Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency v. Alberto C. (In Re I.C.) , 4 Cal. 5th 869 ( 2018 )


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  • Filed 4/26/18
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
    In re I.C., a Person Coming Under the    )
    Juvenile Court Law.                      )
    ____________________________________)
    )
    ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL                    )
    SERVICES AGENCY,                         )
    )                         S229276
    Plaintiff and Respondent, )
    )                  Ct.App. 1/2 A141143
    v.                        )
    )                   Alameda County
    ALBERTO C.,                              )               Super. Ct. No. SJ12019578
    )
    Objector and Appellant.   )
    ____________________________________)
    In a juvenile dependency proceeding, a child’s out-of-court reports of
    parental abuse are admissible in evidence regardless of whether the child is
    competent to testify in court. (In re Cindy L. (1997) 
    17 Cal. 4th 15
    , 20 (Cindy L.);
    Welf. & Inst. Code, § 355.) But a juvenile court may not base its findings solely
    on the hearsay statements of a truth-incompetent child—that is, a child who may
    not testify because she is too young to separate truth from falsehood—unless the
    child’s statements bear “special indicia of reliability.” (In re Lucero L. (2000) 
    22 Cal. 4th 1227
    , 1246, 1231 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.); 
    id. at pp.
    1250–1251 (conc. opn.
    of Kennard, J.) (Lucero L.).) This requirement, rooted in the constitutional
    guarantee of due process, reflects a balance between the vital interests at the heart
    of the juvenile dependency system: It is designed to ensure that children are
    1
    protected from abuse while guarding against the risk that children will needlessly
    be separated from their parents on the basis of unreliable reports that are not
    subject to testing in court.
    We granted review to determine whether, under the rule established in
    Lucero L., certain uncorroborated hearsay statements made by a three-year-old
    child provided a sufficient basis to determine that she had been sexually abused by
    her father. Although the juvenile court found the statements to be unclear,
    confusing, not credible, and unreliable in significant respects, it ultimately
    concluded that the indicia of the statements’ reliability outweighed the indicia of
    unreliability. Based on the child’s statements, the juvenile court adjudged her a
    dependent of the court and ordered her father removed from the family home. The
    Court of Appeal, deferring to the juvenile court’s weighing analysis, affirmed.
    Mindful of the balance of interests underlying the Lucero L. rule, we conclude that
    the juvenile court erred and reverse the judgment.
    I.
    A.
    Under section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code (section 300), a
    court may exercise dependency jurisdiction over a child who has been abused,
    neglected, or is otherwise at risk of “serious physical harm” because of a parent’s
    or guardian’s abuse or inability to provide adequate supervision, care, or
    protection. (§ 300 [listing categories of children subject to dependency
    jurisdiction].) A dependency proceeding commences when a child welfare agency
    files a petition alleging that a child has been abused or otherwise comes within the
    court’s jurisdiction under section 300. (Id., §§ 325, 332.) The court then holds a
    hearing at which it may receive in evidence “[a]ny legally admissible evidence
    that is relevant to the circumstances or acts that are alleged to bring the minor
    within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Id., § 355, subd. (a); see 
    id., § 334.)
                                               2
    “Proof by a preponderance of evidence must be adduced to support a finding that
    the minor is a person described by Section 300” who may be adjudged a
    dependent of the court. (Id., § 355, subd. (a).)
    “A dependency adjudication is a preliminary step that allows the juvenile
    court, within specified limits, to assert supervision over the endangered child’s
    care.” (In re Ethan C. (2012) 
    54 Cal. 4th 610
    , 617.) After the juvenile court takes
    that preliminary step, the court may impose limitations on parental authority as
    necessary to protect the child. (Ibid.; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (a).) It
    may also order that the child be removed from a parent’s physical custody if there
    is clear and convincing evidence that removal is necessary to protect the child
    from a substantial risk of harm. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c); In re I.J.
    (2013) 
    56 Cal. 4th 766
    , 773.) In some cases, a dependency adjudication may lead
    to termination of parental rights. (In re Ethan 
    C., supra
    , at p. 617; see Cynthia D.
    v. Superior Court (1993) 
    5 Cal. 4th 242
    , 247–250.)
    B.
    In September 2012, the Alameda County Social Services Agency (the
    Agency) filed a section 300 petition to have I.C., then three years old, and her
    brother J.C., then five years old, declared dependents of the juvenile court. The
    petition alleged that I.C. had been sexually abused by her father (Father), and that
    both children were at risk as a result of the abuse.1 Shortly thereafter, the court
    ordered that the children be temporarily placed with the Agency and issued a
    temporary restraining order ordering Father to move from the family home and to
    have no contact with I.C. and J.C. except for supervised visitation. Approximately
    1      The allegations involving J.C. were dropped at the dispositional hearing.
    3
    two weeks later, the Agency permitted the children to return to their mother
    (Mother), on the condition that Father remain out of the home.
    A jurisdictional hearing was held over the course of six days in December
    of 2012 and January and March of 2013. Evidence before the court showed that,
    approximately two months before the alleged parental abuse occurred, I.C. had
    been sexually molested by an eight-year-old neighbor named Oscar. Oscar had
    come to the younger children’s home and was playing with them in a bedroom
    when Mother noticed that it had gotten quiet and the bedroom door was closed.
    When Mother opened the door, she saw a blanket had been thrown over the bunk
    bed. Oscar, I.C., and J.C. were on the bed. Mother asked, “Hey, what’s going on
    here?” and I.C. said, “Oh, nothing. We’re just kissing.” Mother asked J.C. what
    was going on, and he began crying and responded: “Oscar was kissing [I.C.] and
    he put a train in her.” A wooden toy train was on the bed next to the children.
    According to the social services report, Oscar also “stuck his penis into [I.C.’s]
    vagina.”
    Mother told Oscar, “Get out of my house . . . I’m calling your mother.”
    Oscar ran home. Mother again asked J.C. what had happened. He said that Oscar
    was laying on top of I.C., kissing her, and said, “We’re going to fuck.” Although
    Oscar instructed J.C. to look away, J.C. at one point turned and saw Oscar putting
    the wooden train in I.C.’s vagina.
    Mother called a hospital to seek advice. The hospital employee with whom
    she spoke, with Mother’s consent, called the police. A police officer arrived and
    interviewed the children. The police later interviewed Oscar, who admitted to
    “kissing [I.C.] on the mouth” but “did not admit to inserting any toy or his penis.”
    Mother later testified that she did not recall either I.C. or J.C. telling her
    that Oscar had put his penis in I.C. The police advised Mother to take I.C. to an
    emergency room, where a doctor examined her. The doctor told Mother that he
    4
    could not tell whether Oscar had used the wooden train or if Oscar had sex with
    I.C.
    The matter was referred to Child Protective Services, but the investigation
    proved inconclusive. An investigator from Child Protective Services attempted
    without success to contact I.C. and her parents on numerous occasions after the
    incident occurred. In the months that followed the incident with Oscar, Mother
    testified, she had many discussions about this incident with I.C., and explained the
    difference between “good touches and bad touches.” She used the words “penis”
    and “vagina” during those talks.
    Approximately two months after the incident, on Friday, September 7,
    2012, the family saw Oscar again when Mother, Father, and I.C. took J.C. to his
    first day of school. I.C. said, “ ‘Mom, Oscar is going to [J.C.]’s school.’ ” Mother
    testified that I.C. was frightened and confused. At that point, Mother testified,
    “we realized we had a problem, because [I.C.] would go to the same school.” The
    family “talked about it all weekend.”
    On Tuesday evening of the following week, I.C. spontaneously said to
    Mother: “My dad put his penis on me.” J.C. corrected her, saying: “No, that’s
    what Oscar did to you.” Mother asked I.C. for details, but other than saying it
    happened on J.C.’s bed, “[s]he kept saying the same thing”: “Daddy put his penis
    on me.” Mother said she “tried to get [I.C.] to tell me what happened, but it didn’t
    seem like it all went together and made very much sense.”
    The next morning, Mother asked I.C. about what she had said the night
    before. I.C. said she was “just kidding.” Although I.C. did not normally go to day
    care on Wednesdays, Mother decided to take her, explaining that I.C. had “told me
    something within the last 12 hours that was rather alarming . . . and I thought until
    I could figure out what was the reason why she was saying this, I took her to
    school, where she loved to be.” Mother, who worked full time, also explained that
    5
    she took I.C. to day care that day so I.C. would not be home with Father. Before
    Mother left, she woke Father and told him what I.C. had said. He said, “That’s
    crazy.”
    Later that morning, a child welfare worker made an unannounced visit to
    I.C.’s preschool and spoke to I.C. The social services report states: “[I.C.] was
    open and cooperative. Minor was not able to tell the difference between telling a
    true [sic] and telling a lie. . . . [I.C.] reported to Child Welfare Worker that her
    father touched her vagina with his penis. [I.C.] stated that this happened in her
    home in [J.C.’s] room.” I.C. underwent a sexual assault forensic examination at
    Children’s Hospital in Oakland, but “results of the examination [were]
    inconclusive.”
    I.C. and J.C. were taken to the Child Abuse, Listening, Interviewing, and
    Coordination Center (CALICO), a facility that offers forensic interviews of
    children who may have suffered abuse or neglect. In a videotaped interview, I.C.
    again said that her father had molested her. I.C. was seated on a carpeted platform
    next to a padded mat. She promised to tell the truth and not tell any lies. The
    interviewer asked I.C. what she had done that morning and I.C. said she had
    watched a movie, taken a nap, gone to San Francisco with her mother, gone to the
    park, gone shopping with her mother and bought glasses and eggs, gone to school,
    played in the park, and sat in a chair at her house and watched television.
    When asked what she had told her teacher at day care that morning, I.C.
    answered: “I told daddy put penis on me,” adding, “then he put a train on me and
    he put a flower on me yesterday.” Pointing to the mat next to her, she said, “In
    this bed,” but then said they were on J.C.’s bed. I.C. climbed on the mat, lay down
    and opened her legs and, gesturing towards her groin area, said “he do this to my
    vagina.” When asked again what Father had done, I.C. repeated: “Put a penis and
    then a flower and then the train.” The interviewer asked what I.C. was wearing.
    6
    I.C. said: “I don’t wear clothes . . . he take off my clothes. He take of[f] my
    shoes, my pants and my shirt. . . . My underwear too . . . and my socks.”
    I.C. said Father then kissed her on her mouth and she said, “stop it,”
    adding: “And he didn’t listen to me when I say ‘stop it.’ ” When asked why she
    wanted Father to stop, I.C. said, “because he can’t do that to touch me here,”
    putting her hand on her groin area. She repeated: “He didn’t listen to me, so I say
    ‘stop it.’ Then he didn’t listen to me. . . . He still doesn’t listen to me.” The
    interviewer asked what I.C. wanted Father to stop doing, and she replied: “Don’t
    do that. Okay. That’s . . . mine. If he leaves my vagina alone, just leave it. Okay.
    Then he didn’t . . . leave me alone still. . . . He still bothers me,” adding: “Don’t
    do that, okay, that’s mine. If you do that then gonna be in trouble. So he do that
    . . . and he didn’t stop it.”
    I.C. said she was on the bed and Father was lying next to her with no
    clothes on. Father “smacked the wall” five times and I.C. said, “stop it.” The
    interviewer asked I.C., “Was any part of your Daddy’s body touching any part of
    your body when you were lying like that?” and she answered: “Yeah. He put
    penis on me.” When asked to say more about that, she said: “Put penis on me,
    and he put penis on me, he put penis on me yesterday,” gesturing toward her groin
    area each time and adding “five times” and holding up five fingers. When asked
    what Father had done five times, I.C. said, “this and this and this and this and
    this,” moving her hand to her vagina each time. I.C. said it did not feel good. I.C.
    demonstrated that Father “put penis on me like this,” touching her vagina, and
    “then like that,” poking between her legs with her fingers two times, adding “he
    put penis on me and he do this, this, this, this,” poking with her hand each time.
    Asked if anything came out of Father’s penis, I.C. said, “Yeah,” adding, “it’s
    ducky.”
    7
    Asked if a penis is the same thing as a train, she said, “Yeah.” I.C. said she
    got up and ran away to a car in her garage “[b]ecause he did stuff to me and I’m
    sad.”
    I.C. said when Mother returned home, she told Mother what Father had
    done and “told her ‘stop it.’ ” She “said, Daddy, stop it, that’s not . . . yours, that’s
    mine. Anyone can touch my vagina.” I.C. “told her ‘stop it’ and her listen to me.”
    I.C. stated Mother said, “ ‘[S]top.’ ‘Oh my, daddy is going to be in all so much
    trouble.’ ” I.C. said her father was going to jail and had told the police, “ ‘I
    promise, I won’t do it again.’ ”
    When asked whether Father had ever done that before, I.C. said “yes,”
    explaining: “He put, hmm, another train on me.” When asked if this ever
    happened anywhere else besides in J.C.’s bed, I.C. said, “it was in my house and
    here.” Asked to explain what she meant by “here,” she gestured to the mat next to
    her.
    The interviewer asked, “have you ever seen your daddy do that to anybody
    else?” and I.C. answered, “He do that to RJ,” Father’s 21-year-old daughter from a
    previous marriage. Asked what she saw Father do, I.C. said: “Put penis in the
    flower and the train and train and . . . that’s it.” She added that Father removed
    RJ’s clothes and removed his own clothes and RJ kissed him. I.C. was with them
    on J.C.’s bed, as well as her babysitter and her babysitter’s sister. Asked what
    Father wanted to do, she said, “the bad things,” which are “[t]he train, the train
    and train—and the flower and the penis.”
    After a break, the interviewer asked I.C. if Father touched her vagina with
    his penis “on the outside or the inside” and I.C. said: “The inside.” When asked
    how that felt, she said: “Feels hurt.” When asked where it hurt, she pointed to her
    groin area and said, “here.” She said that Father took off her clothes and kissed
    8
    her vagina. That felt “not good.” She repeated “not good” several times. She said
    it happened in J.C.’s bed four times, a “long time” ago.
    At the jurisdictional hearing, the child welfare worker assigned to the case,
    Sylvina Cooper, testified that she believed “that the allegation of sexual molest of
    the minor, [I.C.], is accurate” and “that there has to be a process for the father in
    terms of counseling . . . and for someone to assess when and if it would be a good
    time for the father to return to the family unit.”
    Cooper testified that I.C. “presents as being very, very intelligent and very,
    very mature, beyond the age of three. And she has a very high level of language
    development.” Cooper watched the video recording of I.C.’s CALICO interview
    and “believe[d] that most of the statements that [I.C.] made are credible” and that
    I.C. knows the difference between what is true and what is false. I.C. reported to
    her mother, school personnel at the day care center, the child welfare worker who
    interviewed I.C. at the day care center, and the CALICO interviewer that her
    father had sexually molested her and each account was consistent. Cooper knew
    of no possible motive for I.C. to make up these allegations. Finally, Cooper
    testified that during a supervised visit, I.C. asked if Father could come home.
    Father’s 21-year-old daughter from a previous marriage, who is known as
    RJ, testified that Father had never touched her inappropriately and she had never
    seen her father touch I.C. inappropriately.
    Throughout the juvenile dependency proceedings, Father denied that he
    molested his daughter and Mother stated that she does not believe he did.
    C.
    After the close of evidence, the juvenile court declared I.C. a dependent
    child of the court, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Father sexually
    molested I.C. In a lengthy ruling, the court stated:
    9
    “This is a very difficult case because the evidence comes from a three-year-
    old child who, at times, was very clear in her statements about what happened, and
    at other times was very unclear, and at times very confusing about the statements
    that she makes concerning what she alleges her father did to her.
    “Essentially, all the Court has to go on in this case is the hearsay statements
    of a three-year-old minor, [I.C.]. [¶] . . . [¶]
    “. . . The Court believes that when the minor made the statement to her
    mother that, ‘Daddy put penis on me,’ this was a statement that came out of the
    blue. It was completely spontaneous. It was not a product of [] prompting on the
    part of the mother. The mother was caught completely off guard by the
    statement. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [T]hey were not in the middle of the discussion of what
    occurred in July or any other matters of a sexual nature. [¶] . . . [W]hen the minor
    made the same statements shortly thereafter to the staff at the day care center,
    again, the statements were completely spontaneous.
    “She has consistently repeated the same core allegations to various people:
    Her mother, the day care center staff, and the Calico staff. [¶] In fact, on the
    Calico tape, she depicted the incident with great detail, using gestures, hand signs,
    words, and actions, as were noted in the police report. She repeats the details
    throughout the 40 minutes or so of the interview. [¶] . . . [¶] And the court can
    find no evidence that she has a motive to lie about the statements that she made.
    “What supports unreliability: Her very confusing statements about the train
    and the flower as it relates to the father. It’s very difficult to follow her thought
    process in relating the train and the flower to her father. It leads one to believe
    that maybe she’s having some sort of flashback to the July encounter with the
    eight-year-old. [¶] . . . .
    “Another piece of evidence that one could conclude leads to the
    unreliability of her statements is that she made statements during the course of her
    10
    Calico interview that both her stepsister, RJ, was in the bed with her and her
    father, and two other girls, that they were all naked, and the father was wanting to
    do bad things to them, to each one of them. These statements are not believable,
    and in fact, were denied by RJ. [¶] Her statement on the Calico tape that she had
    an encounter with the father on the couch at Calico was not correct, and it’s
    unreliable. [¶] . . . [¶]
    “So there’s supporting evidence on both sides. . . . [¶] But the Court finds
    the evidence that supports the reliability more compelling. The Court does not
    subscribe to the theory that the minor is having a flashback to the July incident and
    is projecting that incident onto the father. [¶] There’s several distinctions between
    the July incident and the statement made by the minor regarding the September
    encounter with the father. For example, . . . in the July incident, the minor never
    used the word penis to describe her experience with the eight-year-old. . . . [T]he
    minor did not say that the eight-year-old had used his penis. She only referred to a
    train being used. And according to the observations of her brother, a toy train was
    used in that incident. [¶] In the September incident, although she talked about a
    train and she talked about a flower, she was very clear in her statement that,
    ‘Daddy put his penis on me.’ [¶] She did not refer to anyone other than the father
    . . . . [¶] In the July incident, both the mother and the brother were at home. In the
    Calico statements, she was very clear that the encounter with her father occurred
    while her mother was at work and while her brother was at school. It’s a very
    different scenario than the scenario in the July incident. [¶] . . . [¶]
    “So to this Court, reviewing all the evidence that’s been presented, the core
    allegations of the minor have remained consistent, they have remained
    spontaneous throughout the recounting of this incident, and the Court can find no
    motive on her part to lie about this. The Court can find no credible evidence that
    there is or was a psychological process that was involved here that caused the
    11
    minor to somehow misstate what had happened to her in July with what she claims
    her father did to her. The Court can find no evidence of any fraud or any deceit or
    any und[ue] influence.” The court confirmed that it based its ruling on the hearsay
    statements of I.C. “and the circumstances under which those statements were
    made.”
    The juvenile court held a dispositional hearing in several sessions over the
    course of the following year. Based in significant part on its jurisdictional finding
    that Father had sexually molested I.C., the juvenile court found that the Agency
    had sustained its burden of proof and ordered that Father continue to be removed
    from the family home until further order of the court.
    D.
    The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
    dispositional findings. Noting that the case involved a “somewhat novel
    application of In re Lucero L.,” the court concluded that the “juvenile court’s
    decision to receive evidence of [I.C.’s hearsay statements] . . . is supported by
    substantial evidence and thus properly served as the basis for asserting the
    jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor as a dependent child.” The court
    acknowledged, as had the juvenile court, that discrepancies in I.C.’s statements
    made this “ ‘a very difficult case.’ ” But the court noted that the juvenile court had
    both viewed the videotaped CALICO interview with I.C. and “took particular
    pains to state its reasoning as to why it found I.C.’s evidence reliable.” “Given the
    scrupulousness with which the juvenile court evaluated the pros and cons of the
    hearsay statements,” the court concluded, “there is no basis on this record for
    overturning the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding.” The court further
    concluded that the jurisdictional finding supported its dispositional finding “that
    the minor’s safety required separation from [Father].”
    12
    Justice Stewart dissented. In her view, the juvenile court erred in asking
    merely whether I.C. was “more credible than not,” rather than asking whether
    I.C.’s truthfulness was “ ‘ “so clear” ’ that ‘ “the test of cross-examination would
    be of marginal utility.” ’ (Lucero 
    L., supra
    , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1249 [(plur. opn. of
    Mosk, J.)].)” She further faulted the Court of Appeal majority for failing to
    review the record for substantial evidence that would have met that standard. In
    her view, “[t]he juvenile court’s own concerns about the reliability of I.C.’s
    hearsay statements—all of which were uncorroborated [fn. omitted]—
    demonstrates that there is not substantial evidence that meets the Lucero L.
    mandate.”2
    II.
    A.
    As a general rule, an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of its
    content is inadmissible in evidence. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) This rule, which is “of
    venerable common law pedigree,” is rooted in concerns about reliability. (Cindy
    
    L., supra
    , 17 Cal.4th at p. 27.) Unlike in-court testimony, hearsay statements
    generally are not made under oath; they are generally made outside of the view of
    the trier of fact, which therefore cannot adequately assess the speaker’s credibility;
    and they are not generally subject to testing through cross-examination. (Cindy 
    L., supra
    , 17 Cal.4th at p. 27; Englebretson v. Industrial etc. Com. (1915) 
    170 Cal. 2
          Father’s counsel has informed this court that Father has since been
    permitted to return home, subject to Mother’s supervision of his interactions with
    I.C., and that the juvenile court dismissed the dependency proceeding shortly
    before our grant of review. Father argues, however, that the case is not moot
    because the jurisdictional finding has significant continuing consequences. The
    Agency did not file a response and conceded at oral argument that the
    jurisdictional finding has significant continuing consequences for Father. We
    agree with the parties that the case is not moot.
    13
    793, 798.) In cases of suspected child abuse or neglect, however, strict adherence
    to the rule would lead to the exclusion of firsthand reports of many victims in the
    very proceedings that are designed to protect them from harm. Child victims of
    abuse and neglect may be unable to testify in court for a number of reasons; young
    children, in particular, are often incompetent to testify in court because they are
    unable to understand the duty to tell the truth under oath. (See Evid. Code, § 701,
    subd. (a)(2) [“A person is disqualified to be a witness if he or she is: [¶] . . . [¶]
    [i]ncapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.”].) For that
    reason, the traditional hearsay bar has been modified in the juvenile dependency
    context to allow courts to consider certain out-of-court statements concerning
    suspected abuse or neglect, including the statements of so-called “truth-
    incompetent” young children.
    This court first began to frame what we have termed the “special
    evidentiary rules for dependency hearings” in In re Malinda S. (1990) 
    51 Cal. 3d 368
    (Malinda S.). (Lucero 
    L., supra
    , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1237 (plur. opn. of
    Mosk, J.).) In Malinda S., we held that statutory provisions authorizing juvenile
    courts to consider “social studies” prepared by probation officers or social workers
    also implicitly created a hearsay exception for the various hearsay statements
    typically contained in such studies. (Malinda 
    S., supra
    , 51 Cal.3d at p. 379.) We
    further held that courts may rely on such studies as “competent evidence” in
    making their jurisdictional findings. (Id. at p. 382 [construing Welf. & Inst. Code
    former § 355].) In so ruling, we had “assumed that those whose hearsay
    statements appear in a social study would be available for cross-examination.
    [Citation.] We did not consider whether such statements would be admissible and
    competent evidence if the testimony of the child making those statements was not
    available during the hearing.” (Cindy 
    L., supra
    , 17 Cal.4th at p. 22.)
    14
    In part to codify the rule of Malinda S., the Legislature in 1996 amended
    Welfare and Institutions Code section 355 (section 355), which prescribes rules for
    the conduct of jurisdictional hearings. (Lucero 
    L., supra
    , 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1240–
    1242 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Subdivision (a) of section 355, as amended,
    provides: “[a]ny legally admissible evidence that is relevant to the circumstances
    or acts that are alleged to bring the minor within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
    court is admissible and may be received in evidence.” Subdivision (b) adds: “A
    social study prepared by the petitioning agency, and hearsay evidence contained in
    it, is admissible and constitutes competent evidence upon which a finding of
    jurisdiction pursuant to Section 300 may be based, to the extent allowed by
    subdivisions (c) and (d).”3 Finally, subdivision (c)(1) of section 355 provides: “If
    a party to the jurisdictional hearing raises a timely objection to the admission of
    specific hearsay evidence contained in a social study, the specific hearsay
    evidence shall not be sufficient by itself to support a jurisdictional finding or any
    ultimate fact upon which a jurisdictional finding is based, unless the petitioner
    establishes one or more of the following exceptions,” including, as particularly
    relevant here: “(B) The hearsay declarant is a minor under 12 years of age who is
    the subject of the jurisdictional hearing. However, the hearsay statement of a
    minor under 12 years of age shall not be admissible if the objecting party
    establishes that the statement is unreliable because it was the product of fraud,
    3      “For purposes of this section, ‘social study’ means any written report
    furnished to the juvenile court and to all parties or their counsel by the county
    probation or welfare department in any matter involving the custody, status, or
    welfare of a minor in a dependency proceeding pursuant to Article 6 (commencing
    with Section 300) to Article 12 (commencing with Section 385), inclusive.”
    (§ 355, subd. (b)(1).)
    15
    deceit, or undue influence.”4 As amended, section 355 “broadly authorize[s]
    reliance on any hearsay contained in the social study by a child victim under the
    age of 12, as long as an objecting party does not prove that the statement was
    procured by means of fraud, deceit, or undue influence.” (Cindy 
    L., supra
    , 17
    Cal.4th at p. 28, fn. 6.)
    In a separate development, California courts in the wake of Malinda S. also
    crafted a broader, more general common law “child dependency exception” for
    out-of-court statements of children in dependency proceedings. (Cindy 
    L., supra
    ,
    17 Cal.4th at p. 20; see In re Carmen O. (1994) 
    28 Cal. App. 4th 908
    .) In Cindy L.,
    we explained that although courts must “proceed with caution” in developing new
    exceptions to the “general rule that hearsay evidence is inadmissible because it is
    inherently unreliable,” the child dependency exception concerned a class of
    evidence for which there was a “substantial need.” (Cindy L., at pp. 27–28.) We
    explained: “[T]here are particular difficulties with proving child sexual abuse: the
    frequent lack of physical evidence, the limited verbal and cognitive abilities of
    child victims, the fact that children are often unable or unwilling to act as
    witnesses because of the intimidation of the courtroom setting and the reluctance
    to testify against their parents. [Citation.] Given these realities, the categorical
    exclusion of child hearsay . . . will often mean the exclusion of significant, reliable
    evidence required for the juvenile court to assert its jurisdiction over the child and
    to ultimately protect him or her from an abusive family relationship.” (Id. at p. 28,
    fn. omitted.)
    4      Subdivision (d) of section 355 states: “This section shall not be construed
    to limit the right of a party to the jurisdictional hearing to subpoena a witness
    whose statement is contained in the social study or to introduce admissible
    evidence relevant to the weight of the hearsay evidence or the credibility of the
    hearsay declarant.”
    16
    We also acknowledged in Cindy L. that necessity alone is insufficient; “an
    exception to the hearsay rule is not valid unless the class of hearsay evidence
    proposed for admission is inherently reliable.” (Cindy 
    L., supra
    , 17 Cal.4th at
    p. 28.) To “better safeguard the reliability of a child’s hearsay statements” (ibid.)
    and to “provide specific due process protections for parents in child dependency
    hearings” (
    id. at p.
    18), we concluded that a child’s out-of-court statements were
    admissible if: (1) “the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide
    sufficient indicia of reliability”; (2) the child is available for cross-examination or
    other evidence corroborates the child’s statements; and (3) interested parties have
    notice the statements will be used (
    id. at p.
    29).
    In Cindy L., we noted the passage of the Legislature’s 1996 amendments to
    section 355, but had no occasion to consider their import, since the amendments
    postdated the events at issue in the case. (Cindy 
    L., supra
    , 17 Cal.4th at p. 28,
    fn. 6.) We considered those amendments for the first time in Lucero L., in which
    we explored the relationship between the social study exception codified in the
    newly amended section 355 and the child dependency exception recognized in
    Cindy L.
    The question in Lucero L. concerned a juvenile court’s admission of, and
    reliance on, the hearsay statements contained in a social study of a truth-
    incompetent three-year-old child. In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Mosk,
    the court concluded that section 355 authorizes the admission of such statements
    contained in a social study, regardless of whether the statements satisfied the test
    for admission under the child dependency exception announced in Cindy L.,
    including the requirements of reliability and corroboration. (Lucero 
    L., supra
    , 22
    Cal.4th at p. 1231 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.).) But the plurality opinion explained
    that “ ‘[t]he admissibility and substantiality of hearsay evidence are different
    issues.’ ” (Id. at p. 1244.) Even though the hearsay statements of a truth-
    17
    incompetent child, contained in a social study, are admissible, the plurality
    concluded, they “may not be relied on solely as a basis for a jurisdictional finding
    unless the court finds that they show special indicia of reliability.” (Id. at
    p. 1231.)
    In so holding, the plurality applied the balancing test “under California and
    federal law used to determine what sort of process is due in a given judicial or
    administrative proceeding.” (Lucero 
    L., supra
    , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1246 (plur. opn. of
    Mosk, J.).) The plurality reasoned that “relying too heavily on the hearsay
    statements of incompetent minors to make jurisdictional findings when there has
    been no opportunity for cross-examining the minor” (
    id. at p.
    1244)—and, in
    particular, when the minor “has been determined to be incompetent to distinguish
    between truth and falsehood” (
    id. at p.
    1246)—raises a substantial risk of
    erroneously depriving parents of their substantial interest in maintaining custody
    of their children. (Id. at pp. 1244–1247.) Accordingly, due process requires a
    showing that “ ‘the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide
    sufficient indicia of reliability’ ” before a juvenile court may rely exclusively on
    such a statement in making its jurisdictional findings. (Id. at p. 1248.) On the
    other hand, the plurality concluded, the federal and state Constitutions do not
    require that the child’s statements be corroborated by other evidence; while “ ‘[a]
    requirement of corroboration is an additional safeguard against the possibility of
    fabrication by very young witnesses whose out-of-court statements are insulated
    from the rigors of cross-examination,’ ” it is not “mandated by due process.” (Id.
    at pp. 1248–1249.) Applying these principles, the plurality in Lucero L. upheld a
    jurisdictional finding based on the hearsay statements of the truth-incompetent
    child, concluding that the statements were sufficient to sustain the finding because
    they showed special indicia of reliability. (Id. at pp. 1231, 1249–1250.)
    18
    In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennard, joined by Justice Brown,
    generally agreed with the plurality’s legal framework: “(1) Hearsay statements by
    a minor who is the subject of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 hearing,
    and who is incompetent to testify because of an inability to understand the
    obligation to tell the truth, are admissible under [section 355] when they appear in
    a social study and are not the product of fraud, deceit, or undue influence; (2) this
    rule of admissibility does not violate the federal and state Constitutions; and
    (3) such statements may not form the sole basis for a jurisdictional finding unless
    they show special indicia of reliability.” (Lucero 
    L., supra
    , 22 Cal.4th at
    pp. 1250–1251 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Justice Kennard disagreed with the
    plurality’s application of the rule to the facts of the case, however; in her view,
    because there was corroborating evidence in the case, it was unnecessary to
    decide, as the plurality had, whether the child’s hearsay statements bore special
    indicia of reliability.
    Justice Chin, joined by Justice Baxter, concurred in the result. He also
    agreed with the plurality that “the hearsay statements in the social study were
    admissible and that unreliable and uncorroborated hearsay, alone, would be
    insufficient to sustain the trial court’s jurisdictional finding.” (Lucero 
    L., supra
    , 22
    Cal.4th at p. 1252 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.).) He would have based that conclusion
    solely on section 355’s requirement that a jurisdictional finding must be supported
    by “proof by a preponderance of the evidence,” though he acknowledged that “[i]t
    might also violate due process to base a finding on unreliable and uncorroborated
    evidence.” (Id. at p. 1253.)
    B.
    1.
    In this case, Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s decision to admit
    his three-year-old daughter’s out-of-court statements describing the alleged
    19
    incident of abuse. He contends, rather, that the juvenile court misapplied the rule
    of Lucero L. when it relied solely on those statements in finding that the abuse
    occurred. I.C.’s uncorroborated out-of-court statements, he argues, did not
    manifest the special indicia of reliability required by Lucero L. to sustain the
    court’s jurisdictional finding.5
    In pressing this argument, Father relies heavily on a passage in Lucero L. in
    which the plurality responded to concerns about the due process implications of
    dispensing with Cindy L.’s requirement that a child’s hearsay statements be
    corroborated to be admitted in evidence: “In concluding that the corroboration
    requirement is inapplicable, we emphasize the importance of juvenile court
    scrutiny of the statements of young children who are both legally incompetent and
    insulated from cross-examination. At least in the case of a truth incompetent
    minor, the court may rely exclusively on these out-of-court statements only ‘if the
    declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test
    of cross-examination would be of marginal utility . . . .’ ” (Lucero 
    L., supra
    , 22
    Cal.4th at p. 1249 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.), quoting Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497
    5       At oral argument, counsel for the Agency argued for the first time—and
    contrary to the position taken in its briefing—that Lucero L. does not apply at all
    because there was no evidence that I.C. was truth incompetent. The Agency has
    forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in a timely manner. (See People v.
    Clark (2016) 
    63 Cal. 4th 522
    , 584.)
    Both parties have assumed that due process does not require that a child’s
    hearsay statements be corroborated by independent evidence. The plurality
    opinion in Lucero L. so stated (see Lucero 
    L., supra
    , 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1248–1249
    (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.)), but because the other members of the court believed that
    there was, in fact, corroborating evidence in that case, there was no majority vote
    for the proposition. We agree with the plurality opinion that corroboration is not a
    due process requirement. (See 
    id. at p.
    1249 [noting that a criminal prosecution
    may be based on a child’s uncorroborated hearsay statement and reasoning that
    “[t]he standard of evidence cannot be higher under the due process clause in a
    dependency hearing”]; 
    id. at p.
    1248.)
    
    20 U.S. 805
    , 820.) Father contends that the juvenile court ignored this requirement of
    “clear truthfulness” when it determined that I.C.’s statements were sufficiently
    reliable to support its jurisdictional finding, and that no substantial evidence in the
    record satisfies the “clear truthfulness” standard.
    While we agree with Father that the juvenile court erred in its evaluation of
    the reliability of I.C.’s statements, we do not believe the court’s error lies in its
    failure to ask whether I.C.’s truthfulness was “so clear from the surrounding
    circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility.”
    The test established in Lucero L., endorsed by a majority of the members of the
    court, is simply whether the statements show “special indicia of reliability.”
    (Lucero 
    L., supra
    , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1231 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.); 
    id. at pp.
    1250–
    1251 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).) The “clear truthfulness” language quoted in the
    plurality opinion was borrowed from Idaho v. 
    Wright, supra
    , 
    497 U.S. 805
    , in
    which the high court held that the prosecution in a criminal trial may introduce the
    out-of-court statements of a young victim of child abuse if the statements bear
    “ ‘adequate “indicia of reliability.” ’ ”6 (Id. at p. 815.) The court explained that
    6      Since Idaho v. Wright, the high court has held that substantive reliability is
    no longer the touchstone of admissibility of hearsay statements in a criminal case;
    the operative question, instead, is whether the hearsay declarant is bearing
    “testimony” against the accused. (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 
    541 U.S. 36
    ,
    54.) If the declarant’s statements are testimonial, the confrontation clause of the
    Sixth Amendment ordinarily prohibits their introduction unless the witness is
    “unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
    examination.” (Ibid.) Applying this framework, the high court has held that a
    young child’s out-of-court statements describing abuse to a teacher are not
    testimonial, and has noted that “[s]tatements by very young children will rarely, if
    ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.” (Ohio v. Clark (2015) 576 U.S. ___,
    ___–___ [
    135 S. Ct. 2173
    , 2181–2182].) The high court has not squarely
    addressed whether Idaho v. Wright has continued vitality in the wake of Crawford,
    nor has it addressed whether due process places any limitations on reliance in
    criminal cases on the uncorroborated hearsay statements of a child witness that do
    (Footnote continued on next page.)
    21
    this determination is to be made by reference to “relevant circumstances . . . that
    surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly
    worthy of belief,” without regard to any evidence that might corroborate the
    statement. (Id. at p. 819.) The court went on to explain that this rule “derives
    from the rationale for permitting exceptions to the general rule against hearsay,”
    which the court summarized as follows: “[I]f the declarant’s truthfulness is so
    clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would
    be of marginal utility, then the hearsay rule does not bar admission of the
    statement at trial.” (Id. at pp. 819–820.)
    When the court in Idaho v. Wright applied these general principles to the
    case before it, however, the court did not suggest that the proper inquiry was
    whether it would have been more than marginally useful to cross-examine the two-
    and-a-half-year-old child declarant in the case. It instead outlined a nonexhaustive
    list of factors for a court to consider when deciding whether “the child declarant
    was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made”—that
    is, whether the child’s statements bore indicia of reliability comparable to
    statements falling under recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. (Idaho v.
    
    Wright, supra
    , 497 U.S. at p. 822; 
    id. at p.
    827.) And likewise in Lucero L., this
    court engaged in the same sort of analysis to uphold the juvenile court’s
    jurisdictional finding in what it acknowledged was a “close” case involving a
    (Footnote continued from previous page.)
    not satisfy the Idaho v. Wright standard of reliability. (Cf. Jackson v. Virginia
    (1979) 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 318 [due process requires that a criminal conviction be
    supported by evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
    doubt].) We have no occasion to consider these questions in this civil dependency
    case.
    22
    series of hearsay statements by a three-and-a-half-year-old child that “were not
    identical in every detail.” (Lucero 
    L., supra
    , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1250 (plur. opn. of
    Mosk, J.).) The law’s general approach to the development of exceptions to the
    hearsay bar does properly inform the inquiry. (See Idaho v. Wright, at p. 820.)
    But ultimately the question is simply whether the “ ‘time, content and
    circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability’ ” to support
    the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding, considering the important interests at
    stake. (Lucero 
    L., supra
    , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1248 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.), quoting
    Cindy 
    L., supra
    , 17 Cal.4th at p. 29.)
    This reliability requirement is not designed to be “especially formidable,”
    or to be “so stringent” that “it will impede the government’s ability to protect
    children in an abusive situation.” (Lucero 
    L., supra
    , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1247 (plur.
    opn. of Mosk, J.).) But neither is it an empty formality. Rather, as Lucero L.
    made clear, the reliability requirement is an important procedural safeguard
    against the risk of erroneous determinations based solely on hearsay statements “in
    an area in which the truth of a hearsay statement [is] particularly open to
    question,” and in which the cost of error may be to needlessly separate families
    from one another, at substantial cost to parents and children alike. (Id. at p. 1248
    (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.); 
    id. at p.
    1247; 
    id. at pp.
    1250–1251 (conc. opn. of
    Kennard, J.); see Malinda 
    S., supra
    , 51 Cal.3d at pp. 383–384.)
    We have previously identified certain factors courts may consider in
    determining whether a child’s hearsay statements satisfy this standard of
    reliability, including: “(1) spontaneity and consistent repetition; (2) the mental
    state of the declarant; (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of a similar
    age; and (4) lack of motive to fabricate.” (Cindy 
    L., supra
    , 17 Cal.4th at p. 30,
    citing Idaho v. 
    Wright, supra
    , 497 U.S. at pp. 821–822; 
    id. at p.
    29.) Cindy L. also
    cited “the child’s ability to understand the duty to tell the truth and to distinguish
    23
    between truth and falsity” as a factor—albeit not a determinative one—in
    determining the reliability of her out-of-court statements. (Cindy L., at p. 30.) A
    court’s determination is not limited to these factors, however; “any factor bearing
    on reliability may be considered.” (Lucero 
    L., supra
    , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1250 (plur.
    opn. of Mosk, J.).) “[T]he unifying principle is that these factors relate to whether
    the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement
    was made.” (Idaho v. 
    Wright, supra
    , 497 U.S. at p. 822.)
    2.
    The juvenile court in this case acknowledged the nature of the task before
    it, observing: “This is a very difficult case because the evidence comes from a
    three-year-old child who, at times, was very clear in her statements about what
    happened, and at other times was very unclear, and at times very confusing about
    the statements that she makes concerning what she alleges her father did to her.”
    Although the court made no express finding that I.C.’s statements bore special
    indicia of reliability, the court concluded that I.C.’s statements were sufficiently
    reliable because the statements were made spontaneously, because I.C. was
    consistent in her “core allegations” (that her father had put his penis on her), and
    there was no evidence that I.C. had been prompted or coached, or that she had any
    motive to lie. The juvenile court acknowledged, on the other hand, that several of
    I.C.’s statements regarding Father’s alleged abuse were “not believable,” and that
    I.C.’s “very confusing statements about the train and the flower . . . lead[] one to
    believe that maybe she’s having some sort of flashback” to her earlier sexual
    molestation by her eight-year-old neighbor, Oscar. The court rejected the latter
    possibility, explaining that “the minor never used the word penis to describe her
    experience with the eight-year-old,” that I.C.’s description of the September
    incident differed in certain respects from the circumstances of the July incident,
    and that I.C. had stated during the CALICO interview that “what her father did to
    24
    her hurt.” In affirming the juvenile court’s judgment, the Court of Appeal
    understood the juvenile court to apply the correct standard under Lucero L., and it
    considered itself bound by the substantial evidence standard to defer to the court’s
    weighing analysis, given the “scrupulousness with which the juvenile court
    evaluated the pros and cons of the hearsay statements.”
    We agree with the Court of Appeal that the juvenile court’s lengthy ruling
    is commendably thorough. It is, however, a separate question whether the ruling
    is adequately supported by the record.
    The plurality opinion in Lucero L. states, and the parties here have
    assumed, that the juvenile court’s ruling must be upheld if supported by
    substantial evidence. (See Lucero 
    L., supra
    , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1249 (plur. opn. of
    Mosk, J.), citing Soto v. State of California (1997) 
    56 Cal. App. 4th 196
    , 199.) We
    accordingly proceed on that assumption as well.7 Substantial evidence is a
    deferential standard, but it is not toothless. It is well settled that the standard is not
    satisfied simply by pointing to “ ‘isolated evidence torn from the context of the
    whole record.’ ” (People v. Johnson (1980) 
    26 Cal. 3d 557
    , 577, quoting Traynor,
    The Riddle of Harmless Error (1969) p. 27; 
    id. at p.
    578.) Rather, the evidence
    supporting the jurisdictional finding must be considered “in the light of the whole
    record” “to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence
    which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value . . . .” (Johnson, at pp. 577–578.)
    And in the Lucero L. context in particular, in which the central determination at
    issue concerns the very reliability of the evidence on which the court has based its
    7     We note, however, that there was not a majority for this proposition in
    Lucero L.; because the other members of the court concluded that the child’s
    statements in the case were corroborated, they did not consider the standard of
    review that applies to a court’s decision to rely solely on the uncorroborated
    hearsay statements of a truth-incompetent minor.
    25
    findings, a court may not conclude that the standard is satisfied merely because the
    record contains some evidence that the court could have found reliable; a
    reviewing court instead must consider whether the record as a whole provides
    substantial evidence to support a determination that the child’s statements bear
    special indicia of reliability.
    Here, the evidence supporting I.C.’s reliability was weaker than the
    juvenile court acknowledged. Although the juvenile court addressed the factors
    identified in Lucero L., it failed to take adequate account of the confounding role
    of I.C.’s prior molestation. For example, the juvenile court emphasized that I.C.’s
    initial statement to her mother that her father had sexually abused her “came out of
    the blue.” But I.C. had been sexually molested only two months earlier by an
    older child. The incident resulted in a response from police, a hospital
    examination, and many discussions with Mother about inappropriate touching and
    about private body parts. On the Friday before I.C. made her statement regarding
    Father, I.C. saw Oscar for the first time since he molested her when the family
    took her brother to his first day of school. I.C. was frightened “and very
    confused” and the family “talked about it all weekend.” It was early the following
    week when I.C. first said that her father had “put his penis on me.” Given the
    timing, it is unsurprising that her family’s immediate reaction—including that of
    her five-year-old brother—was that I.C. was somehow recalling her earlier
    molestation: “No, that’s what Oscar did to you.” Under these circumstances, the
    fact that I.C. spoke spontaneously of sexual molestation was not a compelling
    indicator of trustworthiness. The probability that I.C.’s statements resulted from
    her recent molestation by Oscar, and her surprise encounter with her abuser just
    days earlier, cannot be ignored.
    The juvenile court also relied heavily on its finding that I.C. “has
    consistently repeated the same core allegations to various people.” But the
    26
    consistency of I.C.’s “core allegations” was not particularly strong given the
    juvenile court’s own finding that many of I.C.’s core allegations were either false
    or confusing. In her CALICO interview, for example, I.C. asserted that she had a
    naked encounter with her father, her stepsister RJ, the babysitter, and the
    babysitter’s sister. As the juvenile court noted, these statements were “not
    believable.” As for the “core allegation” that Father put his penis on her, I.C. also
    stated that Father put a train and a flower on her, that a penis is the same thing as a
    train, and that she had seen her father “[p]ut penis in the flower and the train and
    train.” As the juvenile court acknowledged, these statements were “very
    confusing” and again suggested that I.C. might be recalling the July incident in
    which Oscar used a toy train.
    The connection between the alleged abuse by Father and the July incident
    in which I.C. was molested and her recent surprise encounter with her abuser also
    was stronger than the juvenile court acknowledged. As noted, both the timing and
    content of I.C.’s allegations concerning her father strongly suggested a
    relationship to her earlier molestation. It is true, as the juvenile court noted, that
    no evidence showed that I.C. herself had previously used the word “penis” in
    connection with her molestation by Oscar. But a social services report concerning
    the incident indicates that Oscar had “stuck his penis in [I.C.’s] vagina.” Mother
    testified that over the following weeks, she and I.C. engaged in several
    conversations about the incident, using words such as “penis” and “vagina.”
    It is also true, as the juvenile court noted, that I.C.’s description of the
    circumstances surrounding the abuse by her father differed in certain respects from
    the circumstances surrounding the abuse by Oscar. For example, while the
    incident involving Oscar occurred while Mother was at home, I.C. told the
    CALICO interviewer that the abuse by Father had occurred while her mother was
    at work and J.C. was at school. But I.C.’s description changed over the course of
    27
    the interview; at another point, she told the interviewer that her mother was
    sleeping at the time of the abuse. And in any event, the differences between these
    accounts would go only to show that I.C. was not referring to the incident with
    Oscar, or misremembering the incident involving Oscar as having involved Father.
    These differences also are consistent, however, with the possibility that I.C. had
    woven her memories of the incident with Oscar into an imagined account of
    strikingly similar abuse by her father.
    Although, as the juvenile court noted, there is no evidence in this case to
    suggest that I.C. was coached or had a motive to lie, the evidence does indicate
    that I.C. had a tendency to interweave fantasy with truth. Her fantastical
    statements ranged from the highly significant—for example, her assertion that her
    father had molested her along with her stepsister, babysitter, and babysitter’s
    sister—to the mundane: After promising to tell the truth, I.C. told her interviewer
    that she had spent the morning taking a nap with her babysitter, watching a movie,
    going to San Francisco, and going to the park, when, in fact, she had done none of
    those things. This pattern is equally relevant in evaluating whether I.C. was likely
    telling the truth about the incidents involving Father.
    The Agency argues that our review must take account of the testimony of
    Child Welfare Worker Sylvina Cooper, who, the parties stipulated, “is an expert in
    risk assessment for child abuse and child sexual abuse.” Cooper testified that she
    believed that Father had molested I.C., and that I.C. was not merely recalling the
    earlier incident involving Oscar. But Cooper herself had not discussed the
    allegations with I.C.; her opinion was based on her review of I.C.’s statements to
    Mother, day care teachers, the child welfare worker, and the CALICO interviewer.
    When asked to explain the basis for her belief, Cooper cited I.C.’s “very detailed
    descriptions of what she said that her father did to her. Her use of words that he
    put his penis on her. That she told him that this was bad, these are bad things . . . .
    28
    She put gestures. It just seemed very, very specific regarding her father.” Cooper
    also acknowledged, however, that discussions in the home regarding I.C.’s
    previous sexual abuse “could” have had some impact on I.C.’s allegations
    involving her father. She further acknowledged that some of I.C.’s allegations
    were, in fact, false. Cooper’s opinion that I.C. was telling the truth about the
    alleged abuse by Father does not constitute substantial evidence that I.C.’s
    statements bear special indicia of reliability.
    3.
    The Court of Appeal, in upholding the juvenile court’s determination,
    acknowledged the “weaknesses and inconsistencies of I.C.’s statements.” But it
    deferred to the juvenile court because it believed that the juvenile court’s
    determination rested on an evaluation of I.C.’s credibility based on what the court
    had seen in the videotaped interview. The court reasoned that “[s]uch a credibility
    determination qualifies as a legitimate consideration, one of the non-enumerated
    factors ‘bearing on reliability’ permitted by Lucero,” and that such credibility
    determinations are “beyond [the] power” of an appellate court “to revisit.” We
    conclude this was error.
    There are certainly many advantages to videotaping interviews with
    suspected victims of child abuse. Among them, videotaping makes it easier to
    evaluate the circumstances under which the child’s statements were given and the
    propriety of the interviewing techniques, and it creates a clear record of what the
    child said and the manner in which she said it. (Cf. Commonwealth v. Patton
    (2010) 
    458 Mass. 119
    , 134 [“A videotape possesses ‘certain special
    characteristics,’ including the precise words used by the child and display of the
    child’s demeanor as she related what happened, adding to its reliability”]; Off. of
    Atty. Gen., Cal. Dept. of Justice, California Child Victim Witness Judicial
    Advisory Committee: Final Report (Oct. 1988) p. 27 [Recording an interview
    29
    with a child, “more so than a written record, can assist in determining whether a
    child was asked leading questions, or was prodded into giving certain answers.”];
    
    id. at p.
    28.)
    But the fact that the juvenile court was able to view a videotape of I.C.’s
    interview (as, indeed, was this court) does not end the inquiry. We are required to
    consider the entire record to determine whether the juvenile court’s finding is
    supported by substantial evidence. It is possible that the juvenile court may have
    been influenced by I.C.’s gestures as captured on the video recording; as noted,
    Child Welfare Worker Cooper mentioned these gestures in explaining the basis for
    her opinion that I.C. had been molested. But as noted, given I.C.’s prior sexual
    molestation, we cannot conclude that the degree of sexual knowledge
    demonstrated by her gestures is an accurate indicator of the reliability of her
    allegations involving Father. It is not clear what else, if anything, the juvenile
    court may have seen in the videotape that might have influenced its reliability
    determination. The Agency has not argued that I.C.’s demeanor during the
    interview supports the reliability of her allegations involving Father, and the
    juvenile court made no such finding. And as all acknowledge, I.C. was not telling
    the truth at several points during the interview. In the end, assumptions about the
    conclusions the juvenile court might have drawn about the child’s credibility from
    viewing an out-of-court videotaped interview are not a substitute for careful
    consideration of whether the record as a whole provides substantial evidence to
    support a finding that the child’s statements bear the requisite special indicia of
    reliability. The videotape, in short, cannot close the substantial gap between the
    indications of I.C.’s unreliability and the juvenile court’s finding that I.C.’s
    account was sufficiently reliable to support a jurisdictional finding.
    30
    4.
    A juvenile court presented with a child’s out-of-court reports of parental
    abuse faces a sensitive and difficult task. “Although the parent has an interest in
    avoiding an erroneous finding of jurisdiction, the child—and, accordingly, the
    court—has at least as important an interest in avoiding erroneous findings of no
    jurisdiction.” (Lucero 
    L., supra
    , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1257 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.).)
    Courts evaluating abuse allegations must keep in mind that a child’s verbal and
    cognitive limitations may prevent her from providing an account of her abuse that
    is as coherent and consistent as we might expect from an adult. (See 
    id. at p.
    1250
    (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.).) A child’s account may reflect uncertainty, and may even
    contain some contradictions, and nevertheless warrant the court’s trust. (See
    United States v. Dorian (8th Cir. 1986) 
    803 F.2d 1439
    , 1444–1445.)
    This case, however, involves an unusual situation in which the child
    recently had been molested and had just encountered, once again, the older child
    who had molested her. Her repeated statements about abuse were strikingly
    similar to descriptions of that recent act of molestation. Moreover, the child’s
    accounts contained both inconsistences and inaccuracies that were woven through
    her core allegations. The juvenile court acknowledged that its jurisdictional
    finding was based entirely on the child’s hearsay statements, but the court did not
    make an express finding, and the record supplies no adequate basis to support an
    implied finding, that the child’s statements bore special indicia of reliability as
    required by Lucero L. The juvenile court therefore erred in making its
    jurisdictional finding that the child had been sexually abused by her father, on
    which the court based its order that the father be removed from the family home.
    31
    III.
    The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.
    KRUGER, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
    CHIN, J.
    CORRIGAN, J.
    LIU, J.
    CUÉLLAR, J.
    RENNER, J.*
    *      Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned
    by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    32
    See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
    Name of Opinion In re I.C.
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished Opinion
    Original Appeal
    Original Proceeding
    Review Granted XXX 
    239 Cal. App. 4th 304
    Rehearing Granted
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Opinion No. S229276
    Date Filed: April 26, 2018
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Court: Superior
    County: Alameda
    Judge: Willie Lott, Jr.
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Counsel:
    Louise E. Collari, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Objector and Appellant.
    Aida Aslanian for California Appellate Defense Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Objector and
    Appellant.
    Donna R. Ziegler, County Counsel, Melinda Leong Capozzi, Nicole L. Roman and Samantha Stonework-
    Hand, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
    Louise E. Collari
    4115 Blackhawk Plaza Circle, Suite 100
    Danville, CA 94506
    (925) 487-3795
    Samantha Stonework-Hand
    Deputy County Counsel
    1221 Oak Street, Suite 450
    Oakland, CA 94612
    (510) 272-6700