People v. Vasquez CA2/8 ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 5/25/22 P. v. Vasquez CA2/8
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION EIGHT
    THE PEOPLE,                                                     B313809
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. GA061406)
    v.
    ALVARO ALEXIS VASQUEZ
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County. Michael D. Carter, Judge. Affirmed.
    U.S. Law Center and Sanjay Sobti for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
    Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis and Stephanie A. Miyoshi,
    Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    _________________________
    INTRODUCTION
    In 2019, appellant Alvaro Alexis Vasquez filed a motion to
    vacate his 2005 conviction for robbery, as he was currently facing
    deportation proceedings due to the conviction. He claimed he did
    not understand the adverse immigration consequences of
    pleading no contest in 2005 because he was not a “fluent English
    speaker” and did not have a Spanish interpreter present at the
    hearings. The trial court denied the motion without prejudice.
    In 2020, appellant filed his second motion to vacate the
    2005 conviction. He claimed to have new evidence in support of
    his motion. After argument, the trial court found appellant’s new
    evidence was insufficient, and denied the second motion with
    prejudice. Appellant appeals from the order denying his second
    motion.
    We find appellant’s arguments unavailing and affirm the
    trial court’s order.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    I.    2005 Conviction for Robbery
    Appellant was born in El Salvador. In 1997, he moved to
    the United States when he was 11 years old. On May 18, 2004,
    appellant, then 18 years old, acquired his status as a legal
    permanent resident in the United States.
    One year later, on May 19, 2005, the People filed a felony
    complaint against appellant, charging him with the crime of
    second degree robbery for “unlawfully, and by means of force and
    fear” taking personal property from victim Kim Gyu, in violation
    of Penal Code1 section 211. The complaint also alleged, under
    1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2
    section 12022, subdivision (d), that a principal (not appellant)
    was armed with a firearm during the commission of the robbery,
    and that appellant knew the principal was armed.2
    Four hearings occurred in this criminal case—on
    September 30, 2005, October 11, 2005, October 13, 2005, and
    October 26, 2005. We were not provided a copy of the reporter’s
    transcript of these four proceedings.3 We glean the following
    from the minute orders of those proceedings.
    On September 30, 2005, appellant “state[d] [his] true name
    as charged.” Appellant was represented by public defender
    Stephan Boysaw. Appellant was “advised of the following rights
    orally” including: “If you are not a citizen, you are hereby
    advised that a conviction of the offense for which you have been
    charged will have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from
    admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization
    pursuant to the laws of the United States.” The September 30,
    2005 minute order does not state an interpreter was present at
    the hearing.
    At the early disposition hearing held October 11, 2005,
    appellant was present with court-appointed public defender
    2     On March 27, 2005, appellant and co-companion “pointed a
    handgun at victim inside a parking structure” and “fled with
    victim’s money, CDL and wristwatch.”
    3     The record provides that the court reporter listed for the
    hearing held October 26, 2005 has “retired from the Los Angeles
    Superior Court and is no longer preparing transcripts.” Per
    Government Code section 69955, subdivision (e), “court reporters’
    notes may be destroyed upon the order of the court after 10 years
    from the taking of the notes in criminal proceedings.”
    3
    Steven E. Kaplan (Kaplan). The minute order does not state an
    interpreter was present.
    At the preliminary hearing held October 13, 2005,
    appellant was present in court with counsel Kaplan; no
    interpreter was identified as present in court. It is noted
    appellant “is to retain private counsel to be present on the next
    court date.”
    On October 26, 2005, appellant was present in court along
    with his appointed counsel Kaplan; once again, an interpreter
    was not listed in the minute order as among those present at the
    hearing. Appellant was advised of the effects of a no contest plea.
    He was further advised: “If you are not a citizen, you are hereby
    advised that a conviction of the offense for which you have been
    charged will have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from
    admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization
    pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Appellant was
    advised of and “personally and explicitly” waived his right to a
    jury trial; his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; his
    right to subpoena witnesses into court to testify; his right against
    self-incrimination. The court found each such waiver knowingly,
    understandingly, and explicitly made. Appellant pled no contest.
    “Counsel and [appellant] stipulate[d] to the use of the early
    disposition report for purposes of sentencing.” The early
    disposition probation officer’s report and criminal history
    assessment included information from appellant’s girlfriend of
    three years, Jasmine Chimil.4 She reported appellant had lived
    in Los Angeles County for eight years. He currently lived with
    4     It is specifically noted that Jasmine Chimil provided this
    information in “Lang: English.”
    4
    his mother and cousin. His father resided in El Salvador. Chimil
    also reported appellant worked as a “full-time stocker” at a
    Staples store in Los Angeles for the last 14 months. Appellant
    “completed his G.E.D.”; before that, he was a “full-time high
    school student.”
    The court found appellant guilty, sentenced him to
    365 days in county jail, placed him on three years’ formal
    probation, and ordered him to pay restitution.
    In a later probation report dated June 18, 2008, appellant
    told his probation officer he was “working full time at Westlake
    Company as a title specialist for the past [two] years.”
    II.    Appellant’s Petition for Dismissal
    Twelve years after his conviction, on December 26, 2017,
    appellant filed a petition for dismissal pursuant to section 1203.4,
    requesting he be permitted to withdraw his 2005 plea, the finding
    of guilt be set aside, and a plea of not guilty be entered and the
    action dismissed. The petition alleged he had fulfilled the
    conditions of probation for the entire period.
    On January 24, 2018, the court denied the petition without
    prejudice. The court found appellant “had paid only
    approximately $1000 of the $2307.50 owed” to the victim Kim
    Gyu, even though appellant “was employed and had the ability to
    pay restitution” in full.
    III.   Deportation / Removal Proceedings
    On July 14, 2019, U.S. Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement (ICE) officers took appellant into custody and
    initiated removal proceedings. Appellant was deemed deportable
    under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
    5
    § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), (iii)), based on his 2005 robbery conviction, an
    aggravated felony and crime involving moral turpitude.
    IV.   Appellant’s First Motion to Vacate
    On September 30, 2019, appellant filed his first motion to
    vacate the 2005 conviction pursuant to section 1473.7. Appellant
    alleged his “first language is Spanish” and that at “the time of his
    plea, [he] was not a fluent English speaker” and “did not have an
    interpreter at his hearings.” He alleged he “did not understand
    the immigration consequence of his plea because he did not have
    an interpreter.” He argued he was prejudiced and his
    constitutional rights were violated because he “unknowingly
    entered a guilty plea to a conviction that rendered him . . .
    deportable.” He alleged he “would not have agreed to the plea
    bargain now that he understands [it] has life-destroying
    consequences”; the United States “is home for [him]” and his
    “entire family lives in the United States,” including his fiancée,
    his 12-year-old son5, and his mother.
    In support of his motion, appellant submitted his sworn
    declaration, a letter from his fiancée Patricia Toscano, a letter
    from his former manager at Westlake Financial Services Carlos
    Cardona, and letters from family and friends attesting to his
    character.
    Appellant’s sworn declaration set out the following facts.
    Appellant is a citizen of El Salvador, and a United States legal
    permanent resident. He was a legal permanent resident at the
    time he entered his plea in 2005. His counsel during the 2005
    proceedings, i.e., Kaplan, “did not inform [him] that the charge
    5     Appellant’s son was born here and is an American citizen.
    6
    [he] pled to is a deportable charge . . . and that [his] conviction is
    a bar to U.S. citizenship.” Also, while appellant’s first language
    was Spanish and his English “was not as fluent,” he “did not have
    an interpreter at [the] hearings” which precluded him from
    understanding the adverse immigration consequences of taking
    the plea. He “would have never pleaded guilty and risked
    permanent separation from [his] family . . . if [he] had been
    advised of the consequences of pleading guilty to the [2005]
    charges.” He would have instead opted to proceed to trial.
    Patricia Toscano provided the following in her letter: She
    is a licensed marriage and family therapist. She has known
    appellant for 6.5 years and is his fiancée. She met appellant
    when he was “working at Wilshire Credit Consumer while
    simultaneously trying to obtain a nutritionist degree from LA
    Trade Tech.” During their relationship, he also worked at Lobel
    Financial. Toscano and appellant “are currently working on
    opening up a Whole-Food Plant Based Restaurant where he
    intends to also present seminars about the impact nutrition has
    on health and disease and I intend to present seminars on how
    nutrition impacts mental health.”
    Carlos Cardona, appellant’s former manager at Westlake
    Financial Services, stated he interviewed and hired appellant in
    2007 “as a customer service agent.” Cardona “saw his potential
    and his eagerness to succeed [and] further his career within the
    company.” Appellant became a “Title Specialist working directly
    with the Department of Motor Vehicles” within a few years.
    Appellant was “responsible to perfect our titles as we boarded
    new loans.”
    V.    Hearing and Ruling on First Motion to Vacate
    7
    On January 17, 2020, the hearing on appellant’s first
    motion to vacate took place. We glean the following from the
    minute order, as we were not provided a copy of the reporter’s
    transcript of the hearing. Appellant’s mother and fiancée
    testified. The court took the matter under submission.
    On March 3, 2020, the trial court issued its written ruling,
    denying the motion without prejudice. It found appellant’s
    evidence did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence
    that the lack of an interpreter constituted prejudicial error.
    The court referred to evidence provided by appellant that it
    considered in making its decision—most of which is not provided
    in the record before us. The court referred to: 1) appellant’s
    sworn declaration; 2) the “testimony of his mother, to the effect
    that he spoke only Spanish in the home”; 3) the probation officer’s
    early disposition report which said appellant had completed his
    G.E.D.; 4) appellant’s high school transcript showing he attended
    public middle school and high school from 1997 to 2002 and he
    took “English As a Second Language [(ESL)] class most recently
    in Fall Semester, 2001–2002”; and 5) a letter from the general
    manager at Staples, who stated appellant worked as “an office
    supply associate” at Staples since July 2004, whose job duties
    included “customer service, stocking shelves and cashiering,” and
    who “sometimes train[ed] new associates” since he was “a model
    employee.”
    The court noted “in all misdemeanor and felony criminal
    proceedings, certified interpreters have been available to all non-
    English speaking defendants for decades preceding [appellant]’s
    case.” The court found while it is possible the court and defense
    counsel failed to notice appellant’s English was deficient, it was
    “[m]ore likely, defense counsel and the defendant himself did not
    8
    request an interpreter because it was evident that he did not
    need one. This conclusion is supported by the facts that, before
    the time of his plea, [appellant] had been attending public schools
    . . . for years and had been working in retail as a cashier and
    customer service person for at least a year.” The court
    emphasized appellant’s “own declaration does not state that he
    ever requested an interpreter on any of his three court
    appearances.” Based on the foregoing, the court found
    appellant’s evidence did not establish that the absence of an
    interpreter constituted prejudicial error under the statute.
    VI.   Appellant’s Second Motion to Vacate
    On October 8, 2020, appellant filed his second motion
    pursuant to section 1473.7. Appellant essentially made the same
    arguments based on the same facts he had alleged in support of
    his first motion to vacate. However, he stated he was “refil[ing]
    the motion” with “additional evidence” in support, and urged the
    court to “reconsider its prior decision and . . . set aside his guilty
    plea.”
    Appellant submitted, as additional evidence, his high
    school transcript. The transcript shows appellant received a C in
    his ESL Intermediate class during Fall and Spring semesters in
    8th grade (1998–1999). The transcript also shows appellant
    received a C in his ESL Advanced class during Fall semester and
    an F during Spring semester in 9th grade (2000–2001).
    Appellant also submitted, as new evidence, a letter dated
    May 8, 2020 from Staples HR Services that confirmed appellant’s
    “termination of employment” from Staples on January 11, 2007.
    The letter referred to appellant’s former job title as “associate
    office supply.” Appellant also provided, as an exhibit, a letter
    dated May 19, 2020 from the Registrar’s Office of Pomona Unified
    9
    School District. The letter verified appellant registered and
    attended the Adult and Career Education department’s G.E.D.
    program from September to November 2017 for a total of
    81.5 hours.
    In support of his second motion, appellant submitted a
    more recent declaration; for the most part, it set out the same
    information as his declaration from the first motion to vacate.
    It provided the following additional information: Appellant’s
    “primary language at home growing up was Spanish” and his
    “entire family speaks only Spanish at home.” He was an ESL
    student who “received C grades in the intermediate level and
    failed the advanced level.” He took G.E.D. classes in 2017,
    “12 years since [his] conviction.” He was “employed at Staples as
    a supply stocker” and “did not have work in customer service nor
    did [he] have any direct communication with customers.”
    On December 18, 2020, appellant filed a supplemental
    exhibit for the court’s consideration—notes from Millennium
    Medical Associates regarding appellant’s visit two days prior, on
    December 16, 2020. The notes state appellant made the
    appointment to seek treatment for adult ADHD. The notes
    expressly provide: “Specifically, [appellant] state[d] ‘Had enough
    dealing with too many racing thoughts and my lack [of] focus has
    been very low this past [few] months.’ ” The notes also provide
    appellant “state[d] he feels his brain ‘doesn’t stop.’ ”
    On April 27, 2021, appellant filed another supplemental
    exhibit for the court—the sworn declaration of Kaplan. Kaplan
    stated he was appointed to represent appellant when he was
    employed as a deputy public defender. He represented appellant
    at his plea and sentencing hearing. Kaplan has “no recollection
    of the facts of the case” and “no recollection of what [he] did or did
    10
    not do” in the case. He has “no recollection of discussing
    [appellant]’s immigration status” and “no recollection if [he]
    provided immigration advisements” to appellant. Kaplan did not
    recall if appellant spoke English or Spanish. Kaplan was listed
    as an “inactive attorney.”
    VII. Hearing and Ruling on Second Motion to Vacate
    On May 24, 2021, the trial court heard appellant’s second
    motion to vacate. The court explained that because its denial of
    the first motion was without prejudice, “you can bring in new
    information.” The court would “reconsider” if appellant has
    “something new.” It explained “this is not an en banc review”
    and it would not go “back to review everything else that . . . [was]
    already ruled on” via the first motion. “The only thing [the court
    was] considering is what is new and whether or not that would
    change the decision.”
    During the hearing, the clerk of the court was asked
    whether it is “always the practice of the clerk’s office when
    preparing a minute order to record whether or not the defendant
    was assisted by a Spanish interpreter or interpreter of any
    language?” The clerk responded: “Yes. If the defendant is
    present and an interpreter was used, we put that in the minute
    order.”
    After hearing argument, the trial court denied appellant’s
    second motion with prejudice. The court found the additional
    information appellant provided “is all information that could
    have and should have been presented to the court at the time of
    the original hearing.” The court “does not find that there is any
    new information to change or any new sufficient information to
    change the ruling; and the court is going to stand by [the original
    court’s] ruling of the denial of the petition.”
    11
    Appellant timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    I.    Applicable Law
    Mandatory deportation from the United States is an
    immigration consequence when a defendant is convicted of a
    crime deemed an aggravated felony under federal immigration
    law. (Moncrieffe v. Holder (2013) 
    569 U.S. 184
    , 187–188; 
    8 U.S.C. § 1228
    (c) [aggravated felony is conclusively presumed
    deportable].) With respect to appellant’s case, a violation of
    section 211 constitutes an aggravated felony, a deportable offense
    under federal law. (
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(A)(iii) [“Any alien who
    is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission
    is deportable”].)
    Section 1473.7 authorizes a person no longer in criminal
    custody to file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence for any
    of the following reasons: “(1) The conviction or sentence is legally
    invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s
    ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly
    accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences
    of a conviction or sentence. . . . [¶] 2) Newly discovered evidence
    of actual innocence exists that requires vacation of the conviction
    or sentence as a matter of law or in the interests of justice.”
    (§ 1473.7, subds. (a)(1), (2).) A motion based on newly discovered
    evidence must be filed “without undue delay from the date the
    moving party discovered, or could have discovered with the
    exercise of due diligence, the evidence that provides a basis for
    relief under this section.” (Id., subd. (c).)
    Effective January 1, 2019, legislative amendments to
    section 1473.7 afforded a defendant relief under the statute
    12
    without a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel under the
    Strickland standard. (People v. Camacho (2019) 
    32 Cal.App.5th 998
    , 1005.) To establish prejudice, a defendant must show by a
    preponderance of the evidence that he did not meaningfully
    understand or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse
    immigration consequences of the plea. (Id. at pp. 1010–1011; see
    People v. Mejia (2019) 
    36 Cal.App.5th 859
    , 862 (Mejia); see People
    v. Martinez (2013) 
    57 Cal.4th 555
    , 565 (Martinez) [defendant may
    show prejudice by convincing the court that he “would have
    chosen to lose the benefits of the plea bargain despite the
    possibility or probability deportation would nonetheless follow”].)
    A fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if it is more
    likely than not that the fact is true. (People v. Rodriguez (2021)
    
    60 Cal.App.5th 995
    , 1003.)
    The key to section 1473.7 is “ ‘the mindset of the defendant
    and what he or she understood—or didn’t understand—at the
    time the plea was taken.’ ” (Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at
    p. 866.) Factors relevant to this inquiry include appellant’s ties
    to the United States, the importance appellant placed on avoiding
    deportation, appellant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and
    whether appellant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral
    negotiated disposition was possible. (People v. Vivar (2021)
    
    11 Cal.5th 510
    , 529–530 (Vivar).)
    II.   Standard of Review
    The California Supreme Court recently determined the
    standard of review for section 1473.7 motion proceedings. In
    Vivar, the Court endorsed the independent standard of review.
    (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 524.) Under independent review,
    an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to
    determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law. (Id. at
    13
    p. 527.) Independent review is not the equivalent of de novo
    review. (Ibid.) An appellate court may not simply second-guess
    factual findings that are based on the trial court’s own
    observations. (Ibid.) Factual determinations by the trial court
    are given particular deference, even though courts reviewing
    such claims generally may reach a different conclusion from the
    trial court on an independent examination of the evidence even
    where the evidence is conflicting. (Ibid.) In section 1473.7
    motion proceedings, appellate courts should “give particular
    deference to factual findings based on the trial court’s personal
    observations of witnesses.” (Id. at pp. 527–528.) Where the facts
    derive entirely from written declarations and other documents,
    however, there is no reason to conclude the trial court has the
    same special purchase on the question at issue; as a practical
    matter, the trial court and this court are in the same position in
    interpreting written declarations when reviewing a cold record in
    a section 1473.7 proceeding. (Id. at p. 528.) Ultimately it is for
    the appellate court to decide, based on its independent judgment,
    whether the facts establish prejudice under section 1473.7.
    (Ibid.)
    III.   Analysis
    Appellant contends the trial court erred when it denied his
    motion to vacate the conviction because he satisfied the
    requirements of section 1473.7. He repeats his argument that
    the absence of a Spanish interpreter during the plea colloquy on
    October 26, 2005 constituted prejudicial error affecting his ability
    to knowingly and meaningfully understand the adverse
    immigration consequences of accepting the plea. He argues:
    “Despite the declarations, letters, proof of his prior position [at
    Staples], his ESL classes, evidence previously not available that
    14
    were submitted by [appellant], the [c]ourt failed and refused to
    consider these as new evidence.” He claims the court
    “stonewalled [appellant]’s arguments with the only explanation
    that [it] did not want to disturb the prior decision.”
    Section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), requires appellant to
    show that his “ability to meaningfully understand, defend
    against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse
    immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence” was
    damaged by an error. (Italics added.) Appellant has failed to do
    so.
    We note the absence of a reporter’s transcript for
    appellant’s hearings prevents us from reviewing any discussions
    held on the record, as well as any advisements or information on
    adverse immigration consequences that may have been given
    other than what was noted in the minute order. Also, Kaplan’s
    declaration was not informative, as he does not recall any
    information pertaining to his representation of appellant. Thus,
    we can only speculate as to why there was no interpreter
    assisting appellant during his criminal case.
    We are not persuaded by appellant’s argument that the
    absence of an interpreter at the plea prejudiced him because he
    was not fluent in English. The only evidence in support is
    appellant’s declaration. An appellant seeking to set aside a plea
    must do more than simply claim he did not understand the
    immigration consequences of the plea. (People v. Abdelsalam
    (2022) 
    73 Cal.App.5th 654
    , 664 (Abdelsalam).) The claim must be
    corroborated by objective evidence beyond appellant’s self-serving
    statements. (Ibid.) “It is up to the trial court to determine
    whether the defendant’s assertion is credible, and the court may
    reject an assertion that is not supported by an explanation or
    15
    other corroborating circumstances.” (Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th
    at p. 565.) We find it telling that appellant’s own declaration
    does not state that he ever requested an interpreter during any of
    the four proceedings held in 2005.
    Similarly, we find unpersuasive appellant’s assertion that
    had he been properly advised he was facing mandatory
    deportation, he would have insisted on an immigration-neutral
    disposition and, failing that, gone to trial instead of accepting the
    plea agreement. Courts should not upset a plea solely because of
    post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have
    pleaded but for the deficiencies; judges should instead look to
    contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant’s
    expressed preferences. (People v. Ogunmowo (2018)
    
    23 Cal.App.5th 67
    , 78.)
    Relying on contemporaneous evidence in the record,
    appellant’s girlfriend at the time reported that he had “completed
    his G.E.D.” after attending high school full-time. This tends to
    indicate appellant understood English to a reasonable extent.
    Appellant submitted as new evidence via his second motion a
    letter dated May 19, 2020 from Pomona Unified School District’s
    Registrar’s Office that specified appellant registered and
    attended their G.E.D. program from September to November
    2017. He alleged this shows he had not taken a G.E.D. class
    until 12 years after his conviction. However, this does not
    disprove whether appellant had completed his G.E.D. via another
    program or school prior to the 2005 proceedings, as stated by his
    then-girlfriend of three years.
    Relying on other contemporaneous evidence, a letter from
    appellant’s Staples general manager described appellant as an
    “office supply associate” from 2004–2005, whose job duties
    16
    included “customer service, stocking shelves and cashiering” and
    “sometimes training new associates.” Appellant argued he did
    not have direct communication with customers and was usually
    in the back of the store. He submitted via his second motion, as
    new evidence, a copy of a letter from Staples HR services that
    specified appellant’s “former job title” as “associate office supply.”
    Contrary to appellant’s assertion, however, this does not negate
    or contradict the portion of the general manager’s letter that
    described appellant’s duties as “customer service” and
    “cashiering” in addition to “stocking shelves”—which tends to
    indicate appellant was able to communicate and/or understand
    English to some extent. The letter from Staples HR merely
    confirmed the title of appellant’s position at Staples.
    The undisputed facts are that appellant had lived in the
    United States for eight years at the time of his conviction, having
    arrived when he was 11 years old. Appellant’s school transcripts
    show he attended public middle school and high school from 1997
    to 2002. Nothing indicates his classes were held in Spanish.
    Appellant’s employment history demonstrates he has worked at a
    credit consumer agency, a financial company, a title company; no
    evidence was provided to indicate these were Spanish-speaking
    only jobs.
    Appellant refers to his transcripts that show he received a
    C in his ESL Intermediate class in 8th grade (1998–1999) and a
    C and an F in his ESL Advanced class in 9th grade (2000–2001).
    He relies on this as proof that he was not fluent in English at the
    time of his plea four years later in October 2005. We find that
    unpersuasive. Additionally, his poor grades do not necessarily
    demonstrate an inability to understand English and could
    17
    instead indicate a lack of interest or effort (especially as the
    transcripts show an overall pattern of failing grades).
    The trial court found the evidence insufficient to warrant
    granting the second motion to vacate; it found the additional
    information provided was “all information that could have and
    should have been presented to the court at the time of the
    original hearing.” The trial court below deferred to all factual
    findings based on oral testimony given at appellant’s first motion
    to vacate. We see no reason to depart from the maxim and defer
    to any factual findings made by the trial court in the underlying
    proceedings. (See Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 524 [factual
    determinations by the trial court are given particular deference;
    an appellate court may not simply second-guess factual findings
    that are based on the trial court’s own observations].)
    We find unavailing appellant’s reliance on the December
    16, 2020 notes from Millennium Medical Associates about
    appellant’s appointment to seek treatment for adult ADHD. This
    is not contemporaneous evidence from the time of appellant’s
    2005 plea deal. More importantly, notes from a December 2020
    medical appointment is not evidence that appellant had or
    suffered from ADHD 15 years prior—in 2005. There is also no
    evidence or expert testimony in the record regarding whether
    appellant’s claimed ADHD had any effect on his ability to
    understand the adverse immigration consequences of accepting
    the plea deal, communicated in English in 2005.
    Nor are we convinced by appellant’s insistence that he
    would have opted for trial had he been properly advised of the
    immigration consequences. We might speculate that remaining
    in the country was important to appellant as the United States
    “is home for [him]” and his mother, fiancée, and son, but whether
    18
    that consideration rose to preeminence over avoiding a longer
    prison sentence at the time of taking the plea in 2005 is
    speculative based on the evidence before the trial court.
    Undoubtedly, removal from the United States after creating a life
    here is a nightmare; however, the test for prejudice considers
    what appellant would have done at the time of the plea and not
    the consequences appellant currently faces. (See Martinez,
    supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 564.) Appellant offered no evidence that
    at the time of the plea avoiding deportation was a priority of his
    and that he communicated that priority to his counsel or the
    court. He also failed to present evidence that at the time of the
    plea, he “had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated
    disposition was possible.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530.)
    He did not offer any evidence that alternative, non-deportable
    dispositions would have been available and acceptable to the
    prosecutor. (Abdelsalam, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 665; People
    v. Olvera (2018) 
    24 Cal.App.5th 1112
    , 1118.)
    Exercising independent review, we conclude appellant did
    not carry his burden for section 1473.7 relief.
    19
    DISPOSITION
    The order denying appellant’s motion to vacate is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    STRATTON, P. J.
    We concur:
    GRIMES, J.
    HARUTUNIAN, J.*
    *     Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the
    Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
    Constitution.
    20
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B313809

Filed Date: 5/25/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/25/2022