Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes ( 2023 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
BETTY TANSAVATDI,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES,
Defendant and Respondent.
S267453
Second Appellate District, Division Four
B293670
Los Angeles County Superior Court
BC633651 and BC652435
April 27, 2023
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger,
Jenkins, and Evans concurred.
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
S267453
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et
seq.), a public entity can be held liable for either creating a
dangerous condition on its property (id., § 835, subd. (a)) or
failing to protect against such a condition when the entity had
notice of the danger and sufficient time to remedy the situation
(id., subd. (b)). The statutory defense of design immunity,
however, precludes liability for injuries that were allegedly
caused by a defect in the design of a public improvement when
certain conditions are met. (Id., § 830.6.) To obtain design
immunity, a public entity must establish that the challenged
design was discretionarily approved by authorized personnel
and that substantial evidence supported the reasonableness of
the plan. (Cornette v. Dept. of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th
63, 66 (Cornette).)
The question presented in this case is whether design
immunity bars all forms of claims that seek to impose liability
for injuries resulting from a dangerous feature of a roadway.
More specifically, we must determine whether design immunity
is limited to claims alleging that a public entity created a
dangerous roadway condition through a defective design, or
whether the statutory immunity also extends to claims alleging
that a public entity failed to warn of a design element that
resulted in a dangerous roadway condition.
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TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Relying on our holding in Cameron v. State of California
(1972) 7 Cal.3d 318 (Cameron), we conclude that design
immunity does not categorically preclude failure to warn claims
that involve a discretionarily approved element of a roadway.
As we expressly held in Cameron, “[W]here the state is immune
from liability for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of its
property because the dangerous condition was created as a
result of a plan or design which conferred immunity under
[Government Code] section 830.6, the state may nevertheless be
liable for failure to warn of this dangerous condition.”
(Cameron, at p. 329.) The effect of Cameron is that while section
830.6 shields public entities from liability for injuries resulting
from the design of the physical features of a roadway, they
nonetheless retain a duty to warn of known dangers that the
roadway presents to the public.
The City of Rancho Palo Verdes (the City), however,
argues that Cameron is poorly reasoned and should be
overruled. The City contends that Cameron’s “illogical” holding
gravely undermines the design immunity defense: “If the
improvements at issue would be covered by design immunity,
and the [public] entity is therefore not liable for injuries caused
by them, how could it make sense to hold the entity liable for the
defendant’s failure to warn of the same improvements?”
Contrary to the City’s assertions, however, we find nothing
illogical in Cameron’s conclusion that section 830.6 was not
intended to allow government entities to remain silent when
they have notice that a reasonably approved design presents a
danger to the public.
Moreover, the City has failed to identify any subsequent
development in the law or other special justification that
warrants departure from the doctrine of stare decisis. (See
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 336 [“ ‘stare decisis’ is ‘a
fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable
precedent usually must be followed’ ”]; Moradi-Shalal v.
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 297
[“reexamination of precedent may become necessary when
subsequent developments indicate an earlier decision was
unsound”]; Kisor v. Wilkie (2019) __ U.S. __ [139 S.Ct. 2400,
2422] (Kisor) [“any departure from [stare decisis] demands
‘special justification’ — something more than ‘an argument that
the precedent was wrongly decided’ ”].) Cameron has been
controlling law for over 50 years and the Legislature has never
chosen to abrogate the holding. (See People v. Latimer (1993)
5 Cal.4th 1203, 1213 (Latimer) [“ ‘Considerations of stare decisis
have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for
here . . . [the Legislature] remains free to alter what we have
done’ ”], italics omitted.) For all those reasons, we decline to
overrule our prior precedent.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Accident and Complaint
On the afternoon of March 18, 2016, decedent Jonathan
Tansavatdi was riding his bicycle on Hawthorne Boulevard in
the City of Rancho Palos Verdes. Although most of Hawthorne
Boulevard includes a bike lane, the bike lane stops at Dupre
Drive (to the north) and then restarts after Vallon Drive (to the
south). The block between Dupre and Vallon pitches sharply
downhill in the southbound direction. The City chose not to
provide a bike lane along this section of Hawthorne because it
wanted to make space for street parking that provides access to
an adjacent park. The parking spots end shortly before a right
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
turn lane at the intersection of Hawthorne and Vallon. The bike
lane then resumes on Hawthorne, south of Vallon.
At the time of the accident, the decedent was traveling
southward (downhill) along the right side of Hawthorne
Boulevard. As he approached the intersection with Vallon
Drive, the decedent rode his bicycle into the right turn lane but
rather than turn right onto Vallon, he continued riding straight
through the intersection. As the decedent was entering the
intersection, an 80-foot tractor trailer began making a right turn
from Hawthorne onto Vallon. Due to the length of the trailer,
the truck started its turn from a southbound lane of Hawthorne,
causing it to cut across the right turn lane at a perpendicular
angle. The decedent collided with the truck and died from his
injuries.
The decedent’s mother, plaintiff Betsy Tansavatdi, filed a
complaint against the City for “[d]angerous [c]ondition of
[p]ublic [p]roperty pursuant to Government Code section 835.”
The complaint alleged that the intersection of Hawthorn
Boulevard and Vallon Drive constituted a dangerous condition
that the City had “created, or allowed to be created . . . under
[section] 835.” The complaint further alleged the City had
provided “inadequate warning of dangerous conditions not
reasonably apparent to motorists . . . for those driving through
the road at the intersection of Hawthorne Boulevard and Vallon
Drive.”
B. Trial Court Proceedings
1. The City’s motion for summary judgment
The City filed a motion for summary judgment arguing
that it had a “complete defense to [the] action for design
immunity under Government Code section 830.6.” In support of
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
the motion, the City submitted evidence showing that local
officials had approved a repaving project along Hawthorne
Boulevard in 2009. The plans showed a bike lane running along
Hawthorne Boulevard that stopped at Dupre Drive and then
restarted again at Vallon Drive. On the block between Dupre
and Vallon, the plans showed parking spots in lieu of a bike lane,
and a right turn lane at the intersection of Hawthorne and
Vallon. A former city engineer provided a declaration
explaining that the City had decided against including a bike
lane on that block because it wanted to provide on-street
parking for the benefit of an adjacent park.
The City also provided the declaration of a traffic
engineering expert who had reviewed the 2009 repaving plans
and concluded that they were reasonable and compliant with all
applicable state and federal guidelines. The engineer also
reviewed collision data that showed the decedent’s accident was
the only serious collision that had occurred at the intersection of
Hawthorne Boulevard and Vallon Drive between 2006 to 2017.
The expert opined that this data demonstrated the intersection
had an “extremely good” collision record and was safe when used
with due care.
The City argued that, considered together, its evidence
established as a matter of law that it was entitled to judgment
based on the defense of design immunity. In particular, the City
argued the evidence showed the element of the roadway that
had allegedly caused the decedent’s accident — the absence of a
bike lane between Dupre and Vallon — had been approved by
authorized personnel and that substantial evidence supported
the reasonableness of the design. Thus, the City contended, it
could not be held liable under Government Code section 835 for
any injury resulting from that alleged dangerous condition. In
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
a footnote, the City acknowledged Tansavatdi’s complaint had
also alleged an alternative theory of liability for “failing to warn
of a dangerous condition.” In the City’s view, however, because
it had “met the requisites of design immunity, no such warning
was required.”
In opposition, Tansavatdi argued there were disputed
questions of fact as to whether the design of the street qualified
as a dangerous condition, contending that the City “should have
ensured the roadway would be striped with a
continuous . . . bicycle lane directing bicyclists approaching the
intersection of Hawthorne and Vallon to the left of the right turn
lane.” Tansavatdi also argued there were disputed issues
whether the City was entitled to design immunity under
Government Code section 830.6, arguing there was no evidence
showing that the public employees who approved the repaving
project on Hawthorne had authority to do so, or that the design
was reasonable.
Citing Cameron, Tansavatdi separately argued that even
if the City had demonstrated it was entitled to design immunity,
that immunity did not apply to her claim that the City should
have “warned of the dangerous condition . . . since it [was] not
reasonably apparent to a bicyclist” and thus “create[ed] a
concealed trap.” Tansavatdi noted that the City’s motion
acknowledged the complaint had “pled this separate,
independent theory [of dangerous conditions liability], negating
any claimed design immunity.”
In support of her opposition, Tansavatdi submitted an
expert declaration opining that the discontinuation of the bike
lane along the steeply pitched section of Hawthorne caused
“bicyclists to ride their bicycles at relatively high speeds and
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
straight through the right turn lane at Vallon,” thus increasing
the risk of collision between cars and bicycles. The declaration
further stated that to avoid the possibility of injury, “a bicyclist
on Hawthorne between Dupre and Vallon needs more advanced
warning and positive guidance for the safe and intended
operation of the roadway.”
In its reply, the City did not challenge Tansavatdi’s
assertion that Cameron had held that design immunity does not
preclude a claim for failure to warn of a dangerous traffic
condition. Instead, the City argued the evidence submitted in
support of its motion showed that the section of roadway where
the accident occurred had signs warning vehicles to reduce their
speed. According to the City, this signage was sufficient to
defeat any failure to warn claim. The City also contended that
it would be “readily apparent” to bicycle riders that they should
not travel straight through the right turn lane.
2. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment
The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment,
concluding that the City had established as a matter of law that
it was entitled to design immunity under Government Code
section 830.6. Specifically, the court found the evidence showed
a “discretionary decision was made that street parking near the
community park on Hawthorne Boulevard east of Dupre Drive
had a higher priority than a bicycle lane near that particular
stretch of Hawthorne Boulevard,” and that the “plan and design
were reasonable.” The court’s order made no mention of
Tansavatdi’s argument that design immunity did not preclude
her alternative theory of liability for failure to warn of a
dangerous traffic condition.
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C. The Court of Appeal Proceedings
As in the trial court, Tansavatdi argued on appeal that the
City had failed to prove each of the elements necessary to
establish design immunity. Tansavatdi also argued reversal
was necessary because the trial court failed to address her
alternative assertion that “design immunity ‘[does] not
immunize [a government entity] for its concurrent negligence in
failing to warn of the dangerous condition.’ [Citation.] The
evidence detailing the City’s failure to warn of the concealed
trap here precludes a finding that design immunity applies to
shield the City of all liability.”
Although the City’s briefing focused on design immunity,
it also responded to Tansavatdi’s failure to warn claim. The City
contended that even after Cameron, “a failure to warn claim
cannot be based on a condition that is subject to design
immunity; such a claim is only permissible when it involves
something other than the approved design.” According to the
City, because “the absence of a bicycle lane from the stretch of
Hawthorne at issue — and the presence of a lane at other parts
of Hawthorne — was part of the approved plan,” there could be
no claim for failing to warn of that immunized design.
The Court of Appeal affirmed that the evidence supported
a finding of design immunity, thus precluding any claim that the
City was liable for having created a dangerous roadway
condition by failing to provide a bike lane on the block between
Dupre and Vallon. However, citing Cameron, the appellate
court agreed with Tansavatdi that “design immunity does not,
as a matter of law, preclude liability under a theory of failure to
warn of a dangerous condition.” (Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho
Palos Verdes (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 423, 441 (Tansavatdi).)
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Because the trial court did not address the failure to warn claim
in its order granting summary judgment, the court remanded
for further proceedings on that issue.
The City filed a petition for review challenging the court’s
conclusion that design immunity does not bar Tansavatdi’s
claim for failure to warn. We granted review.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The sole question presented in this case is whether the
statutory defense of design immunity set forth in Government
Code section 830.61 categorically precludes any claim that the
public entity is liable for having failed to warn of a dangerous
traffic condition resulting from that approved design. Because
this issue involves a pure question of law, we apply a de novo
standard of review.2 (People v. Rells (2000) 22 Cal.4th 860, 870
[“pure question of law . . . is examined de novo”]; Regents of
University of California v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509,
531 [“ruling on . . . summary judgment motion, and its
resolution of the underlying statutory-construction issues, were
subject to independent review”].)
1
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory citations are
to the Government Code.
2
We have no occasion to consider, and express no opinion
on, several additional arguments the City raised in its motion
for summary judgment that are unrelated to design immunity.
Those additional arguments include, among other things, that
the discontinuation of the bike lane does not qualify as either a
“ ‘[d]angerous condition’ ” (§ 830, subd. (a)) or a concealed trap
(see § 830.8), and that Hawthorne Boulevard contains adequate
signage to protect against any possible danger.
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
B. Legal Background
1. Relevant provisions of the Government Claims Act
a. Government liability for dangerous conditions
(§ 835)
Under the Government Claims Act, a tort action cannot be
maintained against a government entity unless the claim is
premised on a statute providing for that liability. (See § 815.)
In this case, plaintiff Tansavatdi brought her claims pursuant
to section 835, which “ ‘is the principal provision addressing the
circumstances under which the government may be held liable
for maintaining a dangerous condition of public property.’ ”
(Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1131.) To
establish liability under section 835, a plaintiff must show: “(1)
‘that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of
the injury’; (2) ‘that the injury was proximately caused by the
dangerous condition’; (3) ‘that the dangerous condition created
a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was
incurred’; and (4) either (a) that a public employee negligently
or wrongfully ‘created the dangerous condition’ or (b) that ‘[the]
public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous
condition a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken
measures to protect against the dangerous condition.’ ” (Ducey
v. Argo Sales Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 707, 716, quoting § 835, italics
& fn. omitted.)
Thus, section 835 expressly authorizes two different forms
of dangerous conditions liability: an act or omission by a
government actor that created the dangerous condition (§ 835,
subd. (a)); or, alternatively, failure “to protect against”
dangerous conditions of which the entity had notice (id., subd.
(b)). The term “protect against” is statutorily defined to include,
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
among other things, “warning of a dangerous condition.” (§ 830,
subd. (b).)
b. Statutory immunities to dangerous conditions
liability
The Government Code also provides numerous statutory
exceptions that limit liability for claims involving a dangerous
condition. (See §§ 830.1–831.8.) Two of those exceptions are
relevant here.
Section 830.6, commonly referred to as “design immunity,”
precludes liability for any injury caused by “the plan or design
of . . . , or an improvement to, public property.” (§ 830.6.) As we
explained in Cornette, design immunity requires that a public
entity establish three elements: “(1) a causal relationship
between the plan or design and the accident; (2) discretionary
approval of the plan or design prior to construction; and (3)
substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the plan
or design.” (Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 69.) Resolution of
the third element — the existence of substantial evidence
supporting the reasonableness of the adoption of the plan or
design — is a matter for the courts, not the jury, to decide. (See
§ 830.6 [“[T]he trial or appellate court” is to determine whether
“there is any substantial evidence upon the basis of which . . . a
reasonable public employee could have adopted the plan or
design”].)
“The rationale for design immunity is to prevent a jury
from second-guessing the decision of a public entity by reviewing
the identical questions of risk that had previously been
considered by the government officers who adopted or approved
the plan or design. [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘[T]o permit reexamination in
tort litigation of particular discretionary decisions where
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
reasonable [people] may differ as to how the discretion should
be exercised would create too great a danger of impolitic
interference with the freedom of decision-making by those
public officials in whom the function of making such decisions
has been vested.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at
p. 69.)
Section 830.8 provides a second form of immunity,
precluding public entity liability “for an injury caused by the
failure to provide traffic or warning signals, signs, markings or
devices described in the Vehicle Code.” (§ 830.8.) Section 830.8,
however, sets forth a limitation to such immunity: “Nothing in
this section exonerates a public entity . . . from liability for
injury . . . caused by such failure if a signal, sign, marking or
device . . . was necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which
endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not
be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated
by, a person exercising due care.” This limitation to section
830.8 immunity is commonly referred to as the “concealed trap”
exception. (See Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995)
38 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1196–1197; Callahan v. City and County
of San Francisco (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 696, 704; see also Van
Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar
1980) § 3.40, p. 253 (Van Alstyne) [immunity under § 830.8
“inapplicable when a warning sign . . . is necessary to warn of a
concealed trap”].)3
3
As the Court of Appeal noted, at this stage of the
proceedings “[i]t is unclear precisely what kind of warning
[Tansavatdi] claims the city should have provided.”
(Tansavatdi, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 441, fn. 17).
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2. Relevant case law
a. Flournoy v. State of California
As discussed below, our holding in Cameron is based
largely on the analysis set forth in Flournoy v. State of
California (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 806 (Flournoy). Thus, to aid
our understanding of Cameron, it is helpful to first consider
Flournoy.
The plaintiffs in Flournoy brought a wrongful death action
under section 835 alleging that the state had maintained a
bridge in a dangerous condition. According to the complaint, the
bridge had been designed in a manner that caused moisture to
condense on the roadway, which then froze in cold weather
resulting in icy conditions. The complaint further alleged that
although the state had notice of numerous accidents caused by
ice on the bridge, it had not posted any warning signs or
redesigned the roadway surface. The trial court granted
summary judgment based on design immunity (§ 830.6),
concluding that “ ‘the condition [on] which plaintiff seeks to
predicate liability was inherent in the design of the bridge.’ ”
(Flournoy, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 810.)
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that design
immunity only addressed one of the two theories of dangerous
Tansavatdi has consistently taken the position, however, that
the warning she claims was necessary would fall within section
830.8 as a type of “traffic or warning signal[] . . . described in the
Vehicle Code.” (§ 830.8.) Because both parties have proceeded
under the assumption that any possible warning regarding the
bike lane would fall within section 830.8, we do the same. We
express no opinion regarding the breadth of section 830.8 or how
design immunity might affect failure to warn claims that do not
involve a traffic condition.
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
conditions liability set forth in section 835: “The trial court
erred in granting the summary judgment, for the state’s [design
immunity defense] could affect only one of two [alternative]
theories of recovery . . . made by the pleadings . . . : (1) The state
was liable under subdivision (a) of section 835, for it had created
a dangerous condition by constructing an ice-prone bridge; and
(2) the state was liable under subdivision (b) of section 835, for
it had knowledge of a dangerously icy condition (not reasonably
apparent to a careful driver) and failed to protect against the
danger by posting a warning. Each of these theories postulated
a separate, although concurring, cause of the accident.
[Citation.] The first theory asserted causation in the state’s
active negligence in creating a danger, the second in the state’s
passive negligence in failing to warn of it.” (Flournoy, supra,
275 Cal.App.2d at pp. 810–811.)
Flournoy explained that the distinct theories of liability
set forth in section 835 subdivision (a) and subdivision (b)
reflected the common law principle that a single defendant may
produce “two concurring, proximate causes of an accident[:] . . .
an affirmatively negligent act and . . . a passively negligent
omission. . . . [¶] Here, . . . the complaint alleged active and
passive negligence of a single defendant (the creation of a
dangerous condition and the failure to post a warning of it) as
separate, concurring causes. Regardless of the availability of
the active negligence theory, plaintiffs were entitled to go before
a jury on the passive negligence theory, i.e., an accident caused
by the state’s failure to warn the public against icy danger
known to it but not apparent to a reasonably careful highway
user.” (Flournoy, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 811.)
The court also rejected the state’s argument that section
830.6’s design immunity provisions “ ‘prevail[]’ over any liability
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
for a dangerous condition of public property under section 835,”
concluding that “[b]y force of its very terms the design immunity
of section 830.6 is limited to a design-caused accident.
[Citation.] It does not immunize from liability caused by
negligence independent of design, even though the independent
negligence is only a concurring, proximate cause of the
accident.” (Flournoy, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 811, fn.
omitted.)
b. Cameron v. State of California
In Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d 318, plaintiffs filed a
complaint alleging the state was liable under section 835 for
having negligently constructed an improperly banked “S” curve
that left drivers unable to “negotiate the curve even though
going at a lawful speed.” (Id. at p. 322.) Plaintiffs separately
alleged the state had failed to adequately warn of this defective
design, contending that a sign warning drivers to slow their
speed to 35 miles per hour would have been sufficient to
neutralize the dangerous design. At the close of evidence, the
trial court granted a motion for nonsuit based on design
immunity.
On appeal, plaintiffs raised two arguments in support of
reversal. First, they argued design immunity was inapplicable
because the approved plans did not address the banking of the
“S”-curve, which plaintiffs alleged was the dangerous condition
that had caused the accident. Second, plaintiffs argued that
“even if ‘design immunity’ . . . immunize[d] the state for
negligence in the creation of the dangerous condition, the
concurrent negligence by the state in failing to warn of the
dangerous condition provides an independent basis for
recovery.” (Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 322.) Plaintiffs
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contended that because the state had provided no evidence that
this “negligent failure to warn” was “the result of any design or
plan which would confer immunity under section 830.6”, such
conduct provided a separate “basis for recovery, even if the
dangerous condition itself was created as a result of a plan
covered by section 830.6.” (Id. at p. 327.)
We agreed with both arguments. Regarding the first
issue, we found the state had presented no evidence that the
curve’s banking was part of the design approved by the public
entity, and thus there was “no basis for concluding that any
liability for injuries caused by this [alleged defect] was
immunized by section 830.6.” (Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at
p. 326, fn. omitted.) Although that conclusion was sufficient to
reverse the trial court’s judgment of nonsuit, we went on to
consider plaintiffs’ second argument that, even if proven, design
immunity would not preclude their claim for failing to warn
motorists about the dangerous curve. We explained that
addressing this alternative claim was necessary “[f]or the
guidance of the trial court” (id. at p. 326) because it was possible
“upon remand that the state could produce evidence to show
that the [banking] was [part of the approved design]. In that
event, plaintiffs’ second contention would become determinative
on the issue of design immunity.” (Id. at p. 327, fn. 11.)
We began our analysis of the failure to warn claim by
noting that while section 830.8 generally immunizes liability for
injuries caused by the failure to provide traffic or warning
signals, the statute allows public entity liability “if a sign was
necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which would not be
reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by,
a person using the highway with due care.” (Cameron, supra,
7 Cal.3d at p. 327.) We further held that plaintiffs had
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introduced sufficient evidence to support a finding “that
warning signs, indicating the proper speed to negotiate the
curve, . . . would eliminate the dangerousness from the condition
of uneven [banking].” (Ibid.)
Turning to whether section 830.6’s design immunity
provision precluded plaintiffs’ claim for failure to warn, we
summarized Flournoy at length, and in particular its discussion
of active versus passive negligence. (Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d
at pp. 327–328.) We ultimately “[a]gree[d] with the reasoning
and conclusions of Flournoy” (id. at p. 328), and held that, as in
that case, plaintiffs had alleged “active negligence . . . (the
creation of the dangerous condition, namely [improper banking])
and passive negligence (failure to warn of the dangerous
condition) of . . . the state.” (Ibid.) We further held that, “as in
Flournoy, the passive negligence alleged is independent of the
negligent design” and that plaintiffs were therefore “entitled to
go to the jury on the passive negligence theory.” (Id. at pp. 328–
329.)
We then “recapitulate[d]” our holding, explaining that
“where the state is immune from liability for injuries caused by
a dangerous condition of its property because the dangerous
condition was created as a result of a plan or design which
conferred immunity under section 830.6, the state may
nevertheless be liable for failure to warn of this dangerous
condition where the failure to warn is negligent and is an
independent, separate, concurring cause of the accident.”
(Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 329.)
C. Analysis
To resolve the legal question presented in this case, we
must answer three questions involving Cameron. First, we
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must determine whether the Court of Appeal correctly
interpreted Cameron as holding that “design immunity for a
dangerous condition [does] not necessarily shield the state from
liability for a failure to warn of the same dangerous condition.”
(Tansavatdi, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 442.) Second,
assuming the interpretation was correct, we must address the
City’s assertion that Cameron’s analysis regarding failure to
warn claims does not constitute binding precedent or has
otherwise been impliedly displaced by subsequent events. And
third, to the extent the Court of Appeal properly interpreted
Cameron and the decision is binding precedent, we must decide
whether there is an adequate justification to depart from the
doctrine of stare decisis and overrule our prior holding.
1. The breadth of Cameron’s holding
a. The Court of Appeal correctly interpreted
Cameron
The first question we must resolve is whether the Court of
Appeal correctly interpreted Cameron as permitting failure to
warn claims that involve an immunized element of a design
decision. Several other courts have adopted a similar reading of
Cameron. (See Grenier v. City of Irwindale (1997)
57 Cal.App.4th 931, 945 [“[t]he failure to warn of a trap can
constitute independent negligence, regardless of design
immunity”]; Hefner v. County of Sacramento (1988)
197 Cal.App.3d 1007, 1017, abrogated on another ground in
Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th 63; Levine v. City of Los Angeles
(1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 481, 488; Anderson v. City of Thousand
Oaks (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 82, 91 (Anderson) [“In spite of
respondent’s immunity for a defectively designed roadway, a
second independent ground of liability under subdivision (b) of
Government Code section 835 exists for its failure to warn of the
18
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
dangerous condition if it had actual or constructive notice of
such a condition”]; see also Van Alstyne, supra, § 3.40 at p. 253
[Cameron and other authorities support the proposition that
“even if the source of the danger is inherent in the approved plan
or design of the improvement, and therefore appears to be
nonactionable under the ‘design immunity,’ the entity’s failure
to pose adequate warning signs may result in liability”].)
The City, however, argues we should follow the analysis of
Weinstein v. Department of Transportation (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 52 (Weinstein), which adopted a substantially
narrower interpretation of Cameron. The plaintiffs in Weinstein
alleged that a freeway “ ‘lane drop’ ” (the discontinuation of a
lane) created a dangerous traffic condition and that defendant
had failed to properly warn of that condition. (Id. at p. 54.) The
trial court granted summary judgment based on design
immunity. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiffs’ contention
that “defendant’s design immunity defense did not bar them
from recovering for defendant’s failure to post” sufficient
warnings about the lane drop. (Id. at p. 61.) The appellate court
explained that “ ‘[i]t would be illogical to hold that a public
entity immune from liability because the design was deemed
reasonably adoptable, could then be held liable for failing to
warn that the design was dangerous.’ [Citation.] Since
defendant could not be held liable for these aspects of the
roadway’s design as dangerous conditions, it could not be held
liable for failing to warn of these same aspects.” (Ibid.)
Weinstein further explained that its holding was not in conflict
with Cameron. According to the court, “Cameron involved the
failure to warn of a hidden dangerous condition that was not
part of the approved design of the highway. [Citation.] Here,
plaintiffs claim that defendant was obligated to warn of
19
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
conditions that were part of the approved design.” (Weinstein,
at p. 61, italics omitted.)
The Court of Appeal here found that Weinstein’s reading
of Cameron was “mistaken.” (Tansavatdi, supra,
60 Cal.App.5th at p. 442.) We agree. As noted above, our
decision in Cameron expressly held that if the state were able to
establish on remand that the challenged condition at issue in
that case (the banking of the “S” turn) was part of the approved
highway plans, and thus subject to design immunity, that
immunity would not defeat plaintiffs’ alternative claim that the
state’s failure to warn drivers of the known danger was an
independent, intervening cause of the accident. Contrary to
Weinstein, there is no language in Cameron suggesting that our
holding was only intended to apply when a failure to warn claim
challenges a road condition “that was not part of the approved
design.” (Weinstein, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 61.) Indeed,
such a limitation is in direct conflict with Cameron’s conclusion
that if the defendant were able to produce evidence on remand
demonstrating that the banking of the curve was part of the
approved plan (thus precluding any claim for having created
that dangerous condition), plaintiffs would nonetheless remain
entitled to move forward with their failure to warn claim. (See
Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 326–327 & fn. 11.) Accordingly,
we disapprove that portion of Weinstein v. Department of
Transportation, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th 52.4
4
We likewise disapprove language in Compton v. City of
Santee (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 591, suggesting that design
immunity categorically precludes claims alleging failure to warn
of a dangerous traffic condition created by the immunized
20
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
b. Cameron’s limitations on failure to warn claims
While we agree with the Court of Appeal’s determination
that Weinstein misread Cameron, for the guidance of our courts
we think it helpful to clarify additional aspects of Cameron’s
analysis that affect the requirements necessary to prevail on a
claim alleging failure to warn of a dangerous traffic condition.
First, as noted above, Cameron expressly adopted both the
reasoning and the conclusions set forth in Flournoy. (See
Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 328.) Flournoy, in turn, made
clear that its conclusion that design immunity does not
categorically preclude failure to warn claims was based on the
two distinct grounds for dangerous conditions liability set forth
in section 835: liability for injuries caused by a dangerous
condition that a public entity created (§ 835, subd. (a)); and
liability for failing to protect against a dangerous condition of
which the public entity had notice (id., subd. (b).) Flournoy
further reasoned that these two distinct theories of liability
incorporated the “active” and “passive” theories of negligence
recognized in the common law. (See Flournoy, supra,
275 Cal.App.2d at pp. 810–811.) Thus, under Flournoy and
Cameron, section 830.6 immunizes liability for having created a
dangerous traffic condition under section 835, subdivision (a) (a
form of active negligence) but does not necessarily immunize
liability for failing to warn of a known dangerous traffic
condition under section 835, subdivision (b) (a form of passive
design. (See id. at p. 600.) Although decided many years after
Cameron, the Compton court failed to address our holding in any
way.
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TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
negligence).5 This distinction is important because unlike
claims brought under section 835, subdivision (a), to prevail on
a claim under subdivision (b), the plaintiff must prove the public
entity had notice of the dangerous condition. (See § 835, subds.
(a), (b); compare Van Alstyne, supra, § 3.17, at p. 208 [“[w]hen
the alleged basis of entity liability for a dangerous property
condition is . . . creation of the condition [under § 835, subd. (a)],
plaintiff is not required to establish . . . notice to the entity”];
with id. at § 3.20, p. 212 [when alleged basis of entity liability is
failure to protect under § 835, subd. (b), plaintiff’s “failure to
establish . . . notice is fatal to recovery”].) Accordingly, a
plaintiff seeking to impose liability for failure to warn of an
immunized design element must prove the public entity had
notice that its design resulted in a dangerous condition. (See,
e.g., Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820,
829 [public entity “could not be liable under section 835,
subdivision (b)” where “there was no evidence that [it] had notice
5
The City argues the reasoning of Cameron and Flournoy
are flawed because they incorporate “common law negligence
concepts” — namely active versus passive negligence — when
interpreting public entity liability for dangerous conditions. The
City contends this analysis conflicts with subsequent case law
clarifying that “public entity liability for dangerous property
conditions must be based on Government Code section 835,
rather than common law negligence.” The City’s argument,
however, overlooks that Cameron and Flournoy’s discussion of
active and passive negligence was rooted in the statutory
language of section 835, with subdivision (a) incorporating the
concept of active negligence and subdivision (b) incorporating
the concept of passive negligence. In other words, Cameron did
not find that public entities can be held liable for failure to warn
based on common law principles of active versus passive
negligence, but rather found that section 835 incorporates those
common law principles.
22
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
of the allegedly dangerous condition”]; Anderson, supra,
65 Cal.App.3d at p. 92 [discussing notice requirement of claims
arising under section 835, subdivision (b)].)
Second, while Cameron held that design immunity does
not categorically preclude claims alleging failure to warn of a
dangerous traffic condition pursuant to section 835, subdivision
(b), the decision’s reasoning also makes clear that such claims
may be subject to a separate, more limited form of statutory
immunity: Signage immunity set forth in section 830.8. That
provision precludes government liability for failing to provide
“traffic or warning signals” (§ 830.8), except when “necessary to
warn of a dangerous condition which would not be reasonably
apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person
using the highway with due care” (Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at
p. 327). As noted above, this exception to signage immunity is
known as the “concealed trap” exception. (See ante, at p. 12.)
Thus, under Cameron, despite the inapplicability of design
immunity, a plaintiff alleging failure to warn of a dangerous
traffic condition must nonetheless overcome signage immunity
by establishing the accident-causing condition was a concealed
trap.
Third, Cameron makes clear that to establish liability for
failing to warn of a dangerous traffic condition that is otherwise
subject to design immunity, the plaintiff must prove the absence
of a warning was an “independent, separate, concurring cause
of the accident.” (Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 329.) We have
previously observed that “[i]n cases where concurrent
independent causes contribute to an injury, we apply the
‘substantial factor’ test” (State Dept. of State Hospitals v.
Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 352, fn. 12), which
requires the plaintiff to “show some substantial link or nexus
23
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
between omission and injury.” (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 778.) Thus, if a plaintiff is not able to
establish that the absence of a warning sign was a substantial
factor in causing the injury, the claim will fail.
Finally, we note that while Cameron concluded a public
entity can be held liable for failing to warn of a dangerous
roadway feature that was the result of a properly approved
design, our decision did not address whether design immunity
might apply if the public entity is able to show that the presence
or absence of warning signs was part of the approved design.
The plaintiffs in Cameron specifically alleged that the state’s
failure to warn was not part of any approved plan (id. at p. 326),
and they acknowledged in their petition for review that section
830.6 might apply “where the presence or absence of signs was
a considered element of the plan or design.”6 In this case, the
City’s summary judgment motion argued only that section 830.6
shields public entities from failure to warn claims involving an
approved feature of the roadway; the City did not argue that the
evidence offered in support of its design immunity defense
showed city officials had considered whether to provide a
warning about the discontinuance of the bike lane. Thus, as in
Cameron, we have no occasion to consider, and express no view
on, how design immunity might affect a failure to warn claim
when a public entity does produce evidence that it considered
whether to provide a warning.
6
We granted Tansavatdi’s request that we take judicial
notice of the petition for review that the plaintiffs filed in
Cameron as well as a 1978 Staff Report prepared by the Joint
Committee on Tort Liability. That staff report is discussed in
more detail below. (See post, at pp. 30–31.)
24
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
The above discussion illustrates that while Cameron
generally permits claims for failure to warn of a dangerous
traffic condition that is subject to design immunity, a plaintiff
pursuing such a claim must nonetheless prove various elements
that are not present when pursuing a claim alleging a public
entity created that dangerous condition: (1) the public entity
had actual or constructive notice that the approved design
resulted in a dangerous condition (see §§ 835, subd. (b) & 835.2
[defining “notice” within the meaning of § 835, subd. (b)]); (2)
the dangerous condition qualified as a concealed trap, i.e.,
“would not [have been] reasonably apparent to, and would not
have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care” (§
830.8); and (3) the absence of a warning was a substantial factor
in bringing about the injury.
2. Cameron constitutes binding precedent
Having clarified the breadth of our holding in Cameron,
we next consider the City’s arguments that Cameron’s
discussion of failure to warn claims is nonbinding dicta or,
alternatively, no longer remains good law due to an intervening
amendment to section 830.6.
a. Cameron’s discussion of the plaintiffs’ failure
to warn claim is not dicta
The City argues that Cameron’s discussion of the
plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim is properly construed as
nonbinding “dictum” insofar as the discussion was only provided
“ ‘[f]or the guidance of the trial court on remand’ ” in the event
the state was able to prove on remand that the banking of the
curve was an approved aspect of the plan. This argument is
without merit.
25
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
We have previously held that “[s]tatements by appellate
courts ‘responsive to the issues raised on appeal and . . .
intended to guide the parties and the trial court in resolving the
matter following . . . remand’ are not dicta.” (Sonic-Calabasas
A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1158.) Cameron
expressly clarified why we elected to address the failure to warn
claim at issue in that case, explaining that if the state was able
to produce evidence showing the banking of the “S” turn was
part of the approved design, “plaintiffs’ second contention” —
i.e., their failure to warn claim — “would become determinative
on the issue of design immunity.” (Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at
p. 327, fn. 11.) Under established law, our analysis of the
plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim is not dicta.
b. The 1979 amendments to section 830.6 did not
abrogate Cameron
The City next argues that even if Cameron held that
design immunity does not preclude failure to warn claims, the
holding is no longer good law in light of amendments the
Legislature made to section 830.6 in 1979 (seven years after
Cameron was decided). Those amendments describe the
circumstances under which government entities can retain
design immunity when changed circumstances have rendered
the original design no longer safe.
To understand this argument, further background
discussion regarding the 1979 amendments is necessary. When
originally enacted in 1963, section 830.6 did not contain any
provision explaining whether, once obtained, design immunity
could ever be lost. Although we initially interpreted the absence
of any such provision to mean design immunity continued
regardless of any subsequent change in conditions (see Cornette,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 69–70 [discussing history of § 830.6]),
26
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
we overruled those decisions in Baldwin v. State of California
(1972) 6 Cal.3d 424 (Baldwin), which held that section 830.6’s
statutory immunity is lost when “the actual operation of the
plan or design over a period of time and under changed
circumstances discloses that the design has created a dangerous
condition of which the entity has notice.” (Baldwin, at p. 431.)
In 1979, the Legislature responded to Baldwin by
adopting Assembly Bill No. 893 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.)
(Assembly Bill 893), which amended section 830.6 to “specify the
circumstances under which a public entity retains its design
immunity despite having received notice that the plan or design
has become dangerous because of a change of physical
conditions.” (Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 71.) Those
amendments added the following language to section 830.6:
Notwithstanding notice that constructed or
improved public property may no longer be in
conformity with [an approved] plan or design . . . ,
the immunity provided by this section shall continue
for a reasonable period of time sufficient to permit
the public entity to obtain funds for and carry out
remedial work necessary to allow such public
property to be in conformity with [the approved
plan] . . . . In the event that the public entity is
unable to remedy such public property because of
practical impossibility or lack of sufficient funds, the
immunity provided by this section shall remain so
long as such public entity shall reasonably attempt
to provide adequate warnings of the existence of the
condition not conforming to the approved plan or
design or to the approved standard. (Italics added.)
27
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
As we discussed in Cornette, the legislative history of Assembly
Bill 893 makes clear the amendments were intended to both
codify Baldwin’s conclusion that design immunity can be lost
due to changed circumstances while also softening the financial
ramifications of such a rule by allowing public entities “a
reasonable time to finance and take remedial action or to
provide adequate warning of the dangerous condition.”
(Cornette, at p. 72.)
The City argues the 1979 amendments undermine
Cameron because the statute now expressly describes the
limited circumstances under which design immunity does not
preclude a failure to warn claim: When the public entity has
notice that the originally approved plan or design has become
dangerous because of a change in physical conditions but takes
no remedial action. The City contends that because section
830.6 now specifically states when an entity must warn of the
dangers associated with a design, Cameron no longer controls.
The City further contends that the amendments create a conflict
between Cameron, which holds that design immunity does not
extend to claims alleging the failure to warn of an approved
design element, and the statutory language of section 830.6,
which indicates that a warning is necessary only when changed
circumstances have rendered the original design dangerous. In
the City’s view, because plaintiff has never argued that a change
in physical conditions rendered the original design of the
roadway dangerous, any claim for failure to warn necessarily
fails.
We are not persuaded. As noted above, the legislative
history demonstrates that the 1979 amendments were intended
to mitigate the financial effects of Baldwin’s holding that design
immunity can be lost when “the plan or design has become
28
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
dangerous because of a change of physical conditions.”
(Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 71, italics added.) Cameron,
in contrast, addresses whether design immunity applies to
failure to warn claims irrespective of changed circumstances.
Indeed, in the claims at issue in Cameron, there was no
allegation that the challenged design feature (the banking of the
turn) had become dangerous as the result of changed physical
conditions, but rather that the design of the roadway was
dangerous from its inception, and that a warning would have
mitigated the problem. Thus, Cameron allows plaintiffs to seek
redress for injuries where the public entity has notice that an
approved design has resulted in a concealed traffic danger and
a warning would have protected against that danger. The 1979
amendments do not speak to that specific situation.
The legislative history lends clear support to the
conclusion that the 1979 amendments were unrelated to
Cameron. In January 1979, the Joint Committee on Tort
Liability, chaired by assemblyman John Knox, issued a staff
report recommending that the Legislature amend section 830.6
in two distinct ways: (1) add language to the statute that would
limit the financial impacts of Baldwin, supra, 6 Cal.3d 424; and
(2) “obviate[] [Cameron’s] holding” that a public entity can be
held liable for failing to warn of a dangerous design element
“even though design immunity may have been applicable.”
(Joint Com. on Tort Liability, 1978 Staff Report on Tort Liability
(Jan. 1979) p. 78-257.)
In the 1979 amendments that followed, however, the
Legislature made the recommended changes in response to
Baldwin but took no action to abrogate Cameron. Indeed, in a
letter that Assemblyman Knox (who both authored Assembly
Bill 893 and chaired the Joint Committee on Tort Liability) sent
29
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
to then Governor Edmund J. Brown, Jr., Knox explained that
“ ‘[a]lthough the staff of the Joint Committee agreed with
Baldwin, it felt there should be some recognition of the practical
limitations which have been imposed upon governments by
Article XIII A of the California Constitution (Proposition 13) and
ever increasing liability insurance costs. This recognition is
achieved by AB 893.’ ” (Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 72,
quoting Assemblyman John T. Knox, letter to Governor
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., re Assem. Bill No. 893, Aug. 30, 1979,
pp. 1–2; see also Cornette, at p. 72 [“Although referenced
elsewhere in several legislative analyses, the purpose of the
[1979 amendment] was best explained by its author
[Assemblyman Knox] in a letter to the Governor urging him to
approve it”]; Martin v. Szeto (2004) 32 Cal.4th 445, 450–451
[statements from a bill’s sponsor “are entitled to consideration
to the extent they constitute ‘a reiteration of legislative
discussion and events leading to adoption of proposed
amendments rather than merely an expression of personal
opinion’ ”].) The letter contains no reference to Cameron. This
history supports the view that the amendments to section 830.6
were intended to address how changed circumstances affect
design immunity, not Cameron’s holding regarding how design
immunity affects failure to warn claims.7
7
In an answer brief filed in response to amicus Consumer
Attorneys of California, the City has also argued that regardless
of what Cameron may have concluded about design immunity’s
application to failure to warn claims brought pursuant to section
835, subdivision (b), our subsequent decision in Cornette, supra,26 Cal.4th 63, “squarely held that design immunity” does apply
to claims arising under subdivision (b). In support, the City cites
30
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
3. Adherence to stare decisis
Finally, we address the City’s contention that even if
Cameron remains binding precedent, we should overrule the
decision and hold that design immunity precludes any claim
alleging that a public entity failed to warn of a dangerous
roadway condition that was reflected in the approved plans. “It
is, of course, a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior
applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the
case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by the
current justices.” (Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency
Formation Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 489, 503–504.) “Accordingly,
a party urging us to overrule a precedent faces a rightly onerous
language from Cornette that states: “Section 835, subdivision
(b) provides that a public entity is liable for injury . . . caused by
a dangerous condition of its property if the . . . public entity had
actual or constructive notice of the condition a sufficient time
before the injury to have taken preventive measures. . . . [¶]
However, under section 830.6, the public entity may escape such
liability by raising the affirmative defense of ‘design
immunity.’ ” (Cornette, at pp. 68–69, fn. omitted.)
Although this isolated passage is arguably in tension with
some of our discussion in Cameron, we find it notable that
Cornette did not involve a claim for failure to warn nor did it
discuss Cameron’s treatment of failure to warn claims. Instead,
the plaintiff in Cornette claimed loss of design immunity based
on changed physical circumstances. Moreover, Cornette’s brief
reference to section 835, subdivision (b) was of only marginal
relevance to the legal issue presented in that case, which was
whether section 830.6 requires that every element of design
immunity should be decided by the court rather than the jury.
(See Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 66–67.) We find nothing
in Cornette suggesting that our brief reference to section 835,
subdivision (b) was intended to modify or otherwise overrule our
holding in Cameron, which had been binding precedent at that
time for over thirty years.
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TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
task.” (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 288 (Trope); see also
Kisor, supra, 139 S.Ct. at p. 2422] [“any departure from [stare
decisis] demands ‘special justification’ ”].) That burden is even
greater where, as here, “ ‘the Court is asked to overrule a point
of statutory construction. Considerations of stare decisis have
special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here,
unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the
legislative power is implicated, and [the Legislature] remains
free to alter what we have done.’ ” (Latimer, supra, 5 Cal.4th at
p. 1213, italics omitted.)
a. Cameron’s reasoning is not “illogical”
The City argues we should depart from stare decisis
because Cameron’s holding is “illogical” insofar as it takes away
the very immunity that section 830.6 is intended to provide: “If
the improvements at issue would be covered by design
immunity, and the entity is therefore not liable for injuries
caused by them, how could it make sense to hold the entity liable
for the defendant’s failure to warn of the same improvements?
The injuries would still be caused by the same dangerous
condition: the improvements.”
Contrary to the City’s suggestion, we find nothing illogical
in Cameron’s conclusion that while section 830.6 shields public
entities from liability for the design of the physical features of a
roadway, those entities retain a duty to warn of known dangers
that the roadway presents to the public. At its core, Cameron
held that if a warning would have “effectually neutralized”
(Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 329) the risks associated with a
dangerously designed roadway, the absence of such a warning
qualifies as an independent cause of the injury. Stated
differently, if a warning would have “eliminate[d] the
32
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
dangerousness” (id. at p. 327) of the approved design, the failure
to extend such a warning is a distinct cause of the accident that
is separate from the design itself, and thus not subject to section
830.6. That reasoning is evident in Cameron, where the court
found that the plaintiffs had introduced sufficient evidence to
support a finding that any danger arising from the design of the
curve would have been mitigated by a sign that warned drivers
to slow down their speed. (See ibid. [“plaintiffs have introduced
sufficient evidence to show that . . . warning signs . . . , if obeyed
by the driver, would eliminate the dangerousness from the
condition of uneven [banking]”]; id. at p. 329 [“if there had been
proper warning of a dangerous curve and posting of the safe
speed, the dangerous condition of the highway would have been
effectually neutralized”].)
Indeed, Cameron’s conclusion that a government entity
cannot simply remain silent when it has notice that a reasonably
approved design presents a danger to the public (see § 830.8),
closely mirrors how we (and our Legislature) have treated
design immunity in the context of changed circumstances. In
Baldwin, supra, 6 Cal.3d 424, we held that when a public entity
has notice that changed physical conditions have caused an
approved design to become dangerous in operation, the entity
“must act reasonably to correct or alleviate the hazard.” (Id. at
p. 434.) Concluding that design immunity was never intended
to be “absolute” (id. at p. 433), we explained that while section
830.6 protects a public entity’s initial design decision, the entity
nonetheless remains “ ‘under a continuing duty to review its
plan in the light of its actual operation.’ ” (Baldwin, at p. 433,
quoting Weiss v. Fote (N.Y. Ct.App. 1960) 167 N.E.2d 63, 67; see
Baldwin, at p. 434 [“Having approved the plan or design, the
governmental entity may not, ostrich-like, hide its head in the
33
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
blueprints, blithely ignoring the actual operation of the plan”].)
In response to concerns that permitting the loss of design
immunity would “forc[e] [public entities] to spend vast sums of
money to update hazardous or obsolescent public
improvements” (id. at p. 436), we noted that “[i]n many cases,
inexpensive remedies, such as warning signs . . . will be
sufficient” (id. at p. 437). The Legislature’s subsequent 1979
amendments to section 830.6 were intended to codify Baldwin’s
approach to design immunity, while making clear that
governments can retain immunity by providing a warning in
lieu of remedying the design defect. (See ante, at pp. 26–31.)
While Baldwin and the 1979 amendments addressed how
design immunity can be retained or lost when changed
circumstances have rendered an approved design dangerous,
Cameron’s conclusion that section 830.6 does not bar claims for
failing to warn of a dangerous design element employs similar
logic. Under Cameron’s approach, section 830.6 operates to
protect a public entity’s discretionary design decisions but does
not permit it to remain silent when it has notice that an element
of the road design presents a concealed danger to the public.
And much like section 830.6’s treatment of loss of design
immunity, Cameron does not compel public entities to engage in
costly remediation projects or redesign roadways to avoid the
danger in question; it merely compels the government to provide
warnings about dangers of which it has notice. Stated
differently, Cameron recognizes that a design might be the best
engineers can do under the circumstances but still leave
foreseeable dangers that can and should be addressed through
appropriate warnings.
In sum, we find nothing illogical about interpreting
sections 830.6 and 835 in a manner that compels government
34
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
entities to provide a warning when they know (or should know)
that an approved roadway design presents concealed dangers to
the public. Indeed, as argued by amicus curiae, “[A] contrary
rule would effectively allow public entities to withhold . . .
warnings for known hazards despite [repeated injuries or even
deaths]. . . . [I]t [disserves] . . . public policy to allow
governmental entities to consciously disregard known, ongoing
hazards to the public.”8
b. Factors supporting stare decisis
In addition to Cameron being well reasoned, several other
factors support application of stare decisis. Our unanimous
decision in Cameron is over 50 years old. (See Trope, supra,8
The City also argues that Cameron was poorly reasoned
insofar as it concluded that the “concealed trap exception” set
forth in section 830.8’s signage immunity provision also creates
an exception to the general rule of design immunity set forth in
section 830.6. As stated in the City’s briefing, “To hold that
section 830.8’s exception to one immunity trumps a different
and broader immunity is illogical.”
This argument, however, misconstrues Cameron’s
reasoning as to why design immunity does not categorically
preclude claims for failure to warn. As discussed above, we do
not read Cameron as having concluded that the concealed trap
exception in section 830.8 also creates an exception to section
830.6’s design immunity provision. Instead, Cameron’s holding
was based on the distinct theories of dangerous conditions
liability set forth in section 835 subdivision (a) (creating a
dangerous condition) and subdivision (b) (failing to protect
against a known dangerous condition). (See ante, at pp. 15–17,
21–22.) Cameron reasoned that while design immunity shields
public entities from liability for having created a dangerous
condition (see § 835, subd. (a)), design immunity does not
necessarily shield such entities from having failed to warn
against dangerous condition of which it had notice. (See § 835,
subd. (b).)
35
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
11 Cal.4th at p. 288 [citing “age of the precedent” as factor in
evaluating stare decisis]; People v. Shea (1899) 125 Cal. 151,
153; see also Woollacott v. Meekin (1907) 151 Cal. 701, 705
[noting prior opinion was unanimous in applying stare decisis].)
While some decisions have suggested that design immunity
continues to preclude most forms of failure to warn claims, the
weight of authority has long understood Cameron to preserve
such claims. (See ante, at pp. 18–21; 9 Witkin, Cal. Proc. (6th
ed. 2023) Appeal, § 536 [“The long acceptance of a rule by the
courts, as where it is followed in other cases, . . . is a potent
argument in favor of allowing it to stand”].) Moreover, on the
record before us, there has been no showing that Cameron has
broadly impacted government liability for dangerous conditions
or gravely undermined design immunity. (Cf. Johnson v.
Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 875 [overruling
prior precedent that was shown to be “having a broad impact”].)
That is not particularly surprising given that, as discussed
above, Cameron leaves in place substantial barriers for parties
who seek to impose liability for failing to warn of an immunized
roadway design element. (See ante, at pp. 21–25.)
Finally, it bears emphasizing that Cameron involves a
question of statutory interpretation, which leaves the
Legislature free to abrogate the holding through amendment of
the Government Claims Act. (See Latimer, supra, 5 Cal.4th at
p. 1213 [“ ‘Considerations of stare decisis have special force in
the area of statutory interpretation, for here . . . Congress
remains free to alter what we have done’ ”]; Halliburton Co. v.
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (2014) 573 U.S. 258, 274.) The fact
that the Legislature has never elected to address Cameron is
particularly persuasive in light of legislative history showing
that it was directly asked to do so. As discussed above, that
36
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
history shows the Legislature previously chose to follow a
legislative committee’s recommendation to amend section 830.6
in response to Baldwin, supra, 6 Cal.3d 424, but it declined the
commission’s further recommendation to amend the statute to
abrogate Cameron. (See ante, at pp. 29–31.) While the City
correctly notes that “legislative inaction alone does not
necessarily imply legislative approval” (Latimer, at p. 1213), the
fact that Cameron was brought to the attention of the
Legislature, and the Legislature thereafter modified section
830.6 without addressing Cameron, further bolsters our decision
to follow the principles of stare decisis. (See 9 Witkin, Cal. Proc.
(6th ed. 2023) Appeal, § 537 [“Another justification frequently
advanced for following a precedent is that . . . the Legislature
has not seen fit to change it by statute. [¶] . . . [¶] Much
strength is added to this factor where it further appears that the
Legislature modified or reenacted a statute without changing
the provision as previously construed”].) If the Legislature
ultimately comes to agree with the City that design immunity
should likewise preclude all claims asserting that the public
entity failed to warn of dangers resulting from approved
elements of a roadway design, it can act accordingly.9
9
The Department of Transportation, acting as amicus
curiae for the City, notes that courts have interpreted other
statutory immunities that contain language similar to section
830.6 to preclude failure to warn claims. (See, e.g., Arroyo v.
State of California (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 755, 760 [language in
§ 831.2 that precludes liability for “an injury caused by a natural
condition of any unimproved public property” extends to claims
alleging failure to warn of a dangerous natural condition].)
Although we decline to overrule Cameron based on the principle
of stare decisis, we express no opinion whether its reasoning can
37
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
III. DISPOSITION
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is affirmed and the matter
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
GROBAN, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.
or should be extended to other statutory immunities set forth in
the Government Code that pertain to dangerous conditions
liability.
38
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes
__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 60 Cal.App.5th 423Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S267453
Date Filed: April 27, 2023
__________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Robert Broadbelt III
__________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Mardirossian & Associates; Mardirossian Akaragian, Garo
Mardirossian, Armen Akaragian, Adam Feit; The Linde Law Firm,
Douglas A. Linde, Erica A. Gonzales; Esner, Chang & Boyer, Holly N.
Boyer, Shea S. Murphy; Ehrlich Law Firm and Jeffrey I. Ehrlich for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Singleton Schreiber McKenzie & Scott and Benjamin I. Siminou for
Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Wesierski & Zurek, Frank J. D'Oro, David M. Ferrante-Alan; Pollak,
Vida & Barer, Daniel P. Barer and Anna L. Birenbaum for Defendant
and Respondent.
Hanson Bridgett, Alexandra V. Atencio, Adam W. Hofmann and David
C. Casarrubias for League of California Cities, California State
Association of Counties, California Special Districts Association,
California Association of Joint Powers Authorities and Independent
Cities Risk Management Authority as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Defendant and Respondent.
Erin E. Hollbrook, Alan M. Steinberg, Joann Georgallis, Judith A.
Carlson and Brandon S. Walker for California Department of
Transportation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and
Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Jeffrey I. Ehrlich
Ehrlich Law Firm
237 West Fourth Street, Second Floor
Claremont, CA 91711
(909) 625-5565
Daniel P. Barer
Pollak, Vida & Barer
11500 West Olympic Boulevard, Suite 400
Los Angeles, CA 90064
(310) 551-3400