 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1331-1335.)
    The Weaver court found 
    Beltran, supra
    , 
    82 Cal. App. 4th 693
    , “inapposite,”
    apparently because its holding concerned the Vehicle Code section 2800.3
    conviction rather than the manslaughter conviction. 
    (Weaver, supra
    , 149
    Cal.App.4th at p. 1335, fn. 35.) Citing 
    Verlinde, supra
    , 
    100 Cal. App. 4th 1146
    , it
    also disagreed with Beltran‟s conclusion that no great bodily injury enhancement
    would apply to a manslaughter conviction. It said the Beltran court reached that
    conclusion “[w]ithout any substantive reasoning.” (Weaver, at p. 1335, fn. 35.)
    7
    The next case to consider this question was People v. Julian (2011) 
    198 Cal. App. 4th 1524
    (Julian). There, the defendant was involved in an accident in
    which one person (Terri Keller) was killed immediately, one (Amanda Keller)
    died after being in a coma for several months, and a third (Alexis Keller) was
    badly injured but survived. A jury convicted the defendant of two counts of
    vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated without gross negligence (§ 191.5, subd.
    (b)), count 1 for Terri‟s death and count 2 for Amanda‟s death. The defendant was
    charged with no substantive count as to Alexis, the surviving victim. The jury also
    found true two great bodily injury enhancement allegations as to each
    manslaughter count. As to Terri, the two allegations were for the coma Amanda
    suffered before she died and for Alexis‟s injuries. Because section 12022.7,
    subdivision (b), imposes a five-year enhancement for great bodily injury “which
    causes the victim to become comatose due to brain injury,” the enhancement
    regarding Amanda‟s coma was for five years. The allegations as to Amanda were
    for Terri‟s death and Alexis‟s injuries.
    The trial court in Julian sentenced the defendant to prison for 12 years for
    Terri‟s manslaughter, consisting of the upper term of four years for the
    manslaughter itself, five years for Amanda‟s coma, and three years for Alexis‟s
    great bodily injury. The court also imposed a sentence for Amanda‟s
    manslaughter with the two three-year great bodily injury enhancements attached to
    that count. But to avoid punishing the defendant twice for Amanda‟s and Alexis‟s
    injuries, the court stayed that sentence under section 654, which prohibits multiple
    punishment for a single act or omission. 
    (Julian, supra
    , 198 Cal.App.4th at p.
    1526.)
    Relying in part on 
    Weaver, supra
    , 
    149 Cal. App. 4th 1301
    , and 
    Verlinde, supra
    , 
    100 Cal. App. 4th 1146
    , the Julian court upheld all of the great bodily injury
    enhancements and the sentence. It noted that in Weaver and Verlinde, the great
    8
    bodily injury enhancement was not for a victim who died but for a victim who
    survived. But it concluded that although two of the victims in the case before it
    “died as a result of their injuries and their deaths support Julian‟s manslaughter
    convictions, in this case their injuries also support enhancements under section
    12022.7. [¶] As we did in Verlinde and Weaver, we narrowly construe the
    exception set forth in section 12022.7, subdivision (g). Under section 12022.7,
    subdivision (g), when a defendant is convicted of murder or manslaughter, that
    conviction may not be enhanced with the injury the victim of the murder or
    manslaughter necessarily suffered. However, injuries caused to other victims of
    the defendant‟s conduct may serve as enhancements under section 12022.7.”
    
    (Julian, supra
    , 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1530.)
    The court noted that, regarding the injuries the surviving victim suffered,
    Weaver and Verlinde were indistinguishable. It then turned to the question
    regarding the victim who died. “This brings us then to the injuries Amanda
    suffered. The fact Amanda died from her injuries cannot, by itself, prevent those
    injuries from being used as an enhancement to Julian‟s punishment for Terri‟s
    death. Amanda‟s injuries were just as distinct from Terri‟s injuries as Alexis‟s
    injuries and under Verlinde and Weaver their separate and distinct nature permits
    the injuries to be used as an enhancement. [Citations.] To hold Alexis‟s injuries
    will support an enhancement but, because she died, Amanda‟s injuries will not,
    would permit a defendant, such as Julian, to benefit to some extent from the fact
    one of his multiple victims died rather than survived. We of course must reject
    such a grotesque interpretation of the statute. As we stated in Verlinde, „a
    fundamental principle of statutory construction is that the language of a statute
    should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd
    consequences.‟ 
    (Verlinde, supra
    , 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1168-1169.)
    9
    “Moreover, the fact Amanda‟s fatal injuries led to a second distinct
    manslaughter conviction did not prevent the trial court from imposing a section
    12022.7, subdivision (b) enhancement to Terri‟s manslaughter based on Amanda‟s
    injuries. Under section 654 Julian could not and was not punished twice for the
    fatal injuries Amanda suffered. [Citations.] As we have noted, although
    Amanda‟s fatal injuries were the basis for both the five-year enhancement
    imposed for Terri‟s death and the four-year upper term imposed for the second
    manslaughter conviction, the trial court properly stayed execution of the second
    manslaughter sentence under section 654. Thus, a broader interpretation of
    section 12022.7, subdivision (g) is not necessary to avoid dual punishment.”
    
    (Julian, supra
    , 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1530-1531.)
    This brings us to the case we are now reviewing. Agreeing with 
    Verlinde, supra
    , 
    100 Cal. App. 4th 1146
    , and 
    Weaver, supra
    , 
    149 Cal. App. 4th 1301
    , and
    rejecting 
    Beltran, supra
    , 
    82 Cal. App. 4th 693
    (which it observed had “rel[ied]
    exclusively on the language of section 12022.7, subdivision (g)”), the Court of
    Appeal upheld the great bodily injury enhancement for the victim who survived.
    But it disagreed with 
    Julian, supra
    , 
    198 Cal. App. 4th 1524
    , regarding the victims
    who died and were the subject of separate manslaughter convictions. It reversed
    the great bodily injury enhancements as to those victims.
    The court explained that “although we do not construe section 12022.7,
    subdivision (g) as broadly as does Beltran, neither do we agree it should be
    construed as narrowly as does Julian. . . . Subdivision (g) would appear to mean
    what it clearly reads, i.e., the enhancement does not attach with regard to a victim
    of murder or manslaughter for which a conviction on the substantive count has
    been obtained. Moreover, Julian‟s holding results in a pleading shell game where
    a manslaughter charge as to victim A is enhanced with the great bodily injury of
    10
    B, simultaneously charging the defendant with the manslaughter of B with an
    attached enhancement for A.”
    The court recognized Julian‟s concern that the defendant should not benefit
    from the fact one of the victims died, but it found that rationale “does not
    necessarily withstand scrutiny.” It explained that “in Julian the People could have
    merely pled the first count of manslaughter against Terri Keller with the section
    12022.7 enhancements as to both Alexis Keller and Amanda Keller without
    charging a second count of manslaughter against Amanda and have obtained the
    same sentencing result. Indeed, in the instant case the People did not charge
    defendant for any substantive crime for the injuries sustained by [the surviving
    victim]. Rather, they merely attached the [section 12022.7,] subdivision (a)
    enhancement to the count 1 charge. This most likely reflects the People‟s
    determination that any substantive crime they could have charged defendant with
    for injuries sustained by [the surviving victim] would have resulted in lesser
    punishment than simply alleging the enhancement for those injuries. [¶] In the
    alternative, in Julian, the People could have pled the case exactly as they did, but
    moved for dismissal of the count 2 charge and attached enhancements pursuant to
    section 1385 [, which permits the court to dismiss an action] at the time for
    sentencing — again, resulting in the same potential sentence for the defendant
    without violating the statutory language of section 12022.7, subdivision (g).”
    The court also believed that “any problem concerning the degree of
    punishment for the charge of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated without
    gross negligence at issue in Julian being less than that for the section 12022.7,
    subdivision (b) enhancement [five years for the coma] is something that should be
    dealt with by the Legislature, not by judicial violation of the clear language of
    section 12022.7, subdivision (g).” The court concluded that “however noble, the
    desire to punish a defendant more extensively for the perceived egregiousness of
    11
    her crimes does not justify violating the statutory prohibitions on imposing section
    12022.7 enhancements with regard to victims for which defendant has already
    been convicted of a homicide. Therefore, we shall reverse the true findings on the
    section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancements with respect to [the other
    manslaughter victims].”
    The most recent case to consider this question is Hale v. Superior Court
    (2014) 
    225 Cal. App. 4th 268
    (Hale). There, the defendant was involved in an
    accident in which three persons were killed. He was charged with three counts of
    vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (b)), one count for each
    of those who died. Each of the three counts included two great bodily injury
    enhancement allegations under section 12022.7, one each for the other two
    deceased victims, for a total of six great bodily injury allegations. In a pretrial
    writ matter, the Court of Appeal ordered all of the enhancement allegations
    dismissed.
    The Hale court distinguished 
    Weaver, supra
    , 
    149 Cal. App. 4th 1301
    , and
    
    Verlinde, supra
    , 
    100 Cal. App. 4th 1146
    , on the ground that they “did not involve as
    here a [great bodily injury] enhancement alleged for a deceased victim‟s injuries,
    where the deceased victim was also a named victim of another manslaughter count
    arising out of the same facts and charged in the same case against the defendant.”
    
    (Hale, supra
    , 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 272.) But it believed those cases “cast doubt
    on the validity of such duplicative prosecution. Verlinde expressly rejected the
    proposition in dicta, explaining that subdivision (g)‟s „statutory exemption for
    murder and manslaughter is intended to bar imposition of an enhancement for the
    injuries inflicted on the homicide victim, who obviously suffered great bodily
    injury.‟ (Verlinde, at p. 1168.) Put another way, the guilty verdict on a
    manslaughter count necessarily includes a finding of great bodily injury, and the
    12
    sentencing range the Legislature has prescribed for manslaughter necessarily
    includes punishment for the injuries the defendant inflicted on the victim.
    “Weaver reached the same conclusion. Weaver criticized as „[w]ithout any
    substantive reasoning‟ a case holding that section 12022.7 did not apply at all in
    vehicular manslaughter cases, even as an enhancement for injuries suffered by
    other victims besides the deceased victim. 
    (Weaver, supra
    , 149 Cal.App.4th at p.
    1335, fn. 35, criticizing People v. Beltran (2000) 
    82 Cal. App. 4th 693
    , 695.) As
    pertinent here, in upholding on appeal a [great bodily injury] enhancement for
    victims other than the deceased, the Weaver court implicitly concluded the
    enhancement did not apply to a victim for whom the defendant faced manslaughter
    charges. (Weaver, at pp. 1330-1335.)” 
    (Hale, supra
    , 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 272-
    273.)
    While apparently acquiescing in Verlinde‟s and Weaver‟s holdings (which
    Hale‟s facts did not implicate), the Hale court disagreed with Julian‟s extension of
    those cases to permit a great bodily injury enhancement of one manslaughter count
    for injuries suffered by another, separately charged, manslaughter victim. It
    described 
    Julian, supra
    , 
    198 Cal. App. 4th 1524
    , as not barring the attachment of a
    great bodily injury “enhancement based on one victim‟s fatal injuries to a
    manslaughter count pertaining to another victim, even if the defendant is also
    charged and convicted of manslaughter for the first victim’s death. The court
    implicitly found dispositive the pleading artifice of attaching an enhancement to
    one count rather than another. (Julian, at p. 1530.)” 
    (Hale, supra
    , 225
    Cal.App.4th at p. 273.)
    As did the Court of Appeal in this case, the Hale court recognized Julian‟s
    concern that the defendant should not benefit from the fact a victim died rather
    than was seriously injured but survived. But it believed that “Julian‟s
    interpretation . . . introduces its own anomaly in which the bar on [great bodily
    13
    injury] enhancements in subdivision (g) applies only in single-victim vehicular
    homicides. Julian acknowledges subdivision (g) bars a [great bodily injury]
    enhancement where the same victim is named in the underlying count 
    (Julian, supra
    , 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1530), as in a single-victim accident. But according
    to Julian, the bar is circumvented in multiple-victim accidents by simply attaching
    a [great bodily injury] enhancement for a deceased victim‟s injuries to a
    manslaughter count for another victim. Yet nothing in the statutory language
    suggests the Legislature intended to limit subdivision (g) to vehicular
    manslaughter cases involving one victim, but allow [great bodily injury]
    enhancements in multiple-victim cases.
    “Proscribing punishment is the Legislature‟s domain, and we conclude the
    legislative proscription in subdivision (g) means what it says. The statutory
    language plainly states a [great bodily injury] enhancement „shall not apply to
    murder or manslaughter . . . .‟ (Subd. (g), italics added.) Removing any
    conceivable doubt, subdivision (g) further provides a [great bodily injury]
    enhancement „shall not apply if infliction of great bodily injury is an element of
    the offense‟ (italics added). Great bodily injury is by definition inherent in a
    murder or manslaughter victim‟s injuries that result in death. Consequently, great
    bodily injury is necessarily proven when the victim‟s death is proven as an
    element of those offenses. By statutory command, a [great bodily injury]
    enhancement therefore „shall not apply.‟ (Subd. (g).) We must give effect to this
    plain language.” 
    (Hale, supra
    , 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 274-275, fn. omitted.)
    The Hale court did “not find subdivision (g) ambiguous. We must interpret
    the statute according to its terms because „ “the words the Legislature chose are
    the best indicators of its intent.” ‟ (People v. Ramirez (2010) 
    184 Cal. App. 4th 1233
    , 1238.) . . . The statutory purpose of the Legislature‟s [great bodily injury]
    enhancement regime is not to maximize punishment under every pleading artifice
    14
    a prosecutor can devise, but instead to „deter[] the use of excessive force and the
    infliction of additional harm beyond that inherent in the crime itself.‟ (People v.
    Wolcott (1983) 
    34 Cal. 3d 92
    , 108.) The great bodily injuries a vehicular
    manslaughter victim suffers are inherent in the offense that causes his or her death,
    and therefore precluded by subdivision (g) as a basis for enhancement.” 
    (Hale, supra
    , 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 275-276.)
    Responding to the district attorney‟s argument that the statute should not be
    interpreted to allow a defendant to benefit from the fact the victims died, the Hale
    court noted that potential anomalies of this kind will exist under any interpretation
    of section 12022.7, subdivision (g). “The absurdity argument does not aid the
    district attorney precisely because of peculiarities in the punishment of drunk
    driving offenders. Simply put, the district attorney‟s charging artifice does not
    result in longer imprisonment for a drunk driving offender who commits vehicular
    manslaughter than one who only injures his victims. In other words, the district
    attorney‟s charging methodology does not correct the absurdity he identifies. If
    Hale had severely injured his victims instead of causing their deaths, it appears he
    would face a maximum prison term of 12 years. Specifically, a defendant faces a
    potential upper term of three years for causing „bodily injury‟ while driving under
    the influence (Veh. Code, § 23153, subds. (a) &(b), 23554; see Pen. Code, § 18
    [providing for upper term of three years where felony punishment is unspecified]),
    which may be enhanced by three years for causing great bodily injury [citations].
    A great bodily injury enhancement may be imposed for each victim without
    violating section 654 [citation], resulting in a total term of 12 years when the
    defendant injures three victims. This figure exceeds the maximum 10 years‟
    imprisonment the district attorney seeks for the vehicular homicides he alleges
    Hale committed.” 
    (Hale, supra
    , 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 276-277.)
    15
    The Hale court stated that a “sentencing disparity does not necessarily
    render a statutory scheme absurd because it is the Legislature‟s prerogative to affix
    punishment. [Citation.] But the disparity here is glaring and unjust. It inures,
    however, to Hale‟s benefit and therefore furnishes him no basis for an equal
    protection or disproportionate punishment claim. The district attorney has no
    corresponding constitutional claims to assert against the disparity. More to the
    point, we may not simply rewrite the statutory scheme, purporting to sit as a super-
    Legislature. Here, as discussed, the express exclusion in subdivision (g) precludes
    the prosecutor‟s duplicative charging theory for the victim‟s great bodily injuries
    necessarily subsumed in their deaths. We appeal to the Legislature to correct this
    manifest sentencing disparity by ensuring proportional punishment for offenders
    who commit vehicular manslaughter.” 
    (Hale, supra
    , 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.)
    Finally, the Hale court “observe[d] that charging a defendant with „only‟
    one count of vehicular manslaughter and attaching to that count two [great bodily
    injury] enhancements for two additional deceased victims technically avoids
    violating subdivision (g)‟s bar on a [great bodily injury] enhancement for the same
    injuries subsumed in a manslaughter count for the same victim. Charging in this
    manner potentially yields the same 10-year term the district attorney seeks here,
    specifically a four-year upper term on the manslaughter count and three years on
    each of two [great bodily injury] enhancements for two additional deceased
    victims.” 
    (Hale, supra
    , 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 277, fn. 4.) Noting that the district
    attorney did not charge the case in that manner, the court expressed no opinion on
    the point. (Ibid.)
    C. The Proper Rule
    After reviewing these cases, we see that the relatively early case of 
    Beltran, supra
    , 
    82 Cal. App. 4th 693
    , stated in dicta that no great bodily injury enhancement
    16
    can attach to a murder or manslaughter conviction, and held that no such
    enhancement can attach to a crime for which infliction of great bodily injury is an
    element. 
    Verlinde, supra
    , 
    100 Cal. App. 4th 1146
    , 
    Weaver, supra
    , 
    149 Cal. App. 4th 1301
    , and the Court of Appeal in this case disagreed with Beltran and permitted a
    great bodily injury enhancement for a surviving victim to attach to a manslaughter
    conviction, at least when the surviving victim is not the subject of a separate
    charge. 
    Julian, supra
    , 
    198 Cal. App. 4th 1524
    , permitted any great bodily injury
    enhancement to attach to a manslaughter conviction other than one for the charged
    victim, including enhancements for victims who are the subject of separate
    manslaughter charges. The Court of Appeal in this case and 
    Hale, supra
    , 
    225 Cal. App. 4th 268
    , disagreed with Julian and refused to permit a great bodily injury
    enhancement to attach to a manslaughter conviction for victims who are the
    subject of separate manslaughter counts. We must determine the correct rule.
    We conclude that 
    Beltran, supra
    , 
    82 Cal. App. 4th 693
    , was correct, and the
    later cases erred when they began to find exceptions to section 12022.7,
    subdivision (g)‟s command that great bodily injury enhancements “shall not apply
    to murder or manslaughter.” Subdivision (g) means what it says — great bodily
    injury enhancements simply do not apply to murder or manslaughter. The Weaver
    court and the Court of Appeal here criticized Beltran for relying exclusively on
    subdivision (g)‟s language without additional substantive reasoning, but doing so
    was reasonable given the simplicity and clarity of that language. As the Hale
    court noted, the statutory language is the best indicator of the Legislature‟s intent.
    (Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Orange County Employees Retirement System
    (1993) 
    6 Cal. 4th 821
    , 826.)
    Noting that subdivision (a) of section 12022.7 applies to someone who
    “inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice” (italics
    added), and arguing that the statute must be read as a whole, the Attorney General
    17
    contends that subdivision (g)‟s limitation applies only to the victim of the charged
    murder or manslaughter and not to “any” other victim. But subdivision (g)‟s plain
    language is not so limited. It simply states that the section, meaning all of section
    12022.7, does not apply to murder or manslaughter.
    The Court of Appeal in this case said it was interpreting section 12022.7,
    subdivision (g), to “mean what it clearly reads, i.e., the enhancement does not
    attach with regard to a victim of murder or manslaughter for which a conviction on
    the substantive count has been obtained.” But that subdivision does not clearly so
    read. Its clear reading is the unqualified statement that the great bodily injury
    enhancement “shall not apply to murder or manslaughter” (§ 12022.7, subd. (g)),
    not the qualified statement that the enhancement “shall not apply to murder or
    manslaughter with regard to a victim of murder or manslaughter for which a
    conviction on the substantive count has been obtained.” If the latter had been the
    Legislature‟s intent, it would not have used the simple, unqualified language it
    employed.
    With considerable justification, the Court of Appeal here criticized Julian‟s
    holding as “result[ing] in a pleading shell game where a manslaughter charge as to
    victim A is enhanced with the great bodily injury of B, simultaneously charging
    the defendant with the manslaughter of B with an attached enhancement for A.”
    But then the court suggested what could justifiably be called its own pleading shell
    game — that the prosecutor might avoid the bar on great bodily injury
    enhancements for a victim who is the subject of a separate conviction simply by
    charging only one count of manslaughter, or if a second manslaughter count is
    originally charged, by later moving to dismiss the second manslaughter count.
    We think the correct approach, one that comports with section 12022.7,
    subdivision (g)‟s language, is to prohibit any such pleading shell games. The
    prosecution can charge a defendant for each manslaughter the defendant
    18
    committed and, if appropriate, for crimes committed against surviving victims,
    and the court can sentence the defendant for each crime against separate victims
    for which the defendant is convicted to the extent the sentencing laws permit. The
    Verlinde court interpreted subdivision (g) as permitting a manslaughter conviction
    to be enhanced for injuries suffered by a surviving victim in order to avoid “absurd
    consequences which the Legislature did not intend.” 
    (Verlinde, supra
    , 100
    Cal.App.4th at p. 1169.) But it did not identify what those absurd consequences
    might be. We see nothing absurd in charging and punishing a defendant
    separately for whatever crimes that defendant committed against separate victims.
    The Verlinde and Weaver courts argued that the defendant should be
    punished commensurately with the gravity of the criminal act and its result, and a
    defendant who injures more than one person should be subject to greater
    punishment than a defendant who injuries only one person. 
    (Verlinde, supra
    , 100
    Cal.App.4th at p. 1168; 
    Weaver, supra
    , 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1331.) But reading
    subdivision (g) as requiring the prosecution to charge a defendant with separate
    crimes against separate victims, and permitting the court to sentence the defendant
    for those crimes, does punish more severely a defendant who injures multiple
    persons. Here, defendant was convicted of three counts of vehicular
    manslaughter. The court sentenced her to prison for the midterm of four years for
    one of the manslaughters and consecutive terms of one year four months (one-
    third of the midterm) for the other two manslaughters. Presumably, if defendant
    had been charged with and convicted of a crime as to the surviving victim, the
    court could have imposed a consecutive sentence for that crime.
    Thus, imposing a consecutive sentence for each crime committed against a
    separate victim would punish a defendant who injures more than one person more
    severely than a defendant who injures only one person. To be sure, in cases of
    vehicular manslaughter, the increase in punishment for additional persons injured
    19
    will be less if we interpret section 12022.7, subdivision (g), to mean what it says
    than it would be under an interpretation that permits great bodily injury
    enhancements for other victims to attach to a manslaughter conviction. This is
    because the statutory punishment for vehicular manslaughter is relatively short and
    even shorter for additional victims. The vehicle manslaughter conviction of this
    case is punishable by two, four, or six years. (§ 193, subd. (c)(1).) A consecutive
    sentence for additional convictions would be for one-third of the middle term of
    four years, or one year four months. (§ 1170.1, subd. (a); see People v. Felix
    (2000) 
    22 Cal. 4th 651
    , 655.) One year four months is shorter than the three-year
    great bodily injury enhancement specified in section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and
    even more so than the longer enhancements specified in other subdivisions of that
    section, such as section 12022.7, subdivision (b)‟s five-year enhancement for
    causing a coma. This means that if the sentence for the one manslaughter victim
    may be enhanced for other victims‟ great bodily injuries, then the sentence for the
    manslaughter of the other victims would always be subsumed by the enhancement.
    But section 193, subdivision (c)(1), establishes what the Legislature has
    determined is the appropriate punishment for vehicular manslaughter, and section
    1170.1, subdivision (a), establishes what the Legislature has determined is the
    proper way to sentence consecutively when there are multiple victims. As the
    Hale court indicated, the Legislature‟s purpose is not to maximize the punishment
    under any pleading artifice imaginable, but to impose the punishments it
    established by statute. (See 
    Hale, supra
    , 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 275.)
    As the Attorney General argues and the Julian court noted, to permit
    enhancement for injuries a surviving victim suffered, but not to permit
    enhancement for the death of other victims, could result in a defendant who
    merely injured additional victims receiving a longer total sentence than a
    defendant who killed the additional victims. For this reason, the Julian court held
    20
    that if, as Verlinde and Weaver had concluded, a great bodily injury enhancement
    for a surviving victim can attach to a manslaughter victim, so too must a great
    bodily injury for one manslaughter victim attach to the conviction for a different
    manslaughter victim. If one accepts the holdings of Verlinde and Weaver, Julian‟s
    extension of those holdings was a reasonable effort to avoid the obvious anomaly
    of making the potential sentence longer when additional victims survived than
    would be possible when the additional victims had died. But Julian‟s holding
    separates the law ever farther from section 12022.7, subdivision (g)‟s language
    than did Verlinde‟s or Weaver‟s. Rather than supporting Julian‟s extension of the
    earlier cases, we think the problems that have arisen demonstrate that Verlinde and
    Weaver erred in permitting any great bodily injury enhancement to attach to a
    manslaughter conviction. The answer to the potential anomaly is not to disregard
    subdivision (g)‟s plain language, but instead simply to mandate that a defendant
    receive the punishment prescribed for each crime committed against each victim.
    We must also note that, as the Hale court explained, it appears that no
    interpretation of section 12022.7, subdivision (g), is guaranteed to eliminate all
    possible anomalies. Fact patterns might exist in which crimes could be charged in
    such a way that a defendant who merely injured might face a longer potential
    sentence than one who killed. (See 
    Hale, supra
    , 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 276-277.)
    Because of the complexity of today‟s sentencing rules, other potential anomalies
    might exist.2 But no anomaly exists in this case, and we are unaware of any case
    2       For an example of a sentencing anomaly this court has confronted, see
    People v. King (1993) 
    5 Cal. 4th 59
    , 64-70, where a literal interpretation of
    interrelated statutes would have meant that some juveniles convicted of first
    degree murder would be eligible to be committed to the former California Youth
    Authority (CYA) rather than sentenced to state prison, but the same juveniles who
    merely attempted to commit first degree murder would be ineligible for such a
    commitment. To avoid an absurd result the Legislature could not have intended,
    (footnote continued on next page)
    21
    where the potential anomaly Hale noted has actually arisen. If a case arises in
    which a defendant who merely injured faces a longer potential sentence than if
    that defendant had killed, the courts can consider the problem, and what to do, at
    that time and in that case. And, of course, as the Hale court recognized, the
    Legislature can change the sentencing laws anytime it chooses to do so.
    Finally, the Weaver court found support for its conclusion in People v.
    
    Oates, supra
    , 
    32 Cal. 4th 1048
    , and People v. 
    Ausbie, supra
    , 
    123 Cal. App. 4th 855
    .
    
    (Weaver, supra
    , 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1331-1335.) Those cases might support a
    conclusion that, in some situations, multiple great bodily injury enhancements can
    attach to a single crime, a point on which we express no opinion. But neither case
    concerned the attachment of great bodily injury enhancements to manslaughter or
    murder, and thus they provide no support for Weaver‟s interpretation of section
    12022.7, subdivision (g).
    For these reasons, we conclude that no great bodily injury enhancement can
    attach to a conviction for murder or manslaughter.3
    (footnote continued from previous page)
    we interpreted the statutes to make such juveniles who either commit or attempt to
    commit first degree murder eligible for a CYA commitment. (Id. at pp. 69-70.)
    3      We express no opinion regarding the question, not presented here, of
    whether and, if so, how great bodily injury enhancements may attach to other
    crimes for a defendant who is convicted of murder or manslaughter as well as
    those other crimes.
    22
    III. CONCLUSION
    We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to
    that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We also disapprove
    People v. 
    Julian, supra
    , 
    198 Cal. App. 4th 1524
    , People v. 
    Weaver, supra
    , 
    149 Cal. App. 4th 1301
    , and People v. 
    Verlinde, supra
    , 
    100 Cal. App. 4th 1146
    , to the
    extent they are inconsistent with this opinion.
    CHIN, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
    WERDEGAR, J.
    CORRIGAN, J.
    LIU, J.
    CUÉLLAR, J.
    KRUGER, J.
    23
    See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
    Name of Opinion People v. Cook
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished Opinion
    Original Appeal
    Original Proceeding
    Review Granted XXX 
    222 Cal. App. 4th 1
    Rehearing Granted
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Opinion No. S215927
    Date Filed: February 5, 2015
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Court: Superior
    County: Riverside
    Judge: Dennis A. McConaghy*
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Counsel:
    Thomas K. Macomber, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland,
    Assistant Attorney General, Steven T. Oetting, Lise Jacobson and Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy
    Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    *Retired judge of the Riverside Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section
    6 of the California Constitution.
    1
    Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
    Thomas K. Macomber
    3403 Tenth Street, Suite 752
    Riverside, CA 92501
    (951) 314-3745
    Tami Falkenstein Hennick
    Deputy Attorney General
    110 West A Street, Suite 1100
    San Diego, CA 92101
    (619) 645-2274
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S215927

Citation Numbers: 60 Cal. 4th 922, 342 P.3d 404, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 502, 2015 Cal. LEXIS 691

Judges: Chin

Filed Date: 2/5/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/3/2024