People v. Brown ( 2023 )


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  •         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
    CALIFORNIA
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    DAJAH BROWN,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    S271877
    Sixth Appellate District
    H048462
    Santa Clara County Superior Court
    17AP002184, C1646856
    March 27, 2023
    Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which
    Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Kruger and Jenkins
    concurred.
    Justice Groban filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, in
    which Justices Liu and Evans concurred.
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    S271877
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    As part of their inherent power to control the litigation
    before them, trial courts enjoy broad discretion to deny
    continuances unsupported by a showing of good cause.
    However, established case law holds that it is an abuse of
    discretion to deny a trial continuance, solely because good cause
    is lacking, when doing so will result in dismissal of the charges
    and the continuance can be granted without violating the
    defendant’s speedy trial rights. (See People v. Ferguson (1990)
    
    218 Cal.App.3d 1173
     (Ferguson); see also Pen. Code., §§ 1050,
    subd. (l), 1050.5, subd. (b).)1
    This case involves a motion to continue the hearing on a
    suppression motion. (§ 1538.5.) We conclude the Ferguson
    principles apply when the People are unable to proceed with
    such a hearing. If the challenged evidence is so critical that its
    suppression would require dismissal of the case, the court must
    generally grant a continuance unless dismissal would be in
    furtherance of justice. The burden is on the prosecution to show
    an inability to go forward without the evidence in dispute. The
    court, however, must ultimately determine whether dismissal of
    the case is reasonably probable absent a continuance.
    1
    All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
    otherwise noted.
    1
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Near 11:30 p.m. on July 13, 2016, San Jose Police
    Department Officer Nader Yasin saw defendant and another
    woman standing in an area known for prostitution. Upon
    noticing the officer’s patrol car, the women walked away in
    opposite directions. Officer Yasin followed defendant and
    detained her. Defendant admitted she worked as a prostitute
    but said she had not had any “dates” that night. When asked if
    she had any condoms, she produced four. After an advisement,
    defendant waived her Miranda rights and admitted she had
    been loitering for purposes of prostitution. (Former § 653.22,
    subd. (a); Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 
    384 U.S. 436
    .) She was
    cited and released.
    Defendant was arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty, and
    waived her right to a speedy trial. On January 19, 2017, she
    moved to suppress both her statements and the physical
    evidence gathered by Officer Yasin as the fruit of an unlawful
    detention. (§ 1538.5.) On the date scheduled for the suppression
    hearing, the prosecutor orally requested a continuance. He
    explained that Yasin was under subpoena but had called during
    the lunch recess to report that he was the only gang unit officer
    available to interview a percipient witness to a shooting. The
    interview was scheduled at the same time as the hearing.
    Without consulting the court or notifying opposing counsel, the
    prosecutor told Yasin “it would be okay” for him to conduct the
    interview rather than come to court. Defendant objected to a
    continuance, arguing a lack of good cause. The court agreed and
    passed the matter to the afternoon to allow the prosecutor to
    secure the officer’s presence.
    2
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    When the case was recalled, Officer Yasin did not appear
    and the prosecutor gave no further explanation. Nevertheless,
    he urged the court to continue the matter, noting Yasin’s
    testimony was needed to respond to the motion and the
    challenged evidence was critical to the People’s case. He
    observed that the People needed only a brief continuance and
    argued defendant would suffer no prejudice because she was out
    of custody and had waived her speedy trial rights. The court
    rejected these arguments and denied the continuance for lack of
    good cause. Because the People had no witness, the suppression
    motion was granted. Asked how he wished to proceed, the
    prosecutor relayed his understanding that “a lot of the evidence
    in this case was evidence obtained by . . . observation from the
    police officer before any contact with the defendant.” He asked
    the court not to dismiss the case but instead to give the People
    additional time to determine whether they could proceed
    without the suppressed evidence. Defense counsel responded
    that the People had no remaining evidence sufficient to prove
    the charges and invited the court to dismiss the case under
    section 1385. Defendant then withdrew her time waiver,
    making March 20, 2017 the last day on which trial could begin
    under section 1382. The court set a trial date of March 6, 2017.
    On March 2, the People moved for reconsideration based
    on People v. Ferrer (2010) 
    184 Cal.App.4th 873
     (Ferrer), which
    held that a court abuses its discretion by denying a prosecutor’s
    request to continue a suppression hearing when the denial will
    foreseeably result in dismissal of the case. The prosecutor
    stated that the People would be unable to proceed to trial if the
    evidence was suppressed. The court declined to impose
    monetary sanctions because it found the prosecutor had not
    acted in bad faith. Based on Ferrer, the court vacated its prior
    3
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    orders and held a new suppression hearing on March 17. After
    hearing testimony from both Officer Yasin and defendant, the
    court denied the suppression motion.
    When the case was called for trial on March 20, 2017,
    defendant agreed to a “slow plea” pursuant to Bunnell v.
    Superior Court (1975) 
    13 Cal.3d 592
    . Under this procedure, a
    defendant waives the right to jury trial and allows the court to
    decide the case based on police reports or other agreed-upon
    evidence. (People v. Robertson (1989) 
    48 Cal.3d 18
    , 39–40.) The
    court accepted defendant’s plea, found her guilty, and placed her
    on probation for three years. It imposed fines and fees of $235
    but ordered no jail time.
    Defendant appealed, challenging the court’s decision to
    reconsider its continuance and suppression rulings. The
    superior court’s appellate division affirmed, noting the Ferrer
    decision was dispositive. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior
    Court (1962) 
    57 Cal.2d 450
    , 455.) A lengthy concurrence urged
    that Ferrer was wrongly decided. The Sixth District Court of
    Appeal granted defendant’s petition to transfer (Cal. Rules of
    Court, rule 8.1006) and issued an opinion disagreeing with
    Ferrer. The Court of Appeal concluded Ferrer’s rule was
    unsupported and criticized the rule’s “difficulties in
    application.” (People v. Brown (2021) 
    69 Cal.App.5th 15
    , 31
    (Brown).) Instead, the court held that trial courts retain
    authority to deny a continuance unsupported by good cause even
    if the decision will foreseeably result in dismissal of the case for
    lack of evidence. (Id. at p. 32.) We granted review to resolve the
    conflict. We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment and clarify
    the Ferrer rule.
    4
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    II. DISCUSSION
    The trial court’s authority to grant continuances in
    criminal cases is governed by statute. Accordingly, we begin
    with an examination of the relevant provisions, guided by
    familiar principles.      “ ‘ “We first examine the statutory
    language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do
    not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the
    statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope
    and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the
    enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow
    its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in
    absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the
    statutory language permits more than one reasonable
    interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the
    statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.” ’ ” (City
    of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 
    2 Cal.5th 608
    , 616–617.)
    Issues of statutory construction are reviewed de novo. (People
    v. Jimenez (2020) 
    9 Cal.5th 53
    , 61.)
    A.    Statutory Text
    Originally enacted in 1927 and amended many times
    since, section 1050 regulates the granting of continuances in
    criminal cases.2 Its initial subdivision describes the statute’s
    aim as follows: “The welfare of the people of the State of
    California requires that all proceedings in criminal cases shall
    be set for trial and heard and determined at the earliest possible
    2
    Early versions of section 1050 placed limits only on
    continuances of trial (see People v. Iocca (1974) 
    37 Cal.App.3d 73
    , 78), but amendments have expanded the statute’s reach to
    all criminal hearings. (See People v. Johnson (2013) 
    218 Cal.App.4th 938
    , 942 (Johnson).)
    5
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    time. To this end the Legislature finds that the criminal courts
    are becoming increasingly congested with resulting adverse
    consequences to the welfare of the people and the defendant.
    Excessive continuances contribute substantially to this
    congestion and cause substantial hardship to victims and other
    witnesses.      Continuances also lead to longer periods of
    presentence confinement for those defendants in custody and
    the concomitant overcrowding and increased expenses of local
    jails. It is therefore recognized that the people, the defendant,
    and the victims and other witnesses have the right to an
    expeditious disposition, and to that end it shall be the duty of all
    courts and judicial officers and of all counsel, both for the
    prosecution and the defense, to expedite these proceedings to the
    greatest degree that is consistent with the ends of justice.”
    (§ 1050, subd. (a).) Later provisions set out both procedural
    requirements and the necessary substantive showing.
    Subdivisions (b) through (d) of section 1050 address
    procedure. As relevant here, subdivision (b) requires that
    motions for a continuance be supported by written notice, filed
    and served at least two court days before the hearing in
    question, together with “affidavits or declarations detailing
    specific facts showing that a continuance is necessary.” (§ 1050,
    subd. (b).) Subdivision (c) provides that a party who has not
    followed the procedures in subdivision (b) may still request a
    continuance, but “unless the moving party shows good cause for
    a failure to comply with those requirements, the court may
    impose sanctions as provided in Section 1050.5.” (§ 1050,
    subd. (c).) Those sanctions may include a fine of up to $1,000
    and a report to “an appropriate disciplinary committee”
    (§ 1050.5, subd. (a)), but they may not include dismissal of the
    case (§ 1050.5, subd. (b)). Finally, when the moving party has
    6
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    failed to satisfy the procedural requirements of section 1050,
    subdivision (b), subdivision (d) requires the court to hold a
    hearing to determine whether good cause excuses the lack of
    procedural compliance. If the moving party cannot show good
    cause for that failure, subdivision (d) states that “the motion for
    continuance shall not be granted.” (§ 1050, subd. (d).)
    Other subdivisions of section 1050 go on to explain the
    substantive requirements for obtaining a continuance.
    Subdivision (e) states: “Continuances shall be granted only
    upon a showing of good cause. Neither the convenience of the
    parties nor a stipulation of the parties is in and of itself good
    cause.” (§ 1050, subd. (e).) Convenience of witnesses is,
    however, a factor for the court to consider both in deciding
    whether good cause has been shown and in selecting the new
    date. (§ 1050, subd. (g)(1).) If the court concludes that a
    continuance is necessary, it must state on the record the facts
    justifying that finding. (§ 1050, subd. (f).) Any permitted
    continuance must be limited to “only . . . that period of time
    shown to be necessary by the evidence considered at the hearing
    on the motion.” (§ 1050, subd. (i).) Section 1050, then, provides
    for two different good cause showings. If the moving party has
    not complied with the procedures of subdivision (b), it must
    show that there is good cause to excuse that failure. If such a
    showing is not made the court may impose sanctions. As to the
    merits of a continuance motion, subdivision (e) requires a good
    cause showing that a continuance is necessary.
    A trial court’s exercise of its broad discretion when ruling
    on a continuance motion is accorded substantial deference on
    appeal. (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 
    5 Cal.5th 442
    , 508;
    People v. Beames (2007) 
    40 Cal.4th 907
    , 920 (Beames).)
    Although section 1050 states conditions under which
    7
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    continuances “shall” and “shall not” be granted, case law has
    long recognized that various aspects of section 1050 are
    directory rather than mandatory.3 This principle is confirmed
    by the statute’s final subdivision.          Enacted in 2003,
    subdivision (l) states: “This section is directory only and does
    not mandate dismissal of an action by its terms.” (§ 1050,
    subd. (l).) Accordingly, “a failure to comply with a particular
    directive set forth in section 1050 does not, in itself, require
    dismissal of a criminal proceeding.” (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th
    at p. 1151, fn. 8, italics added; see Johnson, supra, 218
    Cal.App.4th at pp. 942–943; see also Malengo v. Municipal
    Court (1961) 
    56 Cal.2d 813
    , 816; People v. Brown (1956) 
    141 Cal.App.2d 299
    , 302–303.)        Thus, despite the seemingly
    mandatory phrasing of some portions of section 1050, a number
    of appellate decisions have recognized the trial court’s discretion
    to allow a continuance even without a factual showing of
    necessity. (See Johnson, at pp. 942–943; Brown, at p. 303.)
    Section 1050.5 was also added in 2003. After prescribing
    sanctions for a movant’s failure to comply with section 1050’s
    procedural requirements, section 1050.5 states that these
    sanctions “shall be in addition to any other authority or power
    available to the court, except that the court or magistrate shall
    not dismiss the case.” (§ 1050.5, subd. (b).)
    3
    As we explained in People v. Engram (2010) 
    50 Cal.4th 1131
    , 1148, footnote 7 (Engram) in regard to another aspect of
    section 1050: “[T]he term ‘directory,’ when used in reference to
    a statute, has been employed to denote different concepts —
    sometimes referring solely to the lack of (or limited type of)
    remedy prescribed when the statute is violated, and sometimes
    referring to whether a statute is simply ‘directive’ or ‘permissive’
    rather than ‘obligatory,’ ‘compulsory,’ or ‘mandatory.’ ”
    8
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    The text of section 1050 speaks only to continuances; it is
    not an independent source of dismissal authority. It is
    important to keep the distinction in mind.              Although
    section 1050, subdivision (l) makes clear that dismissal of an
    action is never required, the statute does not explicitly forbid
    dismissals that may result from a continuance denial. Further,
    section 1050.5 is inapplicable here. The sanctions statute
    forbids dismissal of an action as punishment for a party’s failure
    to satisfy procedural requirements (§ 1050.5, subd. (b)), but it
    does not speak to the court’s authority in ruling on a motion that
    fails to demonstrate a continuance is necessary.
    The language of section 1050 thus does not resolve the
    issue before us, because it neither authorizes nor prohibits
    dismissals. To consider how the relevant statutes can be read
    together, we turn to their legislative history and interpretative
    case law.
    B.   Case Law Context and Legislative History
    Both section 1050, subdivision (l) and the language of
    section 1050.5, subdivision (b) discussed above were added by
    Assembly Bill No. 1273 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.). The Legislature
    acted in response to a series of cases, which we discuss before
    reviewing the bill’s legislative history.
    1.    Cases Addressing Continuance of Trial
    Several opinions have examined how the time limits in
    section 1382 affect the court’s discretion in ruling on
    continuances that would delay the start of trial. Without the
    defendant’s waiver or consent, or a showing of “good cause to the
    contrary,” section 1382 requires that the court dismiss an action
    not brought to trial within: (1) 60 days after the defendant’s
    arraignment or plea in felony cases; (2) 30 days after the
    9
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    arraignment or plea in misdemeanor cases when the defendant
    is in custody; or (3) 45 days after the arraignment or plea in
    misdemeanor cases when the defendant is not in custody.
    (§ 1382, subd. (a)(2)–(3).)     Whenever the defendant has
    requested or agreed to begin trial on a date beyond the
    applicable period, the case must be brought to trial no later than
    10 days after that date. (Id., subd. (a)(2)(B), (a)(3)(B).)
    An early decision touching on the interplay between
    section 1382 and continuances was People v. Kessel (1976) 
    61 Cal.App.3d 322
     (Kessel). On the day set for trial, the People
    moved for a seven-day continuance because the deputy district
    attorney assigned to the case was unavailable. The court denied
    the continuance and dismissed the case under section 1382.
    (Kessel, at pp. 324–325.) Although the Court of Appeal did not
    separately address the propriety of the continuance ruling, it
    held that dismissal of the case was an abuse of discretion
    because the seven-day continuance would have resulted in a
    trial date set within section 1382’s 10-day grace period. (Kessel,
    at p. 325.) Further, the dismissal could not be justified under
    section 1385, which permits an action to be dismissed “in
    furtherance of justice” (§ 1385, subd. (a)), because there had
    been no showing of prejudice to the defendant. (Kessel, at
    p. 325.) The court explained: “The People’s right to be heard
    cannot be frustrated to accommodate judicial convenience or
    because of court congestion. A dismissal under section 1385 for
    such a reason is an abuse of discretion.” (Id. at p. 326; see People
    v. Orin (1975) 
    13 Cal.3d 937
    , 946–947 (Orin).)
    People v. Flores (1978) 
    90 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1
    , 6 (Flores),
    highlighted the distinction between continuances and
    dismissals. On the date of trial, the prosecution requested a one-
    week continuance because the arresting officer was unavailable
    10
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    to testify. The court denied the request and dismissed the case
    because the People were not ready to proceed. (Ibid.) The
    superior court’s appellate division reversed. First, it observed
    that the requested continuance was “well within” the time limit
    prescribed by section 1382. (Flores, at p. 6.) So that statute
    provided no basis for dismissing the action. (Id. at p. 7.) Nor
    would a continuance have impinged on the defendant’s
    constitutional speedy trial rights. (Id. at pp. 7–8.) The appellate
    division then considered section 1050’s requirement that
    continuances be granted “only upon a showing of good cause.”
    (§ 1050, subd. (e); see Flores, at pp. 8–9.)          Noting that
    section 1050’s provisions are not mandatory, the court relied on
    the language of section 1382 to conclude an action that can be
    brought to trial within the applicable section 1382 time limit
    may not be dismissed despite the absence of good cause for a
    continuance. (Flores, at p. 9.) Finally, the court concluded
    dismissal was not appropriate under section 1385 because such
    a dismissal arbitrarily prevents the People from prosecuting an
    offense supported by probable cause, without any showing of
    detriment to the defendant. (Flores, at p. 9.)
    Subsequent Court of Appeal decisions reached the same
    conclusion. In People v. Arnold (1980) 
    105 Cal.App.3d 456
    , 458
    (Arnold), the prosecution sought a trial continuance to locate an
    essential witness, requesting a date within section 1382’s 10-
    day grace period. The request was denied and the case
    dismissed, assertedly pursuant to section 1382. (Arnold, at
    p. 459.) The Court of Appeal held the ruling erroneous, under
    both section 1382 and section 1385. A dismissal within the 10-
    day grace period was directly contrary to section 1382. In
    addition, because such a dismissal undermined the legislative
    11
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    policy expressed in section 1382, it was not “in furtherance of
    justice” under section 1385. (Arnold, at p. 459.)
    Similarly, People v. Hernandez (1979) 
    97 Cal.App.3d 451
    (Hernandez) held that a trial court lacks discretion to dismiss a
    criminal case before expiration of section 1382’s 10-day grace
    period. (Hernandez, at p. 454.) Although the prosecution had
    failed to show good cause for its inability to proceed, the court
    reasoned no such showing was necessary because section 1382’s
    grace period operates as an exception to the statute’s good cause
    requirement. (Hernandez, at pp. 454–455.) Echoing Kessel,
    Arnold, and Flores, the Hernandez court also concluded the
    dismissal contravened the legislative policy underlying
    section 1382’s grace period. As a result, the dismissal was not
    in furtherance of justice, as required by section 1385.
    (Hernandez, at p. 455.) People v. Rubaum (1980) 
    110 Cal.App.3d 930
     (Rubaum) was in accord, holding the trial court abused its
    discretion in denying a continuance and dismissing the case
    under section 1385 when the People’s requested a continuance
    date within section 1382’s time limit.
    Ferguson, supra, 
    218 Cal.App.3d 1173
     reaffirmed these
    decisions. The court there concluded the trial court had
    improperly dismissed a case under section 1385 after denying a
    brief continuance for the prosecutor to complete a different trial.
    (Ferguson, at pp. 1176–1177, 1180.) The Court of Appeal’s
    reasoning was “strongly guided” (id. at p. 1181) by our decision
    in Orin, which had explained that the furtherance of justice
    determination under section 1385 “ ‘requires consideration both
    of the constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of
    society represented by the People, in determining whether there
    should be a dismissal.’ ” (Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 945.) The
    dismissal in Ferguson was held to be “without proper and
    12
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    adequate reason” and “served no policy objective.” (Ferguson, at
    pp. 1182–1183.) Nor would the requested continuance have
    harmed the defendant, who was not in custody and had
    previously “seemed in no rush to get to trial.” (Ibid.)
    However, People v. Torres (1984) 
    159 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8
    (Torres) articulated an important limitation on these general
    rules. There, a prosecutor sought continuances of trial in two
    cases within the section 1382 time period but offered no showing
    of why the People could not proceed. Instead, the prosecutor
    disclosed a strategy of seeking “ ‘to always drag things out till
    [sic] the last possible moment so that even if the case was lost or
    dismissed, the defendants paid the price through the hassle of
    multiple appearances and the expenses of private counsel.’ ”
    (Torres, at p. 11.) Finding no good cause for delay, the trial court
    denied the continuances and dismissed the cases under
    section 1385. (Torres, at pp. 11, 15–16.)
    The appellate division affirmed. It explained that a trial
    court has “ ‘discretion to dismiss pursuant to section 1385’ ”
    provided “ ‘that the reasons for the court’s decision be such as
    “would motivate a reasonable judge.” . . . There must be ‘a
    balancing of society’s interest against that of the defendant.’
    [Citation.] There must also be a showing of detriment to the
    defendant.” (Torres, supra, 159 Cal.App.3d Supp. at pp. 12–13.)
    The court distinguished the line of cases discussed above
    because none involved a situation in which the People were
    capable of proceeding to trial but chose not to in order to
    manipulate the court and harass the defendant. (Ibid.) Torres
    explained, “It was never the intent of [the case law] to shift the
    control of the calendar from the court to the prosecutor,” and
    emphasized that trial courts retain discretion to dismiss a case
    under section 1385 to address “a flagrant abuse” of power or “an
    13
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    attempt by the prosecutor to usurp the inherent right of the
    court to control the courtroom.” (Id. at p. 13.)
    2.    Assembly Bill No. 1273
    The Legislature responded to these decisions by enacting
    Assembly Bill No. 1273 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.), which added
    subdivision (l) to section 1050 to make clear that the statute “is
    directory only and does not mandate dismissal of an action by
    its terms.” The bill also amended section 1050.5, subdivision (b)
    to add the final clause: “The authority to impose sanctions
    provided for by this section shall be in addition to any other
    authority or power available to the court, except that the court or
    magistrate shall not dismiss the case.” (§ 1050.5, subd. (b),
    italics added.) Legislative history confirms that the purpose of
    these amendments was to codify holdings in the Ferguson line
    of cases. (See, e.g., Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem.
    Bill No. 1273 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 1, 2003,
    pp. 2–3; Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1273
    (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 1, 2003, pp. 2, 5–6.)
    A report prepared by the Senate Committee on Public
    Safety described the need for Assembly Bill No. 1273 as follows:
    “Current law (Penal Code section 1382) provides the People and
    the defendant with a right to a speedy trial, but that right is
    balanced against the right of both parties to have at least 60
    days to prepare their case. [¶] The problem AB 1273 attempts
    to resolve involves situations when a court seeks to dismiss a
    case before the expiration of the statutory 60 day time limit.
    [¶] The confusion involves an apparent conflict between two
    Penal Code sections. . . . [O]ne section (Penal Code Section 1050)
    requires a showing of good cause to trail a case within the 60
    day statutory period and the other section (Penal Code
    14
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    Section 1382) does not require a showing of good cause within
    the 60 day period.” (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem.
    Bill No. 1273, supra, pp. 4–5.)4 According to the bill’s sponsor,
    courts had sometimes “dismissed cases after the prosecutor
    failed to establish good cause to continue the trial of the matter
    even though it was still within the 60-day statutory speedy trial
    period.” (Id. at p. 5.) The report stated that Assembly Bill
    No. 1273 was intended to codify Ferguson’s holding that
    section 1050 “ ‘is directory only and does not mandate any
    dismissal of an action by its terms.’ ” (Id. at p. 6.)5 “Thus, under
    this bill a case could not be dismissed as a sanction for failing to
    comply with the rules governing continuances if the statutory
    time for a speedy trial has not run.” (Ibid.)
    By clarifying that sections 1050 and 1050.5 do not
    independently authorize dismissal for failure to satisfy either
    the procedural or substantive requirements, the Legislature
    confirmed that trial courts may dismiss a case, or force a
    dismissal by denying a continuance, only under the aegis of
    some other conferred authority.     Despite limits on their
    discretion imposed by case law and these statutory
    amendments, trial courts retain the power to dismiss “in
    4
    This analysis addressed the final version of the bill, after
    it had passed in the Assembly.
    5
    Although the report cited Ferguson, the language was in
    fact a quotation from Rubaum, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at
    page 935. (See Ferguson, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1181.)
    The original source of this language appears to be Malengo v.
    Municipal Court, supra, 56 Cal.2d at page 816 (“section 1050 . . .
    is directory only and contains no provision for the dismissal of a
    case when its terms are not complied with”).
    15
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    furtherance of justice” (§ 1385, subd. (a); see Torres, supra, 159
    Cal.App.3d Supp. at pp. 12–13.)
    It is evident from committee reports on Assembly Bill
    No. 1273 that the Legislature was specifically concerned with
    continuances of trial.       But, in codifying Ferguson, the
    Legislature would have been aware of its factual context: The
    People were not ready to proceed on the scheduled date because
    the deputy district attorney assigned to the case was engaged in
    a different trial. (Ferguson, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1176.)
    When the Legislature amended section 1050 to clarify that the
    statute does not require dismissal in such a circumstance, it also
    effectively placed constraints on the court’s ability to deny
    continuances.      “In codifying the result in Ferguson, the
    Legislature must have understood that it was obligating trial
    courts to grant continuances where necessary to avoid a
    dismissal, even in the absence of a showing of good cause”
    (Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 881), unless dismissal
    would be in furtherance of justice. Broad language in the
    legislative history is consistent with applying Ferguson’s
    reasoning to continuance requests in other proceedings. For
    example, committee reports consistently stated that passing
    Assembly Bill No. 1273 would mean that “courts may not
    dismiss a case due to a failure to meet the good cause
    requirements for a continuance” before the statutory period has
    expired. (Sen. Rules Com., Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1273 (2003–
    2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 1, 2003, p. 1; see Sen. Com. on
    Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1273, supra, p. 2; Off. Crim.
    Justice Planning, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1273
    (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) prepared for Governor Davis (July 15,
    2003) p. 1.)
    16
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    C.   Applications Beyond the Trial Continuance Context
    The Courts of Appeal have considered how these
    principles apply to continuances of proceedings other than trial,
    like preliminary hearings and motions to suppress evidence
    (§ 1538.5). With the exception of the Court of Appeal below, all
    courts addressing the question have concluded the trial court’s
    discretion to deny a continuance is also limited in such
    circumstances. We agree with this prevailing view.
    1.    Preliminary Hearings
    Shortly after the passage of Assembly Bill No. 1273,
    People v. Henderson (2004) 
    115 Cal.App.4th 922
     (Henderson)
    considered whether Ferguson’s limits on continuance denials
    apply to preliminary hearings. In Henderson, the People sought
    to continue a preliminary hearing because the victim was
    absent. Although the victim had been mailed a subpoena, the
    prosecutor made no additional efforts to secure attendance.
    (Henderson, at p. 928.) Finding the request lacked good cause,
    the magistrate denied the continuance. (Id. at p. 929.) The
    People were unable to proceed, and the case was dismissed.
    (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal held the ruling was improper.
    First, the court concluded dismissal was not appropriate
    under section 859b, which requires that a felony preliminary
    hearing be held 10 days after a defendant’s arraignment or plea
    unless the prosecution establishes good cause for a continuance
    or the defendant waives time. If there is such a showing or
    waiver, the statute sets an outside date of 60 days after the
    arraignment or plea. That period that can be extended only with
    the defendant’s personal consent. (§ 859b.) The complaint is
    subject to dismissal if a preliminary hearing is not held within
    these statutory deadlines. (Ibid.; see Henderson, supra, 115
    17
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    Cal.App.4th at pp. 930–931.) Henderson had waived the 10-day
    deadline. (Henderson, at p. 928.) Thus, a continuance was
    permissible under section 859b without a showing of good cause
    so long as the continued hearing date was within the 60-day
    window. (Henderson, at pp. 931–932.)
    Next, the court considered whether any other statute
    authorized dismissal.      Although section 1050 sets out
    procedural requirements and section 1050.5 permits sanctions
    for non-compliance, neither statute authorizes dismissal of the
    case when a continuance is denied. (Henderson, supra, 115
    Cal.App.4th at p. 934.) The court discussed Assembly Bill
    No. 1273’s amendments prohibiting dismissal as a sanction for
    failure to comply with the continuance statute’s procedural
    requirements and concluded “dismissal is a disfavored and
    possibly unauthorized remedy” under the circumstances
    presented. (Henderson, at p. 936.)
    Nor was dismissal appropriate under section 1385.
    Henderson observed that several decisions, including Ferguson,
    had “rejected the application of section 1385 to dismiss cases
    before trial after a failed request for a continuance made within
    the statutory period.” (Henderson, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 936.) The court concluded “the same analysis applies to
    section 859b”     and     preliminary      hearing   continuances.
    (Henderson, at p. 936.) “[B]oth sections 1382 and 859b establish
    statutory limits to safeguard a defendant’s constitutional right
    to a speedy trial,” yet neither statute authorizes dismissal when
    its prescribed time period has not expired. (Id. at p. 939.)
    Henderson declined to confine the Ferguson line of cases to the
    trial context. It held “the trial court has no authority to dismiss
    an action, even when the People have failed to show good cause
    for a continuance under section 1050, so long as the requested
    18
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    date for the preliminary hearing is within the statutory time
    limit established in section 859b.” (Ibid.) The court stressed
    that lesser sanctions are available to punish belated
    continuance requests, and trial courts need not reschedule the
    hearing to the prosecutor’s preferred date. (Henderson, at
    pp. 939–940.) But, so long as the continuance is “ ‘not sought
    arbitrarily or for an unlimited period,’ ” it must be granted if the
    alternative is dismissal, since a dismissal under these
    circumstances would not be “in the furtherance of justice within
    the meaning of section 1385.” (Henderson, at p. 941.)
    2.    Suppression Hearings
    The Ferrer decision was the first to consider these
    questions in the suppression hearing context. After Ferrer was
    held to answer, he moved to suppress statements made and
    evidence seized during a warrantless detention and search.
    (Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 877–878.) The prosecutor
    appeared at the suppression hearing but requested a
    continuance, explaining “she had not subpoenaed her witnesses
    due to a ‘mix up.’ ” (Id. at p. 878.) The court denied the
    continuance and then granted the suppression motion because,
    due to the witness’s absence, the People failed to establish the
    lawfulness of the detention and search. (Ibid.) After a short
    delay, the People announced that they were unable to proceed
    against Ferrer without the suppressed evidence, and the court
    dismissed the information. (Ibid.)
    On appeal, the People conceded they had failed to show
    good cause but argued the court nevertheless could not deny a
    continuance because there was adequate opportunity to conduct
    the suppression motion before the timely trial date. (Ferrer,
    supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 878–879.) The Ferrer court
    19
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    agreed, applying Henderson’s analysis in the suppression
    motion context. It explained: “In Henderson, the lower court
    did not literally dismiss the criminal case as a sanction for the
    prosecutor’s failure to show good cause, but denial of the motion
    to continue meant the prosecution lacked the necessary evidence
    to present at the preliminary hearing, which led to dismissal of
    the case. (Henderson, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 929.) The
    Henderson court treated the dismissal as an unauthorized
    sanction for the failure to show good cause even though the
    dismissal was a consequence of the denial of the continuance
    rather than an express sanction. (Id. at p. 935.)” (Ferrer, at
    p. 882, italics added.) This application of the statutes was
    consistent with legislative intent, Ferrer reasoned, because
    Assembly Bill No. 1273 sought to prevent dismissals resulting
    from a prosecutor’s temporary inability to proceed. (Ferrer, at
    p. 882, citing Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill
    No. 1273, supra, pp. 5–6.) “Thus, the Legislature intended that
    a dismissal that causally follows from denial of a motion for a
    continuance be treated as a sanction of dismissal.” (Ferrer, at
    p. 882.)
    Ferrer found the suppression hearing context “analogous”
    to the preliminary hearing and trial situations addressed in
    Henderson and Ferguson. (Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 882.) It reasoned that, although the trial court did not
    literally dismiss the action as a sanction, it was clear that the
    continuance denial was likely to lead to dismissal of the case.
    (Ibid.) The People bore the burden to justify the warrantless
    search and seizure, and the unavailability of their witnesses
    “would necessarily result in” the motion being granted. (Id. at
    p. 883.) If the evidence in question, which was the only support
    for the charges, was no longer available, a dismissal of the case
    20
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    for lack of evidence would follow. (Ibid.) Ferrer ultimately held
    that “[w]here it is reasonably foreseeable that granting a motion
    to suppress will result ultimately in dismissal of the case, the
    fact that the dismissal is not inevitable or immediate does not
    create a material distinction from the circumstances involved in
    Henderson and Ferguson.” (Ibid.)
    Ferrer grounded its analysis on the language of
    sections 1050 and 1050.5. (Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at
    pp. 879–881.) However, the court went on to discuss the
    conclusions in Ferguson and Henderson that dismissals based
    solely on a failure to show good cause are not “in furtherance of
    justice.”   (§ 1385, subd. (a)); see Henderson, supra, 115
    Cal.App.4th at p. 940; Ferguson, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at
    p. 1182.) It reasoned that the same can be said for dismissals
    resulting from the court’s refusal to continue a hearing to
    determine whether evidence supporting the charges was legally
    obtained. (Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 885.) Indeed,
    the policy balance is arguably even more compelling in the
    suppression hearing context because, unlike preliminary
    hearings and trial, the Legislature “has not provided any
    independent right to a speedy suppression hearing.” (Id. at
    p. 884.) It would be anomalous to conclude the Legislature
    intended greater protection for a defendant’s interest in a
    prompt suppression hearing than in a prompt preliminary
    hearing or trial. (Ibid.)6 Accordingly, Ferrer concluded, “the
    Legislature did not intend for a dismissal to result unless the
    6
    And, because a suppression hearing is usually conducted
    before trial or in connection with a preliminary hearing (see
    § 1538.5, subds. (f)–(g)), the time limits required in those
    contexts protect a defendant’s right to speedy adjudication.
    21
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    requested continuance results in violation of a statutory time
    limit (such as § 859b or § 1382) or defendant’s constitutional
    right to a fair trial (see Henderson, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 940).” (Ferrer, at p. 884, fn. omitted.)
    The Court of Appeal below disagreed with Ferrer’s reading
    of both the statutory text and legislative history. Construing
    section 1050, subdivision (l)’s statement that the statute “does
    not mandate dismissal of an action by its terms,” the court noted
    that the provision does not require dismissal but does not
    preclude dismissal either. It observed the statute “can hardly
    stand for proposition that the trial court has no authority — for
    example, under section 1385 . . . — to dismiss an action in the
    first place.” (Brown, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 26, fn. omitted.)
    The court concluded there was no basis in the statutory text for
    Ferrer’s rule. (Id. at p. 25.)
    In disagreeing with Ferrer’s reading of legislative history,
    the Court of Appeal focused on language that was removed from
    the original version of Assembly Bill No. 1273. As introduced,
    the bill proposed to add an express exception to section 1050’s
    good cause requirement. Proposed subdivision (e)(2) would have
    stated: “The good cause requirement shall not apply to a
    prosecution or defense motion to continue a felony trial to a date
    not more than 60 days from the date of the defendant’s
    arraignment on the information, or to a date not more than 10
    days from a trial date set following the defendant’s waiver
    pursuant to [section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(B)]. This exception
    to the requirement of a finding of good cause is intended to codify
    existing case law.” (Assem. Bill No. 1273 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.)
    as introduced Feb. 21, 2003, § 1.) Amendments removed this
    proposed language, which would have eliminated the good cause
    requirement for continuances within the speedy trial period,
    22
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    and replaced it with subdivision (l) and an amendment to
    section 1050.5, subdivision (b) specifying that “the court or
    magistrate shall not dismiss the case” as a sanction. (Assem.
    Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 1273 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) May 1,
    2003, § 2.)
    As discussed, even after the amendment, committee
    reports consistently stated that Assembly Bill No. 1273’s
    purpose was to codify case law holding that dismissals resulting
    from a party’s failure to satisfy the requirements for a
    continuance are disfavored. (See, e.g., Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety,
    Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1273, supra, p. 2; Sen. Rules Com., Off
    of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading of analysis of Assem. Bill
    No. 1273, supra, p. 1.) The Court of Appeal below asserted these
    statements of purpose should be disregarded because they were
    erroneously referring to the original version of the bill. (See
    Brown, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 29.) Instead, the court
    stressed that the changes to sections 1050 and 1050.5 actually
    enacted did not eliminate the good cause requirement and did
    not prohibit dismissals. Accordingly, the court concluded, trial
    courts have authority to deny a continuance unsupported by
    good cause “even if this decision may foreseeably result in a
    dismissal of the matter for lack of evidence.” (Brown, at p. 32.)
    That reading is overly expansive.
    Although legislative history does not disclose why the
    original bill was amended, it is evident that the Legislature did
    not want to abandon the requirement that parties seeking a
    continuance show good cause for the attendant delay or
    potentially face sanctions. That choice is consistent with the
    statute’s express intent to discourage unwarranted
    continuances and to change a legal culture in which
    continuances had become unacceptably commonplace. (See
    23
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    § 1050, subd. (a).) But it does not follow that the amendment
    signaled an intent to read a new dismissal authority into
    section 1050 and upset the balance between the court’s control
    of its calendar and a strong policy preference for cases to be
    resolved on their merits. Because the Legislature chose to
    retain the good cause requirement, prosecutors who seek a
    continuance within the speedy trial window remain obligated to
    provide the court with a showing of necessity. But if they do not,
    case law codified in Assembly Bill No. 1273 places limits on the
    court’s ability to deny the continuance when such a denial will
    foreseeably result in dismissal of the case.
    D.   Limits on the Court’s Discretion To Deny a Continuance
    As we explain, a review of the relevant statutory text,
    legislative history, and case law leads us to a different
    conclusion from that reached by the Court of Appeal below.
    However, we do not completely embrace Ferrer’s statutory
    analysis, either. The court below was correct to observe that the
    trial court retains its discretion to dismiss a case under
    section 1385. But it overlooked the line of cases, codified in
    Assembly Bill No. 1273, holding it is an abuse of that discretion
    to dismiss a case based solely on a failure to show good cause
    when a continuance can be granted within the section 1382
    window. The Ferrer court was correct in concluding that the
    trial court abuses its discretion when it declines such a request
    to continue a suppression hearing if a dismissal of the
    underlying case is reasonably foreseeable. But it went astray in
    basing its analysis on sections 1050 and 1050.5.
    Sections 1050 and 1050.5 continue to require a showing of
    good cause that the continuance of any criminal hearing is
    necessary. They do not prohibit the trial court from denying a
    24
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    continuance when the prosecutor fails to make such a showing.
    Because the continuance statutes do not themselves authorize
    dismissal, however, a dismissal under these circumstances is
    appropriate only if it is “in furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385,
    subd. (a).)
    Section 1385 grants trial courts the power to dismiss if,
    under the totality of the circumstances, after weighing “ ‘the
    constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of society
    represented by the People’ ” (Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 945),
    the court finds that dismissal would be “in furtherance of
    justice” (§ 1385, subd. (a)). In conducting this inquiry, a court
    may consider whether the prosecution acted abusively or in bad
    faith (Torres, supra, 159 Cal.App.3d Supp. at pp. 12–13),
    whether the defendant has suffered prejudice (Kessel, supra, 61
    Cal.App.3d at p. 325), society’s interest in the prosecution of the
    crime (Orin, at p. 945), and other relevant factors.
    When the People are unable to proceed to trial because the
    court has suppressed evidence following a hearing on the merits,
    a dismissal is generally appropriate under section 1385. (See
    People v. Laiwa (1983) 
    34 Cal.3d 711
    , 722; People v. Bonds
    (1999) 
    70 Cal.App.4th 732
    , 738–740.) But there is a “distinction
    between evidence that does not exist and evidence that is simply
    unavailable at the moment.”           (Henderson, supra, 115
    Cal.App.4th at p. 942.) Dismissals under section 1385 are
    disfavored when “the People are thereby prevented from
    prosecuting defendants for offenses of which there is probable
    cause to believe they are guilty as charged. Courts have
    recognized that society, represented by the People, has a
    legitimate interest in ‘the fair prosecution of crimes properly
    alleged’ [Citation] ‘ “[A] dismissal which arbitrarily cuts those
    25
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    rights without a showing of detriment to the defendant is an
    abuse of discretion.” ’ ” (Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 947.)
    For nearly 50 years, appellate decisions have held that it
    is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny a continuance
    within the speedy trial period, absent countervailing factors
    warranting dismissal. (See Ferguson, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at
    p. 1183; Rubaum, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 935; Arnold,
    supra, 105 Cal.App.3d at p. 459; Hernandez, supra, 97
    Cal.App.3d at p. 455; Flores, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d Supp. at p. 9;
    Kessel, supra, 61 Cal.App.3d at pp. 325–326; see also Henderson,
    supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 936.) The Legislature was aware
    of this settled case law and expressly set out to codify it in
    Assembly Bill No. 1273. When time remains to bring the matter
    to trial, and thus to hear the defendant’s motion to suppress, it
    typically does not further justice for the court to force a
    dismissal and forestall a legitimate prosecution conducted in
    compliance with the speedy trial statutes. As we have observed
    in other circumstances, “[I]t would frustrate the orderly and
    effective operation of our criminal procedure as envisioned by
    the Legislature if without proper and adequate reason
    section 1385 were used to terminate the prosecution of
    defendants for crimes properly charged in accordance with legal
    procedure.” (Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 947.)
    Accordingly, consistent with Ferrer and the case law
    codified in Assembly Bill No. 1273, we hold that it is an abuse of
    discretion for the court to deny continuance of a suppression
    hearing when it is reasonably foreseeable that dismissal of the
    case will result, unless dismissal would be in furtherance of
    justice. (§ 1385, subd. (a).)
    26
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    This is not to say that the court’s hands are tied when the
    prosecution seeks a continuance without satisfying
    section 1050’s requirements. It may impose fines, refer the
    prosecutor for discipline, and impose any other sanctions at its
    disposal short of dismissal for procedural noncompliance.
    (§ 1050.5, subd. (b); see § 1050, subd. (b).) “And, of course, the
    trial court may exercise its discretion in selecting the length of
    a continuance; it need not necessarily accede to the prosecutor’s
    preferred date.” (Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 886.)
    The court below criticized Ferrer’s “reasonable
    foreseeability” standard as posing some practical difficulties in
    application. (See Brown, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 31–32.)
    In determining whether the denial of a continuance will make it
    reasonably foreseeable that a case will be dismissed, the court
    must consider the totality of the extant circumstances. One of
    the factors to be considered is the People’s representation that
    they will be unable to proceed without the challenged evidence.
    But the court must independently examine that representation.
    In the end it is the court’s determination, not the People’s
    representation, that is dispositive.             The reasonable
    foreseeability standard comes into play when the case cannot be
    tried absent the evidence, not when the case will simply be more
    difficult to prove. The standard requires the prosecution to
    defend its assertion that the contested evidence is vital. At the
    same time, the defense, in possession of discovery, will be poised
    to argue against this assertion, as it did here. Of course the
    defense cannot be put to the burden of arguing the strength of
    the prosecution’s case. And while the court is generally
    precluded from reading the police reports and other supporting
    documents (see § 1204.5), the defense may give its consent for
    the court to do so, to assist in its consideration of the question.
    27
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    In the final analysis, the burden is on the People to make this
    showing. If that showing falls short, the court is free to deny the
    continuance and proceed with the suppression hearing. Since
    Ferrer was decided more than a decade ago, neither parties nor
    trial courts appear to have struggled unduly with this
    procedure.
    As an alternative to the reasonable foreseeability
    standard, the Attorney General argues trial courts should
    simply rely on prosecutors’ representations as to their ability to
    proceed. We reject this suggestion. That approach would
    abrogate the court’s independent responsibility and deprive the
    defense of its legitimate opportunity to challenge the
    prosecutor’s assertions.         Although the prosecutor’s
    representation is certainly a relevant consideration, we stress
    that trial courts are obliged to take into account all facts and
    arguments presented on the issue and to make their own
    independent determination of whether dismissal of the case is
    reasonably foreseeable if a continuance is denied.
    E.    Application
    Here, the prosecutor failed to satisfy either the procedural
    or substantive requirements of section 1050 in moving for a
    continuance. He provided neither advance written notice nor
    documentary support for the motion. (See § 1050, subd. (b).) He
    also failed to present a showing of good cause. (See § 1050,
    subd. (e).)   The prosecutor had unilaterally excused a
    subpoenaed witness from attending a court hearing, for reasons
    the court rightly viewed with skepticism. The trial court was
    thus correct in concluding good cause did not support the
    continuance request, even if the prosecutor acted with poor
    judgment rather than bad faith. We emphasize that the
    28
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    prosecutor’s unilateral decision to tell Officer Yasin he need not
    appear is not condoned under these circumstances. The
    subpoenaing of witnesses is part of the process by which courts
    and parties can ensure cases will be ready to proceed when
    scheduled. In subpoenaing witnesses, the parties ultimately
    rely on the authority of the court to compel those summoned to
    appear. Parties who release a witness from that duty do so at
    their peril. The prosecutor’s action here, without consultation
    with the court, was distinctly ill-advised.
    When the prosecution moved for reconsideration of the
    court’s ruling, it alerted the court to Ferrer’s holding and
    represented that the People would be unable to proceed to trial
    if the challenged evidence was suppressed. After reviewing
    Ferrer, the court vacated its prior orders, held a suppression
    hearing, and ultimately denied the suppression motion. This
    decision reposed within the court’s sound discretion. Defendant
    was out of custody, and the continuance was within the speedy
    trial timeframe. There is no indication that she suffered any
    prejudice by the hearing’s delay. The court also expressly found
    that the prosecutor had not sought the continuance in bad faith.
    The court said it had reviewed portions of the police report at
    the initial suppression hearing, and it was provided additional
    facts in the People’s opposition to the suppression motion. From
    these materials, the court would have readily appreciated the
    centrality of defendant’s incriminating statements and the
    items collected by Officer Yasin. The trial court repeated that it
    had not suppressed the officer’s observations, but then
    concluded the People were unable to proceed “because those
    were the — all of the facts that were available.” This record is
    sufficient to show the trial court made an independent
    conclusion that the People could not proceed without the
    29
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    suppressed evidence. Defendant has not established that the
    court abused its discretion by concluding that dismissal of the
    case was reasonably foreseeable should a continuance be
    denied.7
    In summary, reading the statutes together, the following
    legislative intent is evident. Requests for continuances in
    criminal cases are to be justified by good cause following the
    procedures and showings required in section 1050. Failure to
    follow the required procedures can be sanctioned under
    section 1050.5. While the statutory requirements cannot be
    ignored without consequences, they are not intended to be so
    7
    In speculating that the trial court “may have” based its
    ruling on the prosecutor’s representation alone (conc. & dis.
    opn., post, at p. 13, fn. 3) and arguing reversal is necessary
    because “we simply cannot determine . . . whether the trial court
    understood or applied” Ferrer’s reasonable probability standard
    (id. at p. 11), the concurring and dissenting opinion loses sight
    of our standard of review. The California Constitution prohibits
    a judgment from being set aside on appeal absent an error that
    “has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI,
    § 13.) The separate opinion identifies no such error. Nor can
    reversal be justified on the theory that our opinion announces a
    new legal standard (see conc. & dis. opn., post, at pp. 13–14). We
    have merely affirmed and elaborated on the standard set forth
    in Ferrer. That case, contrary to the separate opinion’s
    assertion, considered the totality of the circumstances and never
    suggested courts should abdicate their role and rely solely on
    prosecutors’ representations.         (See Ferrer, supra, 184
    Cal.App.4th at p. 883.) Because the trial court applied a legal
    standard we have now approved, reversal of its decision would
    be appropriate only if the court had abused its discretion by
    acting arbitrarily or basing its decision on insufficient evidence.
    (See Beames, 
    supra,
     40 Cal.4th at pp. 920–921.) As the party
    opposing continuance, it is the defendant’s burden to show such
    an abuse of discretion. (See id. at p. 920.) She has not done so.
    30
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
    rigidly applied as to require dismissal of the case. Thus
    understood, the statutes empower the court to hold accountable
    those who fail to comply with them. But they should not be
    applied so stringently that legitimate prosecutions cannot be
    pursued within statutory time frames and constitutional
    protections.
    III. DISPOSITION
    The Court of Appeal’s decision is reversed. The trial
    court’s judgment, finding defendant guilty of the charge, is
    affirmed. While this appeal was pending, the Legislature
    decriminalized the act of loitering for purposes of prostitution,
    the offense of which defendant was convicted. (See Stats. 2022,
    ch. 86 (Sen. Bill No. 357), § 4, effective Jan. 1, 2023.) In doing
    so, the Legislature provided a mechanism for those previously
    convicted of that offense to request resentencing or dismissal
    and sealing of their case, as applicable. (See § 653.29.) Nothing
    we say here prohibits defendant from seeking that relief.
    CORRIGAN, J.
    We Concur:
    GUERRERO, C. J.
    KRUGER, J.
    JENKINS, J.
    31
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    S271877
    Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Groban
    I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Penal Code
    provisions governing continuances and dismissals (see, e.g.,
    Pen. Code, §§ 1050; 1385)1 do not permit a trial court to deny a
    continuance of a suppression hearing “solely because good cause
    is lacking, when doing so will result in dismissal of the charges
    and the continuance can be granted without violating the
    defendant’s speedy trial rights.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1.) I
    write separately for two reasons.
    First, I share the Court of Appeal’s concerns that the
    statutory procedures governing continuance requests of
    suppression hearings pose various practical complications for
    defendants and our trial courts. (See People v. Brown (2021)
    
    69 Cal.App.5th 15
    , 31–32 (Brown); cf. maj. opn., ante, at p. 27.)
    Whether those complications warrant amendment of the
    controlling statutes, however, is ultimately a question for the
    Legislature to decide.
    Second, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that
    the record in this case demonstrates the prosecution and the
    trial court complied with the standards articulated in today’s
    opinion. Because I am not persuaded the record supports such
    a finding, I dissent from that portion of the opinion and the
    disposition affirming Brown’s judgment of conviction. I would
    1
    All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    1
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Groban, J., concurring and dissenting
    reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court
    with directions to conduct a hearing on whether the prosecution
    has satisfied (or can satisfy) its burden to show “the case cannot
    be tried absent the [challenged] evidence.” (Maj. opn., ante, at
    p. 27, italics omitted.)
    I.
    Although I find the language of Penal Code section 1050,
    and in particular subdivision (l), to be susceptible to more than
    one reading, I agree that the statutory scheme is most
    reasonably construed as requiring trial courts to grant a
    continuance of a suppression hearing if the prosecution shows
    “the challenged evidence is so critical that its suppression would
    require dismissal of the case.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1.)
    Nonetheless, I agree with the Court of Appeal that this
    “reasonable foreseeability standard” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 27)
    poses some “distinctive difficulties in application” (Brown,
    supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 31; see People v. Brown (Santa Clara
    App.Div., Aug. 20, 2020, No. 17AP002184) [nonpub. opn.], conc.
    opn. of Saban, J. [describing practical difficulties of requiring
    trial courts to determine whether dismissal is likely]; cf. maj.
    opn., ante, at p. 27). It is unclear, for example, what type of
    evidentiary showing the prosecution must make to establish
    that denial of a continuance will result in dismissal. Nor is it
    clear how a trial court should go about making an “independent
    determination of whether dismissal” will occur. (Maj. opn., ante,
    at p. 28.) Is the prosecution required to describe all of the
    admissible evidence that remains in the case and explain why
    that evidence is insufficient to continue? Does the court have a
    duty to independently review the entire record to ensure the
    prosecution’s representations are accurate? Should the court
    2
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Groban, J., concurring and dissenting
    hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the remaining
    strength of the prosecution’s case? At a minimum, forcing the
    trial court to assess the state of the prosecution’s evidence,
    without having heard or seen that evidence, seems to place the
    court in a very difficult position.
    The “reasonable foreseeability” inquiry places defendants
    and their counsel in an even more difficult position. The
    majority notes that the defense can challenge the prosecution’s
    assertion that denial of a continuance is likely to result in
    dismissal. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 27.) It seems highly
    unusual, however, to place defense counsel in the position of
    arguing in favor of the strength of the State’s case. I agree with
    the majority that the “burden of arguing the strength of the . . .
    case” ultimately resides with the prosecution, and not the
    defendant. (Ibid.) I also agree with the majority’s rejection of
    the Attorney General’s proposal that trial courts should simply
    rely on prosecutors’ representations as to their ability to
    proceed. (Id. at p. 28.) Even so, our decision today leaves
    defense counsel in a quandary. Take the situation here: Brown
    surely would have benefitted if the trial court had denied a
    continuance and forced the prosecution to proceed to trial
    without Officer Yasin’s challenged statements. But to advocate
    for such a result, defense counsel would have had to argue that
    the prosecution’s remaining evidence against Brown was strong
    enough to move forward with the case. Does the possibility of
    having the continuance denied, and thus the challenged
    evidence suppressed, warrant arguing in favor of the strength of
    the State’s case? Perhaps, but that is a tricky position for any
    defense lawyer to be in.
    Moreover, requiring our trial courts to grant continuance
    requests of suppression hearings that are unsupported by good
    3
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Groban, J., concurring and dissenting
    cause diminishes their ability to manage their calendars. As we
    have previously explained in interpreting section 1050, “one
    important element of a court’s inherent judicial authority . . . is
    ‘the power . . . to control the disposition of the causes on its
    docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and
    for litigants.” (People v. Engram (2010) 
    50 Cal.4th 1131
    , 1146.)
    Creating a rule that trial courts must grant continuances of
    suppression hearings, regardless of good cause, undoubtedly
    cuts against those interests. This case is illustrative. Without
    consulting the defense or the trial court, the prosecution
    instructed a subpoenaed police officer that he could skip the
    suppression hearing to conduct a routine witness interview in
    another matter. As a result of such conduct, Brown, her defense
    counsel and the trial court were all required to expend time and
    resources to reschedule a hearing for which there was no good
    reason to delay. One might fairly question whether that
    outcome is consistent with the purposes underlying subdivision
    (e)’s good cause requirement. (See § 1050, subd. (a) [“the
    Legislature finds that . . . . [e]xcessive continuances contribute
    substantially to th[e] congestion [of criminal courts] and cause
    substantial hardship to victims and other witnesses”].)
    The complications described above take on added
    significance given that, at least in the context of felony cases,
    section 1538.5 substantially mitigates the consequences of the
    trial court’s grant of a suppression order. If a suppression
    motion is granted in a felony case, the prosecutor is statutorily
    authorized to dismiss the case, refile, and relitigate the
    suppression ruling. (See § 1538.5, subd. (j).) Thus, when a court
    grants a suppression motion, the prosecution is left to determine
    whether the suppressed evidence is sufficiently important to go
    through the inconvenience of refiling the case and relitigating
    4
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Groban, J., concurring and dissenting
    the motion. One might wonder why that remedy — which places
    the onus on the prosecution rather than the courts to evaluate
    the importance of the evidence in question — is not equally
    appropriate when a prosecutor lacks good cause for being
    unprepared to participate in a suppression hearing.
    In the end, however, whether these practical
    complications warrant changing the statutory procedures that
    govern continuance requests of suppression hearings, or
    otherwise warrant giving our trial courts more discretionary
    authority to deny such requests when unsupported by good
    cause, are questions for the Legislature to decide.
    II.
    I agree that the reasonable foreseeability standard places
    the burden on the People to show the contested evidence “is so
    critical that its suppression would require dismissal of the case.”
    (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1; see id. at pp. 27–28.) I also agree that trial
    courts cannot “simply rely on prosecutors’ representations as to
    their ability to proceed” (id. at p. 28), but rather must make
    their “own independent determination” (ibid.) whether the
    prosecution has shown “the case cannot be tried absent the
    evidence” (id. at p. 27, italics omitted).
    I do not agree, however, with the majority’s further finding
    that the record here shows the prosecution and the trial court
    actually complied with these requirements — requirements that
    are articulated for the first time in today’s opinion. I would
    therefore reverse the judgment of guilt and remand the matter
    to allow the trial court to hold further hearings on whether the
    prosecution can proceed without the suppressed evidence.
    5
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Groban, J., concurring and dissenting
    A. Factual summary
    Prior to trial, Brown filed a motion to suppress evidence
    that had been gathered by Officer Yasin during an allegedly
    unlawful detention. (See § 1538.5.) On the day of the
    suppression hearing, the People requested a continuance. The
    prosecutor explained that he had told Yasin, who was then
    under subpoena, that he could skip the hearing to conduct a
    witness interview in another case. The prosecutor described
    Yasin as the People’s only witness, but provided no description
    of what Yasin would testify to or the nature of the evidence at
    issue in the suppression hearing.2
    The court concluded the prosecution had failed to establish
    good cause and then granted the motion to suppress due to
    Yasin’s absence. The court clarified it was excluding all
    statements Brown had made to Yasin during the allegedly
    unlawful stop but was not excluding any of Yasin’s observations
    of Brown. Defense counsel argued that the case should be
    dismissed in light of the suppression ruling. The prosecutor,
    however, requested time to evaluate whether to proceed,
    explaining that he believed the State might be able to continue
    with the case because “a lot of the evidence in this case was
    evidence obtained by . . . observation from the police officer
    2
    The majority asserts that the prosecution told the court
    that “the challenged evidence was critical to the People’s case.”
    (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 3.) However, the hearing transcript shows
    the prosecution merely asserted that Yasin was the State’s only
    witness; it did not make any representations about the
    importance of the evidence at issue in the suppression hearing.
    Indeed, as discussed below, later in the same hearing, the
    prosecutor clarified that he believed much of the evidence Yasin
    had gathered came in the form of observations that were not at
    issue in the suppression motion.
    6
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Groban, J., concurring and dissenting
    before any contact with the defendant.” The court then set the
    matter for trial.
    Two weeks later, the People filed a motion for
    reconsideration arguing that the court was required to grant a
    continuance under People v. Ferrer (2010) 
    184 Cal.App.4th 873
    (Ferrer). The motion and accompanying memorandum of points
    and authorities contained an extensive discussion of Ferrer but
    did not include any discussion of the evidence against Brown or
    otherwise explain why the prosecution could not continue
    without the suppressed evidence. At the hearing on the motion,
    the prosecution asserted that it intended to dismiss if the
    suppression order was left in place but again presented no
    argument regarding the state of the remaining evidence. The
    prosecution did not mention its earlier claim that much of the
    evidence against Brown consisted of “observation[s] from the
    police” that were not subject to suppression, nor did it explain
    why the State’s evaluation of the case had apparently changed.
    The court concluded that Ferrer required it to grant the
    continuance, explaining that the People had stated “they were
    unable to go forward.” The court withdrew its prior orders,
    rescheduled the suppression hearing, and ultimately denied the
    suppression motion. Brown was later found guilty.
    On appeal, Brown argued that even if Ferrer, supra,
    
    184 Cal.App.4th 873
    , was correctly decided, the prosecution had
    failed to satisfy the “reasonable foreseeability” standard because
    it had presented no argument that the remaining evidence was
    insufficient to move forward with the case. The Attorney
    General’s answer brief did not respond to that argument.
    Instead, the Attorney General argued that the appropriate
    inquiry under Ferrer “is not whether it is reasonably foreseeable
    that the case will still be strong enough to prosecute without the
    7
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Groban, J., concurring and dissenting
    suppressed evidence,” but rather “whether it is reasonably
    foreseeable that the district attorney’s office, in its discretion,
    will express an inability to proceed or prove the case beyond a
    reasonable doubt once the evidence is suppressed.” The People
    further contended that applying that standard here, the trial
    court had properly granted a continuance because it had been
    “advised [by the prosecution] that the case would be dismissed
    absent the suppressed evidence.” Because the Court of Appeal
    ultimately rejected Ferrer’s conclusion that a trial court must
    grant a continuance of a suppression hearing when it is
    reasonably foreseeable that denying such a request will result
    in dismissal, the court did not address what showing the
    prosecution must make under the reasonable foreseeability
    standard or whether the prosecution had in fact made such a
    showing.
    In its briefing before this court, the Attorney General has
    again declined to evaluate the state of the remaining evidence
    against Brown. While acknowledging that Ferrer does “not
    provide any specific guidance for determining when a denial of
    a continuance may result in a dismissal,” the Attorney General
    instead reiterates that the People believe the appropriate “test
    . . . is whether . . . the prosecutor expresses an inability to
    proceed to trial. If so, the continuance must be granted.”
    Indeed, the Attorney General goes so far as to argue that “[t]he
    prosecutor’s assessment of the case without the challenged
    evidence must necessarily be the determinative factor in
    deciding whether denial of the continuance will lead to
    dismissal,” and that it would be improper for “a court or
    magistrate to conduct an ‘independent review’ of the evidence.”
    While the majority rejects the Attorney General’s proposed
    approach (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 28), it nonetheless concludes
    8
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Groban, J., concurring and dissenting
    that the record here shows the continuance was properly
    granted in accord with the procedures that we have articulated
    in today’s opinion.
    B. Analysis
    On this record, I am not persuaded we can conclude that
    the prosecution satisfied its burden to show “the case cannot be
    tried absent the [suppressed] evidence.” (Maj. opn., ante, at
    p. 27, italics omitted.) Nor do I believe we can assess whether
    the trial court did “not simply rely on prosecutors’
    representations as to their ability to proceed” (id. at p. 28), but
    rather made an “independent determination” (ibid.) that
    dismissal would be required.
    The fact that the record provides no indication that the
    prosecutor or the trial court complied with these requirements
    is not particularly surprising given that, before today, it was
    unclear what standards courts should apply when evaluating a
    continuance request of a suppression hearing that is
    unsupported by good cause. There is nothing in Ferrer, supra,
    
    184 Cal.App.4th 873
    , signifying that the prosecution has the
    burden to show the “challenged evidence is so critical that its
    suppression would require dismissal of the case” (maj. opn.,
    ante, at p. 1) or that trial courts must “make their own
    independent determination of whether dismissal of the case is
    reasonably foreseeable” (id. at p. 28). Indeed, the Attorney
    General has consistently argued that under Ferrer, a trial court
    can (and indeed should) rely solely on the prosecution’s
    representation regarding dismissal and not make any
    independent determination of that question — a proposition
    that the majority correctly rejects.
    9
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Groban, J., concurring and dissenting
    Nor do I find anything in the record that suggests the trial
    court intuited the standards we have articulated in our opinion
    today. As noted, the court provided no indication that it had
    independently evaluated the state of the evidence or that it
    believed the prosecution had a burden to show the case could not
    proceed without the disputed evidence. Nor did the court make
    any inquiry regarding the People’s prior representation that “a
    lot of evidence” in the case consisted of “observations from the
    police officer before any contact with the defendant.” The fact
    that the court made no inquiry about the remaining evidence,
    and instead seems to have relied on the prosecution’s assertion
    that it would dismiss, suggests it may well have wrongly
    interpreted Ferrer’s standard in accordance with the Attorney
    General’s position.
    And it appears beyond dispute that the prosecution did not
    believe it had any burden to show the suppressed evidence was
    “so critical that its suppression would require dismissal of the
    case.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1.) Instead, the State has
    consistently taken the position that the prosecution’s
    representation to the court that it would dismiss was, in itself,
    sufficient to require a continuance. (See ante, at pp. 7–8.)
    Indeed, I find it noteworthy that despite multiple opportunities
    to do so, neither the prosecution nor the Attorney General has
    ever argued that the case would not merely “be more difficult to
    prove” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 27) without the suppressed
    evidence, but rather would require dismissal.
    The majority, however, appears to conclude that various
    items in the record demonstrate the trial court did make an
    independent determination that the case could not proceed
    without the suppressed evidence. First, the majority surmises
    that the court “would have readily appreciated the centrality of
    10
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Groban, J., concurring and dissenting
    defendant’s incriminating statements” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 29)
    based on the police report and the factual summary set forth in
    the People’s opposition to the original suppression motion, both
    of which were provided to the court before the prosecution had
    ever requested a continuance. Those materials, however,
    merely contain a brief description of the events that preceded
    Yasin’s stop of Brown. The prosecution never represented to the
    court, nor was it ever asked, whether the summary contained in
    either document represented a full description of the evidence
    against Brown. Indeed, at the time those materials were
    presented to the court, the prosecutor argued against dismissal,
    contending that “a lot” of the evidence against Brown was not
    subject to the suppression order. (See ante, at p. 6.)
    But even if these materials could be said to support a trial
    court’s “independent determination” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 28)
    that the denial of a continuance would result in dismissal, they
    do nothing to show the trial court actually made such an
    independent determination here or otherwise understood that it
    was required to do so. To be clear, the relevant problem as I
    view it is not that the record contains insufficient evidence to
    support a finding that the denial of a continuance would result
    in dismissal. Rather, the problem is that on this record we
    simply cannot determine (and indeed have reason to doubt)
    whether the trial court understood or applied the standards we
    have articulated for the first time in today’s opinion. The
    materials submitted at the initial suppression hearing do
    nothing to rectify that problem.
    The majority next asserts that during the hearing on the
    prosecution’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court stated
    that it did not believe the People could proceed with the case
    because the suppressed statements were “ ‘all of the facts that
    11
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Groban, J., concurring and dissenting
    were available.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 29.) Contrary to the
    majority’s characterization, however, the record shows the trial
    court did not state that it had found the suppressed statements
    made up all the facts of the case. Rather, the record makes clear
    that the court was referring to statements defense counsel made
    at the initial hearing on the motion to suppress. The full
    statement at issue made by the court is: “The Defense at the
    time conceded, uh, as much because those were the — all the
    facts that were available.” (Italics added.)
    The discussion from the initial suppression hearing (that
    the court is referring to above) is illuminating. It shows that
    after the court had denied a continuance and granted the motion
    to suppress, the court had an exchange with the parties about
    how to proceed. During that exchange, the court explained that
    it intended to dismiss unless the prosecution believed there was
    “other evidence” in the case that would allow it “to proceed.”
    Defense counsel argued dismissal would be appropriate because
    Yasin’s suppressed statements comprised “essentially
    . . .everything” in the case and there was no longer sufficient
    evidence to prove the charges. Crucially, the trial court noted in
    response that defense counsel’s evaluation of the remaining
    evidence was “not necessarily” accurate. The prosecution then
    expressly disagreed with the defense, contending that the
    People might be able to proceed because “a lot of the evidence”
    against Brown was comprised of observations that were not
    subject to the suppression order. The trial court, apparently
    having accepted the prosecution’s representations, declined to
    dismiss the case and set the matter for trial.
    On this record, I cannot conclude that the trial court
    understood the prosecution had a burden to show the People
    could not proceed without the suppressed evidence or that the
    12
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Groban, J., concurring and dissenting
    court made an independent determination that the case would
    have to be dismissed. In my view, the trial court’s reference to
    statements and arguments defense counsel made during the
    original suppression hearing, which was held before any party
    had even brought Ferrer to the court’s attention, does not show
    that the court evaluated the prosecution’s continuance request
    under the standards we have articulated today.
    Indeed, the only thing that appears to have changed
    between the suppression hearing and the hearing on the motion
    for reconsideration was the prosecution’s representations about
    whether the case could continue: When faced with dismissal at
    the first hearing, the prosecution argued that it might be able to
    continue, but after identifying the Ferrer holding (which
    requires the court to grant a continuance if dismissal would
    otherwise result) the prosecution asserted that it could not
    proceed without the suppressed evidence. As noted, the trial
    court granted the continuance without ever asking the
    prosecution why its evaluation of the case had changed or
    otherwise inquiring about the state of the remaining evidence.
    In my view, the court’s actions suggest that rather than making
    any independent determination of the issue, it may have
    granted the continuance based solely on the prosecution’s
    representation that it would dismiss.3
    3
    While noting that a presumption of correctness generally
    applies to judgments on appeal, the majority appears to agree
    that remand is appropriate when a reviewing court has
    announced a new legal standard. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 30,
    fn. 7.) The majority insists, however, that today’s opinion does
    nothing more than “approve” (ibid.) standards that were already
    articulated in Ferrer, supra, 
    184 Cal.App.4th 873
    . This
    conclusion is at odds with the parties’ reading of that opinion.
    13
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Groban, J., concurring and dissenting
    Because I understand our decision today to clarify the
    legal standards that govern continuance requests in the context
    of suppression hearings, and because I do not believe we can
    discern from this record whether the trial court applied those
    standards here — indeed, if anything the record suggests it did
    not — I would reverse the judgment of guilt and remand the
    matter to the trial court with directions to hold a hearing as to
    whether the prosecution can satisfy its “burden . . . to show an
    inability to go forward without the evidence in dispute.”4 (Maj.
    The Attorney General explains that Ferrer does “not provide any
    specific guidance for determining when a denial of a continuance
    may result in a dismissal,” while Brown’s briefing before the
    Court of Appeal notes that the decision raises “fundamental
    uncertainties” regarding how trial courts should decide that
    question. I agree with the parties.
    Although the majority adopts the same “reasonably
    foreseeable” parlance as Ferrer, I find nothing in Ferrer
    directing that the prosecution has an initial burden to show the
    case “cannot be tried” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 27, italics omitted)
    without the challenged evidence. Nor does Ferrer direct trial
    courts that they must make an independent assessment of the
    prosecution’s representations about its ability to proceed.
    Although the majority characterizes these requirements as
    mere “elaborat[ions]” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 30, fn. 7) on what
    was already said in Ferrer, I view them as addressing an issue
    Ferrer simply did not reach: What standards should trial courts
    apply in assessing whether it is reasonably foreseeable that
    denial of a continuance will result in dismissal?
    4
    As the majority notes, while this appeal was pending, “the
    Legislature decriminalized the act of loitering for purposes of
    prostitution, the offense of which defendant was convicted. (See
    Stats. 2022, ch. 86 (Sen. Bill No. 357), § 4, effective Jan. 1,
    2023.)” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 31.) Were we to reverse the
    judgment and remand, I would direct the trial court to consider
    whether this intervening legislation requires the People to
    14
    PEOPLE v. BROWN
    Groban, J., concurring and dissenting
    opn., at p. 1; see People v. Jimenez (1978) 
    21 Cal.3d 595
    , 609,
    overruled by People v. Cahill (1993) 
    5 Cal.4th 478
     on another
    ground [where opinion clarified uncertainty in the law,
    reviewing court would not “presume[] that the trial court
    applied the correct standard in those cases in which the record
    is silent in this regard”]; Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 
    26 Cal.4th 798
    , 824 [“proper course” is to remand for application of
    “new” standard “to the facts of this case”].)
    GROBAN, J.
    We Concur:
    LIU, J.
    EVANS, J.
    dismiss this case. Under the majority’s approach, however,
    Brown’s judgment of conviction has now been affirmed, meaning
    that she must file a petition or application in the trial court
    (which will presumably require the assistance of counsel)
    requesting dismissal of her conviction. (See § 653.29, subds. (a),
    (b).)
    15
    See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
    argued in Supreme Court.
    Name of Opinion People v. Brown
    __________________________________________________________
    Procedural Posture (see XX below)
    Original Appeal
    Original Proceeding
    Review Granted (published) XX 
    69 Cal.App.5th 15
    Review Granted (unpublished)
    Rehearing Granted
    __________________________________________________________
    Opinion No. S271877
    Date Filed: March 27, 2023
    __________________________________________________________
    Court: Superior
    County: Santa Clara
    Judge: Jesus Valencia, Jr.
    __________________________________________________________
    Counsel:
    William M. Robinson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters,
    Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant
    Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit and Bridget Billeter, Deputy
    Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
    publication with opinion):
    William M. Robinson
    Attorney at Law
    95 South Market Street, Suite 570
    San Jose, CA 95113
    (408) 241-6171
    Bridget Billeter
    Deputy Attorney General
    455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
    San Francisco, CA 94102
    (415) 510-3763
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S271877

Filed Date: 3/27/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/27/2023