Sherwood v. Vogele CA4/1 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 5/7/21 Sherwood v. Vogele CA4/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    ROBERT SHERWOOD et al.,                                              D076776
    Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and
    Appellants,
    (Super. Ct. No.
    v.                                                         37-2017-00012535-CU-BC-CTL)
    EUGENE VOGELE et al.,
    Defendants, Cross-complainants
    and Respondents.
    ROBERT SHERWOOD et al.,
    D077088
    Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and
    Appellants,
    v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No.
    37-2017-00012535-CU-BC-CTL)
    EUGENE VOGELE,
    Defendant, Cross-complainant
    and Respondent,
    CHARLES E. GILBERT et al.,
    Cross-complainants and
    Respondents.
    CONSOLIDATED APPEALS from a judgment and postjudgment
    orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kevin A. Enright, Judge.
    Affirmed.
    Lokk Legal, Daryoosh Khashayar and Angela Ness, for Plaintiffs,
    Cross-defendants and Appellants, Robert Sherwood, Lazy Eye Coffee, LLC,
    and Ashley Babcock.
    Stokes Law, Bonnie Lynn Stokes and Brittany A. Salamin for
    Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent, Eugene Vogele and Linda
    Luckow, in her capacity as personal representative of the estate of Eugene
    Vogele.
    No appearance for Cross-complainants and Respondents, Charles
    Gilbert, Kevin Gilbert, and Linde Gilbert.
    Plaintiffs and appellants Robert Sherwood and Lazy Eye Coffee, LLC
    (collectively Sherwood) initiated litigation against defendant and respondent
    Eugene Vogele arising out of a dispute over building encroachments from
    Vogele’s property on adjacent property leased by Sherwood (the property).1
    The complaint spawned cross-complaints by Vogele against Sherwood and
    the property’s lessor, cross-defendants and respondents Charles Gilbert,
    Kevin Gilbert, and Linde Gilbert (the Gilberts); by the Gilberts against
    Sherwood; and by Sherwood against the Gilberts. Trial resulted in a
    judgment on special verdicts in which a jury, assessing the parties’ efforts to
    mitigate their damages and respective percentages of fault, awarded (1)
    1     Ashley Babcock is also an appellant, as she was a cross-defendant in
    one of the cross-actions. For purposes of appeal, we refer to all three
    appellants as Sherwood as do appellants in their opening brief. Vogele died
    in December 2017, and Linda Luckow, his personal representative, took over
    the matters on behalf of his estate. We will refer to respondent as Vogele
    even though the party was Vogele’s estate.
    2
    $6,000 in damages to Sherwood against Vogele and the Gilberts; (2) $50,000
    in damages to Vogele against Sherwood; and (3) $620,492 in damages to the
    Gilberts against Sherwood and Babcock. The trial court later awarded
    Sherwood $143,183.55 in attorney fees on his operative complaint; and
    awarded the Gilberts $425,125.94 in attorney fees and costs on their cross-
    complaint.2
    Sherwood challenges the jury’s special verdict findings as to his
    mitigation of damages and percentage of fault, the Gilberts’ mitigation of
    their damages, and the award of damages to Vogele, on grounds the findings
    lack sufficient evidence. He contends the special verdicts resulted from juror
    bias and prejudice against him, warranting a new trial on that ground as well
    as on grounds of inadequate damages and inconsistent verdicts. Sherwood
    finally challenges the attorney fee order, arguing the court abused its
    discretion by reducing his sought-after fees to an amount the court
    determined was incurred on his breach of contract claim. We affirm the
    judgment and postjudgment orders.
    2      This court consolidated Sherwood’s appeals from the judgment and
    postjudgment attorney fee orders. Sherwood has sought a partial dismissal
    of his attorney fee appeal as to the Gilberts, representing those issues are
    now moot as Sherwood and the Gilberts have settled their respective attorney
    fee claims. The Gilberts have since filed a “statement of non-interested
    parties” stating they are no longer parties, will not file briefing, and stipulate
    to Sherwood’s request for partial dismissal. The Gilberts have not filed a
    respondent’s brief, but their nonappearance does not absolve us from
    adjudicating the merits of Sherwood’s appeal from the judgment, in which he
    challenges the damages awarded to the Gilberts. (See In re Bryce C. (1995)
    
    12 Cal.4th 226
    , 232-233 [“if a respondent fails to file a brief, the judgment [or
    order] is not automatically reversed”]; In re Marriage of Everard (2020) 
    47 Cal.App.5th 109
    , 111, fn. 1.) Having consolidated the appeals from the
    attorney fee order and from the judgment and based on the parties’
    representations, we simply hold Sherwood’s challenge to the attorney fees
    awarded to the Gilberts is moot, and do not address it on that basis.
    3
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    We state the facts and view the evidence in the light most favorable to
    the jury’s special verdict, resolving all conflicts and indulging all reasonable
    inferences to support the judgment. (American Master Lease LLC v. Idanta
    Partners, Ltd. (2014) 
    225 Cal.App.4th 1451
    , 1459, fn. 1; accord, Roby v.
    McKesson Corp. (2009) 
    47 Cal.4th 686
    , 693-694.)
    In June 2016, Sherwood leased property from the Gilberts on which
    Sherwood and Babcock planned to build and operate a coffee house. The
    lease payment for the first year was $6,160 per month. The Gilberts’
    property had a “zero lot line,” meaning it was “wall to wall” with adjacent
    property owned by Vogele. The Gilberts eventually understood that
    Sherwood’s project contemplated a second story rooftop deck, but the lease
    specified that they did not make representations about the property and
    Sherwood accepted the property “as is.” The lease also contained a hold
    harmless clause by which Sherwood would represent and indemnify the
    Gilberts if he caused a claim to be filed against them.
    The project was the first time Sherwood had ever built a business from
    the “ground up.” Sherwood hired a general contractor and a designer, neither
    of whom had ever done a ground up commercial project. The designer did not
    have an architectural license, nor was she working under an architect. She
    did not have a survey done in the initial pre-design phase. After Sherwood
    entered into the lease, his contractor noticed that shed roof eaves from
    Vogele’s property were overhanging onto the Gilberts’ property and would
    impede the ability to build the project. The Gilberts did not notice the eaves
    were overhanging or perceive them an encroachment onto their property
    until it was brought to their attention. Kevin Gilbert first sought to resolve
    the matter informally and amicably with Vogele, but intended to follow up
    4
    with a City of San Diego (City) code enforcement complaint if unsuccessful.
    Sherwood, on the other hand, expressed he saw “no alternative but to turn
    this over to [his] attorneys.” In late August 2016, he e-mailed Kevin Gilbert
    that it was his opinion that Vogele had “zero intention” to resolve the matter
    and “make this right.” Kevin Gilbert felt that from “day one” Sherwood did
    not believe Vogele would take down the encroachments.
    After Sherwood’s attorney demanded Vogele remove the encroaching
    eaves, Vogele and Sherwood in September 2016 entered into a written
    agreement by which Vogele would “remov[e] all existing illegal roof
    overhangs” and also remove a separate small three-window structure, which
    City had determined was a permit violation. On October 12, 2016, the day
    Vogele was to begin his work to remove the encroachment, Sherwood sent an
    e-mail copying Kevin Gilbert and others telling them that if he did not see
    Vogele’s removal work in progress, he would commence litigation “without
    further delay.” Sherwood stated he did not want to give Vogele “so much as a
    one-hour extension.” Sherwood wrote: “We will have to proceed as if the
    work [by Vogele] will not be done, which means we will have to spend
    considerably more on the build-out to accommodate the problem.” He
    continued: “For this reason I want to seek a million dollars in damages, and
    if in the end it is less, the amount can be adjusted down.” Sherwood told
    Kevin Gilbert to break off negotiations with Vogele and Gilbert did so.
    Gilbert understood that this meant Sherwood was going to spend more
    money and build the project, but proceed with litigation against Vogele for
    damages.
    In early 2017, based on communications from Sherwood and his
    designer, the Gilberts believed Sherwood was designing a “workaround” to
    the encroaching eaves, with a complete tear down of the existing building and
    5
    construction of a new building. Based on that understanding and believing
    Sherwood was going to proceed with the project, the Gilberts authorized the
    demolition. In fact, Sherwood’s contractor was not asked to come up with
    alternative solutions regarding the encroaching eaves, and the final City-
    approved permit for the coffee shop showed the zero lot line without any
    mention of the encroaching eaves. Sherwood’s designer never found a
    definitive solution to design around the eaves. In February 2017, she e-
    mailed Sherwood about potential workarounds, but Sherwood wanted to
    proceed with the demolition permit, stating, “Once we begin demo[lition], it
    kind of paints a picture of Vogele that is a point of no return.” Sherwood’s
    attorney directed the designer to not submit redesigns to City for approval
    because Sherwood and his lawyer wanted a better understanding of which
    way the litigation was moving. Had the Gilberts known Sherwood was not
    proceeding with a workaround for his project, they would not have given
    permission to demolish their building because it would not make financial
    sense.
    In March 2017, Sherwood went ahead and demolished the building on
    the Gilberts’ property. Neighboring businesses complained of property
    damage as a result of the demolition.
    The following month, Sherwood, and eventually Lazy Eye Coffee, LLC,
    sued Vogele for breach of Vogele’s agreement to remove the eaves, fraud
    (intentional misrepresentation), willful and negligent trespass, and nuisance.
    In that complaint, Sherwood sought a permanent injunction to compel Vogele
    to remove the encroachment from the property. Vogele filed a cross-
    complaint against Sherwood and the Gilberts for, among other causes of
    action, fraud, negligence and trespass. Kevin and Linde Gilbert cross-
    complained against Sherwood, Babcock and Lazy Eye Coffee, LLC for breach
    6
    of lease and breach of Sherwood’s duty under the lease to indemnify and
    defend the Gilberts in connection with claims arising from Sherwood’s use of
    the premises. The Gilberts also sought judicial declarations as to Sherwood’s
    duty to defend them and his alleged agreement to accept the premises in an
    “as is” condition.
    Sherwood, however, terminated his lease with the Gilberts in
    September 2017.3 He later filed a cross-complaint against the Gilberts
    alleging causes of action for fraud based on their failure to disclose what he
    alleged were unpermitted conditions existing on the property including the
    overhanging eaves, and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Sherwood
    sought a judicial declaration that by virtue of the Gilberts’ omission of
    material facts about the property, the lease with the Gilberts was invalid and
    unenforceable.
    Even after Sherwood commenced litigation, Kevin Gilbert believed
    based on attorney communications that Sherwood’s project was only on hold;
    that Sherwood still intended to build on the property. It was not until the
    summer of 2018 that Gilbert put out a sign to relet the property. He did not
    market the property in part because Vogele had placed a lis pendens upon it,
    which was a cloud on its title. At one point, the Gilberts looked into renting
    out the empty lot to food trucks, and City advised them depending on the lot
    size and whether it was paved they could put approximately three such
    trucks there. Kevin Gilbert found no interested renters, however. And the
    Gilberts did not have the income to pay for the required paving and fencing,
    3      Sherwood suggests he terminated his lease only because the trial court
    denied his application for a preliminary injunction. But the jury did not hear
    this; the record indicates the trial court in an in limine ruling precluded the
    parties from discussing the fact that Sherwood sought a preliminary
    injunction or the result of that hearing.
    7
    which would have cost between $15,000 and $17,000. In February 2019,
    Gilbert hired a broker to sell the property, initially listing it for $1 million but
    eventually dropping it to $950,000. The Gilberts’ trial expert found the
    current market value for the property was $700,000.
    The matters proceeded to a jury trial, where the parties presented
    competing experts on damages and Sherwood’s due diligence obligations.
    Vogele’s real estate economist expert Nathan Moeder testified his
    expertise was in market analysis, as well as financial and development
    advice to developers and investors on real estate projects. He explained his
    services were used to determine whether a project works or not, usually at
    the front end. Moeder explained the concept of due diligence. Understanding
    the project was a coffee house with a rooftop deck, due diligence would entail
    hiring architects and structural engineers, getting preliminary cost
    estimates, and calling City about zoning. Moeder testified this would be done
    prior to purchase or lease. His opinion was that Sherwood did not conduct
    the proper diligence before signing the lease; Sherwood committed to lease
    payments and exposed himself financially before knowing he would be able to
    build the project. Moeder also opined that Sherwood did not have the right
    team in place: his design architect was not right for the job, which
    necessitated structural changes, and Sherwood should have called a time out
    to find someone who had the proper experience. Also, Sherwood’s structural
    engineer was brought in too late, after Sherwood had committed himself
    financially to the project. According to Moeder, it was a “grave error” to tear
    down the building on the property because “in real estate development, you’re
    not going to tear down a building, unless you know you can build a new one”
    and to do so without knowing whether you could build it was “wasting money
    without knowing that you can do it.” He continued: “Number two is not only
    8
    if it’s torn down, but if you can’t build a new building, now you’re stuck with
    land, and that’s one of the damages here of mitigating damages is I don’t
    have a building anymore, and so that’s a loss of value.” Moeder testified that
    from a developer or investor’s perspective, “I’m not going to keep . . . paying
    for things, unless I know we can build what we want to build. [¶] And if
    there is uncertainty with these eaves, what happens in real estate
    development is you call a time out, you stop everything, you address the
    eaves problem, and figure that out, and once you have resolution and if they
    do have to come down or they don’t, then you start spending money again in
    terms of how do we work around it or you haven’t wasted money, because you
    haven’t torn down a building and paid for something when you can’t build a
    new one, because the eaves don’t have to be taken down. [¶] . . . The proper
    approach would be to call a time out and address the eaves issue first.”
    Moeder also explained that due diligence included the type of lease;
    testifying it was “a whole different ballgame” when the building was
    removed. According to him, a tenant who builds a new building would want a
    lease term longer than 15 years to recoup the investment of building a brand
    new building for the landlord. Moeder testified that in Sherwood’s case, a
    new lease structure should have been considered in the due diligence process
    with a structural engineer to determine whether the building was not sound
    and had to be torn down and reconstructed from the ground up.
    Vogele’s expert in property management and real estate investing,
    Robert Griswold, testified that even in a lease situation a tenant must
    conduct due diligence as if it were a purchase, retaining experts to look at
    everything before signing the lease and making the financial commitment.
    Such diligence would entail talking to City’s development services
    department, making sure you can get a permit, and hiring engineers and
    9
    construction experts. Griswold criticized Sherwood for not doing a financial
    feasibility study before signing the lease or later, when changing from a
    remodel to a complete demolition. He explained that in a commercial
    situation, and particularly where the tenant took the property “as is, where
    is,” the tenant is expected to have done his/her homework and hired the right
    professionals. Griswold’s opinion was that the shed roof and overhang was
    open and obvious, and did not need to be disclosed by the Gilberts. He also
    testified the protrusions were not material or significant in that they would
    not prevent a person from redeveloping the existing building or tearing down
    and rebuilding. Griswold testified, “[Y]ou could easily build around them,
    even while you pursue legal action against the property owner.” Griswold
    testified Sherwood’s designer did not represent Sherwood well, as there was
    plenty of time to change course and exit or renegotiate the deal.
    The jury returned special verdicts as follows:
    On Sherwood’s complaint against Vogele and the Gilberts, the jury
    found in favor of Sherwood that there was a binding contract between
    Sherwood and Vogele that Vogele breached, and that Vogele negligently
    trespassed and also maintained a private nuisance, causing Sherwood
    $1,463,745 in past and future economic damages. However, the jury found
    Sherwood could have avoided $1,433,745 in damages with reasonable efforts,
    expenditures or mitigation. It then assigned Sherwood 75 percent of
    responsibility for his own harm, with Vogele having 20 percent and the
    Gilberts five percent responsibility.
    On Vogele’s claims against Sherwood, the jury found Sherwood
    negligent, but that Sherwood did not negligently puncture Vogele’s property
    so as to cause building materials or debris to enter it. It found Vogele
    10
    incurred $50,000 in damages to his property, and assigned 100 percent of the
    responsibility of the harm to Sherwood.
    On the Gilberts’ claims against Sherwood, the jury found Sherwood
    breached the contract with the Gilberts; that he failed to perform the
    requisite due diligence, the Gilberts did not fail to disclose a known defect
    regarding the property, and the Gilberts were harmed in the amount of
    $705,308 in past and future economic loss by Sherwood’s breach. The jury
    found that the Gilberts could have avoided $84,816 of those damages with
    reasonable expenditures or mitigation, leaving them a total of $620,492 in
    damages. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, ordering that
    Sherwood take nothing from the Gilberts; Sherwood recover $6,000 from
    Vogele’s estate; Vogele’s estate recover $50,000 from Sherwood; the Gilberts
    recover $620,492 from Sherwood; and Vogele’s estate recover $29,027.50 in
    costs from Sherwood.
    Sherwood moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and
    for a new trial, the latter in part on grounds there was jury misconduct as a
    result of juror bias. Sherwood submitted declarations from two jurors
    purporting to describe statements from “multiple jurors” about not wanting
    to give Sherwood “a penny” and stating their own belief the verdicts were
    based on bias against Sherwood.
    The trial court denied the motions, ruling, among other things, the
    juror declarations were inadmissible as speculative, containing hearsay, and
    setting forth jurors’ mental processes. The court also found sufficient
    evidence supported the jury’s verdicts and Sherwood had not shown any
    irreconcilable inconsistency in them.
    On the parties’ competing motions for prevailing party attorney fees,
    the court awarded Sherwood $143,183.55 in attorney fees. The court reached
    11
    this amount by taking Sherwood’s claim for $572,730.11 in fees, calculating
    the hours spent using a reasonable hourly rate and reducing those by 75
    percent because Sherwood prevailed only on his operative complaint.4
    Sherwood appeals from the judgment as well as the postjudgment new
    trial motion order and attorney fee order.
    DISCUSSION
    I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Sherwood challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to various jury
    findings, which we discuss seriatim. The applicable standard of review is
    settled: “ ‘ “When a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there is not
    any substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins
    and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial
    evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which will support the finding of
    fact.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘In a substantial evidence challenge to a
    judgment, the appellate court will “consider all of the evidence in the light
    4      The court found the reasonable hourly attorney rate was $322.50, the
    average hourly rate of Sherwood’s two attorneys. It found Sherwood did not
    provide a breakdown of hours spent in litigating his operative complaint’s
    claims, but explained: “The $143,183.55 amount is based on the $322.50
    reasonabl[e] hourly rate times 443.98 hours, the amount of hours the court
    determined was a reasonable amount spent on . . . litigating plaintiffs’
    contract and tort claims against Mr. Vogele. The 443.98 hours is one-fourth
    of the 1,775.91 hours, the time the court determined plaintiffs spent in this
    entire matter ($572,730.11 / $322.50 = 1,775.91). The court, in its discretion,
    reduced the amount of hours spent in this matter (1,775.91) by 75 [percent]
    because plaintiffs only prevailed on their operative complaint, which
    constituted one-fourth of the action in this matter. The other 75 [percent] of
    this matter consisted of . . . Mr. Vogele’s cross-complaint, the Gilberts’ cross-
    complaint, and plaintiffs’ cross-complaint against the Gilberts, all in which
    the plaintiffs did not prevail on. Thus, the court, in its discretion, awards
    plaintiffs $143,183.55 in attorneys’ fees against the Estate.” (Some
    capitalization and emphasis omitted.)
    12
    most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every
    reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the [findings].
    [Citations.]” [Citation.] We may not reweigh the evidence and are bound by
    the trial court’s credibility determinations. [Citations.] Moreover, findings of
    fact are liberally construed to support the judgment.’ ” (In re Marriage of
    Wozniak (2020) 
    59 Cal.App.5th 120
    , 131.) This standard applies to a jury’s
    special verdicts. (See Mathews v. Happy Valley Conference Center, Inc. (2019)
    
    43 Cal.App.5th 236
    , 251; Frank v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 
    149 Cal.App.4th 805
    , 816.)
    “ ‘An appellant asserting lack of substantial evidence must fairly state
    all the evidence, not just the evidence favorable to the appellant. [Citation.]
    The appellant must “marshall all of the record evidence relevant to the point
    in question and affirmatively demonstrate its insufficiency to sustain the
    challenged finding.” [Citation.] A failure to state all material evidence may
    be deemed a waiver of the argument that the evidence was insufficient.’ ”
    (Hartt v. County of Los Angeles (2011) 
    197 Cal.App.4th 1391
    , 1402.)
    A. Sherwood’s Mitigation of Damages
    Sherwood concedes that a party suffering damages from a breach of
    contract has a duty to take reasonable steps to mitigate those damages, and
    cannot recover for losses that reasonably could have been avoided. However,
    citing Seaboard Music Co. v. Germano (1972) 
    24 Cal.App.3d 618
    , he contends
    that the rule does not apply “where its effect would be to require an innocent
    party to sacrifice and surrender important and valuable rights.” Recounting
    the underlying facts surrounding his entry into the lease, Vogele’s agreement
    to remove the encroaching eaves, and purported assurances by Kevin Gilbert
    that Vogele would honor his agreement, Sherwood states he relied on the
    13
    agreement and assurances in proceeding with the project and demolishing
    the building. He argues his coffee house was to be a “unique” and
    “ ‘signature’ ” property, and asserts: “At no time prior to the litigation did
    Vogele communicate his intention not to honor the parties’ agreement.
    Litigation was the last resort in an effort to resolve the problem and to allow
    the coffee house to be built. The passage of time was occasioned by the
    continued assurances of [the Gilberts] that they could resolve the eaves
    problem with Vogele, and Sherwood trusted the Gilberts. All acts
    undertaken by Sherwood were with the express knowledge and consent of
    [the Gilberts]. From Sherwood’s perspective, it was not until near the filing
    date of their complaint that they had knowledge that the damage and injury
    occasioned by Vogele’s failure and refusal to honor their contract had
    accrued. Therefore, it was not until near April of 2017[,] that Sherwood’s
    duty to mitigate damages arose. By this time Sherwood had previously
    entered into and become obligated to make monthly lease payments; had
    incurred costs and expenses associated with the project and construction; and
    had demolished the existing building on the subject property.” (Some
    capitalization omitted.) Sherwood maintains this evidence “was essentially
    uncontroverted.” From it, Sherwood contends no reasonable jury could have
    concluded that a near 100 percent reduction in a damage award occurred and
    it committed a “gross miscarriage of justice” as the reduction was without
    substantial evidence.
    “The doctrine of mitigation . . . is a limitation on liability for damages
    . . . .” (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 
    49 Cal.4th 758
    , 789.) “The doctrine
    . . . holds that ‘[a] plaintiff who suffers damage as a result of either a breach
    of contract or a tort has a duty to take reasonable steps to mitigate those
    damages and will not be able to recover for any losses which could have been
    14
    thus avoided.’ ” (Valle de Oro Bank v. Gamboa (1994) 
    26 Cal.App.4th 1686
    ,
    1691.) “The familiar rule requiring a plaintiff in a tort or contract action to
    mitigate damages embodies notions of fairness and socially responsible
    behavior which are fundamental to our jurisprudence. Most broadly stated,
    it precludes the recovery of damages which, through the exercise of due
    diligence, could have been avoided. Thus, in essence, it is a rule requiring
    reasonable conduct in commercial affairs.” (Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox
    Film Corp. (1970) 
    3 Cal.3d 176
    , 185; Valle v. Oro Bank, at p. 1691 [plaintiff
    who suffers damage from breach of contract or tort “may not recover for
    damages avoidable through ordinary care and reasonable exertion”].)
    Typically, “ ‘[t]he rule of [mitigation of damages] comes into play after a legal
    wrong has occurred, but while some damages may still be averted . . . .’ ”
    (Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 
    42 Cal.3d 1051
    , 1066, quoting Prosser &
    Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 65, p. 458; see also Clayworth, at p. 789.)
    The burden of proving a plaintiff failed to mitigate damages is on the
    defendant. (Powerhouse Motorsports Group, Inc. v. Yamaha Motor Corp.,
    U.S.A. (2013) 
    221 Cal.App.4th 867
    , 884.) Whether the defendant met that
    burden is a question of fact subject to review for substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
    The adequacy of the plaintiff’s actions depends on the circumstances of the
    case, taking into consideration time, knowledge, opportunity, and expense.
    (Brandon & Tibbs v. George Kevorkian Accountancy Corp. (1990) 
    226 Cal.App.3d 442
    , 466.) “The reasonableness of the injured party’s efforts must
    be judged in light of the situation existing at the time and not with the
    benefit of hindsight.” (State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court (2003)
    
    31 Cal.4th 1026
    , 1043-1044.)
    Sherwood’s arguments as to the jury’s mitigation finding view the
    evidence in a light favorable to him, contrary to the principle of substantial
    15
    evidence review requiring this court to view the evidence favorable to the
    jury’s finding. He does not fully recognize the evidence from which the jury
    could conclude, for example, that litigation was by no means Sherwood’s last
    resort. The evidence recounted above shows that Sherwood did not seek to
    limit his losses once he believed in October 2016 that Vogele was not going to
    act on his September 2016 agreement, but rather as of that time Sherwood
    intended to sue Vogele for a million dollars in damages and proceed with his
    project, instructing Kevin Gilbert to cut off communications with Vogele.
    “One has an obligation to avoid an unwarranted enhancement of damages
    ‘through passive indifference or stubborn insistence upon a conceived legal
    right . . . .’ ” (Valle de Oro Bank v. Gamboa, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p.
    1691.) Nor does Sherwood acknowledge the expert testimony about the
    reasonableness of his proceeding with the project and demolition of the
    existing building when faced with Vogele’s failure to remove the encroaching
    eaves. Typically the obligation to mitigate damages begins once a legal
    wrong has occurred (Valle de Oro Bank, at p. 1691), and here the evidence
    was that Sherwood went ahead with the project and demolition, even
    obtaining permits for his original plans, though by October 2016 he believed
    Vogele was not going to abide by their agreement and take steps to remove
    the encroaching eaves. The jury reasonably reached its mitigation finding in
    view of this evidence. Sherwood cites no authority convincing us that the fact
    the Gilberts knew about Sherwood’s actions—or agreed to the demolition
    believing Sherwood and his team would build around the problem—relieves
    Sherwood from the obligation to mitigate his own losses.
    Sherwood asserts the evidence shows in January and February 2017
    the Gilberts continued to assure him Vogele would honor his agreement to
    remove the eaves, and on that basis he proceeded with demolition. He
    16
    asserts that after the Gilberts’ assurances proved false, “it was agreed”
    Sherwood would commence litigation. Even if there were some relevance to
    the jury’s mitigation finding that Sherwood moved forward only because of
    Kevin Gilbert’s assurances, such circumstances are contradicted by other
    evidence that we credit in our substantial evidence review. When asked if in
    January 2017 he continued to reassure Sherwood that Vogele would remove
    the eaves, Kevin Gilbert denied he told Sherwood not to worry; he testified
    that he agreed to continue to talk to Vogele to nudge him in the right
    direction as long as Sherwood wanted Gilbert to do so. Gilbert testified that
    despite this, in January 2017 Sherwood continued to say he did not believe
    Vogele would remove the eaves, which according to Gilbert was what
    Sherwood said from “day one.” Kevin Gilbert denied agreeing to or approving
    Sherwood’s lawsuit; he testified that in making complaints with City he
    intended not to be part of any litigation against Vogele and always advised
    Sherwood to let City put pressure on Vogele and exhaust administrative
    remedies rather than resort to the courts.
    Nothing about Sherwood’s cited authority, Seaboard Music Co. v.
    Germano, supra, 
    24 Cal.App.3d 618
     convinces us to overturn the jury’s
    mitigation finding or hold Sherwood was not required to mitigate his
    damages. In Seaboard Music, the court decided whether a plaintiff, the
    lessor of a jukebox and pool table, should have been required to mitigate
    damages by re-leasing the equipment it got back from a defendant after the
    defendant repudiated his lease contract for those items. (Seaboard Music, at
    p. 622.) The Court of Appeal declined to apply the mitigation rule: “We are
    not concerned here with the owner of a single house or a single piece of
    equipment who enters into a lease. Such an owner can recoup or reduce the
    loss he sustains from a breach by re-leasing the property. The evidence here
    17
    shows plaintiff was engaged in the business of leasing coin-operated
    equipment; it had a warehouse full of equipment similar to that leased to [the
    defendant] from which it serviced its customers and from which it could
    service any additional leases negotiated, irrespective of whether [defendant]
    fulfilled or breached his obligation. What appellants argue is that plaintiff
    was obligated to re-lease the equipment repossessed from [defendant] to
    reduce the liability incurred by reason of the breach in preference to using its
    own equipment, or additional equipment it might purchase, to carry on its
    normal business. In effect, they assert plaintiff should mitigate its damages
    and reduce their liability by foregoing profit which it would otherwise make in
    the normal course of its business. [¶] The rule of mitigation of damages has
    no application where its effect would be to require the innocent party to
    sacrifice and surrender important and valuable rights. [Citations.] It may
    not be imposed to deprive a plaintiff of the benefit of subsequent contracts
    which would have been available to him irrespective of the original breach.”
    (Seaboard Music, at p. 623, italics added.) In Seaboard, the court reasoned
    that a business owner who leases products is not required to sacrifice
    additional leases available to it so as to re-lease repossessed equipment. It
    was in that context that the court held mitigation of damages does not apply
    “where its effect would be to require the innocent party to sacrifice and
    surrender important and valuable rights.” (Id. at p. 623.)
    The principles expressed in Seaboard Music Co. v. Germano have no
    application here to Sherwood’s obligation to avoid continuing expenditures on
    a specific project that he knew could not go forward without removal of
    Vogele’s encroaching eaves, and then on ensuing litigation. Sherwood is not
    being asked to forego business available to him irrespective of Vogele’s breach.
    (Seaboard Music Co. v. Germano, supra, 24 Cal.App.3d at p. 623.) Rather,
    18
    this is a situation where Sherwood elected to not avoid damages “ ‘through
    [his] stubborn insistence upon a conceived legal right’ ” (Valle de Oro Bank v.
    Gamboa, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1691) to force Vogele to remove the
    eaves.
    In short, Sherwood provides no basis for us to overturn the jury’s
    finding as to his mitigation of damages.
    B. Jury’s Allocation of 75 Percent Fault to Sherwood
    Sherwood’s challenge to the jury’s 75 percent fault allocation to him is
    cursory. Asserting “[t]he jury’s special verdict found that [he] had a
    percentage of fault for 75 [percent] for its contract damages,” he contends
    that comparative fault does not apply to a breach of contract cause of action.
    He then argues: “Inasmuch as comparative negligence was not a theory that
    could have or should have been applied to Sherwood’s breach of contract
    cause of action, the jury’s determination in this regard was improper and the
    lower court’s incorporation of this finding into its judgment was contrary to
    law.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
    “ ‘Under the principles of comparative fault, a person’s negligent
    conduct [is] assigned a share of fault greater than zero percent . . . when the
    conduct was a substantial factor in the causation of the pertinent injuries.
    [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “[L]iability for damage will be borne by those whose
    negligence caused it in direct proportion to their respective fault.” [Citation.]’
    [Citation.] ‘The comparative fault doctrine “is designed to permit the trier of
    fact to consider all relevant criteria in apportioning liability. The doctrine ‘is
    a flexible, commonsense concept, under which a jury properly may consider
    and evaluate the relative responsibility of various parties for an injury
    (whether their responsibility for the injury rests on negligence, strict liability,
    or other theories of responsibility), in order to arrive at an “equitable
    19
    apportionment or allocation of loss.” ’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ ” (David v.
    Hernandez (2014) 
    226 Cal.App.4th 578
    , 591-592, quoting Pfeifer v. John
    Crane, Inc. (2013) 
    220 Cal.App.4th 1270
    , 1285, 1287 and Aidan Ming-Ho
    Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hosp. (2012) 
    55 Cal.4th 291
    , 303.)
    Sherwood’s challenge is based on a misreading of the jury’s special
    verdict form, the correctness of which we assess as a matter of law. (J.P. v.
    Carlsbad Unified School Dist. (2014) 
    232 Cal.App.4th 323
    , 339; City of San
    Diego v. D.R. Horton San Diego Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 
    126 Cal.App.4th 668
    ,
    678.) Reversible error occurs only where special verdicts are “hopelessly
    ambiguous.” (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co. (1968) 
    69 Cal.2d 452
    , 457; accord, Fuller v. Dept. of Transportion (2019) 
    38 Cal.App.5th 1034
    , 1038.) “ ‘ “A verdict should be interpreted so as to uphold it and give it
    the effect intended by the jury . . . .” ’ [Citation.] Where special verdicts
    appear inconsistent, if any conclusions could be drawn which would explain
    the apparent conflict, the jury will be deemed to have drawn them.”
    (Wysinger v. Automobile Club of Southern Cal. (2007) 
    157 Cal.App.4th 413
    ,
    424.) However, this court is not permitted to choose between inconsistent
    answers in a special verdict. (Singh v. Southland Stone (2010) 
    186 Cal.App.4th 338
    , 358.)
    The parties drafted the special verdict form in six sections, five for each
    of Sherwood’s causes of action against Vogele and the Gilberts5 and the sixth
    generally labeled “damages (all parties).” (Some capitalization omitted.) As
    to negligent trespass and private nuisance, the jury found in Sherwood’s
    favor that Vogele recklessly or negligently caused the eaves to enter the
    5     Specifically, the special verdict’s sections were for Sherwood’s claims
    for breach of contract, negligent trespass, and private nuisance against
    Vogele as well his claims against the Gilberts for negligent misrepresentation
    and concealment.
    20
    Gilberts’ property without Sherwood’s permission, and Vogele’s conduct was a
    substantial factor in causing Sherwood harm. The jury found that without
    Sherwood’s consent Vogele created a condition that was harmful to
    Sherwood’s use of the property, the condition interfered with Sherwood’s use
    or enjoyment of the property, an ordinary and reasonable person would have
    been annoyed or disturbed by the conduct, and the conduct was a substantial
    factor in causing Sherwood harm. It found the seriousness of the harm from
    Vogele’s conduct outweighed its public benefit, and Sherwood proved the
    harmful condition was continuing in nature.
    The damages section asked the jury to determine Sherwood’s damages
    for “past economic loss including . . . costs involved with the business and
    project, and rents”; “future economic loss including . . . costs of future rent
    owed to [the Gilberts]; and past non-economic loss including . . . mental
    anguish and annoyance.” (Some capitalization omitted.) It went on to ask
    what amount of Sherwood’s damages “could have been avoided with
    reasonable efforts or expenditures, or mitigated?” The jury assessed the
    verdict forms after considering the arguments of Vogele’s counsel, who
    emphasized Sherwood’s lack of diligence in connection with the project’s
    feasibility, and his proceeding with the project even though he believed
    Vogele was not going to remove the eaves, “push[ing] the plans through
    permitting as if the eaves don’t even exist . . . .”
    We see nothing hopelessly ambiguous about the verdict form, which
    appeared to have joint input from counsel and was finally approved by
    Sherwood’s counsel. Accordingly, we interpret it from its language
    considered in connection with the pleadings, evidence and instructions, as
    well as counsel’s arguments to the jury. (Fuller v. Department of
    Transportation, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 1038.)
    21
    Doing so, we see that the structure of the verdict form did not attribute
    the comparative fault allocation to Sherwood’s breach of contract claim, as
    Sherwood maintains. The “fair import” of the special verdict (Fuller v.
    Department of Transportation, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 1038) is that the
    fault allocation question was directed at the negligence and continuing
    nuisance claims, to which principles of comparative fault are applicable.
    (Tint v. Sanborn (1989) 
    211 Cal.App.3d 1225
    , 1234, [“a trial court properly
    instructs the jury on comparative negligence principles in a nuisance action
    alleging damages to real property where . . . a defense claim is made that if a
    nuisance exists it arose because of . . . negligence”].) It was likewise
    appropriate for the jury to consider Sherwood’s mitigation of damages on the
    claims sounding in negligence. (Id. at p. 1235.) In sum, the special verdict
    form was not contrary to law as applying comparative fault principles to
    Sherwood’s breach of contract claim, as Sherwood contends.
    Further, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding of a 75
    percent fault allocation to Sherwood. As summarized above, Vogele’s experts
    Moeder and Griswold testified extensively about Sherwood’s failure early on,
    before signing the lease, to take proper and reasonable steps to ensure the
    project could actually be built and was financially feasible by hiring the right
    team of qualified professionals, contacting City, and conducting surveys.
    Griswold pointed out that particularly where the lease contained an “as is”
    provision, the burden was on Sherwood to do his homework on the property’s
    suitability for his project. The evidence was that much of Sherwood’s damage
    was caused by his own failure at the project’s outset to hire the right team
    and conduct the proper due diligence before proceeding. The evidence shows
    that even though Sherwood believed Vogele would never remove the
    encroaching eaves, he expended money on consultants, obtained a permit,
    22
    and ultimately demolished the Gilberts’ building as if the project could
    proceed without the encroachments.
    C. Jury’s Verdict on The Gilberts’ Mitigation of Damages
    Sherwood contends substantial evidence does not support the jury’s
    verdict reducing the Gilberts’ damages by only $84,816 for the Gilberts’
    failure to mitigate their damages. He argues the evidence shows the “utter
    failure” of the Gilberts in mitigating their damage by failing to lease or
    advertise the property, pave it and put a surrounding fence for food trucks,
    and by pricing it for sale well above its fair market value. He states: “If one
    were to assume that it might have taken the Gilberts three (3) months to
    pave and fence and property [sic] and to secure the food truck tenants, the
    balance owed on the lease by Sherwood would have been $258,720 (42
    months x $6,160 per month).” (Some capitalization omitted.) He submits
    with that amount as mitigation, the net judgment against him should have
    been $446,588, not $620,492 as reflected in the jury’s verdict.
    We cannot say Sherwood has met his burden to show that the Gilberts
    failed to reasonably mitigate damages in this breach of lease context. (See
    Civ. Code, § 1951.2, subds. (a)(2)-(3), (c); Powerhouse Motorsports Group, Inc.
    v. Yamaha Motor Corp, U.S.A., supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 884.) The
    doctrine of mitigation “does not require the injured party to take measures
    which are unreasonable or impracticable or which would involve expenditures
    disproportionate to the loss sought to be avoided or which may be beyond his
    [or her] financial means.” (Lu v. Grewal (2005) 
    130 Cal.App.4th 841
    , 850.)
    Here, Kevin Gilbert testified the Gilberts did not have the funds to
    pave their empty lot or place fencing upon it so as to satisfy City demands as
    a condition to leasing it to food truck vendors, and there were no potential
    food truck vendors seeking to lease it in any event. Further, even if there
    23
    were evidence the Gilberts could have expended capital on the property to
    conduct some business there, Sherwood is “not entitled to the benefit of [the
    Gilberts’] hard work and capital in making the property productive; nor
    should [the Gilberts] be punished for bringing the abandoned property back
    to life.” (Lu v. Grewal, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 851.) In Lu, after lessees
    abandoned a commercial gas station/convenience store lease, the lessors
    repaired the property and operated the business. (Id. at p. 846.) They
    unsuccessfully attempted to relet or sell the property. (Ibid.) The trial court
    entered judgment for the lessees, finding the lessors had fully mitigated their
    damages by deriving a profit from the business. (Id. at p. 848.) The Court of
    Appeal reversed on grounds the court applied the wrong mitigation standard
    and burden of proof, contrary to “notions of fairness, justice and common
    sense.” (Id. at pp. 851-852.) The proper measure of mitigation was amount of
    rental loss the lessees proved could have been reasonably avoided, not the
    operational profits stemming from lessors’ hard work and capital in making
    the property productive. (Id. at pp. 850-851.) The latter is the sort of
    mitigation standard Sherwood impermissibly seeks to apply here. Sherwood
    does not otherwise challenge the jury’s damages award in the Gilberts’ favor.
    We see no reason to disturb the jury’s reduction of $84,816 as the amount of
    damages the Gilberts could have avoided in mitigation.
    D. $50,000 Award to Vogele
    Sherwood contends there is no substantial evidence to support the
    jury’s $50,000 verdict in Vogele’s favor on his trespass cause of action. He
    points out the jury found he did not recklessly or negligently puncture
    Vogele’s property, and “[s]ince there could be no property damage as there
    was no trespass, the only logical conclusion to be reached is that the $50,000
    award was based on alleged emotional distress suffered by Vogele.”
    24
    Sherwood argues a plaintiff may not recover emotional distress damages for a
    negligence-based property damage claim absent proof the defendant’s conduct
    caused physical injury.
    Again, this argument is based on a misreading of the jury’s special
    verdict form. The verdict form was drafted in three sections: the first for
    Vogele’s claim of negligence against Sherwood, the second for Vogele’s claim
    of trespass against Sherwood, and the third generally entitled “damages.”
    (Capitalization omitted.) In the first section, the jury found Sherwood was
    negligent and that his negligence was a substantial factor in causing Vogele
    harm. In the second section, the jury found Vogele owned his property, but
    that Sherwood did not recklessly or negligently puncture Vogele’s property
    causing building materials and/or building debris to enter it. With its “no”
    answer to that latter question, the verdict form nevertheless instructed the
    jury to proceed to the third damages section, where the jury was asked what
    amount it awarded Vogele’s estate for “past economic damages.” It awarded
    Vogele $50,000 for “damage to the Vogele property.” (Some capitalization
    omitted.)
    The structure of the verdict form shows that the jury’s damages award
    pertains to Vogele’s claim of negligence, not trespass. And because the
    verdict form asked the jury to identify the amount of Vogele’s “past economic
    damages,” the award is unambiguously not an award of noneconomic,
    emotional distress damages. (See Burchell v. Faculty Physicians & Surgeons
    of Loma Linda University School of Medicine (2020) 
    54 Cal.App.5th 515
    , 526
    [noneconomic damages include pain and suffering and emotional distress];
    Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 
    7 Cal.App.5th 276
    , 300 [describing
    noneconomic damages as including emotional distress, pain and suffering].)
    25
    Sherwood does not further challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of
    the jury’s negligence finding or its $50,000 award, but we point out the award
    is supported by the testimony of Vogele’s general contractor expert John
    Thompson, who testified about the cost to fix Vogele’s building caused by the
    demolition. Among other things, he testified it would cost $50,000 to $75,000
    to reconfigure components outside of Vogele’s building (access panels for
    servicing electrical or plumbing, electrical conduit, and rain gutters) if the
    proposed project were erected next to it.6 Because Sherwood rendered the
    Gilberts’ property an empty lot and the lots were zero-lot line, the jury could
    reasonably conclude the reconfiguration of Vogele’s property would occur for
    any new construction. And this conclusion is consistent with Vogele’s
    counsel’s closing argument, in which she pointed out in connection with
    Thomson’s $50,000 to $75,000 damages assessment that the lots were zero lot
    line, and “[w]hatever someone is going to build, whether it’s this coffee or
    shop [sic] or anything else, you got to make sure you can still access
    [components such as electrical or vents].” In sum, Sherwood has provided no
    basis to disturb the jury’s $50,000 damage award to Vogele.
    II. Alleged Juror Bias and Misconduct
    Sherwood’s motion for new trial was based in part on the declarations
    of jurors L.M. and C.S. Both jurors averred that they disagreed with the
    jury’s verdict as to mitigation, and that the amount of awardable damages
    stemmed from Sherwood’s August 12, 2016 e-mail in which Sherwood stated
    he had entered into the lease so as to build a rooftop venue, and that he had
    already spent $30,000 on the project at that point. L.M. averred: “The
    6      Thompson also estimated the interior commercial tenant spaces
    suffered $15,000 in damages from the demolition and it would cost $162,000
    to retrofit the now-exposed masonry wall. The jury apparently rejected these
    elements of damage.
    26
    majority of the jury determined that Mr. Sherwood should have stopped the
    project and terminated the lease as of the date of the August 12, 2016
    e[-]mail, and any damages sustained afterward could have been mitigated if
    he had done so.” L.M. continued: “At the start of our deliberations, before we
    had even examined any evidence, or examined very little evidence, multiple
    jurors expressed that ‘they were not going to give Sherwood a penny’ or
    expressed a similar sentiment. I believe they made this determination before
    examining all the evidence, as such statements were made before we had a
    chance to review the evidence and discuss it.” L.M. averred: “It is my belief
    that multiple jurors had a bias against Mr. Sherwood from the beginning and
    made their vote on the verdict forms based on that bias, not based on the law
    and evidence.” L.M. also averred: “It appeared [the jurors] came with a
    foregone conclusion and backed their way to the [v]erdict [f]orms. Some of
    the conclusions did not make sense to me, such as finding Mr. Sherwood
    should have terminated the contract in August of 2016 but giving the
    Gilberts over $600,000.00 in damages for Mr. Sherwood failing to pay rent
    after that date.” L.M. also stated the jurors discussed issues not in evidence,
    such as Sherwood’s relationship with Babcock or questioning what his “deal”
    was with “young girls.” L.M. further stated that during deliberations, “more
    than one juror mentioned a letter not in evidence” disputing the lease
    termination, though L.M. could not be sure the letter factored into any juror’s
    voting. Juror C.S. made similar averments.
    Pointing to the assertions made in these declarations, Sherwood
    contends the jury’s special verdicts were the direct product of bias and
    prejudice of jurors who said they did not want to “give [him] a penny” before
    examining any or all of the evidence. He argues that none of the opposing
    juror declarations dispute that “central thesis . . . .” In his reply brief, he
    27
    disputes that the declarations delved into the jurors’ mental processes. He
    says the declarations showed jurors “both expressing their actual bias, to wit,
    they were not going to award [him] ‘a dime’ and their further conduct
    implementing that bias, i.e. the [s]pecial [v]erdicts resulting in a negative
    award to [him].”
    “ ‘The right to unbiased and unprejudiced jurors is an inseparable and
    inalienable part of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution.’ ”
    (Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1971) 
    5 Cal.3d 98
    , 110; People v.
    Galloway (1927) 
    202 Cal. 81
    , 92; Grobeson v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 
    190 Cal.App.4th 778
    , 810.) Where juror misconduct materially affects the
    substantial rights of a party, a verdict may be vacated, in whole or in part, on
    a motion for a new trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, par. Two.) A party moving
    for a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct bears the burden of
    establishing misconduct occurred and that misconduct was prejudicial.
    (Ovando v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 
    159 Cal.App.4th 42
    , 57; Donovan v.
    Poway Unified School Dist. (2008) 
    167 Cal.App.4th 567
    , 625.)
    To determine whether a party has established juror misconduct, “[t]he
    trial court must first ‘determine whether the affidavits supporting the motion
    are admissible. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] This, like any issue of admissibility,
    we review for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] [¶] Second, ‘If the evidence is
    admissible, the trial court must determine whether the facts establish
    misconduct. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] . . . [Citation.] On review from a trial
    court’s ‘determin[ation of] whether misconduct occurred, “[w]e accept the trial
    court’s credibility determinations and findings on questions of historical fact
    if supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]” ’ [Citations.] [¶] ‘ “Lastly,
    assuming misconduct, the trial court must determine whether the
    misconduct was prejudicial.” ’ ” (Barboni v. Tuomi (2012) 
    210 Cal.App.4th 28
    340, 345.) We independently review whether any misconduct resulted in
    prejudice. (People v. Nesler (1997) 
    16 Cal.4th 561
    , 582-583.)
    When assessing admissibility of the juror declarations, we abide by
    Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a): “Upon an inquiry as to the
    validity of a verdict, any otherwise admissible evidence may be received as to
    statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring, either within or
    without the jury room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the
    verdict improperly. No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such
    statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him
    to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by
    which it was determined.” Under this law, we “ ‘distinguish[ ] “between proof
    of overt acts, objectively ascertainable, and proof of the subjective reasoning
    processes of the individual juror, which can neither be corroborated nor
    disproved . . . .” ’ ” (People v. Danks (2004) 
    32 Cal.4th 269
    , 301-302.) It
    “ ‘ “prevents one juror from upsetting a verdict of the whole jury by
    impugning his own or his fellow jurors’ mental processes or reasons for assent
    or dissent. The only improper influences that may be proved under [Evidence
    Code] section 1150 to impeach a verdict, therefore, are those open to sight,
    hearing, and the other senses and thus subject to corroboration.” ’ ” (Id. at p.
    302; see People v. Hutchinson (1969) 
    71 Cal.2d 342
    , 349; Vomaska v. City of
    San Diego (1997) 
    55 Cal.App.4th 905
    , 910.)
    Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling inadmissible
    the portions of the jurors’ declarations stating that it “appeared” to them
    other jurors “came with a foregone conclusion and backed their way to the
    Verdict Forms” or it was their “belief” jurors were biased against Sherwood.
    In addition to the statements being vague and speculative, those remarks
    seek to relate both the jurors’ own mental processes, as well as the mental
    29
    processes and subjective reasoning of other jurors regarding their
    deliberations. As such, they cannot be considered under Evidence Code
    section 1150. (People v. Danks, 
    supra,
     32 Cal.4th at pp. 300, 302 [statement
    of juror about reasons for voting for the death penalty were inadmissible
    statements regarding mental processes and subjective reasoning]; see also
    People v. Munoz (2019) 
    31 Cal.App.5th 143
    , 167 [juror declaration about his
    or her “opinion” about why jurors found a defendant guilty, without
    additional specific details in support or other evidence, was “ ‘speculative’ and
    ‘unsupported,’ ” and was insufficient to establish misconduct]; Lankster v.
    Alpha Beta Co. (1993) 
    15 Cal.App.4th 678
    , 681, fn. 1 [juror declaration
    inadmissible to the extent it purported to explain juror’s subjective reasoning
    about why defendant could not be liable]; Bandana Trading Co., Inc. v.
    Quality Infusion Care, Inc. (2008) 
    164 Cal.App.4th 1440
    , 1446 [court properly
    disregarded juror declaration that another juror discouraged others from
    asking questions and rushed them into completing special verdict form].)
    The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding these portions of the
    affidavits inadmissible.
    As for L.M.’s statements that multiple jurors remarked at the outset of
    deliberations they were not going to give Sherwood a penny, and discussed a
    letter not in evidence, Vogele presented contrary declarations from other
    jurors in opposition to Sherwood’s motion in which the jurors stated the jury
    followed the court’s instructions and did not make such statements or
    consider the referenced letter not in evidence. Juror R.P. stated he did not
    witness or have “any knowledge of any juror stating ‘they were not going to
    give Sherwood a penny.’ ” Juror M.A. averred she did not “witness any juror
    making a determination of a verdict by making comments such as ‘they were
    not going to give Sherwood a penny’ before we thoroughly discussed and
    30
    reviewed the evidence, and everyone had the chance for input and discussion
    of their views.” As for the letter, juror R.P. stated, “The letter was mentioned
    and seconds later it was dismissed because it was not in evidence and we
    were told not to consider it.” That juror continued: “Nor did seeing it briefly
    have any impact on my or to my observation on the other juror’s
    determinations.” Other juror declarations submitted by Vogele were in
    accord. As stated, in reviewing the order denying a new trial, we defer to the
    court’s credibility determinations on whether misconduct occurred if
    supported by substantial evidence (People v. Collins (2010) 
    49 Cal.4th 175
    ,
    242; Barboni v. Tuomi, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 345; Jie v. Liang Tai
    Knitwear Co. (2001) 
    89 Cal.App.4th 654
    , 692-693) and indulge all
    presumptions to support the court’s order. (Jie, at pp. 666-667.) In view of
    this evidence, we uphold the trial court’s new trial order as to these elements
    of asserted misconduct by implying a finding that L.M. and C.S. were not
    credible on them. Such implicit finding is sufficient to support the order.
    (Ibid.)7
    We reach the same conclusion with regard to L.M. and C.S.’s remarks
    about jurors’ comments regarding Sherwood and “young girls.” Importantly,
    7     Notably, the alleged juror statements raised by Sherwood concerning
    not giving him “a penny” occurred during deliberations, not while evidence
    was still being presented. This is a significant difference. (See People v.
    Allen and Johnson (2011) 
    53 Cal.4th 60
    , 73 [statement by juror that made
    reference to his previous state of mind at a single point during trial did not
    indicate an intention to ignore the rest of the proceedings or evidence].)
    Thus, even if we were to credit these juror statements, as in People v. Allen
    and Johnson, they do not establish the juror “ignored further evidence,
    argument, instructions or the views of other jurors.” (Ibid.) “A juror who
    holds a preliminary view that a party’s case is weak does not violate the
    court’s instruction as long as his or her mind remains open to a fair
    consideration of the evidence, instructions, and shared opinions expressed
    during deliberations.” (Ibid.)
    31
    Sherwood does not argue these remarks amount to misconduct. And they
    were contradicted by other juror declarations that showed jurors made
    detailed examinations of the evidence during deliberations, and discounted
    the significance of any such remarks. “ ‘When an issue is tried on affidavits
    . . . and where there is a substantial conflict in the facts stated, a
    determination of the controverted facts by the trial court will not be
    disturbed.’ ” (Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp.
    108, 109 [“weighing the credibility of conflicting declarations on a motion for
    new trial is uniquely within the province of the trial court”].)8 We conclude
    the court was within it broad discretion in determining the comments did not
    reflect bias, or rise to the level of misconduct because they are remarks
    naturally expected in response to the evidence. Further, there is no
    indication jurors based their verdicts on those remarks. (See, e.g., English v.
    Lin (1994) 
    26 Cal.App.4th 1358
    , 1365 [insufficient evidence of juror
    misconduct where declarations did not show that juror’s remarks were
    8       One juror who submitted a declaration in opposition to the motion
    stated, “Any comments about Mr. Sherwood and ‘young girls’ did not impact
    any decision I made regarding the verdicts nor was it something the jury
    discussed at length. Based upon what I observed and witnessed during
    deliberations, I do not believe any jurors voted based upon bias or their
    opinion about Mr. Sherwood, but rather voted based on the evidence
    presented at trial.” Juror R.P. similarly stated: “Any comments on ‘young
    girls’ in regard to Sherwood were not a factor in the verdicts—based upon
    what I witnessed, the jurors considered the testimony and evidence admitted
    to reach our verdict.” Yet another juror stated, “I know I wasn’t swayed by a
    couple comments regarding Mr. Sherwood and I didn’t think the other jurors
    would have been either. We made a thorough timeline of events and we
    discussed it in great length. We also referred back to it when needed. [¶] I
    felt that the jury as a whole was very conscientious in going over all the
    written testimony.”
    32
    considered as “additional evidence” by other members of the jury, as opposed
    to an explanation of the particular juror’s “reasoning process”].)
    III. New Trial
    Sherwood contends the trial court should have granted him a new trial
    on grounds of juror bias and misconduct, as well as inadequate damages
    based on the jury’s mitigation finding and inconsistent verdicts. This
    contention is largely based on the same arguments we have addressed and
    rejected above. As to inconsistent verdicts, Sherwood asserts without
    authority or developed legal analysis that the jury’s mitigation finding “is
    irreconcilable with its concurrent finding holding Sherwood liable for failure
    to pay past and future rent.” He then repeats his arguments that the
    evidence shows he had no duty to mitigate damages while Kevin Gilbert
    assured him Vogele would remove the eaves. These bare arguments do not
    demonstrate there is “no possibility of reconciling [the challenged] findings
    with each other” so as to disturb them. (City of San Diego v. D.R. Horton San
    Diego Holding Co., Inc., 
    supra,
     126 Cal.App.4th at p. 682.) We conclude the
    trial court did not err by denying Sherwood a new trial.
    IV. Attorney Fee Award
    Sherwood’s challenge to the trial court’s attorney fee award is also
    fairly cursory. He points out an award of fees under Civil Code section 1717
    must be based on a contract claim and given to the party prevailing on the
    contract. He points out the trial court determined he was the prevailing
    party in his breach of contract claim against Vogele. He correctly observes
    that the amount of reasonable attorney fees is committed to the trial court’s
    broad discretion and usually begins with the lodestar, which is the number of
    hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate, and
    then further adjusted based on factors specific to the case to fix the fair
    33
    market value. (See Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers,
    LLC (2017) 
    3 Cal.5th 744
    , 751; PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 
    22 Cal.4th 1084
    , 1095-1096; Espejo v. The Copley Press, Inc. (2017) 
    13 Cal.App.5th 329
    ,
    383.) Those considerations include the nature of the litigation, its difficulty,
    the amount involved, the skill required and employed in its handling, the
    attention given, the success or failure and other circumstances. (PLCM
    Group, at p. 1096.) “The trial court’s exercise of discretion in deciding
    whether to increase or decrease the lodestar figure ‘will not be disturbed
    unless the appellate court is convinced the award is clearly wrong.’ ” (Espejo,
    at p. 383.)
    Sherwood then asserts: “It was the breach of contract by Vogele which
    led to Sherwood’s termination of the lease with Gibert. It was that breach
    which resulted in the filing of suit and the ensuing defense of Vogele’s Cross-
    Complaints against both Sherwood and Gilbert. Thus, but for the breach of
    contract by Vogele, Sherwood would not have been in the position of
    defending and incurring substantial attorneys fee expenses in this litigation.
    Given the totality of the circumstances, Sherwood submits that an arbitrary
    allocation of but 25 [percent] to the contract claim as the basis for an award
    of attorneys’ fees was an abuse of discretion.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
    This is the entirety of Sherwood’s argument against the trial court’s
    $143,183.55 attorney fee award in his favor; he does not challenge the court’s
    determination of a $322.50 reasonable hourly rate or the court’s lodestar
    calculation. Sherwood does not discuss the scope of the attorney fee clause in
    the contract with Vogele (see Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC. v. Sundowner
    Towers, LLC, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 751), nor does he cite authorities
    pertaining to the allocation or apportionment of attorney fees between tort
    and contract claims, which was the basis for the trial court’s 75 percent
    34
    reduction (see footnote 4, ante). Sherwood does not argue that all of the
    claims in his action and the cross-complaints were “ ‘ “inextricably
    intertwined” ’ ” (Abdallah v. United Savings Bank (1996) 
    43 Cal.App.4th 1101
    , 1111), had related legal theories (Pulliam v. HNL Automotive Inc.
    (2021) 
    60 Cal.App.5th 396
    , 409), or that fees were incurred on factual or legal
    issues common to both his contract cause of action in which fees were proper
    and the others in which they were not allowed. (Cruz v. Fusion Buffet, Inc.
    (2020) 
    57 Cal.App.5th 221
    , 235; Erickson v. R.E.M. Concepts, Inc. (2005) 
    126 Cal.App.4th 1073
    , 1083, citing Abdallah, at p. 1111; see Reynolds Metals Co.
    v. Alperson (1979) 
    25 Cal.3d 124
    , 129-130.)
    “ ‘Apportionment of a fee award between fees incurred on a contract
    cause of action and those incurred on other causes of action is within the trial
    court’s discretion . . . .’ ” (Erickson v. R.E.M. Concepts, Inc., 
    supra,
     126
    Cal.App.4th at p. 1083.) Such discretion is abused only when the court’s
    ruling is “clearly wrong” or exceeds the bounds of reason considering all
    circumstances before it. (Reynolds v. Ford Motor Company (2020) 
    47 Cal.App.5th 1105
    , 1117; Santana v. FCS US, LLC (2020) 
    56 Cal.App.5th 334
    ,
    348-349; see also Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 
    194 Cal.App.4th 939
    , 957 [“Judicial discretion ‘implies absence of arbitrary
    determination, capricious disposition or whimsical thinking’ ” and “ ‘imports
    the exercise of discriminating judgment within the bounds of reason’ ”].) The
    trial court is in the best position to determine whether allocation of fees is
    required. (Cruz v. Fusion Buffet, Inc., 
    supra,
     57 Cal.App.5th at p. 235.) It is
    Sherwood’s burden to show the court abused its discretion. (Cahill, at p.
    957.)
    Sherwood’s claim that the court made an “arbitrary” allocation of 25
    percent of the attorney fees to his contract cause of action is based only on his
    35
    assertion that Vogele’s breach triggered his cancellation of the lease, the
    litigation and his having to defend against the cross-complaints. This
    assertion does not convince us that the trial court was clearly wrong to
    allocate one quarter of Sherwood’s attorney fees to his successful breach of
    contract claim—the one of Sherwood’s four causes of action on which he was
    entitled to recover fees. And Sherwood provides no basis for us to conclude
    his contract cause of action and his tort claims for nuisance, trespass or fraud
    were so intertwined or had related theories such that the court’s decision to
    award only fees on his contract claim was beyond all bounds of reason.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment and postjudgment orders are affirmed.
    O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
    WE CONCUR:
    IRION, J.
    DATO, J.
    36
    

Document Info

Docket Number: D076776

Filed Date: 5/7/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/7/2021