People v. Ramos CA2/3 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 5/14/21 P. v. Ramos CA2/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
    opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
    opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    THE PEOPLE,                                                 B304855
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                            Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BA442346
    v.
    LUIS RAMOS,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, Kathleen Kennedy, Judge. Affirmed.
    Janyce Keiko Imata Blair, under appointment by the Court
    of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
    Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Allison H. Chung,
    Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    INTRODUCTION
    A jury convicted defendant Luis Ramos of first degree
    murder, four counts of attempted murder, and shooting at an
    occupied motor vehicle. The jury also found firearm and gang
    allegations true. The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate
    prison sentence of 210 years to life and imposed various fines and
    fees without objection.
    Defendant contends he is entitled to a new trial because the
    prosecutor committed misconduct during her closing argument
    when she briefly alluded to the idea that communities in Los
    Angeles are tired of gun violence and gang violence. We conclude
    no misconduct occurred. And we reject defendant’s further claim
    of prosecutorial misconduct in the form of improper vouching as
    forfeited because he failed to raise an objection in the trial court.
    Defendant also argues the court violated his due process
    rights when it imposed a $300 restitution fine, a $40 court
    operations fee as to each count, and a $30 criminal conviction fee
    as to each count, without first determining his ability to pay the
    fine and fees as required under People v. Dueñas (2019) 
    30 Cal. App. 5th 1157
    (Dueñas). Because defendant’s sentencing
    hearing occurred more than one year after Dueñas was decided
    and he failed to raise an appropriate objection, we conclude the
    argument is forfeited. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
    2
    PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    The People charged defendant1 by amended information
    with one count of first degree murder (count 1; Pen. Code, § 187,
    subd. (a)),2 four counts of attempted premeditated murder
    (counts 2–5; §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), and one count of shooting at
    an occupied motor vehicle (count 7; § 246).3 All counts included
    allegations that a principal personally used and personally and
    intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury.
    (§ 12022.53.) The People also alleged that counts 1–5 were
    committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22,
    subd. (b)(1)(C)) and that count 7 was committed with the intent
    to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by a gang.
    (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4).)
    A jury convicted defendant on all counts and found the
    firearm and gang allegations true. The court sentenced defendant
    to an aggregate term of 210 years to life in state prison. On the
    base count of first degree murder, the court sentenced defendant
    to 50 years to life (25 years to life for the murder, 25 years to life
    for the firearm enhancement); on counts 2–5, the court sentenced
    him to 40 years to life for each count (15 years to life for the
    attempted murder, 25 years to life for firearm enhancement) to
    run consecutive; and on count 7, the court imposed a sentence of
    32 years to life (7 years for the shooting, 25 years to life for the
    1 Josue Garcia was also charged with all counts in the amended
    information. Defendant and Garcia were tried together. Garcia is not a
    party to this appeal.
    2 All   undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    3   Count 6 related only to Garcia.
    3
    firearm enhancement). The court stayed the sentence on count 7
    under section 654.
    The court also ordered defendant to pay a $300 restitution
    fine (§ 1202.4), a $30 criminal conviction assessment fee for each
    of counts 1 through 5 (Gov. Code, § 70373), a $40 court security
    fee for each of those five counts (§ 1465.8), $4,805 in victim
    restitution (§1202.4, subd. (f)), and a parole revocation fine
    (§ 1202.45), which the court stayed. Defendant did not ask the
    court to determine whether he had the ability to pay the fines
    and fees, nor did he otherwise object to the court’s imposition of
    the fines and fees.
    Defendant timely appeals.
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    In the early morning hours of September 28, 2013, Edwin
    Jurado was at a nightclub in Los Angeles. Jurado was drunk and
    became involved in a dispute with approximately six members of
    the Park View clique of the MS-134 gang. After Jurado struck one
    of the female gang members, a security guard detained Jurado
    and walked the gang members out of the club. As they left the
    club, one of the gang members said that they planned “to pop the
    guy out.” Jurado was a member of a rival street gang.
    The gang members headed from the club to a nearby
    apartment where they discussed the incident at the club and
    decided to “go give a lesson to somebody that had disrespected
    them.” Defendant, a senior member of the Park View clique, and
    his girlfriend were at the apartment. Shortly after 2:00 a.m.,
    defendant (who was armed) and the other gang members (at least
    4   MS-13 refers to La Mara Salvatrucha gang.
    4
    two of whom were armed) drove back to the area of the nightclub
    and found Jurado walking nearby. The gang members, including
    defendant, got out of their cars and attacked Jurado.
    While the attack was in progress, a group of four men drove
    by and saw that the victim, Jurado, was not defending himself.
    They decided to help the victim and stopped their car near the
    fight. One passenger got out of the car and immediately heard
    gunshots. He was injured and then ran to a nearby subway
    station to summon help. Another passenger attempted to get out
    of the car but as he opened the car door, one of the armed gang
    members kicked the door closed and fired into the car, shattering
    the front driver’s side window. The driver sped away from the
    scene.
    Defendant fatally shot Jurado three times in the chest and
    abdomen.
    DISCUSSION
    Defendant asserts he was denied a fair trial due to
    prosecutorial misconduct he alleges took place during closing
    argument. He also argues the court erred by imposing a
    restitution fine and court fees without first determining whether
    he had the ability to pay them. Neither of these arguments has
    merit.
    1.    The prosecutor did not commit misconduct.
    1.1.   Standard of Review
    “We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct pursuant to
    a settled standard. ‘Under California law, a prosecutor commits
    reversible misconduct if he or she makes use of “deceptive or
    reprehensible methods” when attempting to persuade either the
    trial court or the jury, and it is reasonably probable that without
    5
    such misconduct, an outcome more favorable to the defendant
    would have resulted. [Citation.] Under the federal Constitution,
    conduct by a prosecutor that does not result in the denial of the
    defendant’s specific constitutional rights—such as a comment
    upon the defendant’s invocation of the right to remain silent—but
    is otherwise worthy of condemnation, is not a constitutional
    violation unless the challenged action “ ‘so infected the trial with
    unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
    process.’ ” ’ (People v. Riggs (2008) 
    44 Cal. 4th 248
    , 298; People v.
    Crew (2003) 
    31 Cal. 4th 822
    , 839.) In addition, ‘ “a defendant may
    not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a
    timely fashion—and on the same ground—the defendant made an
    assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be
    admonished to disregard the impropriety. [Citation.]” ’ (People v.
    Stanley [(2006)] 39 Cal.4th [913,] 952.) Objection may be excused
    if it would have been futile or an admonition would not have
    cured the harm. (See People v. Hill (1998) 
    17 Cal. 4th 800
    , 820.)”
    (People v. Dykes (2009) 
    46 Cal. 4th 731
    , 760.)
    1.2.   Additional Facts
    Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed
    misconduct during her closing argument. The bulk of her
    argument focused on the evidence presented and the elements of
    the crimes charged. And as she drew near the end of her
    argument, the prosecutor reviewed the evidence of gang
    membership and gang violence relevant to the gang allegations.
    Then, the prosecutor argued as follows: “Just to bring this to a
    close, [the co-prosecutor] and I are prosecutors here in the State
    of California, and specifically here in Los Angeles. We work for
    the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office. And this is a
    community. Lots of communities that are tired of gun violence,
    6
    tired of gang violence. I was looking at news headlines recently
    and I saw this headline (indicating). What a sad state. What a
    sad view of our community. And so, having heard the evidence in
    this case and having heard the law that applies, we are asking
    you to find the defendants—hold them accountable and find them
    guilty. Thank you all for your time.” The court then dismissed the
    jurors for a 15-minute break.
    After the jury left the courtroom, defense counsel objected
    to a slide the prosecutor displayed during the closing portion of
    her argument that apparently included a headline reading,
    “Niger’s Government Asked the U.S. to Arm Its Drones. People
    Aren’t Sure They Like the Idea. I Know America, You Can Be
    Shot in Broad Daylight.” During an extended colloquy with
    counsel, the court repeatedly questioned the relevance of the
    headline to the case as it did not relate to MS-13 in particular or
    gang violence generally. Despite impassioned argument from
    counsel, the court overruled defendant’s objections.
    After the jury returned to the courtroom, and at
    defendant’s request, the prosecutor displayed the slide briefly
    while the court admonished the jury as follows: “There is a
    particular slide; it was utilized during the prosecutor’s argument.
    It is irrelevant to the issues in this case, and I am instructing you
    to disregard the information from that slide.” The court then
    directed the prosecutor to take the slide off the screen, which she
    did.
    1.3.   Analysis
    Defendant contends the prosecutor’s use of the headline
    and her reference to the impact of violence on the community
    generally was an improper reference to evidence not available to
    the jury. “ ‘ “Statements of supposed facts not in evidence ... are a
    7
    highly prejudicial form of misconduct, and a frequent basis for
    reversal.” ’ ” (People v. Rodriguez (2020) 
    9 Cal. 5th 474
    , 480.) We
    reject this argument for several reasons.
    First, with respect to the headline, the jury was instructed
    to disregard the offending slide because it was irrelevant. We
    presume the jury followed these instructions. (See, e.g., People v.
    Avila (2009) 
    46 Cal. 4th 680
    , 719; People v. Ledesma (2006) 
    39 Cal. 4th 641
    , 684.)
    Second, and in any event, the prosecutor’s remarks were
    not improper. “ ‘It is settled that a prosecutor is given wide
    latitude during argument. The argument may be vigorous as long
    as it amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can include
    reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom.
    [Citations.] It is also clear that counsel during summation may
    state matters not in evidence, but which are common knowledge
    or are illustrations drawn from common experience, history or
    literature.’ ” (People v. Wharton (1991) 
    53 Cal. 3d 522
    , 567.) The
    prosecutor’s comment about communities being tired of gun
    violence and gang violence relates to the widely acknowledged
    gang violence problem in Los Angeles, something surely—and
    unfortunately—within the general knowledge or common
    experience of jurors residing in this city.
    Third, the prosecutor’s reference to the impact of violence
    on the community and her display of the headline were incredibly
    brief and unlikely to have influenced the jury to a significant
    degree. The transcript suggests that the comments and display of
    the headline lasted less than 30 seconds. Additionally, the
    statements about community violence were de minimis. As noted,
    the prosecutor’s closing argument, which comprises 66 pages in
    the reporter’s transcript, focused on the evidence and the charges.
    8
    The portion to which defendant objects comprises less than one-
    half of one page in the transcript. (See People v. Anderson (2018)
    
    5 Cal. 5th 372
    , 415 [noting that “[t]o the extent the prosecutor’s
    language, ‘I believe with all my heart,’ could be viewed as
    invoking his personal prestige or depth of experience, the brief
    remark could not have been prejudicial”].)
    Finally, even if the prosecutor’s brief commentary was
    improper, there is no reasonable likelihood that the result would
    have been different. (People v. Ayala (2000) 
    24 Cal. 4th 243
    , 288.)
    Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdicts and defendant
    does not contend otherwise. Further, it is unlikely that the jurors
    would have focused on the headline, given that even the court
    struggled to understand the connection between the headline
    (relating to the use of armed drones in Niger) and the case before
    it. The jury was, in any event, instructed that the attorney’s
    statements were not evidence. And we presume “ ‘the jury treated
    the court’s instructions as statements of law, and the prosecutor’s
    comments as words spoken by an advocate in an attempt to
    persuade.’ ” (People v. Morales (2001) 
    25 Cal. 4th 34
    , 47.)5
    Defendant also asserts that the prosecutor’s reference to
    the District Attorney’s office during her closing argument
    constituted improper vouching. Defendant failed to raise this
    issue below and it is therefore forfeited. “As a general rule a
    defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial
    5Because we conclude the prosecutor did not commit misconduct with
    respect to the headline and the comments identified by defendant, we
    need not consider defendant’s dependent claim that the prosecutor’s
    brief reference to violence in the community was part of “a pattern and
    practice that show[s] the misconduct was calculated[,] deliberate and
    reprehensible. (People v. Cole (2004) 
    33 Cal. 4th 1158
    , 1203.)”
    9
    misconduct unless in a timely fashion—and on the same
    ground—the defendant made an assignment of misconduct and
    requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the
    impropriety.” (People v. Samayoa (1997) 
    15 Cal. 4th 795
    , 841;
    People v. Dalton (2019) 
    7 Cal. 5th 166
    , 251.)
    2.    Defendant forfeited his challenge to fines and fees.
    Citing People v. 
    Dueñas, supra
    , 
    30 Cal. App. 5th 1157
    ,
    defendant contends the court violated his due process rights
    when it imposed, without first determining his ability to pay, a
    $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), five $40 court
    operations assessments (§ 1465.8), and five $30 court facility
    assessments (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)). In January 2019,
    Dueñas held that “due process of law requires [a] trial court to ...
    ascertain a defendant’s present ability to pay before it imposes”
    (1) “court facilities and court operations assessments” (under
    § 1465.8 and Gov. Code, § 70373, respectively), or (2) a restitution
    fine (under § 1202.4). (Dueñas, at pp. 1167, 1172.)
    Defendant concedes that he did not object to the imposition
    of these costs, even though Dueñas was decided more than one
    year before his sentencing hearing. Typically, a defendant who
    fails to object to the imposition of fines, fees and assessments at
    sentencing forfeits the right to challenge them on appeal.
    (See, e.g., People v. Aguilar (2015) 
    60 Cal. 4th 862
    , 864; People v.
    Trujillo (2015) 
    60 Cal. 4th 850
    , 856–859; People v. McCullough
    (2013) 
    56 Cal. 4th 589
    , 596–597.) Applying this general rule, we
    conclude the issue was forfeited in this case.6
    6 Defendant attempts to excuse his failure to object by arguing that
    “there was not enough time realistically for the practicing trial bar,
    and perhaps trial courts, to be informed of the change in the law
    10
    Defendant notes some courts of appeal have concluded that
    the failure to raise the issue of a defendant’s inability to pay fines
    and fees at sentencing does not result in forfeiture and he urges
    us to follow those cases. (See People v. Montes (2021) 
    59 Cal. App. 5th 1107
    , 1117–1121 [analyzing conflicting court of
    appeal decisions and concluding Dueñas was not foreseeable];
    People v. Castellano (2019) 
    33 Cal. App. 5th 485
    , 489 [holding that
    because Dueñas announced a new constitutional principle,
    forfeiture doctrine did not apply]; cf. People v. Frandsen (2019) 
    33 Cal. App. 5th 1126
    , 1153 [defendant forfeited challenge to
    assessments and restitution fine because counsel failed to
    object].) The cases defendant relies upon, however, all involved
    sentencing proceedings that took place before Dueñas was final
    and they are therefore inapplicable here.
    Finally, defendant suggests that he is indigent and
    therefore unable to pay the objected-to fines and fees because he
    was represented at trial by a public defender and is represented
    on appeal by counsel appointed by this court. Those facts are
    insufficient, standing alone, to establish indigency. (See, e.g.,
    People v. 
    Frandsen, supra
    , 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1153 [rejecting
    defendant’s request to determine his alleged inability to pay fines
    and fees “based on a record that contains nothing more than his
    reliance on appointed counsel at trial”].)
    brought about by Dueñas’[s] holding.” Given Dueñas’s significance and
    the resulting conflict among the courts of appeal regarding its
    propriety, we disagree.
    11
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    LAVIN, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    EDMON, P. J.
    EGERTON, J.
    12