In re Camila S. CA2/3 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 4/20/21 In re Camila S. CA2/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
    opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
    8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
    purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    In re Camila S., et al., Persons                                B307598
    Coming Under the Juvenile Court
    Law.                                                           (Los Angeles County
    __________________________________                             Super. Ct. No.
    LAURA F.,                                                      19CCJP00060A-B)
    Petitioner,
    v.
    THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS
    ANGELES COUNTY,
    Respondent;
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
    AND FAMILY SERVICES,
    Real Party in Interest.
    ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary
    writ to review order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
    Martha A. Matthews, Judge. Petition denied.
    Law Office of Rachel Ewing, Bernadette Reyes and Erin
    Lovelance, for Petitioner.
    No appearance for Respondent.
    Rodrigo Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
    Assistant County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
    ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
    Laura F. (mother) filed the present petition for
    extraordinary writ challenging the juvenile court’s order
    terminating her reunification services and setting a Welfare and
    Institutions Code1 section 366.26 hearing as to her two youngest
    children, Camila S. (born in April 2006) and Sofia (born in
    October 2011). Mother’s sole contention in this petition is that
    the juvenile court erred in finding she was provided reasonable
    reunification services by the Los Angeles County Department of
    Children and Family Services (DCFS). We conclude that the
    juvenile court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, and
    thus we will deny the petition.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
    A.    The Initial Investigation
    The family first came to DCFS’s attention in November
    2013 after a caller alleged the family was living in unsanitary
    conditions. According to the caller, the children had “very poor
    hygiene [and] dirty clothing,” and the family’s home was full of
    1    All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to
    the Welfare and Institutions Code.
    2      Sections A–C of this section are taken from our prior
    opinion in this case, In re C.S. (Dec. 31, 2019, B297668) [nonpub.
    opn.].
    2
    flies, cockroaches, dirty dishes, and dirty clothes. Between
    July 2014 and October 2017, DCFS received four more referrals,
    most of which were based on the unsanitary conditions in which
    the family was living.
    In October 2018, DCFS received another referral based on
    the family’s living conditions. The family was living in the
    garage of a house owned by a relative. Although the house was
    clean, the garage was “horrid.” The family slept on two queen-
    sized mattresses on the floor. The garage had electricity and a
    portable stove, but it lacked a bathroom and kitchen. The
    refrigerator was stocked with food, some of which was spoiled,
    and there was spoiled food left out on the portable stove. The
    garage was poorly lit because it lacked interior lighting and all
    the windows were blocked, and it was “very dirty,” smelled “very
    strongly of urine,” and was infested by cockroaches.
    A DCFS social worker who inspected the family’s home
    advised mother she needed to clean the garage “thoroughly,”
    including scrubbing the floors, disposing of any spoiled food, and
    clearing out the items blocking the windows. If mother could not
    improve the condition of the garage, the social worker advised
    her to find “another location to provide the children with better
    living conditions.”
    The referral also alleged that Camila went to school with
    dirty clothes, had a strong odor of urine on her body, and had had
    lice in her hair for “a very long time.” Camila’s teachers were
    struggling to include Camila in group assignments because the
    other students complained about her poor hygiene. On one
    occasion, when she was in the assistant principal’s office, Camila
    opened her binder and cockroaches came out of it. Camila had
    3
    missed 15 out of 57 days of school, and she was always late to her
    first period class.
    The school’s nurse reported that Camila often complained
    about pain in her “private area” when she urinated. Although
    Camila had been diagnosed with a urinary tract infection and
    had been provided medication by her doctor, the school believed
    her parents were not following through with the prescribed
    treatment or taking her back to the doctor when the infection
    recurred. The school had referred Camila to the Public Health
    Clinic, and it provided mother referrals to other family-assistance
    resources, but mother never followed up on them. According to
    the nurse, “mother does not do much for the children[,] and she
    also appears unkempt.”
    In early December 2018, DCFS scheduled a medical and
    mental health evaluation for Camila. Mother and Camila showed
    up to the appointment an hour late, so the clinic was able to
    perform only a mental health evaluation of the child. The clinical
    supervisor who evaluated Camila was concerned about the
    family’s well-being. Camila showed up to the evaluation with
    poor hygiene and dirty clothes, even though the appointment was
    early in the morning. Mother told the supervisor that 12-year-old
    Camila frequently “wet[] the bed,” had constant ear infections,
    and missed a lot of school due to illness. Based on her evaluation
    of Camila, the supervisor believed the child did not shower or
    change her clothes after wetting her bed at night. The supervisor
    advised mother that Camila should receive mental health
    services to address her bed-wetting. The social worker later
    referred Camila to mental health services and instructed mother
    to follow up on scheduling an appointment for the child.
    4
    In late December 2018, mother told DCFS that the family
    had been evicted from the relative’s garage and was living with
    mother’s adult daughter. Mother asked DCFS to “open” a case so
    that the family could receive housing benefits and other
    “resources” to help mother find a job.
    B.    The Dependency Petition
    On January 4, 2019, DCFS filed a dependency petition
    under section 300 on the children’s behalf. As later sustained by
    the court, the petition alleged:
    b-1: “[M]other . . . and father . . . have failed to follow up
    and ensure that [Camila] received necessary medical care for the
    child’s urinary tract infection despite the child’s continued
    complaints. Such failure to ensure that the child received
    appropriate medical care places the child[] and the child’s
    sibling[,] [Sofia,] at risk of serious physical harm.”
    b-2: “On 10/25/18 and on prior occasions, the children[’s]
    . . . home was found to be in a filthy and unsanitary condition.
    On prior occasions, the children were observed to have poor
    hygiene. The mother . . . and father . . . have failed to address the
    filthy and unsanitary home condition and the children’s poor
    hygiene despite being provided with resources and referrals to
    alleviate the conditions. The mother and father’s failure to
    address the unsanitary home condition and children’s hygiene
    issues[] place the children at serious risk of physical harm.”
    At the initial hearing on the children’s petition, the court
    found DCFS alleged a prima facie case under section 300. The
    court allowed the children to remain in their parents’ custody and
    ordered DCFS to provide mother referrals for housing assistance.
    5
    C.     The Family’s Conduct After the Filing of the
    Dependency Petition
    In mid-January 2019, Camila received a medical exam.
    The doctor who evaluated Camila noted the child was “obese” and
    needed to visit a dentist “ASAP.” The doctor also noted that
    Camila had head lice.
    As of early February 2019, the family’s situation had not
    improved. The office manager from Camila’s school reported that
    Camila continued to miss a lot of school. In a three-week period
    following winter break, Camila had attended only seven days of
    class. The school district’s Homeless and Foster Liaison reported
    that she had been working with the family for three years, but
    that “this is the worst [the family] has ever been.” According to
    the liaison, Camila and Sofia “ ‘don’t go to school at all and have
    every illness possible.’ ” The school district was having difficulty
    creating an individualized education program for Camila because
    her parents rarely took her to school.
    Camila also continued to have poor hygiene. The child
    would urinate on herself at school, and other students would
    “make faces” at her because of her foul body odor. Camila’s poor
    hygiene prevented her from having any friends at school. The
    Homeless and Foster Liaison reported that father also had poor
    hygiene and was usually “ ‘extremely dirty.’ ”
    The Homeless and Foster Liaison didn’t know whether
    mother was using drugs, but she reported that mother’s stories
    “do not make sense.” The liaison had referred Camila to therapy,
    but mother never followed through on the referrals. The liaison
    told DCFS’s social worker, “ ‘I don’t know what else to do, we
    have provided the mother with clothing, shoes, gift cards,
    6
    groceries, beds, mattresses . . . and the mother’s situation is the
    worst it’s ever been.’ ”
    The school’s nurse reported that she had recently made an
    appointment for Camila to see a doctor at a medical clinic, but
    mother never took Camila to the appointment. The nurse also
    provided mother several referrals for other “resources,” but
    mother never followed up on them.
    The psychologist from Camila’s school reported that mother
    and father had attended two meetings for a special education
    assessment for Camila. During the first meeting, mother and
    father left after only 10 minutes, telling the psychologist they had
    “other things to do.” During the second meeting, mother and
    father started fighting and left after only a few minutes. Mother
    and father did not show up for the third meeting. According to
    the psychologist, mother and father were “disheveled” and one of
    them had a “strong smell of urine.” The psychologist doubted
    whether mother and father were capable of caring for Camila and
    recommended that both parents drug test.
    DCFS also interviewed the family and some of its relatives.
    Father admitted that the family was still living in the garage,
    even though mother had reported they no longer lived there.
    Father also knew that Camila frequently urinated and defecated
    in her clothes. When father told Camila she needed to use a
    toilet whenever she felt the urge to go to the bathroom, Camila
    responded that she “cannot feel when she soils herself.” Father
    explained he would send Camila to school in soiled clothing out of
    “laziness,” because it was “easier to send her to school than to ask
    her to bathe.”
    Another relative, who wished to remain anonymous, told
    DCFS that the children bathed about once every three weeks.
    7
    Mother and father did not provide the children toilet paper,
    which the relative believed is why the children always smelled
    like urine and feces and why Camila contracted so many urinary
    tract infections. The relative also believed mother and father
    used methamphetamine and that mother had been hospitalized
    due to withdrawals from the drug.
    In late February 2019, DCFS detained Camila and Sofia
    from their parents’ custody and placed them in foster care.
    D.    The Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
    The court held a jurisdiction and disposition hearing on
    April 9, 2019. The court sustained counts b-1 and b-2 of the
    petition, declared Camila and Sofia dependents of the court, and
    ordered the children removed from their parents’ custody.
    Although the court noted the strong bond between the
    parents and children, it found that removal was necessary
    because “long-term neglect is harmful to children, even children
    who obviously love their parents. Their basic needs have not
    been met for a really long time, and it’s still not entirely clear
    what the underlying issue is.” The court acknowledged the
    possibility that mother required some mental health support, but
    noted that “if, in fact part of the solution is that mother needs to
    obtain some form of mental health treatment, that’s going to take
    a while.” The court also noted that neither parent had shown up
    for drug testing, “[a]nd there is a question in the case whether
    substance abuse is part of what is going on. . . . I don’t know,
    because the parents didn’t test. So I don’t know if that’s an issue
    or not.”
    The court noted that although both Camila’s school and
    DCFS had made significant efforts to help the family achieve
    cleaner living conditions, improve Camila’s health, and ensure
    8
    Camila regularly attended school, mother and father “were really
    hard to reach and hard to get them to follow up. So the same
    thing keeps happening.” Speaking directly to the children, the
    court said: “I know that you want to go home, but I can’t let you
    go home today. Because my job is to make sure that you are safe
    and your needs are met. And I don’t seem to be able to make that
    happen in your parent’s house, and I don’t understand why. So I
    need to figure out what’s going on so that things get better.”
    The court ordered both parents to submit to 10 random or
    on-demand drug tests, and if they missed any tests or tested
    positive for any illicit substances, to participate in a full drug-
    treatment program. The court further ordered mother to submit
    to psychological and psychiatric assessments, participate in
    mental health counseling, and follow her psychologist’s
    recommendations. Both parents were granted monitored visits
    with the children.3
    E.     Six Month Review Period
    1.     The Children’s Progress in Foster Care
    The children were placed in foster care in February 2019.
    In August 2019, DCFS reported that the foster mother was
    working closely with the children to improve their hygiene. Both
    children had been treated for head lice, which had been so
    extreme when the children entered foster care that lice could be
    seen across the children’s foreheads. Then thirteen-year-old
    Camila was continuing to struggle with bladder and bowel
    3     Father appealed from the jurisdiction and disposition
    orders, urging that there was insufficient evidence the children
    would be at risk of harm in the parents’ custody, and DCFS had
    not made reasonable efforts to prevent the children’s removal.
    We affirmed. (In re C.S.,, supra, B297668).)
    9
    incontinence, but her accidents had decreased from daily to two
    or three times per week. The foster mother “has been very
    understanding and patient” with Camila’s toileting issues, and
    had taught her to rinse her clothes and shower after an accident.
    Both children had received dental care, Camila had been referred
    to an orthodontist, and Sofia had received treatment for two
    infected teeth. Camila had been seen by an audiologist, who
    diagnosed some hearing loss in both ears. Camila reported she
    had a lot of ear infections and was supposed to have had tubes
    placed in her ears, but never did.
    The children had opened up to the social worker about the
    conditions in which they had lived with their parents, admitting
    that the garage where they lived was very dirty, and that they
    had eaten primarily fast food because mother did not prepare any
    meals. The parents had been aware of Camila’s encopresis
    (bowel incontinence), which Camila said was embarrassing to
    her.
    Camila told the social worker she was happy she no longer
    had daily bathroom accidents. Her self-confidence appeared to be
    improving and she was asking to spend time with school friends.
    She admitted that when she lived with her parents, she was
    teased because she wore the same clothes and shoes to school
    every day. Both children had been obese when they entered
    foster care, but were learning to eat healthy meals and exercise.
    2.     The Parents’ Partial Compliance with Their
    Case Plans
    In August 2019, mother and father reported living in a
    motel, but continued to have poor hygiene, wear dirty clothes,
    and smell of urine. Mother was not working and had not drug
    tested, enrolled in counseling, or enrolled in drug treatment. She
    10
    repeatedly expressed concern about the care the foster mother
    was providing the children; for instance, when Sofia showed
    mother a dental filling, mother became upset and asked the child
    repeatedly whether the procedure had been painful. Mother also
    complained that the foster mother did not provide the children
    with enough food. Mother continued to deny having a dirty home
    and to minimize Camila’s encopresis, saying that Camila simply
    forgot to use the restroom.
    By September 2019, mother had enrolled in parenting
    classes and mental health services. A community health worker
    at the East San Gabriel Valley Mental Health Center said
    mother had been evaluated by a psychiatrist, but because mother
    had not signed a release, the worker could not disclose the results
    of the evaluation.
    The social worker noted that during monthly meetings with
    the parents, the parents “constantly make allegations against the
    foster mother, rather than focusing on their case.” When the
    social worker attempted to discuss the court’s orders, mother
    appeared upset and said, “ ‘[W]hy do we have to talk about
    that?’ ” The worker opined that mother had “not made any
    progress in mitigating the issues that brought her family to the
    attention of [DCFS], . . . ha[d] not made the nexus between her
    behavior and how it negatively affects her children[,] . . . [and]
    ha[d] not taken any accountability as to her actions and
    behavior.”
    3.    DCFS’s Attempts to Schedule a Psychiatric
    Assessment of Mother
    On May 17, 2019, the juvenile court appointed Dr. Nancy
    Kaser-Boyd to perform psychiatric testing of mother pursuant to
    Evidence Code section 730 and to recommend a “treatment plan
    11
    including medication assessment and appropriateness of current
    medication.”4
    Dr. Kaser-Boyd’s assessment was not completed by the
    September 2019 receipt-of-report date. On September 4, 2019,
    the court directed the social worker or county counsel to “make
    sure that Dr. Boyd knows that, if possible, we should try and
    have her report on or before October 17th, and the worker should
    assist in scheduling the assessment as soon as possible, that way
    we won’t have any further delay.”
    A social worker emailed Dr. Kaser-Boyd regarding the
    assessment on September 11, 18, 20, and 27, and on October 3
    and 15, 2019. On September 10, 2019, Dr. Kaser-Boyd requested
    court reports, which the social worker provided the same day.
    Dr. Kaser-Boyd did not otherwise respond to the social worker’s
    emails.
    F.     Six-Month Review Hearing
    At the six-month review hearing on October 21, 2019, the
    court found that the parents were in partial compliance with the
    case plan, and DCFS had complied with the case plan by
    providing reasonable services. The court ordered reunification
    4      Evidence Code section 730 provides in pertinent part:
    “When it appears to the court, at any time before or during the
    trial of an action, that expert evidence is or may be required by
    the court or by any party to the action, the court on its own
    motion or on motion of any party may appoint one or more
    experts to investigate, to render a report as may be ordered by
    the court, and to testify as an expert at the trial of the action
    relative to the fact or matter as to which the expert evidence is or
    may be required.” (Evid. Code, § 730.)
    12
    services to continue for another six months, and set a 12-month
    review hearing for April 28, 2020.
    G.    Twelve-Month Review Period
    1.    The Children’s Progress in Foster Care
    During her eighth-grade year, while in foster care, Camila
    earned primarily A’s and B’s at school and began playing on her
    middle school’s basketball team. She had been assessed for an
    individualized education plan and was receiving language,
    speech, and academic services. Her school’s counselor reported
    Camila had made a lot of progress during the school year, was
    more outspoken, and enjoyed helping her teachers.
    Camila’s encopresis had improved dramatically, with the
    foster mother reporting none or one accident per week. Her
    hearing had improved in both ears, and she was receiving regular
    medical and dental care. She was receiving therapy weekly.
    Sofia also had been assessed for an individualized
    education plan and was receiving assistance with language and
    speech. She no longer had bathroom accidents at night. She also
    received weekly therapy.
    2.    The Parents’ Partial Compliance with Their
    Case Plans
    Mother began meeting with a therapist in December 2019.
    In February 2020, mother had a psychological assessment and
    was diagnosed with a mood disorder, but she declined psychiatric
    medication.
    In April 2020, the therapist reported that she was working
    with mother to decrease depression and suicidal ideation, and to
    develop problem solving skills. Mother was also working with a
    peer advocate who modeled appropriate behavior. However,
    13
    mother failed to attend therapy for a month from late February
    to late March, and again between mid-July and mid-August.
    In January 2020, the social worker confiscated six cell
    phones the parents had secretly provided the children. Mother
    had instructed the children to hide the phones and to call her at
    night when the foster mother was not around.
    As of late August 2020, the parents had not disclosed where
    they were living. Mother said she and father had submitted
    rental applications, but had been denied. Mother was not
    working, had not drug tested, and had not enrolled in a drug
    program. The parents had been offered, but declined, bus passes.
    Mother also had failed to follow up with housing and employment
    referrals provided to her by her case manager.
    3.   DCFS’s Additional Attempts to Schedule a
    Psychiatric Evaluation
    The social worker contacted Dr. Kaser-Boyd by email on
    March 10, 2020. Dr. Kaser-Boyd asked the date of the next court
    hearing, but did not further respond. The social worker emailed
    Dr. Kaser-Boyd again on August 19 and 28, 2020, but received no
    reply.
    G.     12-Month Review Hearing
    At the 12-month review hearing, held September 1, 2020,
    DCFS recommended that mother’s and father’s reunification
    services be terminated. The children’s counsel submitted on
    DCFS’s recommendation.
    Mother objected to termination, asserting that DCFS had
    not provided her with reasonable services because the section 730
    psychiatric assessment ordered by the court had never been
    performed. Mother’s counsel argued that the psychiatric
    assessment was “a crucial part of the court-ordered case plan
    14
    that the mother has not been able to complete.” Counsel thus
    urged that mother should be granted an additional six months of
    reunification services.
    Father also objected to termination, urging that he had not
    received reasonable services because most of the social worker’s
    contacts had been with mother, not with father. He requested
    additional reunification services.
    After hearing argument, the court found that the parents
    were in only partial compliance with their case plans, and found
    by clear and convincing evidence that DCFS had provided
    reasonable services and made reasonable efforts to return the
    children to a safe home. The court also found by clear and
    convincing evidence that there was not a substantial probability
    that the children could be safely returned to the parents’ physical
    custody by the next review hearing because the parents had not
    made significant progress in resolving the problems that had led
    to the children’s removal “and have not demonstrated capacity
    and ability to complete the goals of the case plan and provide for
    the children’s safety, protection, physical and emotional well-
    being.” The court therefore terminated the parents’ reunification
    services and set a section 366.26 hearing for January 13, 2021.
    With regard to reasonable services, the court acknowledged
    that a section 730 psychiatric assessment of mother had not
    occurred. The court found, however, that DCFS’s failure to
    successfully follow up on getting the assessment was not enough
    to trigger a no-reasonable services finding. The court explained:
    “[T]he mother back in September of last year made it extremely
    clear to the social worker that she had no intention of complying
    with any case plan service. Mother tried to get the children re-
    placed by making allegations about the caregivers. It turned out
    15
    to be false. Mother’s conduct during visitation was problematic.
    She was talking about the case and saying negative things about
    the caregiver. In April of 2000 there was an incident where
    mother and father gave the children six cell phones and told
    them to hide the phones. If this was a case where mother’s
    mental health condition was central to the case and the lack of [a
    psychiatric assessment] was really what was preventing a parent
    from successfully reunifying, then I would make a no reasonable
    services finding; however, the parents never complied with
    anything. They never drug tested. They never indicated any
    willingness to do any programs at all, and their behavior, while
    uncooperative, [gave] really no indication that mother was
    suffering from some serious undiagnosed mental health condition
    that was preventing her from reunifying.
    “In fact, in February, she does get an assessment and is
    prescribed medication, which she then decides not to take.
    Although certainly the services in this case were not perfect, . . . I
    just don’t think the [psychiatric assessment] was central enough
    to this case to warrant a no-reasonable-services finding.”
    H.    The Present Petition
    Mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition on
    September 2, 2020, and filed a request for stay of the section
    366.26 hearing on January 11, 2021. On January 11, 2021, this
    court granted a temporary stay, and on February 11, 2021, we
    issued an order to show cause why the petition should not be
    granted.
    DISCUSSION
    Mother contends the juvenile court erred in terminating
    her reunification services because she was not provided with
    reasonable services. For the reasons that follow, we conclude
    16
    that mother’s reunification services, although not perfect, were
    reasonable under the circumstances, and we therefore will deny
    the petition.
    A.     Legal Principles
    Subject to exceptions not relevant here, the juvenile court is
    required to provide reunification services whenever a child is
    removed from parental custody. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) The purpose
    of such services is to “eliminate the conditions leading to loss of
    custody and facilitate reunification of parent and child. This
    furthers the goal of preservation of family, whenever possible.”
    (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 
    63 Cal.App.4th 470
    , 478.)
    At the 12-month review hearing, the court must return the
    child to her parents if it is safe to do so. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) If
    the child cannot be safely returned home, the court shall
    terminate the parent’s reunification services and set a hearing to
    terminate parental rights unless the court finds either that the
    child is likely to be returned home by the 18-month hearing, or
    that “reasonable services have not been provided to the parent.”
    (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) A reasonable services finding shall be
    made by clear and convincing evidence. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(4).)
    “We review a reasonable services finding ‘ “in the light most
    favorable to the trial court’s order to determine whether there is
    substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
    make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing
    evidence standard.” ’ [Citation.] In determining whether there is
    substantial evidence to support the court’s reasonable services
    finding, we review the record in the light most favorable to the
    court’s finding and draw all reasonable inferences from the
    evidence to support the findings and orders. We do not reweigh
    the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely
    17
    determine whether there are sufficient facts to support the
    findings of the trial court. (Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010)
    
    191 Cal.App.4th 676
    , 688–689.) The burden is on the petitioner
    to show that the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile
    court’s findings. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 
    101 Cal.App.4th 942
    , 947.)”
    (In re M.F. (2019) 
    32 Cal.App.5th 1
    , 14, italics omitted.)
    B.    Analysis
    Mother does not dispute that DCFS provided most of the
    elements of her court-ordered case plan—namely, that she was
    offered drug-testing, individual counseling, housing and
    employment assistance, and frequent monitored visits with her
    children. She urges, however, that the court-ordered psychiatric
    evaluation was an essential component of her case plan, and that
    without an evaluation, “the juvenile court lacked the information
    necessary to determine the appropriate treatment plan needed
    for [mother] to successfully reunify with her children.” She thus
    contends that DCFS’s failure to ensure she received a section 730
    psychiatric evaluation constituted a failure to provide reasonable
    services.
    We conclude that substantial evidence supported the
    juvenile court’s conclusion that mother received reasonable
    services. Reasonable services are services “designed to aid the
    parent or legal guardian to overcome the problems that led to the
    initial removal and continued custody of the child.” (§ 366.21,
    subd. (f)(1)(A).) “In almost all cases it will be true that more
    services could have been provided more frequently and that the
    services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether
    the services provided were the best that might be provided in an
    ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the
    circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 
    2 Cal.App.4th 538
    , 547.)
    18
    “Reunification services need not be perfect. [Citation.] But
    they should be tailored to the specific needs of the particular
    family. [Citation.] Services will be found reasonable if [DCFS]
    has ‘identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered
    services designed to remedy those problems, maintained
    reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the
    service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in
    areas where compliance proved difficult.” (In re Alvin R. (2003)
    
    108 Cal.App.4th 962
    , 972–973; see also In re H.E. (2008)
    
    169 Cal.App.4th 710
    , 725 [reasonable services “need only be
    reasonable under the circumstances, not perfect”].)
    In the present case, the problems that led to the children’s
    removal were the unsanitary conditions in which the parents and
    children lived, as well as the children’s untreated medical
    conditions, including chronic urinary tract infections, encopresis,
    ear infections, and head lice. DCFS provided extensive services
    for the family to address these problems, including medical and
    mental health treatment for the children, and housing,
    transportation, and employment assistance for the parents.
    DCFS also provided mother with case management and mental
    health counseling throughout the period of supervision to help
    her address any psychological issues that underlay her chronic
    neglect of the children. These services were narrowly tailored to
    the family’s needs and were reasonable under the circumstances
    of this case.
    It is true, as mother notes, that she was never assessed by
    Dr. Kaser-Boyd. However, mother appears to have been assessed
    by two other mental health professionals—by a psychiatrist at
    the East San Gabriel Valley Mental Health Center in June 2019,
    and by psychologist Dr. Daniel Son in February 2020. Although
    19
    it is not clear whether these assessments were undertaken
    pursuant to the court’s order, they indisputably led to a mental
    health diagnosis—depression—which guided the psychological
    counseling mother received.
    Significantly, a psychiatric evaluation is not an end in
    itself—it is a tool to determine whether the subject of the
    evaluation would benefit from services, such as mental health
    counseling or psychotropic medication. In the present case,
    mother received mental health counseling for at least nine
    months, and was prescribed—but refused—psychotropic
    medication. It therefore does not appear that mother would have
    received any additional benefit from a further evaluation by
    Dr. Kaser-Boyd.
    We note finally that although the juvenile court believed in
    April 2019 that a psychiatric assessment was necessary to
    determine whether an underlying mental health condition was
    impeding mother’s ability to reunify, the court was of a different
    opinion by September 2020. At the 12-month review hearing, the
    same juvenile court judge who ordered the psychiatric
    assessment determined that the lack of a psychiatric assessment
    did not require a no-reasonable-services finding because there
    was “really no indication that mother was suffering from some
    serious undiagnosed mental health condition that was preventing
    her from reunifying.” The juvenile court’s assessment is borne
    out by the record: During the more than 18 months that DCFS
    supervised the family, social workers never observed mother
    behaving in a way that suggested a serious underlying
    psychiatric or neurological issue.
    For all of these reasons, substantial evidence supported the
    juvenile court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that
    20
    mother was provided reasonable services. We thus will deny the
    writ petition.
    DISPOSITION
    The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. The stay
    imposed January 11, 2021, is lifted. This court’s opinion is final
    forthwith as to this court pursuant to California Rules of Court,
    rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
    REPORTS
    EDMON, P. J.
    We concur:
    LAVIN, J.
    EGERTON, J.
    21
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B307598

Filed Date: 4/20/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/20/2021