People v. Medina CA2/3 ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 6/6/22 P. v. Medina CA2/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    THE PEOPLE,                                                  B312251
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                           Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BA159448
    v.
    LEONEL MEDINA,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County. William C. Ryan, Judge. Affirmed
    and remanded with directions.
    Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court
    of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
    Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
    Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Chung L. Mar,
    Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    _________________________
    In 1998, Leonel Medina pleaded guilty to two felony counts,
    and the trial court sentenced him to two years in prison. More
    than 20 years later, Medina filed a motion to vacate the pleas
    and convictions, arguing the trial court failed to make a sufficient
    inquiry into the factual basis for the pleas and referred to the
    wrong statute while taking one of the pleas. The superior court
    construed the motion as a petition for writ of error coram nobis,
    which it denied after finding Medina failed to show due diligence.
    On appeal, Medina argues the court abused its discretion in
    denying his motion. We affirm the order and remand the case
    with directions to correct an error in the abstract of judgment.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In December 1997, the People filed a felony information
    charging Medina with assault on a peace officer (Pen. Code,
    § 245, subd. (c); count 1) and possession for sale of a controlled
    substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351 1; count 2).
    At a hearing in April 1998, Medina’s counsel informed
    the court that “we decided to accept the People’s offer.” The
    prosecutor told the court the People agreed to reduce count 1
    to a non-strike violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision
    (a). The prosecutor also represented that Medina agreed to
    plead guilty to counts 1 and 2 in return for a total sentence
    of two years. The term on count 1 would run concurrent with
    the term on count 2, which would be the base term. Medina
    confirmed the agreement.
    The trial court took Medina’s waivers. Defense counsel
    joined in the waivers, concurred in the pleas, and stipulated
    1    All future unspecified statutory references are to the
    Health and Safety Code.
    2
    to a factual basis for those pleas. The court then asked Medina
    how he pleaded to “felony information . . . count I as amended
    245(a), and count II, 11350 of the Health and Safety Code.”
    Medina responded, “[g]uilty.” No one pointed out to the court
    that the information charged Medina in count 2 with violating
    section 11351 (possession for sale), rather than section 11350
    (simple possession).
    After taking the pleas, the court immediately proceeded
    to sentencing. The court stated that, “[p]ursuant . . . to case
    settlement, the matter having been submitted, the court will
    make the base term count II. That’s 11351, mid term of three
    years.” The parties clarified that the agreement was for a term
    of two years. The court then sentenced Medina as follows:
    “The Court will still select the base term count II, the low term
    two years for 11351, concurrent term for the 245 low term of
    two years, for a total agreed-upon sentence of two years.” The
    abstract of judgment states Medina was convicted of violating
    section 11351 and Penal Code section 245, subdivision (c).
    The government deported Medina to Mexico after he
    served his prison sentence. Medina, however, soon returned
    to the United States to be with his family. At some point, the
    government initiated new removal proceedings against him.
    Medina’s immigration attorney referred him to a criminal
    attorney, whom Medina hired in August 2020.
    In February 2021, Medina filed a motion to “vacate plea
    and conviction under Penal Code section 1192.5.” He argued
    his pleas were deficient because he did not provide a factual
    basis for them, and his counsel did not stipulate to a factual basis
    based on a “document, statement, or plea.” Medina also argued
    the court’s reference to section 11350, rather than section 11351,
    3
    rendered the factual basis for his plea “inadequate . . . because
    the offense pled to did not mirror the anticipated resolution.”
    Further, Medina asserted the court’s reference to section 11350
    invalidated the entire proceeding because it showed he did not
    “intelligently, or accurately understand, or plead to the charges
    alleged and, ostensibly, agreed upon.” According to Medina,
    it would be “absurd to assert that [he] intelligently understood
    the charge he pled to if the proposed agreement was something
    completely different . . . .”
    Medina attached to the motion a declaration in which he
    claimed his trial counsel told him to accept the plea agreement,
    but he did not “really know 100% of what was going on.”
    According to Medina, his counsel told him there “would be
    some changes to the charges that were in my favor. She told me
    I would get a two-year sentence and that with the credits I had,
    I would be out of custody almost immediately. So, I just followed
    what my public defender said to do and say.” Medina claimed
    he first realized he pleaded to simple possession of drugs after
    speaking to the criminal attorney he hired in connection with
    his immigration matter.
    The superior court denied Medina’s motion without
    conducting a hearing. The court explained that Penal Code
    section 1192.5 does not include a mechanism for moving to
    withdraw a plea and vacate a conviction many years after
    the sentence has been served. Nevertheless, the court construed
    the motion as a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The court
    found Medina was not entitled to relief because he “makes no
    attempt to show that the facts upon which he relies were not
    known to him, and could not in the exercise of due diligence
    have been discovered by him, at any time substantially earlier
    4
    than the time of the instant motion. [Medina’s] plea was entered
    over 20 years ago. It is feasible that with the exercise of due
    diligence, [Medina] could have been aware of the facts giving
    rise to the instant motion long before it was filed. [Medina]
    does not state when he first became aware of the facts giving
    rise to the instant petition.”
    Medina timely appealed.2
    DISCUSSION
    “The writ of error coram nobis is a nonstatutory, common
    law remedy whose origins trace back to an era in England in
    which appeals and new trial motions were unknown.” (People v.
    Kim (2009) 
    45 Cal.4th 1078
    , 1091 (Kim).) “[T]he writ’s purpose
    ‘is to secure relief, where no other remedy exists, from a
    judgment rendered while there existed some fact which would
    have prevented its rendition if the trial court had known it
    and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant,
    was not then known to the court.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v.
    Adamson (1949) 
    34 Cal.2d 320
    , 326–327.)
    The petitioner must meet several requirements to be
    entitled to relief. First, he “ ‘must “show that some fact existed
    which, without any fault or negligence on his part, was not
    presented to the court at the trial on the merits, and which
    2      The Attorney General argues the court’s order denying
    Medina’s statutory motion to vacate is not appealable. We need
    not decide that issue because Medina does not contend he is
    entitled to statutory relief. Instead, he urges us to construe his
    motion as a nonstatutory petition for writ of error coram nobis,
    which is appealable. (See People v. Allenthorp (1966) 
    64 Cal.2d 679
    , 683 [a “trial court’s denial of a petition for writ of error
    coram nobis is an appealable order”].)
    5
    if presented would have prevented the rendition of the
    judgment.” ’ ” (Kim, 
    supra,
     45 Cal.4th at p. 1093, quoting
    People v. Shipman (1965) 
    62 Cal.2d 226
    , 230.) Second, he must
    “ ‘show that the “newly discovered evidence . . . [does not go]
    to the merits of issues tried; issues of fact, once adjudicated,
    even though incorrectly, cannot be reopened except on motion
    for new trial.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Third, he “ ‘ “must show that the facts
    upon which he relies were not known to him and could not
    in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered by him
    at any time substantially earlier than the time of his motion
    for the writ . . . .” ’ ” (Ibid.) The “burden falls to defendant
    ‘to explain and justify the delay.’ ” (Kim, at p. 1096, quoting
    People v. Castaneda (1995) 
    37 Cal.App.4th 1612
    , 1618.) “The
    diligence requirement is not some abstract technical obstacle
    placed randomly before litigants seeking relief, but instead
    reflects the balance between the state’s interest in the finality
    of decided cases and its interest in providing a reasonable avenue
    of relief for those whose rights have allegedly been violated.”
    (Kim, at p. 1097.)
    We review the denial of a petition for writ of error coram
    nobis for an abuse of discretion. (Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at
    p. 1095.)
    Here, Medina failed to show due diligence, and the superior
    court properly denied his petition on that basis. Medina’s motion
    to vacate was premised on two purported errors during his 1998
    plea hearing: (1) the trial court did not make a sufficient inquiry
    into the factual basis for his pleas as required under Penal Code
    section 1192.5; and (2) the trial court referred to section 11350,
    rather than section 11351, while taking his plea on count 2.
    Medina was present and represented by counsel at the plea
    6
    hearing, and he does not contend his interpreter made a mistake
    or that he somehow misheard the court. As a result, Medina
    was aware, or at least should have been aware, of all the relevant
    facts more than 20 years before he filed his motion. That he
    may not have fully understood the legal significance of those
    facts until much later is immaterial. (See Kim, 
    supra,
     45 Cal.4th
    at p. 1093 [“For a newly discovered fact to qualify as the basis
    for the writ of error coram nobis, we look to the fact itself and
    not its legal effect.”].)
    Even if Medina had shown due diligence, his claims fail
    for other reasons. As Medina acknowledges, his motion to vacate
    was premised on purported legal errors during the plea hearing,
    which he could have raised on direct appeal. (See People v.
    Holmes (2004) 
    32 Cal.4th 432
    , 443.) The writ of error coram
    nobis, however, “ ‘does not lie to enable the court to correct errors
    of law.’ ” (Kim, 
    supra,
     45 Cal.4th at p. 1093.) Nor is writ relief
    available when the petitioner could have raised the claim on
    direct appeal. (Ibid.)
    Aware of the problems with his original motion, Medina
    asserts a new argument on appeal: he is entitled to relief
    because the trial court sentenced him under the wrong statute.
    Specifically, he insists that as part of his plea deal, the parties
    agreed he would plead guilty to a violation of section 11350,
    rather than section 11351. Therefore, he argues, the trial court
    properly took his plea under section 11350, but mistakenly
    sentenced him under section 11351.3
    3      Confusingly, Medina suggested throughout his motion to
    vacate that the parties agreed he would plead guilty to a violation
    of section 11351, but the trial court mistakenly referred to section
    11350 while taking his plea.
    7
    Medina’s contention finds no support in the record.
    The People alleged in count 2 of the information that Medina
    violated section 11351. Unlike count 1, the prosecutor did not
    move to amend count 2. Nor is there anything in the record
    even suggesting the parties contemplated that Medina would
    plead to violating section 11350. Medina, in fact, asserted in
    his declaration that he did not realize he had pleaded to simple
    possession until more than 20 years after the fact, which is
    inconsistent with his current claim that he always intended
    to plead to the lesser offense. The trial court, moreover, twice
    referred to section 11351 during sentencing and imposed the
    low term under that statute as the base term. Neither Medina,
    his counsel, nor the prosecutor objected.
    On this record, is it clear that Medina intended to plead
    guilty to a violation of section 11351, and the trial court simply
    misspoke when it referred to section 11350 while taking his plea.
    The court’s mistake is akin to a clerical error, which does
    not invalidate the judgment. (See People v. Menius (1994)
    
    25 Cal.App.4th 1290
    , 1294–1295 [the trial court’s inadvertent
    reference to the wrong subdivision during sentencing did not
    require reversal]; People v. Powell (1991) 
    230 Cal.App.3d 438
    , 442
    [the court’s reference to the wrong statute while pronouncing
    judgment was a clerical error subject to correction].) As a result,
    it does not entitle Medina to a writ of error coram nobis. (See
    Kim, 
    supra,
     45 Cal.4th at p. 1093 [for coram nobis relief, the
    petitioner must show the existence of a fact that would have
    prevented the rendition of judgment].)
    Medina alternatively requests we correct two errors in
    his abstract of judgment. Specifically, he contends the abstract
    of judgment erroneously states he was convicted of violating
    8
    section 11351 and Penal Code section 245, subdivision (c).
    According to Medina, he was actually convicted of violating
    section 11350 and Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a).
    We agree with Medina that the abstract of judgment should
    be corrected to reflect that he was convicted of violating Penal
    Code section 245, subdivision (a). The record shows that, before
    taking Medina’s plea, the court granted the prosecutor’s motion
    to amend count 1 from a violation of Penal Code section 245,
    subdivision (c), to a violation of Penal Code section 245,
    subdivision (a). The court then referred exclusively to Penal
    Code section 245, subdivision (a) while taking Medina’s plea
    and sentencing him. The reference to Penal Code section 245,
    subdivision (c) in the abstract of judgment is clearly a clerical
    error, and it must be corrected to reflect the court’s oral
    pronouncement of judgment. (See People v. Mitchell (2001)
    
    26 Cal.4th 181
    , 185 [a reviewing court may order the correction
    of clerical errors in an abstract of judgment at any time]; People
    v. Zackery (2007) 
    147 Cal.App.4th 380
    , 385 [“Where there is
    a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment
    and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral
    pronouncement controls.”].)
    The record, however, does not support Medina’s claim
    that he was convicted of violating section 11350, rather than
    section 11351. As discussed above, it is clear that Medina
    intended to plead guilty to a violation of section 11351, and
    the court simply misspoke when it referred to section 11350
    while taking his plea. Although the court did not recognize
    its error, it correctly sentenced him under section 11351.
    The abstract of judgment, therefore, need not be corrected.
    9
    DISPOSITION
    We affirm the superior court’s order. We remand the case
    to the superior court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment
    reflecting that Leonel Medina was convicted of violating Penal
    Code section 245, subdivision (a), rather than Penal Code section
    245, subdivision (c).
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    EGERTON, J.
    We concur:
    EDMON, P. J.
    LAVIN, J.
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B312251

Filed Date: 6/6/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/6/2022