Untitled California Attorney General Opinion ( 1987 )


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  •                     TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    State of California
    JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP
    Attorney General
    ------------------------------
    OPINION                :
    :
    of                  :
    :
    JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP         :        No. 86-105
    Attorney General           :
    :         MAY 19, 1987
    RODNEY O. LILYQUIST         :
    Deputy Attorney General       :
    ---------------------------------------------------------------
    THE HONORABLE MILTON MARKS, MEMBER, CALIFORNIA SENATE, has requested
    an opinion on the following question:
    Are medical facilities, including hospitals, clinics and physicians'
    offices, places where a blind person has a statutory right to be accompanied by
    a guide dog?
    CONCLUSION
    Medical facilities, including hospitals, clinics and physicians'
    offices, are places where a blind person has a statutory right to be accompanied
    by a guide dog to the extent of providing access equal to that of all or some
    members of the general public.
    ANALYSIS
    Civil Code section 54.2, subdivision (a), 1/        provides:
    "Every totally or partially blind person, or deaf person, or
    person whose hearing is impaired, or physically handicapped person,
    shall have the right to be accompanied by a guide dog, signal dog,
    or service dog, especially trained for the purpose, in any of the
    places specified in Section 54.1 without being required to pay an
    extra charge for the guide dog, signal dog, or service dog; provided
    that he shall be liable for any damage done to the premises or
    facilities by such dog."
    The "places specified in section          54.1"     cover   a   wide   range   of   public
    accommodations and facilities:
    "Blind persons, visually handicapped persons, deaf persons,
    and other physically disabled persons shall be entitled to full and
    equal access, as other members of the general public, to
    accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of all common
    carriers, airplanes, motor vehicles, railroad trains, motorbuses,
    streetcars, boats or any other public conveyances or modes of
    transportation, telephone facilities, hotels, lodging places, places
    1.   All references hereafter to the Civil Code are by section number
    only.
    of public accommodation, amusement or resort, and other places to
    which the general public is invited, subject only to the conditions
    and limitations established by law, or state or federal regulation,
    and applicable alike to all persons." (§ 54.1, subd. (a).)
    The question to be resolved is whether medical facilities, including
    hospitals, clinics and physicians' offices, come within the terms of section 54.1
    and thus are places where a blind person has a right under section 54.2 to be
    accompanied by a guide dog.
    The places referred to in subdivision (a) of section 54.1 may be
    categorized as follows: "All
    [1] common carriers, airplanes, motor vehicles, railroad trains,
    motorbuses, streetcars, boats, or other public conveyances or modes of
    transportation,
    [2] telephone facilities,
    [3] hotels, lodging places,
    [4] places of public accommodation, amusement, or resort,
    [5] and other places to which the general public is invited."
    To the extent that "other members of the general public" have access to these
    specified facilities, a blind person has a statutory right to be accompanied by
    a guide dog   so as to have "full and equal access."      Consistent with this
    provision is the limited exclusion in section 54.1 for areas restricted "alike
    to all persons."
    If medical facilities are to be included within the places specified
    in section 54.1, they must be either "places of public accommodation" or "places
    to which the general public is invited." Neither of these terms is defined for
    purposes of section 54.1. Both are somewhat ambiguous when standing alone.
    In interpreting the language of sections 54.1 and 54.2, we may rely
    upon several well-established principles of statutory construction.          The
    fundamental rule to be applied is to "ascertain the intent of the Legislature so
    as to effectuate the purpose of the law." (Select Base Materials v. Board of
    Equal. (1959) 
    51 Cal. 2d 640
    , 645.) Moreover, "every statute should be construed
    with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part, so that all may
    be harmonized and have effect." (Moore v. Panish (1982) 
    32 Cal. 3d 535
    , 541.)
    Statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be read together insofar as
    reasonably possible. (Fuentes v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 
    16 Cal. 3d 1
    ,
    6-7.)
    Sections 54.1 and 54.2 were enacted in 1968 (Stats. 1968. ch. 461,
    § 1) as part of a legislative scheme (now §§ 54-55.1) giving various rights to
    blind and other physically disabled persons. (See People ex rel. Deukmejian v.
    CHE, Inc. (1983) 
    158 Cal. App. 3d 123
    , 131-132;Marsh v. Edwards Theatres Circuit,
    Inc. (1976) 
    64 Cal. App. 3d 881
    , 886-887.) The basic statutory goal is to grant
    disabled persons "the same right as the able-bodied to the full and free use of
    . . . public places." (§ 54.)
    Along with sections 54-55.1, the Legislature has enacted statutory
    schemes giving handicapped persons access to and use of public buildings
    constructed with public funds (Gov. Code, §§ 4450-4458) and public buildings
    constructed with private funds (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 19955-19959). Also to be
    noted is the Unruh Civil Rights Act (§ 51), prohibiting all forms of arbitrary
    discrimination by a business establishment. These various legislative schemes
    have been construed together. (See People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE, Inc.,
    2.                               
    86-105 supra
    , 
    150 Cal. App. 3d 123
    , 131-135; Marsh v. Edwards Theatres Circuit, 
    Inc., supra
    , 
    64 Cal. App. 3d 881
    , 887-890; 58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 512, 513-515 (1975); see
    also Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 
    30 Cal. 3d 721
    , 731.) As stated in
    People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE, 
    Inc., supra
    , 
    150 Cal. App. 3d 123
    , 135:
    "The prohibition against discrimination of the handicapped
    within Civil Code section 54 et seq., the enactment of Government
    Code section 4450 et seq. and section 19955 et seq., . . . reflect
    a legislative sensitivity to the hardships suffered by those
    afflicted with a wide range of physical disabilities. They are part
    of an expanding legislative effort to attain 'the commendable goal
    of total integration of handicapped persons into the mainstream of
    society . . .' ( In re Marriage of 
    Carney, supra
    , 
    24 Cal. 3d 725
    ,
    740.)    The Legislature has declared '[i]t is the policy of this
    state to encourage and enable disabled persons to participate fully
    in the social and economic life of the state. . . .' (Gov. Code, §
    19230, subd.(a).)     These legislative responses are designed to
    lessen their entire burden, by guaranteeing equal and full access to
    public    buildings,   facilities,  and   accommodations,    without
    jeopardizing their safety."
    With respect to public buildings constructed with private funds, the
    Legislature has defined "public accommodations or facilities" as "a building,
    structure, facility, complex, or improved area which is used by the general
    public and shall include auditoriums, hospitals, theaters, restaurants, hotels,
    motels, stadiums, and convention centers."     (Health & Saf. Code, § 19955.)
    "Hospitals" is further defined in the same statute as "includ[ing], but is not
    limited to, hospitals, nursing homes, and convalescent homes." This statutory
    scheme also specifically covers "[a]ll . . . offices of physicians and surgeons
    . . . ." (Health & Saf. Code, § 19955.5.)
    In 65 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 72, 73-75 (1982), we examined the language
    of Health and Safety Code section 19955, pointing out that hospitals have the
    characteristic of "being public," being "generally available to the public," and
    "made continuously available to the general public and whose economic viability
    cannot survive without their being so available."
    In O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 
    33 Cal. 3d 790
    , 796,
    the Supreme Court observed that with respect to the Unruh Civil Rights Act,
    hospitals "are clearly business establishments, to the extent that they employ
    a vast array of persons, care for an extensive physical plant and charge
    substantial fees to those who use the facilities."
    We are not presented here, however, with whether a blind person has
    a statutory right of access to medical facilities -- that is acknowledged. The
    issue is whether such person, while in the facilities, has a statutory right to
    be accompanied by a guide dog.
    In Lyons v. Grether (Va. 1977) 
    239 S.E.2d 103
    , a blind
    person filed suit against a physician who refused to treat her (she had an
    appointment for the treatment of a specified infection) unless her guide dog was
    removed from the waiting room of his medical office. The Virginia statute was
    in all material respects identical to sections 54.1 and 54.2.         The court
    concluded:
    "We are persuaded by plaintiff's argument as applied to the
    facts alleged in this case. It fairly appears from the face of the
    motion for judgment that defendant's office was a place to which
    certain members of the public were invited by prior appointment to
    receive certain treatment at certain scheduled hours. . . .
    3.                                 86-105
    Accordingly, . . . we hold that, under the facts alleged here,
    defendant's office was within the intendment of the White Cane Act
    . . . ." (Id.)
    We believe that medical facilities, including hospitals, clinics and
    physician's offices, would normally be considered "places to which the general
    public is invited" if not also "places of public accommodation." 2/ As we have
    previously concluded and has been recognized by the courts, medical facilities
    may generally be characterized as business establishments dependent upon members
    of the public for their economic viability. The critical issue is whether all
    or some members of the general public are invited to the facility for business,
    professional, or other services. Another way of stating the issue is whether all
    members of the general public are invited under all or some conditions. (See In
    re Lundgren (1987) 
    189 Cal. App. 3d 381
    , 388.)
    For purposes of sections 54.1 and 54.2, it is irrelevant that some
    groups of the general public are excluded from the facility. A claim that the
    facility is unavailable to healthy persons would not, for example, render the
    statutory scheme inapplicable. Similarly, the facility would not be exempt if
    the invitation were extended only to those members of the general public who have
    a particular disease or were referred to the facility by another physician. (See
    Club Ramon, Inc. v. United States (4th Cir. 1961) 
    296 F.2d 837
    , 840; Lerner v.
    Schectman (D.Minn. 1964) 
    228 F. Supp. 354
    , 355-358; Lerner v. Club Wander In, Inc.
    (D.Mass. 1959) 
    174 F. Supp. 731
    , 732-733; 65 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 106, 109-1l0
    (1982).)
    In sum, medical facilities are normally made available to all or some
    members of the general public for business and professional services. For these
    reasons an able-bodied person may enter the facilities; under sections 54.1 and
    54.2, a blind person may be accompanied by a guide dog within the facilities for
    the same purposes. The legislation was intended to grant equality of right, and
    we so construe it. 3/
    Not all parts of a medical facility, however, may be open to the
    general public. (See People v. Brown (1979) 
    88 Cal. App. 3d 283
    , 290; People v.
    Schad (1971) 
    21 Cal. App. 3d 201
    , 209; People v. Kemick (1971) 
    17 Cal. App. 3d 419
    ,
    421-422.) In Perino v. St. Vincent's Medical Center (Sup.Ct. 1986) 
    502 N.Y.S.2d 921
    , a New York trial court considered whether a blind person accompanied by a
    guide dog could be denied access to a hospital delivery room when his wife gave
    birth to their child. The New York statute was similar to sections 54.1 and
    54.2, except that it apparently did not provide for "conditions and limitations
    established by law, or state or federal regulation, and applicable alike to all
    persons." The court concluded:
    "A delivery room of a hospital, as well as the labor room and
    maternity ward, are not places to which the general public is
    normally invited or permitted, as those places are commonly
    perceived. Normally, they are restricted to the expectant mother
    2. While the term "places of public accommodation" has been found
    applicable in a variety of contexts (see Roberts v. United States Jaycees
    (1984) 
    468 U.S. 609
    , 615; United States v. Medical Society of South Carolina
    (D. S.C. 1969) 
    298 F. Supp. 145
    , 152; Vidrich v. Vic Tanny Intern., Inc.
    (1980) 102 Mich.App.230 [
    301 N.W.2d 482
    , 484]; 65 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 
    72, supra
    , 72-73), "other places to which the general public is invited" would
    seemingly have an even broader meaning.
    3. As previously mentioned, hospitals, clinics, and physicians' offices
    must be built so as to be accessible to handicapped persons (Health & Saf.
    Code, §§ 19955, 19955.5); we do not believe that the Legislature intended for
    something less "equal" with respect to blind persons with guide dogs.
    4.                                 86-105
    and father and the attending physicians and nurses. They are not
    considered public places, not only because social custom and
    practice do not accept them as such, but also because reasonable
    health measures dictate that they not be open to the public.
    Ordinarily, labor, delivery, and nursery units of hospitals are
    closed units, and the hospital may set appropriate restrictions
    governing entry into these units. (10 N.Y.C.R.R. § 405.8(A)(4).)
    It cannot be [said] that the general public is normally or
    customarily invited or permitted to be present at or to view the
    delivery of a child at a hospital, surgery, or the like." (Id., at
    p. 922.)
    Whether a blind person may be accompanied by a guide dog in a particular area of
    a medical facility would depend upon the individual circumstances.
    Finally, we note the language of section 54.1 allowing restrictions
    on access and use of public places where "established by law, or state or federal
    regulation, and applicable alike to all persons."        The only reported case
    discussing this limited exclusion is Marsh v. Edwards Theatres Circuit, 
    Inc., supra
    , 
    64 Cal. App. 3d 881
    , 890-891, in which the Court of Appeal concluded that
    local fire regulations applicable to all persons could form the basis for
    excluding access to and use of public places by handicapped persons.
    The Marsh court relied upon cases interpreting the Unruh Civil Rights
    Act in reaching its conclusion. This legislative enactment is broadly worded but
    allows the exclusion or denial of services where "conditioned or limited by law
    or which is applicable alike to persons of every sex, color, race, religion,
    ancestry, or national origin." Courts have upheld exclusions from this statutory
    scheme where the particular person's conduct was objectionable (see Koire v.
    Metro Car Wash (1985) 
    40 Cal. 3d 24
    , 30-32; O'Connor v. Village Green Owners
    
    Assn., supra
    , 
    30 Cal. 3d 721
    , 741; In re Cox (1970) 
    3 Cal. 3d 205
    , 217) and in
    unique situations involving peculiar types of facilities or services (see Koire
    v. Metro Car 
    Wash, supra
    , 
    40 Cal. 3d 24
    , 31 [suggesting that a child may be
    excluded from an adult bookstore]; Wynn v. Monterey Club (1980) 
    111 Cal. App. 3d 789
    , 796-798 [compulsive gambler denied entrance to a gambling club]). Each
    situation must be examined individually to determine the applicability of this
    limited exception.
    In answer to the question presented, therefore, we conclude that
    medical facilities, including hospitals, clinics and physicians' offices, are
    places where a blind person has a statutory right to be accompanied by a guide
    dog to the extent of providing access equal to that of all or some members of the
    general public.
    * * * * *
    5.                                  86-105