People v. Hubbs CA4/1 ( 2014 )

Filed 12/19/14 P. v. Hubbs CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D063955
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FBABS700108,
FBABS05997)
NORMAN JAMES HUBBS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County,
Steve C. Malone, Judge. Reversed.
Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Lynne G. McGinnis and Joy
Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Norman James Hubbs appeals a judgment committing him to the Department of
State Hospitals at Coalinga for an indeterminate term for treatment and confinement as a
sexually violent predator (SVP) under the provisions of the Sexually Violent Predators
Act (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 6600 et seq.) (SVPA) following a court finding that he is an
SVP.
Hubbs contends (1) his trial counsel was ineffective; (2) the trial court erroneously
denied his motion under People v. Mardsen (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden); (3) the trial
court erred in granting the prosecution's motion to consolidate the two SVP petitions; (4)
the trial court abused its discretion by denying Hubbs the right to represent himself; (5)
the trial court erred when it allowed Hubbs's trial counsel to waive his right to a jury trial
over Hubbs's objection; (6) he had a constitutional right to a jury trial; (7) cumulative
errors require reversal; and (8) the recent amendments to the SVPA are unconstitutional.
We agree with Hubbs there were numerous errors leading up to his trial and these
cumulative errors rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. We therefore reverse the
judgment and remand this matter for a new trial. In reaching this conclusion, we do not
address any of the constitutional issues Hubbs raises.
1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise
specified.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Hubbs's Underlying Convictions of Sex Offenses2
In the underlying criminal prosecution (People v. Hubbs (Super. Ct.
San Bernardino County, 1991, No. BCR-2641), a jury convicted Hubbs of a total of 11
counts of committing lewd and lascivious acts upon, and three counts of engaging in oral
copulation with five boys under the age of 14 years in violation of Penal Code sections
288, subdivision (a), and 288a, subdivision (c), respectively.
B. Hubbs's Previous Commitment
On April 13, 2006, a jury found Hubbs was an SVP and the court recommitted
Hubbs to Atascadero State Hospital for a two-year period for treatment and confinement.
Hubbs appealed the related judgment, and we reversed the judgment on the grounds that
Hubbs's trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective. In making this determination, we
noted that Hubbs's trial counsel did not obtain funding to retain an expert on Hubbs's
behalf. In addition, we observed that Hubbs's trial counsel did not subpoena any expert
witnesses to appear at trial. Because the statutory framework shows that SVP
commitment petitions are generally decided on the basis of expert testimony (see People
v. Angulo (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1358), we concluded Hubbs's utter failure to
secure any expert to testify at trial was prejudicially ineffective assistance of counsel.
2 The following brief history of Hubbs's prior sexual offense convictions is taken
from this court's unpublished opinion in his prior appeal (People v. Hubbs (Oct. 11, 2005,
D043625), hereafter referred to as Hubbs I).
3
(See People v. Hubbs (Feb. 20, 2008, D048607) [nonpub. opn.] (Hubbs II).) We issued a
remittitur on April 21, 2008.
C. Hubbs's Most Recent Recommitment Hearing
On March 27, 2007, the district attorney filed a petition seeking to commit Hubbs
as an SVP for a period of two years. In a series of continuances, many revolving around
Hubbs's apparent problems with appointed counsel, the probable cause hearing was
delayed until December 3, 2007 when it was waived by Hubbs's counsel.
On May 7, 2008, the district attorney amended the March 27 petition seeking to
commit Hubbs as an SVP for an indefinite period of time. The prosecution also moved to
consolidate the instant petition with the previous petition that resulted in a judgment,
which was reversed in Hubbs II. The court granted the motion. The matter eventually
proceeded to trial on March 14, 2013.
1. Prosecution
The prosecution presented the testimony of two experts, Drs. Robert Owen and
Carolyn Murphy. Owen, a licensed clinical psychologist, testified he first met Hubbs in
August 2001. He had conducted seven evaluations of Hubbs from August 2001 through
2012. He interviewed Hubbs in 2005. Owen also reviewed police reports, probation
reports, and medical records regarding Hubbs.
Owen diagnosed Hubbs with pedophilia with a sexual attraction to males and
personality disorder with antisocial features. He defined pedophilia as "a condition
involving at least six months of deviant fantasies, urges or behaviors directed towards
children who are preadolescent, generally 13 years and younger." Owen highlighted
4
several factors that supported his diagnosis. He noted that Hubbs went to great lengths to
molest his victims by creating a "boy[-]friendly environment." Hubbs had a boy living in
his home who brought other boys to the home. Owen opined that Hubbs then exploited
the boys that were particularly vulnerable and molested them. Owen also noted that
while Hubbs was in the state hospital in 2008, he drew a collage that included a nude
child.
Murphy, a clinical psychologist, first met and evaluated Hubbs in 2007. She
updated her report in November 2009 and September 2010. She reevaluated Hubbs in
October 2012. Murphy diagnosed Hubbs with pedophilia, depressive disorder, and
personality disorder not otherwise specified with narcissistic traits. She noted that
Hubbs's sheer number of offenses and pattern of conduct evidenced his pedophilia and
demonstrated that the disorder affected his volitional control. She also observed that
Hubbs had not attempted to modify his behavior or seek treatment, and that he continued
to offend despite consequences and sanctions.
Both Owen and Murphy evaluated Hubbs using the Static 99-R, an actuarial tool
that measures the risk of sexual reoffense. Owen scored Hubbs at a 3, but stated that his
score could also be a 4 depending on whether he actually had a significant live-in
relationship with a partner. The score placed Hubbs in the low to moderate risk of
reoffending, indicating a 15 percent risk of reoffending within five years and 24 percent
within 10 years. Murphy scored Hubbs with a 4, which placed him in a moderate to high
category and indicated that his risk of recidivism was higher than 63 to 77 percent of
offenders.
5
Based on their interviews, evaluations, and assessment of Hubbs's criminal
background and risk scores, Owen and Murphy opined that Hubbs's pedophilia affected
his volitional control, predisposed him to committing sexual offenses, and that he was
likely to reoffend in a sexually violent predatory manner in the future if released. They
ultimately opined that Hubbs met the criteria for commitment as an SVP.
2. Defense
Hubbs testified in his defense at trial. He stated that he had never been attracted to
children, had never engaged in any sexual act with a child, and was wrongfully accused
and convicted in all 12 instances. He said the children in Indiana made up the allegations
possibly to "get even for something." He filed a lawsuit against the San Bernardino
County Sheriff's Department prior to being arrested and accused of child molestation.
Hubbs testified that the reason he has not expressed remorse for the events that led
to his convictions is because they are false allegations. He was wrongfully convicted and
he has not done the things for which he has been convicted.
DISCUSSION
I
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Hubbs contends that his trial counsel was ineffective, and thus, violated his Sixth
Amendment due process rights. Specifically, Hubbs asserts his trial counsel was
6
ineffective for: (1) failing to offer an expert witness in defense of Hubbs at trial and
(2) waiving Hubbs's right to a jury trial.3
A. Background
On December 3, 2007, James Gass was appointed as Hubbs's defense counsel. On
November 3, 2009, at a status conference hearing, Gass stated that he had a list of doctors
to contact as potential defense experts, but would need to request additional funds from
the county administration.
At a status hearing held on January 12, 2010, Gass stated that he had not yet
retained an expert because he had just received the prosecutor's latest evaluation and
would need to send it out to a potential expert to review. Counsel submitted to the court
an application to appoint Dr. Jay Adams as a defense expert. The trial court granted the
order, which included funds for the expert to conduct an initial evaluation.
On March 12, 2010, at another status conference, Gass stated that he had a male
expert lined up who had looked at the evaluations and was willing to help. He stated he
would be submitting a new request for funding. Following several continuances, at a
status hearing on December 16, 2010, Gass told the court that his request for funds had
been denied. Following the probable cause hearing on January 18, 2011, Gass again
explained that his request for more expert funds had been denied, but that he planned to
have a hearing before the judge who denied the funds.
3 We discuss the waiver of jury trial and its impact on Hubbs's trial later in this
opinion.
7
At a status hearing on September 7, 2012, Gass informed the court that he had
spoken with a female expert who reviewed some of Hubbs's records. She told him she
could not help.
On the day of trial, in a Marsden hearing, Gass explained his efforts in attempting
to secure a defense expert. He stated that though he had contacted Adams, she ultimately
indicated that there was not much she could say that would help Hubbs's case.
B. Law and Analysis
To show that trial counsel's performance was constitutionally defective, an
appellant must prove: (1) counsel's performance fell below the standard of
reasonableness, and (2) the "deficient performance prejudiced the defense." (Strickland
v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688.) Competency is presumed unless the
record affirmatively excludes a rational basis for trial counsel's choice. (People v. Ray
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 349; People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1260.)
Here, Hubbs's trial counsel did not retain or present an expert witness on behalf of
Hubbs at trial. As Hubbs points out, the failure of his previous trial counsel to obtain
funding to retain an expert on Hubbs's behalf was the primary reason we reversed his
previous judgment on the grounds that his trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective.
However, there exist differences between the instant matter and Hubbs II.
In Hubbs II, it was clear that Hubbs's counsel did very little to retain an expert. He
did not attempt to obtain funding to retain an expert. He did not subpoena an expert
although he was aware of two who would possibly testify favorably on behalf of Hubbs.
In contrast, here, Gass at least made some effort to retain an expert. He obtained funding
8
for Adams, but Adams apparently could not help Hubbs's case. There is some indication
in the record that Gass contacted at least one other potential expert and there is a
reference to failed attempts to obtain additional funding. However, the record does not
shed much light on these additional efforts as it does not contain Gass's additional
requests for funding or the court's denial of same.
There simply is not enough in the record on which we can evaluate Hubbs's claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Gass's efforts to retain an expert surpass what we
concluded was prejudicially ineffective in Hubbs II, but here we are left to guess as to the
extent of Gass's efforts. Without more in the record, we cannot adequately address this
issue.4 An appellate court generally cannot fairly evaluate counsel's performance at trial
based on a silent record. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.) In
many instances, like here, evaluation of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will
have to await a petition for writ of habeas corpus, should the defendant believe there is a
viable claim that can be pursued. (Ibid.) Accordingly, we conclude that Hubbs's claim of
ineffective counsel is without merit.
4 Hubbs also claims his counsel was ineffective because he waived jury trial over
Hubbs's objection. We address counsel's waiver of jury trial below, but for purposes of
our analysis of the ineffective of assistance claim, this waiver does not help Hubbs's
assertion on the record before us. As we explain in more detail in a later section of this
opinion, there is little in the record to explain Gass's decision to waive jury trial. As
such, we cannot sufficiently examine Hubbs's claim on the record before us.
9
II
MARSDEN HEARING
Hubbs contends the trial court erroneously denied his Marsden motion. We agree.
The trial court did not adequately probe Hubbs's alleged problems with Gass's
representation of him and the record strongly implies that the trial court had decided it
was going to deny the motion prior to even hearing it. On this record, it appears the court
did not exercise its discretion by failing to hold an adequate Marsden hearing.
A. Background
On the morning of his trial, Hubbs reminded the court that he had a Marsden
motion pending. The trial court acknowledged that Hubbs had filed the motion. The
prosecutor objected to the timeliness of the motion, but the trial court interrupted her,
reassuring her: "If you give me five minutes, I could get this done in less time than you
would by making a record."
The court then held a hearing on Hubbs's Marsden motion. The court permitted
Hubbs to state some of his complaints:
"Mr. Gass has not contacted me in two years. As a matter of fact,
over two years ago he moved his office and never even bothered to
tell me. He gave me no notice that I'd even had a probable cause
hearing. He waived my rights to be present at that hearing and
presenting evidence. He has presented me with no defense
evaluations which under the statute I have a statutory right to have
those. Mr. Gass has just had a complete breakdown in
communication, plus the fact that now he has waived my rights to
have evaluators here at this trial for the defense. I have no experts at
all because he has not made any arrangements for any.
10
"Mr. Gass has waived my rights to the jury trial, which I have copies
of the letters that I have sent him over the years and he should be
very well aware of I had witnesses to be called. I wanted to be
present at the probable cause hearing. I wanted to be present
telephonically at all of the other hearings and I have a court order
from a previous judge in this case that granted me that right. And
yet Mr. Gass hasn't contacted me at all. He had all of these hearings
without me even knowing about them. I mean, Mr. Gass has waived
all of my rights without even contacting me, and I feel that this is a
complete denial of due process."
The court offered Gass an opportunity to respond:
"I got a letter from Mr. Hubbs, I believe in 2010 he told me that his
second knee replacement failed and he was going to be in the
medical ward for an extended period of time pretty much unable to
move around and do much. I did speak with an expert recommended
or requested by Mr. Hubbs. Her name is Jay Adams. She indicated
that there wasn't really much she could say that would help in this
particular case. I told Mr. Hubbs that. I spoke to him on the phone
probably close to two dozen times in the last four years, let him
know what was happening when it was happening.
"We had a probable cause hearing. I tried to make telephone contact
with him and were [sic] unable to. I sent him a copy of the
transcript, which he has. He says there are witnesses he called. I'm
not aware of any witnesses. Mr. Hubbs wants to attack the
underlying conviction and we're not able to attack the underlying
conviction. They are findings by two juries that he has qualifying
convictions, so that's the situation."
After listening to Gass's response, the trial court denied the Marsden motion.
Hubbs tried to object, claiming a right to call a witness. The court attempted to silence
Hubbs, leading to the following exchange:
"THE COURT: Mr. Hubbs, we have a court reporter that's here.
You've stated what your complaints are. They are part of the record.
"[Hubbs]: No sir. No, sir, I haven't stated all of them.
11
"THE COURT: That's all the time you have for this at this point.
It's part of the record. When we get done with this, if you are—if it
does not go in your favor I'll advise you of your appellate rights. I'm
not going to allow—
"[Hubbs]: I have orders filed before the Court.
"[THE COURT]: There are.
"[Hubbs]: I have other motions involved before the Court.
"[THE COURT]: I'm going to say this one time. If you keep
shouting over me, I'm going to mute you because I'm not—we can't
hold the proceedings if you keep yelling into the microphone.
"[Hubbs]: Are you going to hold a trial without me?
"THE COURT: You can hear it. We won't hear you until it's time
for you to speak.
"[Hubbs]: Your Honor, this is not right. This is unfair entirely. Mr.
Gass is not even qualified. He's never done a hearing.
"THE COURT: I'm going to turn the volume down on our end and
we'll get back to you.
"[Hubbs]: I have a motion filed against [the prosecutor] that's in the
court.
"[Hubbs]: Thank you, Mr. Gass. You are a son of a bitch.
"THE COURT: We'll seal the record of the Marsden hearing. The
Marsden hearing [sic] was denied."
B. Law and Analysis
A trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion. When the court
denies a Marsden motion, we review the denial under an abuse of discretion standard. A
denial is not an abuse of discretion unless the defendant shows the failure to replace the
appointed attorney would " ' "substantially impair" ' " the defendant's right to competent
12
counsel. (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1085.) A trial court's discretionary
decision will not be disturbed on appeal if there exists a reasonable or even fairly
debatable justification under the law for the action taken. (Gonzales v. Nork (1978) 20
Cal.3d 500, 507.) Consequently, we will interfere with the trial court's exercise of
discretion only when we conclude that under all the circumstances, viewed most
favorably in support of the trial court's action, no judge could have reasonably reached
the challenged result. (Smith v. Smith (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 952, 958.)
Under the Marsden standard, a defendant must show that appointed counsel is not
providing competent representation or that there is an irreconcilable conflict such that
ineffective representation is likely to result. (People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884,
917.) However, "a defendant does not have the right to the appointment of new counsel
absent a clear showing of inadequate representation." (People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d
604, 622.) The trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention
and to relate specific instances of the attorney's inadequate performance. (Marsden,
supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 124.) A trial court may not deny a request for substitution of
attorneys without giving the defendant the opportunity to explain his reasons through
presentation of argument and evidence. (Ibid.) "Marsden explains that 'the trial court . . .
cannot thoughtfully exercise its discretion in this matter without listening to [defendant's]
reasons for requesting a change of attorneys. A trial judge is unable to intelligently deal
with a defendant's request for substitution of attorneys unless he [or she] is cognizant of
the grounds which prompted the request. . . . Thus, a judge who denies a motion for
substitution of attorneys solely on the basis of his [or her] courtroom observations,
13
despite a defendant's offer to relate specific instances of misconduct, abuses the exercise
of his [or her] discretion to determine the competency of the attorney. . . .' [Citation.]"
(People v. Leonard (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 776, 787.) "Failure to inquire adequately into
a defendant's complaints results 'in a silent record making intelligent appellate review of
defendant's charges impossible.' " (People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744, 755, citing
People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308, 318.)
Here, we are troubled by the trial court's comments preceding the Marsden
hearing. When the prosecutor started to object to the motion, the trial court told her that
it would only take "five minutes" to "get this done." The fact that the court stopped the
prosecutor from making a record of her objections to the Marsden motion as well as the
court's comments that the hearing itself would not take much time raises the inference
that the trial court was planning, at best, to hold a perfunctory hearing and had already
decided the issue against Hubbs.
The transcript of the Marsden hearing does not alleviate our concerns, but instead
underscores the superficial nature of the hearing. The trial court allowed Hubbs to state
some of his complaints about Gass: (1) Gass had not contacted Hubbs in two years;
(2) Gass did not provide Hubbs with defense evaluations; (3) Gass had not retained an
expert on behalf of Hubbs; (4) Gass did not inform Hubbs of hearings or let him
participate in them; (5) Gass was not intending to present any witnesses on behalf of
Hubbs at trial; and (6) Gass waived all of Hubbs's rights for the trial. The court then
asked Gass to respond to the complaints, but Gass did not directly respond to them. For
example, Gass stated that he has talked to Hubbs 14 times in the past four years, but said
14
nothing about his communications with Hubbs in the past two years. Gass failed to
adequately explain why he had not retained an expert. He only stated that he talked to
one expert who could not help. In addition, Gass did not explain why he waived many of
Hubbs's rights for trial, including his right to jury trial.
Despite Gass's cursory response, the trial court did not further inquire into Hubbs's
complaints and quickly denied the Marsden motion "[b]ased on the record." The court
did so despite Hubbs's claim to have not stated all of his complaints. The court informed
Hubbs: "That's all the time you have for this at this point."
The People argue that there is no time requirement for a Marsden hearing. We
agree, but logically a court must devote sufficient time to understand a defendant's
complaints against his attorney and reasonably inquire about them. (See People v.
Leonard, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 787.) On the record before us, we cannot conclude
that the court did so.
The People also argue Hubbs's written Marsden motion lessened the need for the
court to hold a more complete hearing. (See People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068,
1103 ["[U]nder circumstances in which a defendant has set forth in a 'self-contained
document' in sufficient detail the basis for his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, . . .
a 'full-blown hearing' on the alleged inadequate representation is not required."].) We
agree with this general proposition of law, but observe there is no indication in the record
that the trial court actually considered Hubbs's written Marsden motion. That motion
contained 17 examples of Gass's alleged representation shortcomings. The court did not
ask Hubbs about these assertions or request that Gass respond to any of them. The court
15
did not read any of the motion's claims into the record. Instead, the court merely
acknowledged that Hubbs had filed a Marsden motion. The trial court's failure to
adequately inquire into Hubbs's complaints results in a "silent record" undercutting our
ability to review Hubbs's charges. (See People v. Hill, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 755;
People v. Cruz, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d at p. 318.)
The People do not address the impact of the trial court's error in failing to hold an
adequate hearing on Hubbs's Marsden motion. Although Marsden error is subject to a
harmless error review (see Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 126), typically such error may
be treated as prejudicial per se, since the very nature of the error precludes meaningful
appellate review of its prejudicial impact. (People v. Hill, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at
p. 755; see Marsden, supra, at p. 126.) This case is no exception to this general rule. In
addition, the effect of this error will be considered in connection with the claim of
cumulative error.
III
CONSOLIDATION OF SVP PETITIONS
A. Background of SVPA
The SVPA, as originally enacted effective January 1, 1996 (Stats. 1995, ch. 763,
§ 3, p. 5922), provided for the involuntary civil commitment for a two-year term of
confinement and treatment of a person who was found beyond a reasonable doubt to be
16
an SVP. (See former § 6604;5 Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1147
(Hubbart).) A person's commitment could not be extended beyond that two-year term
unless a new petition was filed seeking a successive two-year commitment. (Former
§ 6604; People v. Shields (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 559, 562 (Shields).) The SVP
extension hearing was a "new and independent proceeding at which the [People] must
prove the person [committed] meets the [SVP] criteria," including that he or she has a
currently diagnosed mental disorder that renders the person dangerous. (Bourquez v.
Superior Court (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1289 (Bourquez); see § 6605, subds. (d),
(e); People v. Munoz (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 421, 429.)
On September 20, 2006, the Legislature enacted urgency legislation amending the
SVPA, and on November 7, 2006, California voters approved Proposition 83 (also known
as "Jessica's Law") effective November 8, 2006. (Shields, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 562-563.) Among other changes, "former section 6604 was amended to eliminate the
two-year [commitment] term provision and to provide for an indeterminate term of
confinement. . . ." (Id. at p. 562.) Amended section 6604 provides in part: "If the court
or jury determines that the person is [an SVP], the person shall be committed for an
indeterminate term to the custody of the [DMH] for appropriate treatment and
confinement. . . ."
5 Former section 6604 provided in part: "[T]he person shall not be kept in actual
custody longer than two years unless a subsequent extended commitment is obtained
from the court incident to the filing of a [new] petition for extended commitment under
this article or unless the term of commitment changes pursuant to subdivision (c) of
Section 6605."
17
B. The Consolidation of Hubbs's Petitions
In 2006, Hubbs was recommitted to a two-year term in the state hospital, in case
number FBABS5997 (prior petition). In Hubbs II, on February 20, 2008, we reversed the
judgment and remanded the matter for a new trial. We issued the remittitur on April 21,
2008. However, more than a year prior to the issuance of the remittitur, the district
attorney filed the current petition. It was amended over a year later on May 7, 2008 to
account for the change in the SVPA. The prosecution then moved to consolidate the
prior and current petitions. At that time, neither the prior petition nor the current petition
had been set for trial.
On May 9, 2008, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to consolidate. The
prosecution argued that the trial court had authority under Code of Civil Procedure
section 187 to consolidate the petitions and that consolidation would not cause prejudice
or delay since neither case had a trial date set. Defense counsel opposed consolidation
and stated that Hubbs had a right to have a trial on the prior petition. The prosecution
explained the petitions encompassed the same prior convictions, and the same
requirement of finding a current mental disorder and likelihood of predatory reoffense,
and that a trial under the prior petition alone would result in an indeterminate term, and
not a two-year term, because of the recent changes to the SVPA.
When the trial court asked defense counsel what the point was then in objecting to
the consolidation, Hubbs asked to be heard and stated that because the case was reversed
it "reverts it right back to as if it never happened." He further stated that he was entitled
to a trial on the prior petition under the law that was in effect at the time of the prior trial.
18
He argued that consolidating the cases would prejudice him because he would be subject
to an indeterminate term and not the two-year term he claimed was applicable under the
prior petition. The court explained to Hubbs that even if he was tried on the prior petition
that originally indicated a two-year term, if found to be an SVP, he would be committed
to an indeterminate term, but Hubbs maintained that a new trial should be "under the
same circumstances, same law as the original" trial. The trial court subsequently granted
the prosecution's motion and ordered the petitions consolidated.
C. Law and Analysis
Hubbs contends the trial court erred when it consolidated the prior and current
petitions because he was entitled to a retrial under the law as it existed at the time the
prior petition was first tried. We disagree.
In Litmon v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1174 (Litmon), the
court concluded that "the trial court has the inherent power to consolidate" trials held
pursuant to the SVPA. There are limits, however, to that power. "[U]nless an SVP
consents to it, resort to consolidation should rarely be necessary. If a recommitment
petition is tried at or near the commencement of the commitment period to which it
relates, there will be no overlapping petition and thus no need for consolidation. If, for
some compelling reason, the first recommitment petition cannot be tried before a second
recommitment petition is also ready to be tried by both sides, it may well be that
consolidation does not violate this legislative intent. However, when the trial on the
earlier petition can be held within the two-year commitment period to which it relates,
and the SVP has announced ready for trial and has objected to consolidation or a
19
continuance, consolidation appears to be at odds with the legislative intent codified in the
SVPA. The SVPA is designed to ensure that the continued confinement of an SVP is
justified, if at all, at least every two years. The legislative scheme's emphasis on frequent
justification for the confinement of each SVP demands that an SVP not be confined
without an adjudication of the justification for that confinement, solely because judicial
resources will thereby be conserved." (Litmon, supra, at pp. 1175-1176.) "[B]ecause the
SVPA evidences a legislative intent to provide a trial on every filed recommitment
petition as close in time to the expiration of the prior commitment as practicable, it is
error to order consolidation over objection when a consolidated trial can occur only if the
earlier petition is further delayed." (Id. at p. 1176.)
Hubbs asserts his petitions could not be consolidated under Litmon, supra, 123
Cal.App.4th 1156. He argues that Litmon stands for the proposition that it is
inappropriate to deprive a defendant of his opportunity for an additional trial when the
delays that led to the consolidation were over his objection and imposed by the
prosecution. Hubbs notes that here trial on the prior petition occurred during the two-
year commitment period, but the judgment was reversed because he was appointed an
ineffective counsel. He insists the delay that led to the decision to consolidate the two
petitions occurred because the government failed to provide him with a competent
attorney. We are not persuaded.
In the instant matter, there were no delays caused by the consolidation of the
previous and current petitions. The current petition had not been set for trial. Since the
remittitur, the previous petition had not been set for trial. Accordingly, the consolidation
20
of the two petitions did not run afoul of the holding of Litmon, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th
1156. The "delay" Hubbs complains of occurred because we reversed the judgment
recommitting him as an SVP in Hubbs II. The reversal is not a delay of the type that the
court warns trial courts to be careful of in Litmon, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 1156. Indeed,
instead of a delay, the reversal in Hubbs II is simply Hubbs's prior petition running its
course. After remittitur, a new trial would have to be set in any event. As a trial had not
been set, it was not delayed by the consolidation with the current petition.
In addition, we agree with the trial court that judicial economy is well served by
the consolidation of the two petitions. They concern the same prior convictions, the same
requirement of finding a current mental disorder and likelihood of predatory reoffense,
and the same witnesses and evidence in general. It makes little sense to make the
prosecution try two separate cases.
Nevertheless, Hubbs contends two separate trials are required because, based on
the reversal in Hubbs II, he is entitled to a trial on a petition that only seeks a two-year
commitment. Hubbs, however, offers no compelling authority to support his position.
In People v. Carroll (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 503 (Carroll), the Court of Appeal
evaluated how and when the SVPA amendment imposing an indeterminate term of
confinement applied to SVPs. In Carroll, at the time the recommitment petition was filed
against the defendant, the SVPA mandated a two-year commitment for SVPs. However,
at the time of trial, the People asked to amend the petition to seek an indeterminate term,
to reflect the amendments to the SVPA. The trial court granted the request and ruled that
if the petition were found true, the commitment would be for an indeterminate term. The
21
defendant was found to be an SVP. On review, the court recognized that "[b]y changing
SVP terms from two years to an indeterminate period of time, the Legislature
unequivocally conveyed an intent to continue the confinement of persons adjudicated to
be SVPs." (Id. at p. 510.) The court observed that "because 'the trial on any petition for
commitment or recommitment must focus on the person's current mental condition,' "
"the significant point with respect to retroactivity is not the filing of the petition, but trial
and adjudication under the SVPA." (Carroll, supra, at pp. 513-514; accord, Bourquez,
supra, 156 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1288.)
We see no difference between the defendant in Carroll and Hubbs here. As
Carroll made clear, the dispositive factor in determining when an SVP is subject to the
amended SVPA is the time when the person's current mental condition establishes he is
an SVP. (Carroll, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 513-514.) Our reversal in Hubbs II
entitled Hubbs to a new trial on the determination of whether he is currently an SVP.
Hubbs received that. In his new trial, the court determined that Hubbs presently suffers
from a qualifying mental disorder that makes him an SVP. Hubbs thus was subject to
recommitment for an indeterminate term because at the time he was determined to be an
SVP, the amendments had become effective. (People v. Taylor (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th
920, 933; Carroll, supra, at pp. 513-514; Bourquez, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288.)
There was no error.
22
IV
RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION
Hubbs contends that the trial court erroneously denied his request to represent
himself and failed to exercise its discretion in denying his request because the court did
not "follow[] any appropriate procedure."
A. Background
On April 20, 2007, the trial court had a hearing on the current petition. At the
hearing, the Public Defender's Office declared a conflict. When the trial court indicated
that Lorene Mies would be appointed as Hubbs's defense counsel, the following exchange
occurred:
"[Hubbs]: I do not want that, your Honor.
"THE COURT: You no longer have a right to represent yourself in
a sexually violent predator proceeding. There is a new case on the
subject, and you may not represent yourself at this time.
"[Hubbs]: Well, I refuse this attorney.
"THE COURT: Feel free.
"[Hubbs]: It says you cannot force me to take an attorney.
"THE COURT: Yes, the law does say I can. So with that, we need
to set different dates.
Hubbs again objected and the court stated that his objection was noted for the
record. Later during the proceedings, Hubbs asked to speak with his attorney, and when
the trial court told him, "be quiet," Hubbs stated that he wished to enter a peremptory
challenge against the trial judge. The court replied, "[t]hat's up to your attorney, not up to
23
you. You're not representing yourself." Hubbs stated that he had been representing
himself and added that he objected to the whole proceeding.
On September 17, 2007, Mies was relieved as Hubbs's counsel and the court
appointed the conflict panel to represent Hubbs. On December 3, 2007, Gass was
appointed as Hubbs's attorney. Gass appeared on behalf of Hubbs and waived both
Hubbs's presence and the probable cause hearing.6
B. Analysis
Section 6603, subdivision (a) states that a person subject to SVP proceedings is
"entitled . . . to the assistance of counsel." Implied in that statutory right to assistance of
counsel is the right to refuse counsel and proceed pro per.
In People v. Williams (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1577 (Williams), we determined
that the language of the mentally disordered offender (MDO) commitment statutes
implicitly provided a statutory right to self-representation. We noted that Penal Code
section 2972 states that in a hearing for continued involuntary commitment as an MDO
the, " 'court shall advise the person of his or her right to be represented by an attorney.' "
(Williams, supra, at p. 1588, italics omitted.) We reasoned that "[section 2972] expressly
gives the right to counsel to defendants in MDO proceedings and surely they have by
implication the right to refuse appointed counsel and represent themselves." (Williams,
supra, at p. 1591.)
6 Although not explained why in the record, a probable cause hearing was held over
three years later.
24
Here, the trial court twice told Hubbs that he "no longer ha[d] a right to represent
[himself]" because there was a new case on the subject and that he could force Hubbs to
proceed with an attorney. Although the trial court did not cite to a specific case, the
parties agree that it appears the trial court was relying on the holding of People v. Fraser
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1430. In that case, the Court of Appeal determined that a
defendant in an SVPA proceeding did not have a Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation. (Fraser, supra, at p. 1446.) However, the court acknowledged Williams,
supra, 110 Cal.App.4th 1577, and never reached the issue of whether the defendant had a
statutory right to self-representation. (Fraser, supra, at p. 1450.) As such, Fraser does
not stand for the proposition that Hubbs could not represent himself in the SVP
proceeding. Thus, the trial court erred when it told Hubbs twice that he was legally
prohibited from representing himself.
The People argue that we review the trial court's denial of Hubbs's request for an
abuse of discretion and should " 'reverse only if it is more probable than not that [Hubbs]
would have received a better result had he been allowed to represent himself.' " (People
v. Hannibal (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1092 citing Williams, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1592-1593.) We agree with the People that the abuse of discretion is the proper
standard, and if this was the only error in this matter, we would not be likely to reverse
the judgment on the record before us. However, as we explain below, because of the
multitude of errors in this matter, we discuss the impact of this specific error in the
cumulative error section below.
25
V
WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL
Hubbs maintains the trial court erred by allowing Hubbs's trial counsel to waive
his right to a jury trial over his objection. We agree based on the specific facts in the
record before us.
A. Background
On October 19, 2012, at a hearing at which Hubbs was not present, Hubbs's trial
counsel waived Hubbs's right to a jury trial. There is no indication in the record that
Hubbs consented to this waiver. The court did not inquire about Hubbs's position on the
matter, and at this hearing, Hubbs's trial counsel made no representation that Hubbs had
consented to the waiver.
At a hearing on December 5, 2012, the attorneys and the court discussed
arrangements for the trial given Hubbs's medical problems. These problems effectively
prevented Hubbs from traveling to participate in person at trial. As such, the attorneys
and court were discussing the possibility of using video conference technology to allow
Hubbs to participate in his trial remotely. During the hearing, Hubbs's trial counsel and
the court engaged in the following exchange:
"[Mr. Gass]: One issue that I don't know the answer to is I can
waive a jury for Mr. Hubbs over his objection. I don't know that I
can agree to a trial over the phone over his objection, and I don't
know for sure if he's going to object. I know he objected to anything
happening without him either being here or on the phone, but I don't
know for sure if he'll say, yeah, let's proceed to trial. I'm happy on
the phone.
26
"THE COURT: Oh, I thought your request—I thought we started
down this road because Mr. Hubbs wanted the trial to go forward,
and he wanted to participate by phone. I thought that was your
representation to the court.
"[Mr. Gass]: That's half accurate and half not accurate. If he was
going to have a trial, he wants to at least be here by phone. But I'm
anticipating that he may say he doesn't want to have a trial if it has to
be by phone, but he had not said that to me. He, on one hand is
getting older. I've delayed his case for a long time, and I think it
benefits him because his recidivism possibilities go down as he gets
older. But I'm in the position where he could complain that he hasn't
had a trial, and he could complain he wants to have a trial.
"THE COURT: Mr. Gass, it's not often that I would disagree with
counsel, but I have to disagree. I believe your representation was
you announced ready and requested that your client be allowed to
participate by phone. That's the representation you made to the
Court. It's only recently since then that you mentioned that you
might now have an objection to what I thought was his request in the
first place."
The court and Hubbs's counsel did not focus on Hubbs's right to a jury trial during
their exchange. Instead, they centered on whether Hubbs would agree to a trial where he
would participate by phone. When Hubbs's counsel mentioned his concern that he might
not be able to waive jury trial over Hubbs's objection, there was no discussion of the
issue. In addition, Hubbs's counsel's comment about waiver over Hubbs's objection was
all the more odd because he already had waived Hubbs's right to a jury trial almost two
months earlier.
B. Law and Analysis
SVP commitment proceedings are not criminal cases; they are civil in nature.
(Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Ca1.4th 1138, 1171-1172.) An SVP proceeding is
a "special proceeding of a civil nature, because it is neither an action at law nor a suit in
27
equity, but instead is a civil commitment proceeding commenced by petition
independently of a pending action." (People v. Superior Court (Cheek) (2001) 94
Cal.App.4th 980, 988.) In a "special proceeding," the right to a jury trial is generally a
matter of legislative grant, and not constitutional right. (Corder v. Corder (2007) 41
Cal.4th 644, 656, fn. 7 [state constitutional right to a jury trial not applicable in special
proceedings]; Cornette v. Department of Transp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 76; People v.
Rowell (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 447, 452 (Rowell); People v. Williams (2003) 110
Cal.App.4th 1577, 1590 [no constitutional right to trial in civil commitment
proceedings].) In an SVP commitment proceeding, section 6603, subdivision (a)
provides the defendant with a statutory right to a jury trial.7
The People agree that Hubbs had a statutory right to a jury trial, but argue that a
person facing an SVP commitment proceeding must demand a jury trial. (§ 6603,
subd. (f).) They reason that a valid jury demand in a civil proceeding must be made
either "at the time the cause is first set for trial . . . or within five days after notice of
setting . . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 631, subd. (e)(4).) The People assert that Hubbs failed
to timely request a jury trial, and thus, he cannot now contend his attorney improperly
waived his right to a jury trial.
7 Hubbs also contends that he has a constitutional right to a jury trial. We note that
Hubbs's argument runs counter to existing precedent, but he urges us to reconsider this
issue. We decline to do so on the record before us.
28
Hubbs counters that there is no authority indicating Code of Civil Procedure
section 631 applies to SVP proceedings. However, we do not need to resolve this dispute
here. The court set trial in this matter on May 27, 2011. Although we do not have a
transcript of the May 27 hearing, the minutes from this hearing indicate that a jury trial
was set. Thus, it appears from the record, that Gass, Hubbs's attorney, requested a jury
trial at that point.
Moreover, other portions of the record support the inference that Hubbs's counsel
requested a jury trial. On October 19, 2012, Gass waived jury trial. The trial court
accepted the waiver. At that point, the prosecution did not argue that Hubbs had never
requested a jury trial. As such, on the record before us, it appears that Hubbs or his
counsel requested a jury trial, the court set a jury trial, and then Gass later waived the jury
trial. Therefore, we conclude a jury trial was timely requested, and now we must address
whether Gass's waiver of jury trial without Hubbs's consent and/or over his objection was
valid.
The parties concede that no reported decision has addressed the issue presented
here. However, at least one court has determined that a defendant in an SVP proceeding
does not have to personally waive his right to a jury trial. (See Rowell, supra, 133
Cal.App.4th at p. 454.)
In Rowell, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th 447, the defendant objected on appeal to his
trial attorney's waiver of his right to a jury trial. Yet, the attorney had filed a written
declaration under penalty of perjury stating that the defendant no longer wanted a jury
trial. On appeal, the defendant did not argue that the declaration was false or that the
29
attorney was without the actual authority to waive the jury trial. Instead, he claimed that
he had the right to make a personal waiver and the attorney's waiver was invalid. (Id. at
pp. 452-453.) The Court of Appeal rejected this argument concluding that "a defendant's
personal waiver of a jury trial in an SVP proceeding is not required, and the trial court
properly accepted defense counsel's declaration that the defendant wanted a court trial."
(Id. at p. 454.)
Although we do not quibble with the holding of Rowell, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th
447, it is of little help in the instant action. In contrast to the defendant in that case,
Hubbs does not claim his statutory right to jury trial can only be personally waived.
Further, there is no indication in the record that Hubbs ever consented to a waiver of jury
trial or that Gass represented Hubbs had consented to waiver. In fact, the record implies
the opposite conclusion: Gass waived Hubbs's right to a jury trial over Hubbs's objection.
The holding of Rowell therefore does not resolve the issue presented here.
Outside the SVP context, but in other special proceedings, courts have accepted a
defendant's counsel's waiver of a jury trial without the defendant's consent or over his
objection. For example, a defendant's trial counsel can raise a doubt as to defendant's
competency and can even waive a jury trial over a defendant's objection in a competency
proceeding. (People v. Masterson (1994) 8 Cal.4th 965, 971-973 (Masterson). In
Masterson, after determining that a defendant's right to a jury trial in a competency
hearing was statutory not constitutional (id. at p. 969), the California Supreme Court
reasoned it would make no sense to grant the defendant authority to make basic decisions
30
regarding the conduct of the proceeding because the very competency of the defendant is
in question at such a proceeding (id. at p. 971).
However, the conclusion in Masterson was driven, in part, by the recognition that
in proceedings to determine competency to stand trial in a criminal case (ref. Pen. Code,
§ 1368 et seq.), it is presumed that the person whose competence is in question cannot be
entrusted to make basic decisions regarding the conduct of that proceeding. (Masterson,
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 974.) Civil commitments under the SVPA do not necessarily
involve individuals whose competence is in question, so, absent anything in the record
showing there was some question as to Hubbs's competence to make decisions regarding
his defense, we cannot extend the holding of Masterson to the issue before us. As neither
party has pointed to Hubbs's competence being at issue, beyond the mental illness of
pedophilia, we find no indication in the record that would support application of
Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th 965 here.
Courts also have addressed jury waiver issues in commitment proceedings
involving MDOs and defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). In People
v. Otis (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1174 (Otis), the court dealt with Penal Code section 2966,
subdivision (b), which requires a jury trial when a person challenges his or her MDO
status unless the jury is "waived by both the person and the district attorney." There,
counsel waived a jury trial. The defendant objected and requested a jury trial, but at the
time, he was delusional and said he was being sexually assaulted by invisible police. The
court denied the request. (Id. at pp. 1175-1176.)
31
In upholding counsel's waiver, the court found that "nothing in the requirement
that the waiver must be by 'the person' precludes the person's attorney from acting on his
behalf" and noted that "[t]he Legislature did not say the waiver had to be made
'personally.' " (Otis, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176.) The court opined that if the
Legislature had intended to require a personal waiver, it would have made its intent clear
and unambiguous. (Ibid.)
The court further explained that Penal Code "[s]ection 2966 concerns persons who
have been found by the Board of Prison Terms to be mentally disordered. The
Legislature must have contemplated that many persons, such as Otis, might not be
sufficiently competent to determine their own best interests. There is no reason to
believe the Legislature intended to leave the decision on whether trial should be before
the court or a jury in the hands of such a person." (Otis, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1177.)
In People v. Montoya (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 825, the court reached the same
conclusion concerning identical language in Penal Code section 2972, subdivision (a),
which requires a jury trial on an MDO commitment extension unless waived "by both the
person and the district attorney." There too, counsel waived a jury. (Montoya, supra, at
pp. 828-829.)
The court concluded that the constitutional waiver requirements in criminal cases
were inapplicable because a commitment trial is fundamentally a civil proceeding.
(Montoya, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 829-830.) The court further observed that in civil
actions, where there is a state constitutional right to a jury trial, and in ancillary criminal
32
proceedings, where the right to a jury trial is statutory, not constitutional, a jury trial can
be waived by either the client or counsel. (Ibid.) Accordingly, the court looked to the
waiver provision to see if it permitted or prohibited counsel to waive. (Id. at p. 830.)
In upholding counsel's waiver, the court followed Otis, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th
1174. It too noted that the statutory language did not expressly require a personal waiver
or clearly preclude a waiver by counsel and agreed that the Legislature could not have
intended to require a personal waiver and thereby deny counsel the authority to act on
behalf of an incompetent MDO such as the MDO in Otis. (Montoya, supra, 86
Cal.App.4th at pp. 830-831.)
The court acknowledged that "a patient might be mentally disordered for some
purposes and not for others." (Montoya, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 831.) However, it
noted that the defendant's mind was not functioning normally (he was diagnosed with
schizophrenia), and he had repeatedly and recently demonstrated poor judgment and
aberrant behavior. In upholding counsel's waiver, the court found "no reason to believe
that defendant was capable of making a reasoned decision about the relative benefits of a
civil jury trial compared to a civil bench trial." (Ibid.)
In People v. Powell (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1153 (Powell), the defendant, who
was found NGI, objected to counsel's waiver, and requested a jury. When the court
denied the request, the defendant became so argumentative, belligerent, and disruptive
that he had to be removed from the courtroom. On appeal, the defendant claimed that
counsel's waiver was ineffective because Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(4)
required his personal waiver. (Powell, supra, at pp. 1157-1158.)
33
In rejecting this claim, the court cited Otis, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 1174 and noted
that "[t]he Legislature, in enacting [Penal Code] section 1026.5, did not say that the jury
waiver must be 'personally' made by the NGI committee." (Powell, supra, 114
Cal.App.4th at p. 1159.) Moreover, mirroring the Otis court's view concerning
incompetent persons, the court opined generally that "[a]n insane person who is 'a
substantial danger of physical harm to others' [citation] should not be able to veto the
informed tactical decision of counsel." (Id. at p. 1158.) The court pointed out that the
defendant had been found insane twice, medical staff had diagnosed him with paranoid
schizophrenia, and there was no evidence he had regained his sanity. The court further
noted that the defendant had a history of violence, believed certain people should be
killed, and sought release to do so. (Ibid.) The court asked, "Can such a person
intelligently invoke or waive the right to a jury trial? Is such a person competent to
meaningfully understand who should make the determination of whether his commitment
should be extended?" (Ibid.) The court answered, "Common sense dictates that appellant
should not be able to veto his attorney's decision to waive a jury. The record
demonstrates that appellant was suffering from a severe mental disorder. On the day of
the purported demand for jury, appellant was medicated, experiencing mood swings, and
was so belligerent and disruptive that he had to be removed from the courtroom." (Ibid.)
In addition to Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th 965, the People here rely on Montoya,
supra, 86 Cal.App.4th 825 and Powell, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 1153, and to a more
limited extent, Otis, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 1174. However, Otis, Montoya, and Powell
34
must be viewed in light of their particular facts and the issues raised in them.8 (See
Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 ["[l]anguage used in any opinion is of
course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court"].) As
noted, in Otis, the defendant was delusional, and the court upheld counsel's jury waiver
over the defendant's objection, opining that the defendant was not capable of making a
reasoned decision. (Otis, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1175-1176.) In Montoya, the
court also upheld counsel's waiver, noting that the defendant's mind was not functioning
normally, and he, like the defendant in Otis, was not capable of making a reasoned
decision. (Montoya, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 831.) Likewise, the court in Powell
upheld counsel's waiver over the defendant's objection because the defendant was
medicated and his disruptive conduct demonstrated his incompetence. (Powell, supra,
114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158.)
Given the particular facts concerning the mental state of these defendants, we read
these cases for the proposition that when it reasonably appears that an MDO or defendant
who is NGI is incapable of determining whether a bench or jury trial is in his or her best
interests, he or she must act through counsel, and counsel has exclusive authority to
decide even over an objection. We do not read these cases more broadly to hold that
counsel controls the jury issue in an SVP proceeding, regardless of whether the defendant
8 We are mindful that two cases pending before the California Supreme Court
(People v. Blackburn, S211078; and People v. Tran, S211329) may impact the
precedential value of Otis, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 1174; Montoya, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th
825 and Powell, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 1153. However, at this time, these three cases
remain good law and we apply them here accordingly.
35
is incompetent. Simply put, there is a difference between the respective mental states of
the defendants in Otis, Montoya, and Powell on the one hand and Hubbs on the other.
Although the record indicates that Hubbs can be a difficult client and often argues with
the court, we find nothing in the record implying Hubbs was incapable of determining
whether a bench or jury trial was in his best interest. Indeed, such an argument was never
made at trial or on appeal.
Citing People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081 (Barrett), the People argue that a
distinction between Hubbs's mental capability and the respective mental capabilities of
the defendants in Otis, Montoya, and Powel does not matter. We do not read Barrett as
determining this issue.
In Barrett, supra, 54 Cal.4th 1081, the Supreme Court concluded counsel had
exclusive control in a proceeding to commit a mentally retarded person who is dangerous
under section 6500. In that case, the court conducted a bench trial and committed the
defendant. (Barrett, supra, at pp. 1088-1092.) On appeal, she claimed that the federal
Constitution provided the right to a jury trial and required a jury advisement and personal
waiver. (Id. at p. 1093.) Although the statute did not provide the right to a jury trial, the
Supreme Court agreed that constitutional considerations warranted recognizing an
implied statutory right to a jury trial. (Id. at pp. 1097, 1100.) However, the court rejected
advisement and waiver requirements because it found that counsel had exclusive control
over whether to have a jury trial. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied primarily
on Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th 825.
36
The court explained that mental retardation is a developmental disability that
originates when an individual is a minor and continues, or can be expected to continue,
indefinitely, and constitutes a " 'substantial disability for that individual.' " (Barrett,
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1103.) Moreover, for purposes of a commitment under section
6500, mental retardation involves " ' " 'significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior,' and appearing in the
'developmental period.' " ' [Citations.]" (Ibid., italics omitted.) The court opined that
"the significant cognitive and intellectual deficits that the condition entails, which appear
early in life and never recede, affect the ability to 'make basic decisions' regarding the
conduct of the section 6500 proceeding. [Citation.] Such an individual thus plays a
limited 'personal role' in the case, and must rely on counsel to decide all tactical and
procedural matters, such as whether to exercise the jury trial right." (Id. at pp. 1103-
1104.)
The court rejected a claim that this approach "improperly 'presumes' that a person
is mentally retarded before the fact finder has decided the issue." (Barrett, supra, 54
Cal.4th at p. 1104.) The court noted that a commitment petition is filed at the request of
"a responsible and interested party (e.g., parent, conservator, correctional or probation
official, or regional center director), who presents specific information (reasons) for
supposing that the person is mentally retarded and dangerous, in need of treatment, and
eligible for commitment. The significance of this request, and its role in providing a
foundation for the petition and commitment process, is underscored by the verification
requirement. (§ 6502.) . . . [¶] Second, where a section 6500 petition is filed, the trial
37
court is entitled to a written report prepared by, or at the behest of, the director of the
regional center, following an examination of the alleged mentally retarded person.
(§ 6504.5.) Regional centers specialize in assessing and assisting mentally retarded and
other developmentally disabled persons on an individual basis. [Citation.] Thus, the
regional center report obviously serves as a professional pretrial evaluation of the
person's history, condition, and behavior, and includes informed recommendations on
treatment and placement, including any interim placement pending the hearing. . . .
[¶] In light of these principles and authorities, we conclude that someone like Barrett,
who is alleged to be mentally retarded and dangerous under section 6500, is not in a
position to personally assert or waive the right to jury trial, to sufficiently comprehend
the jury trial advisement, or to override the views of counsel on the subject. Sole control
over such tactical and procedural decisions rests with counsel, whether or not the client
has been consulted or objects." (Barrett, supra, at pp. 1104-1105.)
Barrett can be read with Masterson to establish that in certain types of
commitment proceedings, the defendant's alleged mental state—e.g., incompetency and
mental retardation—disables him or her from making reasoned decisions about what is in
his or her best interests, including whether to request or waive a jury trial. Put
differently, it is reasonable to categorically assume that such defendants lack the capacity
to make a rational decision about a jury trial. Accordingly, they must act through
counsel, and counsel has exclusive control over the jury issue. Nevertheless, we do not
read these cases to hold that defense counsel controlled the jury issue here in an SVP
proceeding regardless of Hubbs's mental capabilities. Nor do we read Barrett to render
38
Hubbs's capability of determining whether a bench or jury trial was in his best interest
irrelevant.
In short, we read nothing in Barrett or Matterson (or Otis, Montoya, or Powell for
that matter) that creates a bright line rule in an SVP proceeding that, simply because of
the nature of the proceeding, and the possibility that the defendant is suffering from the
mental illness pedophilia, defense counsel absolutely controls the right to jury trial over
the defendant's objection. This said, we are mindful that there may be situations in an
SVP proceeding where a defendant lacks the capacity to make a reasonable decision
about whether to have a jury or bench trial. This is not that case. In addition, we do not
discard the possibility that a jury waiver may be appropriate over the objection of a
defendant in an SVP proceeding if the waiver is a tactical decision of defense counsel,
depending on the circumstances of the specific case. Again, the record in this case does
not allow us to address this issue to create a general rule that applies beyond the specific
facts of this case.
There is no indication that Hubbs was incapable of determining whether a bench
or jury trial was in his best interest. The People do not make such an argument in their
respondent's brief, and neither the prosecution nor Hubbs's counsel raised this issue with
the trial court. And the record is silent as to why Hubbs's counsel waived jury trial. With
virtually no discussion, Hubbs's counsel and the prosecution waived jury trial on
October 19, 2012. Curiously, almost two months later, when discussing the logistics of
trial considering Hubbs's medical issues and inability to travel, Hubbs's counsel exhibited
concern that he might not be able to waive a jury trial over his client's objection. This
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issue was never probed by the trial court despite the fact that Hubbs used his attorney's
jury trial waiver as grounds to support his Marsden motion. Simply put, on the record
before us, it is not clear that Gass waived jury trial for any tactical purpose to benefit
Hubbs whatsoever.9 Instead, as best as it can be implied from the record, it appears
Hubbs's counsel did so either for his convenience or the court's convenience.
Based on the specific facts before us here, we conclude that the trial court erred in
accepting Hubbs's counsel's waiver of jury trial without any indication that Hubbs
consented to the waiver or Hubbs was incapable of determining whether a bench or jury
trial was in his best interest. The People argue that any error would be harmless. We
discuss this error in the cumulative error section below.
VI
CUMULATIVE ERROR
Hubbs contends that even if no individual errors were prejudicial alone, the
cumulative effect of multiple errors require reversal. When a defendant claims
cumulative error the "test is whether defendant received due process and a fair trial."
(People v. Kronemyer (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 314, 349.) "[W]e review each allegation
and assess the cumulative effect of any errors to see if it is reasonably probable the jury
would have reached a result more favorable to defendant in their absence." (Ibid.) The
9 Ostensibly, it could make sense that Gass waived jury trial because he thought a
bench trial would better serve Hubbs if Hubbs was not going to be present in person at
the trial. However, Gass's questioning of whether he could waive jury trial over his
client's objection when the parties and court were discussing the logistics of a trial
because Hubbs could not travel belies that notion.
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cumulative effect of the errors discussed ante—the failure to conduct a proper hearing on
the Marsden motion, the court informing Hubbs that he was prohibited by California law
from representing himself, and the waiver of jury trial without Hubbs's consent and/or
over his objection—require reversal.
This is one of those rare cases where, simply put, too much went wrong,
undermining our confidence that Hubbs received a fair trial. The court did not
sufficiently explore Hubbs's complaints about Gass in the Marsden motion. It did not
allow Hubbs to discuss all his complaints. The court did not have Gass respond to all the
complaints. The court appeared to ignore the substance of Hubbs's written motion. And,
most egregiously, the court appears to have predetermined the result and did not provide
a sufficient amount of time for the hearing.
In addition, the court incorrectly told Hubbs twice that he was prohibited from
representing himself. These incorrect statements of the law colored Hubbs's interactions
with the court and his counsel. He wanted to represent himself. He was entitled to do so.
(See Williams, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1591.) The court would not permit him to do
so. Perhaps if the court had permitted Hubbs to represent himself, he would have been
able to retain an expert or would not have waived jury trial. We cannot answer these
questions because the trial court erred in informing Hubbs he could not represent himself
and never appropriately considered Hubbs's request.
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The trial court also erred in allowing Gass to waive jury trial. There is no
indication in the record that Hubbs lacked the capacity to determine whether a jury or
bench trial would be in his best interest. Hubbs did not consent to the waiver. And there
is nothing in the record showing that the waiver was the product of Gass's trial strategy.
Added to these three errors are other issues before and during trial that cause us to
question the fairness of the trial here. Although we were unable to determine that Gass
was constitutionally ineffective, we remain very concerned that Gass did not retain an
expert despite his representations to the court that he had consulted with multiple experts.
Also, we do not discount the fact that it took over six years after the original, current
petition was filed to get the matter to trial.
We understand that Hubbs was convicted of odious crimes. We appreciate that he
does not come across as a pleasant person in the record. Yet, despite Hubbs's flaws, he is
still entitled to a proper SVP proceeding. He did not receive one here. This case is an
example of the wheels of justice falling off the track and never quite being able to get
back on. Hubbs was a 68-year-old man at the time of his most recent trial who has been
confined as an SVP since 2006 after serving his prison sentence. Considering the errors
discussed above as well as other irregularities in the record, we cannot be confident that it
is reasonably probable the jury would not have reached a result more favorable to Hubbs
in their absence. (See People v. Kronemyer, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 349.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
McDONALD, J.
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