People v. Nguyen CA4/3 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 9/30/21 P. v. Nguyen CA4/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                          G060096
    v.                                                            (Super. Ct. No. 09ZF0050)
    GIANG THUY NGUYEN,                                                      OPINION
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
    Patrick Donahue, Judge. Affirmed.
    Jill Kent, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    No Appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    This is a Wende appeal from an order denying appellant’s petition for
    resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. (See People v. Wende (1979) 
    25 Cal.3d 1
    436 (Wende).) Having reviewed the record as required under Wende, we conclude there
    are no arguable issues to raise on appellant’s behalf. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
    court’s denial order.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Appellant and his fellow gang members conspired to murder a member of
    their own gang because they feared he might implicate them in a home invasion robbery
    that had gone awry. Although appellant was not present when the victim was murdered
    execution-style on the side of the road, he helped orchestrate the hit and arranged for the
    perpetrator’s getaway in his girlfriend’s car.
    Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit
    murder and first degree premeditated murder. (§§ 182, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a)(1), 189,
    subd. (a).) The jury also found true a gang enhancement allegation, as well as special
    circumstances allegations the murder was committed to avoid arrest and while lying in
    wait. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b), 190.2, subds. (a)(5), (15).) The trial court sentenced
    appellant to life in prison without parole for the murder, 25 years to life for the
    conspiracy and 10 years for the gang enhancement.
    We affirmed the judgment in 2016. Two years later, following the passage
    of Senate Bill No. 1437 (SB 1437), appellant petitioned for resentencing under section
    1170.95. After appointing counsel for appellant and receiving opposition from the
    prosecution, the trial court denied appellant’s petition for failure to establish a prima facie
    case for relief.
    Appellant appealed, and we appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel
    filed a Wende brief which set forth the facts of the case. (Wende, supra, 
    25 Cal.3d 436
    .)
    1
    All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2
    Counsel did not argue against appellant but advised the court no issues were found to
    argue on his behalf. Appellant was given 30 days to file written argument on his own
    behalf, but he did not avail himself of that opportunity.
    DISCUSSION
    SB 1437 was enacted to ensure murder culpability is commensurate with
    the defendant’s own actions and mental state. (People v. Lewis (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 952
    ,
    971 (Lewis).) To that end, the law restricted the scope of the felony murder rule and
    eliminated the natural and probable consequences theory for the crime of murder. (Id. at
    p. 959.) These changes were designed to “‘ensure that murder liability is not imposed on
    a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
    participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’
    [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
    Section 1170.95 is the procedural mechanism that allows convicted
    murderers to take advantage of these changes. To obtain resentencing relief under that
    section, the defendant must have been convicted of murder under the felony murder rule
    or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.)
    And, the circumstances of his murder must have been such that he could not be convicted
    of murder now, due to the changes wrought by SB 1437. (Id. at p. 960.) If the record of
    conviction negates either one of those requirements, the defendant is ineligible for
    resentencing, and the trial court may properly deny his petition for failure to establish a
    prima facie case for relief. (Id. at p. 971.)
    Our review of the record in this case reveals the prosecution did not utilize
    the felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences theory in securing
    appellant’s murder conviction, nor was the jury instructed on those theories. This means
    appellant’s liability stemmed from his own actions. He was not convicted utilizing a now
    defunct theory of vicarious liability.
    3
    Moreover, by finding appellant guilty of premeditated murder and
    conspiracy to commit murder, and by finding true the special circumstance allegation of
    lying in wait, the jury necessarily determined he personally harbored the intent to kill.
    Therefore, as the trial court ruled, he is outside the scope of section 1170.95. Because
    there is no arguable basis in the record to dispute that ruling, we must affirm.
    DISPOSITION
    The trial court’s order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing is
    affirmed.
    BEDSWORTH, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    O’LEARY, P. J.
    FYBEL, J.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: G060096

Filed Date: 9/30/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/30/2021