Untitled California Attorney General Opinion ( 1988 )


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  •                        TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    State of California
    JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP
    Attorney General
    ------------------------------
    OPINION                      :
    :
    of                      :
    :
    JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP                   :       No. 88-501
    Attorney General                  :
    :       DECEMBER 7, 1988
    RODNEY O. LILYQUIST                   :
    Deputy Attorney General                :
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    THE HONORABLE MICHAEL H. KRAUSNICK, COUNTY COUNSEL,
    STANISLAUS COUNTY, has requested an opinion on the following questions with respect to a city
    annexation proceeding:
    1. Are the city and the county required to reach an agreement for the transfer of
    property tax revenues?
    2. Is a property tax transfer agreement void if it is reached by the city and the county
    after expiration of the 30-day negotiation period?
    3. Is a certificate of filing void that is issued with respect to a petition presented more
    than 60 days after the last signature was affixed?
    CONCLUSIONS
    1. In a city annexation proceeding, the city and the county are not required to reach
    an agreement for the transfer of property tax revenues.
    2. In a city annexation proceeding, a property tax transfer agreement is void if
    reached by the city and the county after expiration of the 30-day negotiation period.
    3. In a city annexation proceeding, a certificate of filing is void that is issued with
    respect to a petition presented more than 60 days after the last signature was affixed.
    ANALYSIS
    The Legislature has recently enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme known as the
    Cortese-Knox Local Government Reorganization Act of 1985 (Gov. Code, §§ 56000-57550; "Act"),1
    which consolidates and simplifies the procedures to be followed by cities, counties, and special
    districts in changing their boundaries.
    The three questions presented for resolution concern a proposed annexation of
    territory by a city. Such proceedings may be initiated by the filing of a petition signed by the
    requisite number of persons in the area or by the filing of a resolution of the city council proposing
    the annexation. The petition or resolution is part of an application submitted to the local agency
    formation commission ("LAFCO") established in the county. (§§ 56650-56653, 56700, 56800,
    56828.) When the application is filed with LAFCO it is referred to the county assessor and auditor
    who provide estimates of the property tax changes the annexation would cause. The city and county
    have 30 days from receipt of these estimates to negotiate the actual change in property taxes which
    will result from the annexation. Once these changes are negotiated LAFCO holds a public hearing
    and either approves or disapproves the proposal. (§§ 56828, 56840, 56851.)
    If LAFCO approves the proposal, the city council commences its proceedings, holds
    a public hearing, and either approves or disapproves the proposal. (§§ 57000, 57002, 57050, 57075,
    57080.) If the city council gives its approval, the voters of the area are given an opportunity, with
    certain exceptions, to vote on the proposal. (§§ 56112, 56375, 57100.) If the voters approve,
    LAFCO files a certificate of completion, establishing the effective date of the annexation. (§§
    57200-57203.)
    1. Negotiating a Property Tax Transfer
    Property tax revenues received by cities, counties, and special districts are subject
    to and controlled by an allocation formula devised by the Legislature. (See Rev. & Tax. Code, §§
    93-100; Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 
    22 Cal. 3d 208
    , 218; American Canyon Fire Protection Dist. v. County of Napa (1983) 
    141 Cal. App. 3d 100
    ,
    105-106; 70 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 87, 88 (1987).) When a city annexes unincorporated territory, a
    portion of the property taxes generated by the area is shifted under the statutory formula to reflect
    the change in jurisdiction from the county to the city. Since the county will continue to provide
    various services to the newly incorporated area, it will continue to receive some of the property taxes
    collected from the area. How much of the revenue is to be transferred is subject to negotiation and
    agreement between the city and the county. Revenue and Taxation Code section 99, subdivision (b)
    states in part:
    "Upon the filing of an application or resolution pursuant to . . . the [Cortese-
    Knox Local Government] District Reorganization Act of 1965 . . . , but prior to the
    1
    All references hereafter to the Government Code are by section number only.
    2.                                            88-501
    issuance of a certificate of filing, the executive officer shall give notice of such filing
    to the assessor and auditor of each county within which the territory subject to the
    jurisdictional change is located. Such notice shall specify each local agency whose
    service area or responsibility will be altered by the jurisdictional change.
    "(1) (A) The county assessor shall provide to the county auditor, within 30
    days of the notice of filing, a report which identifies the assessed valuations for the
    territory subject to the jurisdictional change and the tax rate area or areas in which
    the territory exists.
    "(B) The auditor shall estimate the amount of property tax revenue generated
    within the territory which is the subject of the jurisdictional change during the
    current fiscal year.
    "(2) The auditor shall estimate what proportion of the property tax revenue
    determined pursuant to paragraph (1) is attributable to each local agency pursuant to
    Section 96 or 97, and Section 98, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 98.6.
    "(3) Within 45 days of notice of the filing of an application or resolution, the
    auditor shall notify the governing body of each local agency whose service area or
    service responsibility will be altered by the amount of, and allocation factors with
    respect to, property tax revenue estimated pursuant to paragraph (2) which is subject
    to a negotiated exchange.
    "(4) Upon receipt of the estimates pursuant to paragraph (3) the local
    agencies shall commence negotiations to determine the amount of property tax
    revenues to be exchanged between and among such local agencies. Such negotiation
    period shall not exceed 30 days.
    "Such exchange may be limited to an exchange of property tax revenues from
    the annual tax increment generated in the area subject to the jurisdictional change
    and attributable to the local agencies whose service area or service responsibilities
    will be altered by the proposed jurisdictional change. The final exchange resolution
    shall specify how the annual tax increment shall be allocated in future years.
    "(5) In the event that a jurisdictional change would affect the service area or
    service responsibility of one or more special districts, the board of supervisors of the
    county or counties in which the districts are located shall, on behalf of the district or
    districts, negotiate any exchange of property tax revenues.
    "(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the executive officer shall
    not issue a certificate of filing pursuant to Sections 35152, 54791, or 56198 of the
    Government Code until such local agencies included in the property tax revenue
    exchange negotiation, within the 30-day negotiation period, present resolutions
    3.                                                88-501
    adopted by each such county and city whereby each such county and city agrees to
    accept the exchange of property tax revenues.
    "(7) In the event that the commission modifies the proposal or its resolution
    of determination, any local agency whose service area or service responsibility
    would be altered by the proposed jurisdictional change may request, and the
    executive officer shall grant, 15 days for the affected agencies, pursuant to paragraph
    (4) to renegotiate an exchange of property tax revenues. Notwithstanding the time
    period specified in paragraph (4), if the resolutions required pursuant to paragraph
    (6) are not presented to the executive officer within the 15-day period, all
    proceedings of the jurisdictional change shall automatically be terminated."
    (Emphases added.)2
    The first question focuses on the obligation of a city and a county to negotiate a
    property tax transfer agreement in a city annexation proceeding. Are they required to reach an
    agreement? We conclude that they are not so required.
    Revenue and Taxation Code section 99, subdivision (b)(4) states that the city and
    county "shall commence negotiations to determine the amount of property tax revenues to be
    exchanged . . . ." Use of the term "shall" indicates that the two local governments have a mandatory
    duty to negotiate. (See Rev. & Tax. Code, § 16; West v. State of California (1986) 
    181 Cal. App. 3d 753
    , 760; State of California v. Superior Court (1984) 
    150 Cal. App. 3d 848
    , 855; Camp v. Board of
    Supervisors (1981) 
    123 Cal. App. 3d 334
    , 348.)
    The Legislature did not, however, use the phrase: "shall reach an agreement
    concerning the amount of property tax revenues to be exchanged . . . ." Rather, it used the term
    "negotiations." The duty to negotiate does not include the duty to agree. (See Carl Joseph Maggio,
    Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1984) 
    154 Cal. App. 3d 40
    , 58-59; Placentia Fire Fighters
    v. City of Placentia (1976) 
    57 Cal. App. 3d 9
    , 25-26; Los Angeles County Employees Assn. v. County
    of Los Angeles (1973) 
    33 Cal. App. 3d 1
    , 7; N.L.R.B. v. Tomco Communications, Inc. (9th Cir. 1978)
    
    567 F.2d 871
    , 881; N.L.R.B. v. Herman Sausage Co. (5th Cir. 1960) 
    275 F.2d 229
    , 231-232.)
    2
    While Revenue and Taxation Code section 99 refers to "Sections 35152, 54791, or 56198 of
    the Government Code," we note that the referenced statutes have been repealed and incorporated
    into the Act as section 56828. We substitute section 56828 for the referenced statutes under the
    applicable rule of statutory construction. (See § 9604; People v. Richerson (1985) 
    169 Cal. App. 3d 1006
    , 1008-1009; People v. Oliver (1985) 
    168 Cal. App. 3d 920
    , 926.)
    The reference to "certificate of filing" in the statute concerns a document issued by LAFCO
    with respect to the initial application proposing the jurisdictional change. No hearing is held by
    LAFCO until the certificate is issued. (§ 56828.)
    4.                                              88-501
    Indeed, when the Legislature amended Revenue and Taxation Code section 99 in
    1980, it rejected a proposal to force an agreement upon cities and counties. The report of the
    Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee (April 14, 1980) stated in part:
    "One of the problems with the transfer of property tax revenue due to
    jurisdictional [change] through negotiations is that, in many cases, there have been
    protracted struggles among the participants and no agreements. Therefore, many
    worthwhile jurisdictional changes are being held up. This bill does not address this
    impasse issue."
    "Perhaps the committee may wish to consider some type of arbitration where
    the last best offer of each party is submitted to a neutral, unbiased third party, who
    must choose one or the other of the offers."
    While the Legislature ultimately amended the statute to include a "neutral, unbiased third party"
    arbitration procedure, it did so only for school districts negotiating property tax transfers (see Stats.
    1980, ch. 801, § 11) and not for transfers between cities and counties. The difference in the
    language of the statutory provisions with respect to similar situations demonstrates different
    legislative purposes. (See Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court (1988) 
    45 Cal. 3d 491
    ,
    507; Safer v. Superior Court (1975) 
    15 Cal. 3d 230
    , 237-238; City of Hueneme v. City of Oxnard
    (1959) 
    52 Cal. 2d 285
    , 295; Santa Fe Transp. v. State Board of Equal. (1959) 
    51 Cal. 2d 531
    , 538-
    539.)
    In answer to the first question, therefore, we conclude that a city and a county are not
    required to reach a property tax transfer agreement in a city annexation proceeding.
    2. 30-day Negotiation Period
    The city and county are given 30 days in which to negotiate a property tax transfer
    agreement. The second question posed is whether this statutory time limitation has the effect of
    prohibiting a city and a county from reaching an agreement after the 30-day period has expired. We
    conclude that if agreement is not reached within the thirty day negotiation period the annexation
    fails and that an agreement reached after the 30-day period would be void.
    Revenue and Taxation Code section 99, subdivision (b)(4) provides in part: "Such
    negotiation period shall not exceed 30 days." Subdivision (b)(6) of the same statute additionally
    provides: ". . . the executive officer shall not issue a certificate of filing . . . until such local agencies
    . . . within the 30-day negotiation period . . . agree[] to accept the exchange of property tax
    revenues."
    When the language in question was added to the statute in 1980 (Stats. 1980, ch. 801,
    § 11), the purpose of the amendment was stated in the report of the Assembly Revenue and Taxation
    Committee (April 14, 1980) as follows:
    5.                                              88-501
    "Under present law, negotiations can drag on indefinitely. There is some
    feeling that such negotiations should be done timely, so all parties can know where
    they stand."
    Use of the term "shall" again demonstrates a mandatory duty on the part of the city,
    county, and LAFCO to follow the statutory limitation. (See Rev. & Tax Code, § 16; West v. State
    of 
    California, supra
    , 
    181 Cal. App. 3d 753
    , 760; State of California v. Superior 
    Court, supra
    , 
    150 Cal. App. 3d 848
    , 855; Camp v. Board of 
    Supervisors, supra
    , 
    123 Cal. App. 3d 334
    , 348.) It is a
    mandatory duty rather than a permissive or discretionary one.
    It does not necessarily follow, however, that the expiration of the 30-day period
    removes the power and jurisdiction of a city and a county to further negotiate and reach an
    agreement. Whether an agreement reached subsequent to the 30th day is valid and lawful or illegal
    and void depends upon the intent of the Legislature in fixing the particular time limitation.
    For example, a failure to comply with a mandatory duty did not bar further action in
    Edwards v. Steele (1979) 
    25 Cal. 3d 406
    , 409-413 [administrative decision valid although hearing
    held and decision rendered after deadlines specified in city charter], City and County of San
    Francisco v. Cooper (1975) 
    13 Cal. 3d 898
    , 931 [wage resolution valid though enacted prior to the
    date designated in city charter], Garrison v. Rourke (1948) 
    32 Cal. 2d 430
    , 434-436 [judicial decision
    valid though rendered after statutorily prescribed period], Cake v. City of Los Angeles (1913) 
    164 Cal. 705
    , 709-710 [tax assessment valid although not adopted within time limit prescribed by
    statute], People v. Curtis (1986) 
    177 Cal. App. 3d 982
    , 987-989 [judicial order valid although hearing
    held after statutory deadline] and Castorena v. City of Los Angeles (1973) 
    34 Cal. App. 3d 901
    , 908
    [reapportionment ordinance valid though enacted subsequent to charter designated deadline].
    As indicated by the above cases, the expiration of various statutory time limitations
    has not been found to invalidate subsequent governmental action. In Edwards v. 
    Steele, supra
    , 
    25 Cal. 3d 406
    , 410, the Supreme Court declared:
    "We have held that, generally, requirements relating to the time within which
    an act must be done are directory rather than mandatory or jurisdictional, unless a
    contrary intent is clearly expressed. (See, e.g., Garrison v. Rourke (1948) 
    32 Cal. 2d 258
    , 262, Francis v. Superior Court (1935) 
    3 Cal. 2d 19
    , 27; see also Radovich v.
    Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1977) 
    72 Cal. App. 3d 36
    , 47; Anderson v.
    Pittenger (1961) 
    197 Cal. App. 2d 188
    , 194; cf. City and County of San Francisco v.
    Cooper (1975) 
    13 Cal. 3d 898
    , 931.) In ascertaining probable intent, California
    courts have expressed a variety of tests. In some cases focus has been directed at the
    likely consequences of holding a particular time limitation mandatory, in an attempt
    to ascertain whether those consequences would defeat or promote the purpose of the
    enactment. 
    (Morris, supra
    , at pp. 909-910; 
    Pulcifer, supra
    , at p. 262; 
    Francis, supra
    ,
    at pp. 28-29.) Other cases have suggested that a time limitation is deemed merely
    directory 'unless a consequence or penalty is provided for failure to do the act within
    the time commanded.' 
    (Garrison, supra
    , at pp. 435-436; see McDonald's Systems of
    6.                                              88-501
    California, Inc. v. Board of Permit Appeals (1975) 
    44 Cal. App. 3d 525
    , 544-545, fn.
    15, and cases cited.)"
    Edwards was followed in People v. 
    Curtis, supra
    , 
    177 Cal. App. 3d 982
    , 988, where
    the court focused "on the likely consequences of holding a particular time limitation mandatory, in
    an attempt to ascertain whether those consequences would defeat or promote the purpose of the
    enactment." The Curtis court also relied on language in French v. Edwards (1872) 80 U.S. (13
    Wall.) 506, 511 [
    20 L. Ed. 702
    , 703], quoted with approval in People v. McGee (1977) 
    19 Cal. 3d 948
    , 961. In French v. Edwards, Justice Fields stated:
    "There are, undoubtedly, many statutory requisitions intended for the guide
    of officers in the conduct of business devolved upon them, which do not limit their
    power or render its exercise in disregard of the requisitions ineffectual. Such,
    generally, are regulations designed to secure order, system and dispatch in
    proceedings, and by a disregard to which the rights of parties interested cannot be
    injuriously affected. Provisions of this character are not usually regarded as
    mandatory unless accompanied by negative words importing that the acts required
    shall not be done in any other manner or time than that designated." (80 U.S. at p.
    511.)
    On the other hand, in Palmer v. City of Ojai (1986) 
    178 Cal. App. 3d 280
    , the court
    concluded that the particular time limitation at issue was intended by the Legislature to be
    jurisdictional and to void all further proceedings. The court stated:
    "We are aware that our Supreme Court has stated, in Edwards v. Steele
    (1979) 
    25 Cal. 3d 406
    , 410, that time limitations in and of themselves are normally
    viewed as 'directory' rather than 'mandatory.' (See also 2A Sutherland, Statutory
    
    Construction, supra
    , Mandatory and Directory Construction, § 57.19, p. 682.) Two
    factors may, however, persuade to the contrary: (1) Where 'time is of the essence' in
    the legislation and (2) where the penalty for noncompliance, i.e., the consequences,
    has been specified in the legislation itself. The legislative materials all support the
    view that the intent of the Legislature was to place reasonable but firm time
    limitations on the deliberations of public agencies concerning land use decisions.
    The penalty was specified." (Id., at p. 293, fn. omitted.)
    We believe that the 30-day statutory period set by the Legislature for negotiating a
    property tax transfer agreement was intended to limit the power of a city, a county, and LAFCO to
    further act in the proceedings. The legislative history discloses that its purpose was to prevent the
    negotiations from "drag[ging] on indefinitely . . . so all parties can know where they stand." A
    contrary conclusion would thwart this singular purpose of the Legislature.
    Moreover, we find the same legislative intent of providing certainty for public
    agencies in both subdivisions (b)(4) and (b)(7) of the statute, with the latter unmistakably specifying
    that "all proceedings of the jurisdictional change shall automatically be terminated" at the end of the
    7.                                             88-501
    limitations period. No meaningful distinction may be drawn between the two provisions with
    respect to the consequences of a failure to reach an agreement in a timely manner. "A statute must
    be construed 'in the context of the entire statutory system of which it is a part, in order to achieve
    harmony among the parts.'" (People v. Woodhead (1987) 
    43 Cal. 3d 1002
    , 1009.)
    As in Palmer v. City of 
    Ojai, supra
    , 
    178 Cal. App. 3d 280
    , 293, we find that "[t]he
    legislative materials all support the view that the intent of the Legislature was to place reasonable
    but firm time limitations" upon the negotiations for the exchange of property tax revenues in a city
    annexation proceeding.
    Under the statutory directive of Revenue and Taxation Code section 99, subdivision
    (b)(4), a city and a county have an obligation to terminate their negotiations by the end of the 30-day
    period. If they continue to negotiate and reach an agreement, noncompliance with the time
    limitation will invalidate the agreement subsequently reached. The power and jurisdiction of the
    city, county, and LAFCO are removed by the limitation; the agreement and the certificate of filing
    issued by LAFCO would be unlawful. By so construing the statutory provision, we effectuate the
    Legislature's intent to prevent the negotiations from "dragging on indefinitely" so that "all parties
    can know where they stand."
    In answer to the second question, therefore, we conclude that a property tax transfer
    agreement is void if reached by a city and a county after expiration of the 30-day negotiation period
    in a city annexation proceeding.
    3. 60-Day Petition Period
    One of the requirements for submitting a petition to LAFCO proposing the
    annexation of territory by a city is that it be presented "within 60 days after the last signature is
    affixed." Subdivision (a) of section 56705 states:
    "Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b), no petition shall be
    accepted for filing unless the signatures on the petition are secured within six months
    of the date on which the first signature on the petition was affixed and the petition
    is submitted to the executive officer for filing within 60 days after the last signature
    is affixed. If the elapsed time between the date on which the last signature is affixed
    and the date on which the petition is submitted for filing is more than 60 days, the
    executive officer shall file the petition in accordance with Section 56709."3
    3
    Subdivision (b) of section 56705 applies to certain large cities; it contains the same language
    as set forth in subdivision (a) with respect to petitions submitted for filing more than 60 days
    from the date of the last signature.
    Sections 56750-56762 govern the signature requirements for petitions, with section 56753
    specifically governing a proposed annexation of territory to a city.
    8.                                              88-501
    Section 56709 in turn provides:
    "If the petition, including any supplemental petition, is certified to be
    insufficient, it shall be filed with the executive officer as a public record, without
    prejudice to the filing of a new petition. The executive officer shall give mailed
    notice to the chief petitioners, if any, stating that the petition has been found to be
    insufficient."
    The third question posed is whether a certificate of filing would be void that is issued
    with respect to a petition presented more than 60 days after the last signature was affixed. We
    conclude that it would be void.
    Sections 56705 and 56709 prescribe a mandatory duty, not a permissive or
    discretionary one, for the petitioners to submit their petition to LAFCO within the 60-day period.
    (See §§ 5, 14; West v. State of 
    California, supra
    , 
    181 Cal. App. 3d 753
    , 760; State of California v.
    Superior 
    Court, supra
    , 
    123 Cal. App. 3d 334
    , 348.) While the various references to "filing" in the two
    statutes may appear to be confusing, reading sections 56705 and 56709 together and in the context
    of the Act as a whole discloses that if a petition is submitted after the 60-day period, LAFCO has
    a mandatory duty to (1) certify the petition as insufficient, (2) mail notice to the petitioners that the
    petition has been found to be insufficient, (3) treat the petition as not initiating the proceedings, and
    (4) retain the petition as a public record available for public inspection but having no other
    significance. In so interpreting sections 56705 and 56709, we apply the rule that "every statute
    should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part, so that all may
    be harmonized and have effect." (Moore v. Panish (1982) 
    32 Cal. 3d 535
    , 541; see People v.
    
    Woodhead, supra
    , 
    43 Cal. 3d 1002
    , 1009; People v. Craft (1986) 
    41 Cal. 3d 554
    , 560.)
    Nevertheless, as previously discussed, noncompliance with a statutory time limitation
    does not necessarily invalidate all subsequent governmental actions. Similar to the duty at issue in
    the second question, we find here that noncompliance with the 60-day statutory limitation removes
    the power and jurisdiction of LAFCO to initiate the proceedings.
    Of persuasive significance is the language in Palmer v. City of 
    Ojai, supra
    , 
    178 Cal. App. 3d 280
    , 293, that the Legislature intended a time limitation to be jurisdictional "where the
    penalty for noncompliance, i.e., the consequences, has been specified in the legislation itself." As
    in Palmer, section 56705 specifies a "consequence" for the failure to submit a petition within 60 days
    of the last signature. The petition is to be certified as insufficient for purposes of initiating the
    proceedings but kept as a public record. No prejudice, however, is to attach to the filing of a new
    petition as a result of the prior insufficiency.
    We believe that these express consequences contained in sections 56705 and 56709
    demonstrate a mandatory legislative intent with respect to the effect of the time limitation upon
    subsequent governmental actions. By reference to the filing of a new petition, the Legislature has
    indicated the jurisdictional nature of a failure to meet the statutory deadline. (See Edwards v. 
    Steele, supra
    , 
    25 Cal. 3d 406
    , 410.)
    9.                                             88-501
    Treating the time limitation as jurisdictional promotes the legislative purpose of
    protecting the public from "stale" petitions and requires the initiation of proceedings based solely
    upon the signatures of those currently residing in the area. (See Morris v. County of Marin (1977)
    
    18 Cal. 3d 901
    , 909-910.) Because a new petition may be filed without any prejudice attaching, the
    rights of interested parties are appropriately safeguarded. (See People v. 
    McGee, supra
    , 
    19 Cal. 3d 948
    , 962-963.)
    Finally, we examine the language of section 56106, which states:
    "Any provisions in this division governing the time within which an official,
    a conducting authority, or the commission is to act shall in all instances, except for
    notice requirements, be deemed directory, rather than mandatory."
    This statutory directive is inapplicable with respect to the time limitation of section 56705 since the
    latter limits petitioners (persons attempting to initiate the proceedings) rather than "an official, a
    conducting authority, or the commission." (See §§ 56022, 56068, 56079, 56700.)4 Such
    construction of section 56106 harmonizes its language with the provisions of sections 56705 and
    56709 that clearly demonstrate the jurisdictional effect of the 60-day time limitation specified
    therein. Statutory provisions are to be harmonized whenever possible. (People v. 
    Woodhead, supra
    ,
    
    43 Cal. 3d 1002
    , 1009; People v. 
    Craft, supra
    , 
    41 Cal. 3d 554
    , 560; Moore v. 
    Panish, supra
    , 
    32 Cal. 3d 535
    , 541.)
    Accordingly LAFCO is without power and jurisdiction to accept a petition submitted
    to it more than 60 days after the last signature has been affixed. If LAFCO were to issue a certificate
    of filing and treat the petition as sufficient for purposes of initiating the proceedings even though
    received after the expiration of the 60-day period, the certificate would be unlawful and without
    effect.
    In answer to the third question, therefore, we conclude that a certificate of filing is
    void that is issued with respect to a petition presented more than 60 days after the last signature was
    affixed.
    *****
    4
    It may also be observed that courts have not always followed legislative declarations
    concerning the effect of a particular time limitation. (See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc.
    Com. (1964) 
    231 Cal. App. 2d 501
    , 509-510.)
    10.                                           88-501