People v. Hill CA4/2 ( 2022 )

Filed 5/25/22 P. v. Hill CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E075324
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1702026)
MARTIN GRANT HILL, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Steven G. Counelis,
Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos, Kathryn A.
Kirschbaum and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
1
A jury found defendant and appellant Martin Grant Hill guilty of 14 counts of
committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years old. (Pen.
Code, § 288, subd. (a).)1 The jury found true the allegations that, for 10 of the counts,
defendant engaged in substantial sexual conduct with the victim. (§ 1203.066, subd.
(a)(8).) The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of 24 years.
Defendant raises five issues on appeal. First, defendant contends the trial court
erred by excluding expert testimony pertaining to false confessions. Second, defendant
asserts the trial court erred by admitting the victim’s out of court statements under the
fresh complaint doctrine. Third, defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting
evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). Fourth, defendant
asserts the trial court violated his constitutional rights of due process and confrontation
by limiting his examination of the victim. Fifth, defendant contends that, cumulatively,
the foregoing alleged errors require the judgment be reversed. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. DEFENDANT’S CRIMES
Defendant is the victim’s stepfather. Defendant molested the victim over a three-
year period when the victim was between the ages of nine and 12 years old, which
would have been approximately 2013 to 2016. When the victim initially reported the
molestations, she said she had been molested approximately 14 times. At trial, the
1 All subsequent statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2
victim estimated that she had been molested approximately 10 times but agreed that her
memory was better when she initially reported the molestations.
The victim had a bedroom to herself. Defendant entered the victim’s bedroom at
night, when she was sleeping. Sometimes defendant crawled into the room. While
defendant was on the floor, he rubbed the lips of the victim’s vagina with his fingers
and sometimes inserted his fingers into her vagina, over the victim’s panties. Defendant
also touched the victim’s breasts over her clothes.
During an interview with law enforcement, defendant admitted that he
consciously went into the victim’s bedroom and molested her approximately 16 times,
and on approximately 10 of those occasions he rubbed her vagina. Defendant
sometimes masturbated while molesting the victim. Defendant further admitted that his
pornography preference was images of 15- or 16-year-old girls.
B. REPORTING THE CRIMES
In March 2017, when the victim was 13 years old, the victim told her mother
(Mother) about defendant molesting her. Mother was upset and defendant moved out of
the home. However, the victim felt bad about the situation, in part because defendant
provided the majority of the family’s income. The victim told Mother that the
molestation was not as bad as it actually was and that Mother should let defendant
return to the home. Mother permitted defendant to return, and the victim had a lock put
on her bedroom door in order to prevent defendant from molesting her.
In April 2017, the victim and defendant argued over a seat on the sofa. The
argument was “the last straw” and “a breaking point” for the victim. That night, the
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victim texted a suicide hotline and, during a conversation with the hotline, disclosed that
defendant molested her for three years.
The following day, a county social worker along with a sheriff’s deputy
contacted the victim about the molestation allegations she made during her
communication with the hotline. The victim told the social worker and the deputy about
the molestation. The victim told the social worker she did not want to involve the
courts or Mother. As a result of the victim’s disclosure, she moved to her father’s
home. The victim found the transition to her father’s home to be difficult because she
missed Mother, her sister, and her friends, and because her father has “a lot of very
different rules that [the victim] wasn’t used to.”
After the victim moved to her father’s house, the victim visited Mother. During
the first visit, Mother told the victim “to say that [defendant] didn’t do it so [the victim]
can go back home.” Mother told the victim to lie in court, and she blamed the victim
“for breaking up the family.” There were two other visits in which Mother told the
victim to lie about the molestations. At one supervised visit, Mother gave the victim a
note, inside a tin of cookies, that claimed the victim was “destroying [Mother’s] life”
and that the victim should “tell everybody that this didn’t happen.” At another
supervised visit, Mother made it appear that she was showing the victim photographs on
her phone, but Mother actually showed the victim a note written in the notes app “about
[Mother’s] financial problems and how, like, [the victim was] screwing everything up.”
During one of the victim’s visits with Mother, Mother told the victim to call
Mother’s mother (Grandmother) and say that the molestations did not occur. The victim
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complied and told Grandmother that she had been “lying and that [she] was going to fix
all of this.” The victim made the foregoing statement to Grandmother because the
victim felt her family no longer liked the victim and the only way she could live with
Mother and her sister again was to say that the molestations had never occurred. The
victim told Mother that the touching was not sexual, that it was akin to poking and
tickling, and that the social worker had misconstrued the victim’s statement. If the
victim had the situation to do over again, she would not have reported the molestations
because she felt as though she had been punished for the disclosure, in that she no
longer lived with Mother and her sister.
C. DEFENSE
During an interview with law enforcement, defendant said that he has insulin
dependent diabetes. Defendant continued, “[T]here’s times when—when my blood
sugar runs low that I kind of lose track of myself.” Defendant asserted that when he has
low blood sugar, he typically goes to the kitchen to eat, but there were “times that [he]
unknowingly went elsewhere.” Defendant said the victim had previously told him that
he touched her breasts and vagina. When the victim told him that, he “was in disbelief.
[He] couldn’t understand why [he] would do those things.” Defendant said he did not
recall molesting the victim.
The victim’s father sought a restraining order protecting the victim from
defendant. In October 2017, at the restraining order hearing, the victim testified that
defendant may not have been conscious when he molested her because he crawled into
her room.
5
Dr. Marvin Pietruszka is a board certified specialist in preventative medicine,
toxicology, and pathology. Pietruszka met with defendant in January 2019 for one hour.
Pietruszka confirmed that defendant has diabetes. Pietruszka explained that some
diabetics “may sleep walk or sleep talk or sleep eat or verbalize some sexual
terminologies or even participate in sexual activities and not even recall the event.
[That activity] relates to the hypoglycemic episode that has caused damage to specific
brain centers.” Such acts that occur during sleep are parasomnias, which “are true
medical conditions.” Pietruszka opined that defendant’s molestation of the victim was
attributable to defendant’s diabetes.
Grandmother testified at the trial in the instant case. Grandmother said that, in
2017, the victim said “she wanted to come home,” and that the social worker had
pressured the victim into accusing defendant and then “twisted [the victim’s] words.”
Additionally, in 2018, the victim told Grandmother that she “want[ed] to come home”
and that the social worker had “twisted [her] words.” Grandmother opined that
defendant would not molest a child. Grandmother was unaware that defendant
confessed to consciously molesting the victim on 16 occasions. Upon learning of that
confession, Grandmother’s opinion remained unchanged.
Mother also testified at the trial. In 2017, the victim told Mother that defendant
did not molest her. On a separate occasion, the victim told Mother that the victim’s
statement about defendant had been misconstrued by law enforcement. Mother denied
pressuring the victim to recant, and she denied giving the victim notes. Mother asserted
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the lock on the victim’s bedroom door was added to keep the younger children out of
the victim’s room.
DISCUSSION
A. EXPERT TESTIMONY
1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The People moved to exclude the testimony of Dr. Richard A. Leo (Leo), who is
a “proponent[] of a ‘false confession theory’ which postulates that police investigation
practices lead to frequent false confessions or that false confessions happen ‘all the
time.’ The defense [moved to introduce] Leo’s testimony not to demonstrate [the]
confession theory in general, but to directly prove that the defendant’s admissions were
false.” The People asserted the jury did not need an expert to help it judge the
credibility of defendant’s confession.
The People noted that “defendant does not claim that his admissions were
involuntary or otherwise constitutionally defective.” In defendant’s opposition, he
disputed that assertion by the People; he contended, “[D]efendant has maintained his
confession was the product of police tactics. This is the exact subject Dr. Leo will be
testifying to.” Defendant explained that Leo would testify about law enforcement’s
psychological interrogation techniques and how they can amount to coercion.
Defendant further asserted, “Once a trial judge determines that a confession of a
defendant was voluntary, the defendant is entitled to present to the jury all evidence on
the issue of voluntariness of the confession,” so that the jury may determine what
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weight to give the confession. Defendant contended he “has a constitutional right to
present the testimony of expert witness, Dr. Leo.”
The trial court said that, based upon its understanding of the law, “we’re boiling
it down essentially to a[n Evidence Code section] 352 analysis.” The trial court ordered
an Evidence Code section 402 hearing for Leo’s testimony, in order to aid the court in
its application of Evidence Code section 352.
At the hearing, Leo, who is a social psychologist, testified that the deputies who
interviewed defendant appeared to have used what he called the Reid method of
interrogation, which is “where you isolate somebody, build rapport, accuse them,
challenge their denials, confront them with real or fabricated evidence, and try to induce
them through minimization and persuasion and rationalization to stop denying and start
admitting.” Leo contended studies show that people will falsely confess to crimes
because it seems like the best option. Leo asserted that his studies indicated most
people are unfamiliar with police interrogation techniques and do not understand why a
person would falsely confess.
Leo opined that defendant may have been susceptible to giving a false
confession. Leo said, “[N]ot being a clinical psychologist, I’m not suggesting I’m
making any diagnosis—would be his diabetes, his low blood sugar, his description of
hypoglycemia and feelings of loopiness. And for very straightforward reasons,
something like that could make somebody—somebody’s will weaker and more
vulnerable—or I should say susceptible to less likely to resist, less strong-willed, more
vulnerable to just making or agreeing to statements that one doesn’t know to be true or
8
even knows to be false because they don’t have the mental wherewithal because they’re
out of it, because they can’t concentrate. So that’s very plausible to me, and that would
concern me.”
Further, Leo asserted that the investigator who interviewed defendant used a
technique known as “ ‘scripting,’ ” in which the defendant knows some general
information about the crime, but is “pressure[d] to—to adopt a certain account about the
number of times he had done this, the reasons why he had done this.”
The prosecutor asked Leo, “[H]ave you been made aware of any recantation by
the defendant in this case?” Leo responded, “I don’t recall.” The prosecutor asked if “a
diagnosis of diabetes could make a suspect more susceptible” to a false confession. Leo
said, “[S]omebody in a diabetic coma or in a hypoglycemic state might be more
vulnerable. . . . I want to be very clear that I’m not a clinical expert.” Leo stated, “I’m
not qualified to make an opinion about the effects of [defendant’s] diabetes at the time
of his interrogation on his behavior or perceptions.”
The trial court tentatively ruled that Leo’s testimony would be excluded.
Defendant asserted Leo would educate the jury about interrogation techniques and “the
concept of false confessions and how they’re brought about.” Defendant asserted
techniques that produce false confessions were used in the instant case, so Leo’s
testimony would be highly relevant.
The trial court said, “In this case, the defendant’s primary defense to—in the
interview to the police was an assertion that his diabetic condition prevented him from
remembering. Or I’ll put it in legal terms. Also forming the specific intent necessary to
9
commit the crimes. But Dr. Leo was very careful to state that he could not opine as to
this defendant’s particular mental state resulting from a diabetic condition, diabetic
symptoms, hypoglycemic conditions or symptoms either at the time of the offenses or,
more importantly, at the time of the interview with the police.”
Further, the trial court found important the facts that, during the interview,
defendant denied digitally penetrating the victim’s vagina and anus, denied ejaculating
on the victim or her bed, denied forcing the victim to touch his penis, and denied putting
his penis in front of the victim’s face. The trial court said, “[H]is will is not overcome.
He clearly delineated boundaries about his behavior.” The trial court concluded that
Leo’s testimony would be “confusing of the issues and misleading to the jury with
respect to what the jury must determine, which is the believability or credibility of all of
the witnesses and all of the evidence in the case.”
2. ANALYSIS
a. Right to Present a Complete Defense
Defendant contends the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a
complete defense by excluding Leo’s testimony concerning false confessions.
“ ‘[T]he routine application of provisions of the state Evidence Code law does
not implicate a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.’ [Citations.] This is so
because ‘only evidentiary error amounting to a complete preclusion of a defense
violates a defendant’s federal constitutional right to present a defense.’ ” (People v.
Sotelo-Urena (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 732, 756.) We examine whether defendant was
wholly precluded from presenting his defense.
10
Defendant’s trial counsel cross-examined a deputy, who was present during
defendant’s law enforcement interview, about topics including interrogation techniques,
whether defendant was pressured to admit guilt, and how deputies avoid false
confessions. During closing argument, defendant’s trial counsel asserted Pietruszka
testified that hypoglycemia “could cause a person [to] admit facts that weren’t even
true.” Further, defendant’s trial counsel contended that defendant was not offered any
form of sugar during the law enforcement interview and that he was “going through a
diabetic episode” during the interview. Defendant’s trial counsel asserted the deputies
were “going to interview [defendant] until [the deputies] got what [they] wanted, and
that’s what [they] did.” Defendant’s trial counsel concluded, “Remember Dr.
Pietruszka’s testimony and how that negates the required state of mind and what effects
that can have on somebody confessing. Remember the coercive techniques that the
deputies used when you saw the interrogation that they used to wear [defendant] down.”
Because defendant’s trial counsel presented evidence and argument pertaining to
interrogation techniques and the effect that hypoglycemia could have had on
defendant’s confession, we are not persuaded that defendant was denied his
constitutional right to present a defense.
b. Evidence Code section 352
Next, defendant asserts the trial court erred by excluding Leo’s testimony under
Evidence Code section 352.
“A trial court has broad discretion to exclude relevant evidence under Evidence
Code section 352 ‘if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability
11
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the
jury.’ [Citations.] Such ‘discretion extends to the admission or exclusion of expert
testimony.’ [Citation.] We review rulings regarding relevancy and Evidence Code
section 352 under an abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th
1146, 1181.)
In People v. Linton, the high court considered whether the trial court erred by
excluding Leo’s testimony, which the defendant in that case had sought to introduce.
(People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 1179-1181.) The Supreme Court reasoned,
“As was his right, defendant did not testify and thus did not deny the truth of his
interview statements. There was no other evidence offered that logically called into
question the veracity of his admissions.” (Id. at p. 1181.) The court continued, “Not
only was there a dearth of evidence indicating a false admission or confession, a
multitude of corroborative evidence had been introduced at the time of the trial court’s
ruling that suggested defendant’s admissions and confession were true.” (Id. at p.
1182.) The high court concluded, “Under these facts, it fell within the trial court’s
broad discretion to determine that Dr. Leo’s proffered testimony had, at most, minimal
probative value, which was substantially outweighed by its likely undue consumption of
time.” (Ibid.)
In the instant case, there is little to indicate defendant’s confession was false.
Defendant drove himself to the sheriff’s station for the interview. Defendant walked
through the large sheriff’s station to the interview room, which takes “a couple of
12
minutes” because it is a large station. That evidence indicates that defendant was
functioning reasonably well prior to the interview.
During the interview, defendant admitted consciously touching the victim’s
vagina and masturbating while touching the victim. Defendant specified that he
molested the victim approximately 16 times and rubbed her vagina on approximately 10
of those occasions. Defendant denied forcing the victim to touch his penis, denied
ejaculating on the victim or in her bedroom, and denied digitally penetrating the victim.
Defendant admitted preferring pornography of children ages 15 to 16 but denied
preferring pornography of children ages 10 to 13. Defendant admitted to looking at
pornography online, and said Mother checks his phone because “[s]he saw the sites that
[defendant] went to.”
Defendant’s admissions indicate that defendant recalled specific behavior he
engaged in including molesting the victim. Defendant’s denials indicate that he was
capable of denying that he engaged in certain behavior. Thus, defendant was choosing
what to admit and deny, he was not overcome by a hypoglycemic episode or
interrogation techniques. In other words, defendant may have diabetes and the
interview may have involved certain interrogation techniques, but there is little to
suggest those things impacted defendant’s answers during the interview. As a result,
expert testimony about interrogation tactics had little relevance in this case. In sum, the
trial court could reasonably conclude the evidence had little probative value, and,
therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.
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B. FRESH COMPLAINT DOCTRINE
1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The People filed a combined trial brief and motions in limine, in which they
asserted the victim’s statements to the social worker were “not privileged and thus
admissible. Furthermore, the testimony is not . . . made inadmissible by the hearsay
rule.” When addressing the motions in limine, the trial court asked about the foregoing
assertion, saying, “And is this a fresh complaint theory?”
The People assented and asserted the social worker would testify about receiving
a referral from the suicide hotline, coordinating with law enforcement, and the victim’s
statements. As to the victim’s statements, the People explained that the social worker
would testify about the victim having said that she was molested by defendant, in her
bedroom, approximately 14 times over a three-year period.
Defense counsel asserted that “a referral from a suicide hotline is multiple
hearsay.” The trial court asked if the victim would testify and say, “ ‘I called a suicide
hotline’ ”, and the People contended “[T]here’s a very good chance that she’s going to
say that.” The following exchange occurred:
“The Court: I guess the reason I’m asking that is while I appreciate the precision
of your objection, it may be kind of a moot point because the evidence will come out in
some other way—or will probably come out in another way. So do you understand
my—my point?
“[Defense Counsel]: I understand your point. And I think it will come out that
she called a suicide hotline.”
14
The trial court concluded, “So, again, in light of all that anticipated testimony,
there is little to no prejudice to allow the social worker to explain the source of the
referral.”
During the prosecutor’s direct examination of the social worker, the following
exchange occurred:
“[Prosecutor]: Okay. And after that, did she disclose to you the sexual abuse?
“[Social Worker]: Yes. She disclosed that—
“[Defense Counsel]: Objection. Hearsay.
“[Prosecutor]: It’s fresh complaint, Your Honor.
“The Court: Pardon me?
“[Prosecutor]: It’s fresh complaint.
“The Court: The objection is overruled.”
On direct examination, the social worker testified that the victim told the social
worker about defendant coming into her bedroom at night and touching her vagina and
her breasts. The social worker said the victim “reported he would come into her room
anywhere from midnight to about 3:00 a.m.” The social worker testified that the victim
said the molestations occurred “no more than 15 times.” Further, the social worker said
the victim reported that the molestations stopped when a lock was placed on the
victim’s bedroom door.
On cross-examination the following exchanges occurred:
“[Defense Counsel]: Now, you mentioned that she told you that this happened
between 12:00 at night and 3:00 in the morning; right?
15
“[Social Worker]: Yes.
“[Defense Counsel]: She gave a time?
“[Social Worker]: Yes.”
“[Defense Counsel]: Okay. Now, you said that she told you that this happened
no more than 15 times?
“[Social Worker]: Yes.”
“[Defense Counsel]: Did [the victim] provide you with any dates other than a
range?
“[Social Worker]: No.
“[Defense Counsel]: Did you ask?
“[Social Worker]: She could only provide the—a range because she did not
know exactly what dates.
“[Defense Counsel]: That’s what she told you?
“[Social Worker]: Yes.”
“[Defense Counsel]: Did you ask her if anybody was present during any of these
incidents?
“[Social Worker]: I did ask where her mother was, and she had said her mom
was sleeping during those incidents. And as far as, you know, everyone else in the
home, she indicated she had her own room, so—”
“[Defense Counsel]: So when you testified that she was forthcoming, she didn’t
really provide you with many details; right?”
16
“[Social Worker]: She did provide details, but there were things that—I mean, if
you’re—along these lines that I can’t remember if I asked or not. But for someone
disclosing the severity of these allegations, she did provide detail as to what occurred to
her.”
During closing argument, defense counsel asserted, “She was unable to give one
single date or close to it of one single event. She was unable to give any specific detail
beyond, I think a couple times he touched my boob. He would poke me. Some of the
touching she talked about was, on its face, nonsexual. And that he rubbed her vagina,
but we don’t know how many times.” Further, defense counsel argued, “Consider the
fact that the details of these supposed incidents are very sketchy.” Defense counsel
continued, “But she still couldn’t give at that time any definite information. She
couldn’t give any details. She couldn’t give a date. Just generic testimony.”
2. ANALYSIS
Defendant contends the victim’s statements to the social worker about the details
of the molestations were not admissible under the fresh complaint doctrine.
Under the fresh complaint doctrine, an out of court statement about a sexual
offense “is admissible for a limited, nonhearsay purpose—namely, to establish the fact
of, and the circumstances surrounding, the victim’s disclosure of the assault to others,”
e.g., when the complaint was made and whether the statement was voluntarily given.
(People v. Brown (1994) 8 Cal.4th 746, 749-750.) Thus, a trial court may properly
admit evidence of the victim’s complaint, if the evidence is “narrowly limited to the fact
17
of, and the circumstances surrounding, her disclosure of the alleged sexual molestation.”
(Id. at p. 750.)
“Of course, in many cases it will be the defendant who believes that the
particular circumstances under which the victim reported the alleged offense—either
promptly after the offense is alleged to have occurred or at some later date—cast doubt
upon the veracity of the victim’s charge, and the defendant will be entitled to introduce
and rely upon such evidence in seeking to undermine the prosecution’s case. [Citation.]
Indeed, unlike the prosecution, which generally cannot introduce or rely upon the details
or substantive content of the victim’s complaint, a defendant who believes that the
contents of the victim’s extrajudicial complaint may be useful to impeach the victim’s
in-court testimony (or other aspects of the prosecution’s case) generally is free to
introduce and rely upon the details of such a complaint as a prior inconsistent
statement.” (People v. Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 762.)
The People assert that one must testify to some details of the offense in order to
prove that the out of court complaint pertained to the charged offense. During motions
in limine, defendant did not object to the social worker testifying about the victim’s
statements. Rather, defense counsel objected to the social worker testifying about the
referral from the suicide hotline. However, during trial, defense counsel objected when
the social worker was about to describe the victim’s statements. When defense counsel
cross-examined the social worker, he elicited as many, if not more, details about the
victim’s statements than the prosecutor elicited. Because defense counsel initially did
not object, then did object, then asked for as many details as the prosecutor, it is
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difficult to determine whether it was defense counsel’s plan to ask about the alleged
lack of detail in the victim’s statements or whether he was compelled to do so due to the
overruling of his objection during trial.
We will give defendant the benefit of the doubt and assume that defendant would
have preferred to have the details of the victim’s statements to the social worker
excluded. For the sake of judicial efficiency, we will treat this issue as though the trial
court erred by allowing the social worker to testify to an excessive amount of details
from the victim’s out of court statements.
“We review evidentiary errors for prejudice by determining whether it was
reasonably probable that a jury would have returned a more favorable verdict for
defendant had the court not admitted the evidence.” (People v. Felix (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 177, 187.) Defendant admitted to law enforcement that he consciously
molested the victim 16 times and that on 10 of those occasions he rubbed the victim’s
vagina.
The jury found defendant guilty on all 14 counts of committing a lewd or
lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years old. (§ 288, subd. (a).) The jury
found true the allegations that, for 10 of the counts, defendant engaged in substantial
sexual conduct with the victim (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)), but the jury found that same
allegation untrue for the other four counts. Because the jury found substantial sexual
conduct on only 10 of the 14 counts, it appears the jury credited defendant’s confession
that he molested the victim 16 times and rubbed her vagina on 10 of those occasions.
Because the jury credited defendant’s confession, it is not reasonably probable that the
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jury would have returned a more favorable verdict had the social worker not testified
about the details of the victim’s out of court statements. Therefore, even if we assume
the trial court erred, the error is harmless.
C. CSAAS
1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The People moved in limine to present evidence of CSAAS. The People asserted
Dr. Veronica Thomas (Thomas), a forensic psychologist, would “testify generally in
order to educate the jury on . . . how a child molestation victim would delay in
reporting, never report at all, or recant the accusation.” The People contended the
evidence “is relevant simply because it goes to the credibility of the victim in this case.”
The People contended the average juror would not have an understanding of how
children react to being molested.
Defendant moved in limine to exclude evidence of CSAAS. First, defendant
asserted that, in general, CSAAS should “be deemed to be inadmissible as improper,
irrelevant expert opinion which usurps the jury’s function to determine credibility.”
Second, defendant contended that “the subjects [CSAAS] addresses [are] within the
common knowledge of the typical juror.”
The trial court denied defendant’s motion, finding that “the testimony is relevant
to educate the jury on an area which is not subject to—to a common person’s
understanding, and therefore it may be used in [the People’s] case in chief.”
Thomas testified about CSAAS. The prosecutor then posed hypothetical questions that
related to the facts of the case. For example, the prosecutor asked, “Let’s assume that a
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victim discloses to her mother and to law enforcement . . . . The mother tells the victim,
‘You are the reason that our family is split up.’ Given those facts, would it surprise you
if there was then later a recanting statement?” Thomas responded, “That wouldn’t be a
surprise at all.”
2. ANALYSIS
Defendant raises three arguments as to why the trial court erred by admitting the
CSAAS evidence. First, defendant contends the trial court erred because CSAAS
evidence should be excluded in all cases because it is a biased theory that “will always
support the conclusion the abuse actually occurred.” Second, defendant asserts the
CSAAS evidence should have been excluded because the jurors’ answers during voir
dire indicated they did not have preconceived ideas about the reactions of molestation
victims. Third, defendant contends the CSAAS evidence should have been excluded
because the prosecutor’s hypothetical questions were so close to the facts of the instant
case that Thomas effectively testified about whether the victim was molested.
As to all of these issues, if we were to conclude that the trial court erred by
admitting the CSAAS evidence, we would find such an error harmless. The error would
be harmless because the jury’s verdict that defendant molested the victim 14 times, but
only 10 of those occasions involved substantial sexual conduct, mirrors defendant’s
confession that he molested the victim 16 times and rubbed her vagina on 10 of those
occasions Because the jury credited defendant’s confession, it is not reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have occurred if the CSAAS
evidence had been excluded.
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D. VICTIM’S MOTIVES
1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In a motion, defendant asserted that, prior to the victim making allegations
against defendant, the victim told her “family that she is a lesbian, which was not
accepted by the family favorably.” Further, defendant contended the victim contacted
the suicide hotline due to an argument with defendant—not to discuss molestation—and
the subject of molestation never arose during the conversation with the suicide hotline.
Defendant asserted, “[The victim’s] revelation of her sexual orientation and subsequent
therapy are relevant on the issues of motive to fabricate, credibility, and conduct
inconsistent with being molested as well.” The People opposed the motion asserting,
under Evidence Code section 352, “[The victim’s] sexual orientation and her
psychological history are not relevant to her credibility related to the charges in the
instant matter.”
At the hearing on the motion, the trial court asked defendant’s trial counsel how
the evidence was relevant to the victim’s credibility or her bias against defendant.
Defendant’s trial counsel asserted the victim retaliated against defendant due to his
reaction to her sexual orientation or to try to put the family’s focus on an issue other
than her sexual orientation. In response, the prosecutor asserted there was no evidence
to support such a theory. The prosecutor contended the evidence reflected that, prior to
the victim contacting the suicide hotline, there had been an argument about “who was
sitting where” on the sofa. Defense counsel asserted the argument about seating on the
sofa was part of a larger issue.
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The trial court excluded the evidence under Evidence Code section 352,
concluding that “an inquiry into the [victim’s] sexual orientation would confuse the
issues and mislead the jury as to the relevant issues here.” The trial court asserted that
defendant’s theory of the case was that he lacked “the necessary mental state[] to
commit the acts alleged . . . based on his medical condition.” Defendant’s trial counsel
asserted that another point he would argue is “the credibility and motives of the
[victim].” The trial court said it was aware of that intended point, but that inquiring into
the victim’s sexual orientation would create confusion and mislead the jury. The trial
court denied the motion.
During the trial, the victim testified that she suffers from anxiety and went to a
therapist. Grandmother testified, “Apparently, [the victim] was also seeing a doctor, a
psychologist, psychiatrist, and she said they were basically telling her what went on and
what to say and how to change her words.”
2. ANALYSIS
Defendant contends the trial court violated his rights of due process and
confrontation by precluding him from questioning the victim about her family’s
negative reaction to her disclosure of her sexual orientation and her subsequent mental
health.
“The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses [o]n
one’s own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process.” (Chambers v.
Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 294.) “Of course, the right to confront and to cross-
examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other
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legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” (Id. at p. 295.) “In particular,
notwithstanding the confrontation clause, a trial court may restrict cross-examination of
an adverse witness on the grounds stated in Evidence Code section 352. [Citation.] A
trial court’s limitation on cross-examination pertaining to the credibility of a witness
does not violate the confrontation clause unless a reasonable jury might have received a
significantly different impression of the witness’s credibility had the excluded cross-
examination been permitted.” (People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623-624.)
The victim’s credibility was impeached in a variety of ways. The victim testified
that her family did not believe her allegations. Mother and Grandmother testified about
the victim’s four out of court statements in which the victim recanted and said the social
worker and law enforcement misconstrued her statements. Mother testified that the
victim shoplifted multiple times. Thus, there was a variety of evidence from which the
jury could conclude the victim lacked credibility.
In terms of a motive to lie, there was evidence that the victim “had a big
argument” with defendant about a seat on the sofa, which resulted in the victim
“storm[ing] out of the living room.” The victim described that argument as the “last
straw,” which one could conclude indicated a troubled relationship. Thus, there was
evidence from which one could argue the victim disliked defendant.
In sum, there was evidence tarnishing the victim’s credibility and evidence of the
victim’s motive to fabricate the allegations. Given that such evidence was presented,
we conclude the jury would not have had a significantly different impression of the
victim’s credibility had the victim’s sexual orientation and further details of her mental
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health been admitted. (People v. Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 623-624.)
Therefore, the limitation on cross-examination did not violate the confrontation clause.
E. CUMULATIVE ERROR
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the foregoing alleged errors requires
reversal of the judgment. For the sake of judicial efficiency we treated two of the issues
as though the trial court erred. As explained ante, it can be concluded from the jury’s
verdicts that they credited defendant’s confession. Therefore, if the social worker’s
testimony about the victim’s extrajudicial statements had been excluded and if the
CSAAS evidence had been excluded, it is not reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to defendant would have occurred.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
FIELDS
J.
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