In re K.M. CA2/1 ( 2023 )

Filed 4/28/23 In re K.M. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re K.M. et al., Persons B321768
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP01001)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
GARY M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders
of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Pete R. Navarro,
Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
David M. Thompson, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS or the agency) initiated juvenile
dependency proceedings concerning K.M., who was 15, and her
brother, A.M., who was 5. DCFS alleged dependency jurisdiction
was proper because father physically assaulted K.M., causing her
to suffer bruising, swelling, and marks on her head, neck, chest,
and knee. The juvenile court later sustained the petition’s
jurisdictional allegations, removed the children from father’s
custody, and ordered him to participate in various services,
including an anger management program.
On appeal, father challenges the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings as to both children. Applying the
deferential substantial evidence standard of review, we reject his
assertions that K.M. did not suffer serious physical harm and
that father’s conduct fell within the scope of reasonable parental
discipline. We further conclude there was substantial evidence
that father has a propensity to engage in violent acts, thereby
creating a substantial risk of serious physical harm to A.M. We
thus affirm.
2
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
We summarize only those aspects of the procedural history
that are relevant to our disposition of this appeal.
On March 17, 2022, DCFS filed a dependency petition
concerning siblings K.M. and A.M., who were then 15 and 5 years
old, respectively. DCFS alleged dependency jurisdiction over
K.M. was proper pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code 2
section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) (i.e., counts a-1 and b-1),
and the juvenile court should assert jurisdiction over A.M.
pursuant to subdivision (j) of that statute (i.e., count j-1).
Counts a-1, b-1, and j-1 of the petition each alleged the
following: “The children, [K.M.’s] and [A.M.]’s father . . .
physically abused the child, [K.M.] On or about 02/15/2022, the
father repeatedly struck the child’s head with the father’s fist.
The father forcibly threw the child to the ground, grabbed the
child’s hair and pushed the child’s face into the ground. The
father choked the child’s neck with the father’s hands. The
father forcibly grabbed the child’s arms with the father’s hands.
The father struck the child’s body with the father’s hands. The
physical abuse by father inflicted bruising, swelling, tenderness
and marks to the child’s head, face, neck, chest, wrists, knee and
leg. The father was arrested for PC 273A(A)- Child Abuse with
1 We derive part of our Procedural Background from
undisputed portions of the parties’ appellate briefing. (See Artal
v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 [“ ‘[B]riefs and
argument . . . are reliable indications of a party’s position on the
facts as well as the law, and a reviewing court may make use of
statements therein as admissions against the party.’ ”].)
2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
3
Possible GBI/Death. Such physical abuse was excessive and
caused the child, [K.M.], unreasonable pain and suffering. The
physical abuse of the child, [K.M.], by the father, endangers the
child’s physical health, safety, and well-being, creates a
detrimental home environment and places the child and the
child’s sibling, [A.M.], at risk of serious physical harm, damage,
and physical abuse.”
In March 2022, the juvenile court held a detention hearing,
and declared that father is K.M.’s and A.M.’s presumed father.
The court found a prima facie case that K.M. and A.M. were
minors described by section 300, detained the children from
father, and released them to mother’s custody.
On June 24, 2022, the juvenile court sustained the petition
as pleaded, declared the children dependents, removed the
children from father’s physical custody, released the children to
mother, authorized father to have visits with the children, and
ordered DCFS to provide services to father. Regarding visitation,
the court permitted father to have monitored visits with K.M.,
and unmonitored visitation with A.M., so long as the visits
occurred “in a public setting.” Further, the court ordered father
to participate in anger management and developmentally
appropriate parenting programs, and conjoint counseling with
K.M.
On December 22, 2022, the juvenile court issued a juvenile
custody order that awarded sole physical custody of K.M. to
mother, awarded joint legal custody of K.M. to mother and father,
and granted father monitored visitation with the child.
Concurrent with the issuance of the juvenile custody order, the
4
court terminated dependency jurisdiction over K.M. Father
did not appeal the juvenile court’s December 22, 2022 orders.3
On April 14, 2023, the juvenile court awarded mother and
father joint legal and physical custody of A.M., and terminated
dependency jurisdiction as to that child.4
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings [of the juvenile court,] . . .
we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports them. “In making this determination,
we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support
the findings and orders of the [juvenile] court; we review the
record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations;
and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of
the [juvenile] court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence
or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there
are sufficient facts to support the findings of the [juvenile] court.
[Citations.] . . . [Citation.]” . . . ’ [Citation.]” (In re I.J. (2013)
56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) Appellant “has the burden of showing the
jurisdictional finding[s are] unsupported by substantial
evidence.” (See In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594,
598.)
3We previously took judicial notice of the
December 22, 2022 orders and the juvenile court’s docket.
4 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s
April 14, 2023 orders. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
5
DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, we observe that father’s
challenges to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings are
arguably moot because the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction
over the children, and awarded mother and father joint legal and
physical custody of A.M., and because father failed to appeal the
order awarding mother sole physical custody of K.M. and
granting father only monitored visitation with K.M.5 We need
not decide whether father’s appeal is in fact moot because even if
it were, we would exercise our discretion to reach the merits.6
5 (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276–277 (D.P.) [“A
case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it impossible for [a]
court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant
him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation.] . . . [¶] . . . In this context,
relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible impact
on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ ”]; In re C.C. (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488 (C.C.) [“As a general rule, an order
terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a
previous order in the dependency proceedings moot.”]; In re S.G.
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 666–667 [“To effect an actual change
in custody and visitation rights [after the issuance of an order
awarding custody and visitation and terminating dependency
jurisdiction], the appellate court would need to reverse the
juvenile court’s last word on custody and/or visitation—the . . .
order terminating jurisdiction on those terms—which . . . the
appellate court does not have the power to do if that order has
not been appealed.”].)
6 (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282 [“Even when a case
is moot, courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach
the merits of the dispute.”]; C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1488–1489 [exercising the court’s discretion to consider the
merits of an arguably moot appeal “in an abundance of caution”].)
6
Turning to the substance of father’s appeal, he maintains
that K.M. “did not suffer serious physical harm[,] . . . father was
only exercising his right to administer appropriate parental
discipline and control” over K.M. during the incident, and “at the
time of [the] jurisdiction/disposition [hearing], no risk of current
or future harm existed” to K.M. and A.M. (Capitalization
omitted.) For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that
jurisdiction over K.M. was proper because DCFS presented
substantial evidence that she is a child described by section 300,
subdivision (a),7 and there was substantial evidence that A.M.
fell within subdivision (j) of section 300. Furthermore, we affirm
the juvenile court’s dispositional rulings because father’s
challenge to those rulings is premised entirely on his claim that
the court lacked jurisdiction over the children.8
7 In light of that conclusion, we decline to decide whether
jurisdiction over K.M. was also proper pursuant to section 300,
subdivision (b)(1). (See In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th
297, 308 (Briana V.) [“ ‘[T]he minor is a dependent if the actions
of either parent bring [the minor] within one of the statutory
definitions of a dependent. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘For this
reason, an appellate court may decline to address the evidentiary
support for any remaining jurisdictional findings . . . .’
[Citation,]” italics added].)
8 (See In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79 (J.F.) [“The
juvenile court’s orders are ‘presumed to be correct, and it is
appellant’s burden to affirmatively show error.’ ”].)
7
A. There Is Substantial Evidence that Father Inflicted
Serious Physical Harm Nonaccidentally Upon K.M.,
and that Father’s Actions Did Not Constitute
Reasonable Parental Discipline
Section 300, subdivision (a) authorizes dependency
jurisdiction if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial
risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.”
(See § 300, subd. (a).) Subdivision (a) further provides: “For
purposes of this subdivision, a court may find there is a
substantial risk of serious future injury based on the manner in
which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of repeated
inflictions of injuries on the child or the child’s siblings, or a
combination of these and other actions by the parent or guardian
that indicate the child is at risk of serious physical harm. For
purposes of this subdivision, ‘serious physical harm’ does not
include reasonable and age-appropriate spanking to the buttocks
if there is no evidence of serious physical injury.” (Id.)
Section 300, subdivision (a) “does not require the parent
have intended the child to suffer serious physical harm or to be at
substantial risk of such harm, although the evidence may show
that. . . . [The Legislature] chose the term ‘nonaccidentally,’
indicating a volitional act, but without the requirement for a
specific intended consequence.” (See 1 Seiser & Kumli, Cal.
Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2022) § 2.84[2].)
Father argues that Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Dept. of
Social Services (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 72, establishes that K.M.
did not suffer “serious physical harm,” given that “all of the
injuries [she sustained] were superficial and required no further
treatment.” (Citing Gonzalez, at pp. 92–93.) He also suggests
8
that K.M.’s injuries are analogous to those at issue in In re
Isabella F. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 128 (Isabella F.), a decision in
which a Court of Appeal reversed a juvenile court’s assertion of
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a). Additionally,
father claims his conduct falls within the scope of the parental
right to discipline discussed in In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th
634 (D.M.). We reject these contentions.
In Gonzalez, a mother “was reported for child abuse after
she spanked her 12-year-old daughter . . . using a wooden spoon
with enough force to produce visible bruises.” (See Gonzalez,
supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 75.) A child welfare agency
“concluded that the report was ‘substantiated,’ and submitted it
to the state Department of Justice for inclusion in the Child
Abuse Central Index . . . under the Child Abuse and Neglect
Reporting Act [citation] (CANRA or Act).” (See ibid.) The
mother “unsuccessfully sought relief by administrative appeal
and by petition for administrative mandamus in the superior
court.” (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment,
and instructed the court to issue a writ “commanding the [child
welfare agency] to either conduct a new hearing on the matter or
to issue a decision finding the report in question unfounded . . . .”
(See Gonzalez, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 76, 95, 102.) In
particular, the Court of Appeal held that “the trial court erred in
categorically rejecting [the m]other’s assertion that the conduct
reported as child abuse constituted a reasonable attempt to
discipline her child,” given that “the parental privilege to impose
reasonable physical discipline upon a child must be incorporated
into CANRA’s definitions of” child abuse. (See id. at pp. 85, 90,
95.)
9
In the course of arriving at that conclusion, the Gonzalez
court remarked, “the infliction of visible bruises [does not]
automatically require[ ] a finding that the limits of reasonable
discipline were exceeded.” (See Gonzalez, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th
at p. 92.) The appellate court further stated, “We believe that
visible bruising demarcates, or at least very nearly approaches,
the outer limit for the quantum of ‘damage’ to be tolerated.
However, we do not believe that it necessarily compels a finding
of abuse unless there are grounds to find that the parent
intended to inflict bruises, knew his or her conduct would do so,
or should have known that bruises were likely to result from the
amount of force applied and the method of its application.” (Id. at
p. 93.)
Gonzalez is of no assistance to father. According to DCFS’s
jurisdiction/disposition report, K.M. told the agency that on the
evening of the incident, father “ ‘aggressively yelled at [K.M.]’ ”
after she “forgot to wipe down [a] table.” K.M. reported she later
retreated to her room and began crying while on the telephone
with her mother because father and father’s girlfriend were
“laughing at [K.M.]” and “making fun of [K.M.]” K.M. claimed
that father told K.M. to “get out of the room and not talk to
[K.M.’s mother] alone.” K.M. asserted that father “suddenly
grabbed [her,] . . . pushed [her] to the ground[,] . . . pulled [her]
hair[,] . . . punched [her] in the back of the head twice[,] [a]nd . . .
choked [her] out to where [she] couldn’t breathe.”
Furthermore, a medical report submitted with the
jurisdiction/disposition report recites that three days after the
incident, K.M. had a tender “½ inch round mass” on the back of
her head, K.M.’s “right clavicular area [was] swollen[; t]here
[we]re 3 red linear bruises on the right side of [her] neck and
10
right clavicle”; “[t]he outer area of the right knee [was] swollen
compared to the left knee[;] . . . [and o]n the back of the right arm
[was] a 1 ½ inch area of redness, abrasions and bluish bruising.”
In the report, the forensic medical examiner indicated that K.M.’s
injuries were “consistent” with K.M.’s claims that father “hit,
grabbed and pushed” her.
The juvenile court was entitled to credit K.M.’s account of
the altercation and the findings of the medical report, and to
reject father’s assertion that K.M. had inflicted “any bruises or
marks” on herself as she “struggle[d]” to prevent father from
grabbing the telephone from her.9 Further, the court could have
inferred reasonably from this evidence that father should have
known that bruises were likely to result from the nature and
extent of the force he applied to K.M. Accordingly, substantial
evidence establishes that K.M.’s bruising, swelling, and other
injuries exceeded “the outer limit for the quantum of ‘damage’ to
be tolerated” by the law. (See Gonzalez, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th
at p. 93.)
Isabella F. is likewise of no assistance to father. There, a
juvenile court asserted jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (a) after a nine-year-old “reported that [her] mother
hit her in the face, grabbed her by the neck, and locked her in the
9 (See In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 135–
136 [“The appellant has the burden to demonstrate there is no
evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the
findings or orders. [Citation.] We draw all legitimate and
reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. [Citation.] . . .
[¶] . . . To the extent the trial court’s findings rest on an
evaluation of credibility, the findings should be regarded as
conclusive on appeal.”].)
11
bathroom.” (See Isabella F., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 131,
135, 138.) “A social worker reported that [the minor] had
scratches, consistent with fingernail scratches, on one side of her
face and had a gouge mark on her left earlobe consistent with a
fingernail injury.” (Id. at p. 132.) Although the Isabella F. court
acknowledged that the “mother failed to interact appropriately
with [the minor] . . . and that [the] mother would benefit from
services related to anger management,” the panel concluded the
evidence did “not support a finding that [the minor’s] injuries
amounted to ‘serious physical harm’ under section 300,
subdivision (a).” (See Isabella F., at pp. 138–139.)
Father intimates the instant case is akin to Isabella F.
because, “while father may have to some degree ‘failed to interact
appropriately’ with [K.M.], the injuries did not satisfy the
requirements of section 300, subdivision[ ] (a) . . . .” We disagree.
The mother in Isabella F. did not push her daughter to the
ground, pull her hair, punch her in the head, or interfere with
her child’s breathing by choking her. (See Isabella F., supra,
226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 131–132 [describing the event at issue in
that case].) Further, K.M.’s bruising, tenderness, swelling, and
redness on her head, neck, clavicular area, arm, and knee were
far more severe than the “fingernail injuries to [the child’s] face
and earlobe” in Isabella F. (See D.M., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at
p. 642 [summarizing the facts of Isabella F.].) Isabella F. thus is
not instructive.
Similarly, D.M. does not undercut the juvenile court’s
assertion of jurisdiction over K.M. In D.M., “[a] mother used her
hand or a sandal to spank her two children on the buttocks on
those ‘rare’ occasions when lesser disciplinary measures proved
ineffective, but never hard enough to leave bruises or marks.”
12
(D.M., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 637.) The reviewing court
concluded the juvenile court erred in asserting jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j) without first determining
“whether the spankings qualif[ied] as reasonable parental
discipline,” and remanded the matter “so that the court may in
the first instance apply the reasonable parental discipline
doctrine.” (See D.M., at pp. 637, 639–640.) According to the D.M.
court, “Whether a parent’s use of discipline on a particular
occasion falls within (or instead exceeds) the scope of this
parental right to discipline turns on three considerations:
(1) whether the parent’s conduct is genuinely disciplinary;
(2) whether the punishment is ‘necessary’ (that is, whether
the discipline was ‘warranted by the circumstances’); and
(3) ‘whether the amount of punishment was reasonable or
excessive.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 641.) Father’s conduct falls
outside reasonable discipline because regardless of whether his
acts were genuinely disciplinary and some degree of punishment
was warranted, the evidence summarized earlier in this part
demonstrates that the amount of punishment he inflicted was
excessive.10
10 Father argues for the first time in his reply brief that
the juvenile court made statements at the jurisdictional hearing
demonstrating that its “understanding of a parent’s legal right to
physically discipline their child was, at the very least, misplaced,
if not completely wrong.” In particular, father claims the juvenile
court indicated that “father’s actions in disciplining [K.M.] would
have been acceptable” if father had “come home and ‘found out
his child had sold all of the stereo equipment or hocked his
jewelry.’ ” We disregard this belatedly raised argument. (In re
Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1269 [“We need not
13
We further note father contends that, “[i]n order for the
juvenile court to have assumed jurisdiction, it must have found,
based upon this incident, that [K.M.] was subject to future harm.”
This contention fails as a matter of law. As we noted earlier in
this part, section 300, subdivision (a) authorizes dependency
jurisdiction where “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or
guardian.” (See § 300, subd. (a), italics added.) Because
substantial evidence demonstrates that father nonaccidentally
caused K.M. to suffer serious physical harm, the juvenile court
did not need to find that father presented a substantial risk of
future harm to K.M. in order to assume jurisdiction over her.11
address . . . arguments . . . raised for the first time in [a] reply
brief.”].)
11 (See In re David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1641,
1644 [“The plain language of section 300, subdivision (a) provides
that a child is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if he
‘has suffered . . . serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally
upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.’ [¶] . . . [¶] We
hold that, in the absence of unusual circumstances . . . (such as a
substantial lapse of time between the incident and the filing of a
petition or the date of a jurisdictional hearing), an allegation that
a child has suffered serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally by a parent or guardian is sufficient to establish
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a).”].)
14
B. Substantial Evidence Establishes that Father
Exposed A.M. to Substantial Risk of Serious Physical
Harm
Section 300, subdivision (j) authorizes dependency
jurisdiction over a child if: “The child’s sibling has been abused
or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and
there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or
neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.” (§ 300, subd. (j).)
Subdivision (j) further provides: “The court shall consider the
circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the
age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of
the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and
any other factors the court considers probative in determining
whether there is a substantial risk to the child.” (Ibid.)
Father contends that, “by the time of jurisdiction, there was
no reasonable, sufficient evidence that father posed any future
risk of harm to . . . [A.M].” He insists that his altercation with
K.M. was “an isolated incident . . . .” Father also argues he and
A.M. “had several visits with no reported problems,” “[t]here is no
indication that father had ever administered any punishment to
[A.M.] other than verbal reprimands and spanking on the butt
with an open hand,” A.M. “said he felt safe with both father and
mother,” and the juvenile court “indicat[ed]” it “had little concern
that father was a threat to” A.M. when it “granted [father]
unmonitored visits in a public place with” A.M.
Father overlooks record evidence supporting the juvenile
court’s finding that he presented a substantial risk of serious
physical harm to A.M., and father ignores our obligation to
“draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in support of the juvenile
court’s findings . . . even if other evidence supports a different
15
finding. [Citation.] . . . [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (See In re L.B.
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 411–412 (L.B.).)
First, as we explained in Discussion, part A, ante, there is
substantial evidence that father grabbed K.M., pushed her to the
ground, pulled her hair, punched her in the back of the head
twice, and choked her.
Furthermore, the detention report contains statements
from mother that may be reasonably construed as evidence that
father had perpetrated acts of domestic violence against her in
the past. Specifically, the detention report states the following:
“Mother shared she had an abusive relationship with father.
Mother stated the relationship was emotional and verbal.
Mother stated there was physical domestic violence but denied
16
law enforcement being involved. . . . Mother stated father was
continually abusive . . . .”12
The detention report also shows that A.M. informed the
agency that father spanks him “a lot,” A.M. “cries” “when father
spanks him a lot,” and A.M. “is scared” “when father spanks
him.” Per the report, A.M. stated that father yells at A.M.,
“father yells at [K.M.] a lot,” and, on one occasion, A.M. heard
father threaten to “ ‘slap’ ” K.M. if she “ ‘said one more
word . . . .’ ”
Despite the fact that father has not assaulted A.M., the
juvenile court could reasonably have inferred from the evidence
discussed above that father could not control his anger and, as a
12 In its respondent’s brief, DCFS considers this excerpt
from the detention report to be evidence that “father was violent
with mother . . . .” In his reply, father does not dispute DCFS’s
characterization of this portion of the record, although he does
insist his “[f]ailure to reply to a particular point raised in
respondent’s brief is not a concession or waiver of such point.”
Regardless of whether father’s failure to address this issue
constitutes a formal concession, we conclude he has failed to
discharge his burden of showing that mother’s statements could
not be reasonably construed as evidence that he subjected her to
acts of domestic violence. (See J.F., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at
p. 79 [“The juvenile court’s orders are ‘presumed to be correct,
and it is appellant’s burden to affirmatively show error.’
[Citations.] . . . ‘ “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or
asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and
citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.” ’ ”];
Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981 [“ ‘A judgment
or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and
all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its
correctness.’ ”].)
17
consequence, had a propensity to engage in acts of violence. (See
L.B., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 411 [“ ‘The court may consider
past events in deciding whether a child currently needs the
court’s protection.’ [Citations.] Indeed, in a domestic violence
situation, past violence is highly probative of the risk that
violence may recur.’ ”]; cf. Guardianship of Simpson (1998)
67 Cal.App.4th 914, 919–920, 925, 938 [observing, in the course
of reviewing an order terminating a guardianship, that a parent’s
acts of “great violence and rage” may “show a propensity toward
violence on his part,” and that “any propensity to [engage in
domestic violence] is certainly highly relevant as regards [to]
children’s welfare”].) Accordingly, the court did not err in
concluding that its intervention was necessary to protect A.M.
from father. (See In re S.R. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 204, 219
[“ ‘ “[T]he court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or
injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to
protect the child.” ’ ”].) Indeed, by ordering father to complete an
anger management program, the court recognized that father’s
predisposition threatened his children’s welfare. (See Briana V.,
supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311 [noting that a juvenile court is
charged with “ ‘fashion[ing] a dispositional order’ ” designed to
“ ‘best serve and protect the child’s interests’ ”].)
Finally, father’s reliance on the juvenile court’s order
granting him unmonitored visits with A.M. in a public setting is
unavailing. Father ignores the juvenile court’s order removing
A.M. from his custody, meaning the court found clear and
convincing evidence that allowing A.M. to reside with father
would have presented a substantial danger to the child’s physical
18
health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being.13
He also overlooks the fact that although DCFS was not tasked
with supervising father’s visits with A.M., it is apparent the
court’s proviso requiring those visits to occur in a public setting
was intended to mitigate the risk of father harming A.M.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional findings, we reject father’s contention that
“the juvenile court had little concern that father was a threat to
[A.M.]”
In sum, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
findings that jurisdiction over K.M. was proper pursuant to
section 300, subdivision (a), and that A.M. was a child described
by subdivision (j).
13 (See In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 244 [noting
that § 361, subd. (c)(1) requires the juvenile court to find the clear
and convincing evidence standard discussed in the text
accompanying this footnote to have been satisfied before it may
remove a child from a parent with whom the child resided at the
time the petition was initiated]; In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
767, 777 [indicating § 361, subd. (d) imposes the same clear and
convincing evidence standard vis-à-vis removal of a child “from a
parent with whom the child did not reside when the petition was
filed”].)
19
DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional orders.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
WEINGART, J.
20