People v. Albarran CA4/1 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 6/9/21 P. v. Albarran CA4/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    THE PEOPLE,                                                          D077893
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. INF060734)
    MARCOS ANTONIO ALBARRAN,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
    John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed.
    Patricia A. Scott, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Matthew Rodriquez, Acting Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
    Eric A. Swenson and Heather M. Clark, Deputy Attorneys General, for
    Plaintiff and Respondent.
    In 2013, a jury convicted Marcos Antonio Albarran of first degree
    murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and attempted murder (§§ 664 & 187,
    subd. (a)), among other offenses. Albarran appealed and this court reversed
    the judgment in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Albarran (July 6, 2015,
    D067418) [nonpub. opn.].) The case was remanded to the superior court.
    On remand, Albarran entered into a plea agreement under which he
    pleaded guilty to one count of voluntary manslaughter for the benefit of a
    street gang. (§§ 192 & 186.22, subd. (b).) He also admitted three counts of
    attempted murder. (§§ 187 & 664.) Albarran was sentenced to a determinate
    term of 16 years in prison.
    In June 2020, Albarran filed a pro. per. petition for resentencing under
    section 1170.95. Although he was not convicted of murder, he contended he
    was still entitled to resentencing. The trial court denied the petition, finding
    Albarran’s convictions for manslaughter and attempted murder did not
    qualify him for relief under section 1170.95.
    Albarran appeals, contending his convictions for manslaughter and
    attempted murder are eligible for resentencing because he was originally
    prosecuted under theories of felony murder and natural and probable
    consequences. His briefs on appeal acknowledge existing case law is virtually
    unanimous that the essential predicate for relief under this particular statute
    is a conviction for either first or second degree murder. He contends that all
    of the cases reaching such conclusions were wrongly decided. We will reject
    Albarran’s arguments and follow the cases from this court and others which
    have soundly rejected his arguments and affirm.
    1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2
    DISCUSSION
    I
    The Manslaughter Conviction
    Senate Bill No. 1437 “was enacted ‘to amend the felony murder rule
    and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder,
    to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
    actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant
    in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ”
    (People v. Martinez (2019) 
    31 Cal.App.5th 719
    , 723 (Martinez).)
    Section 1170.95 was created to permit defendants convicted of felony
    murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to file a
    petition for resentencing to have the murder conviction vacated and to be
    resentenced on any remaining counts. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)
    The beginning point of the analysis of Senate Bill No. 1437 is that the
    defendant must have been convicted of murder or by plea in a case
    prosecuted on a felony murder or natural consequences theory. (Martinez,
    supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) In this case Albarran was not convicted of
    murder, and his conviction did not arise from an offense where malice is an
    element of the crime. Thus, Albarran is not a person aggrieved by the former
    methods of proving malice that the Legislature has now rejected.
    The arguments that the statute applies to persons convicted of
    manslaughter after being charged with murder or that the failure to apply
    the statute to manslaughter convictions would violate equal protection have
    been soundly rejected by the courts of appeal, including the following cases:
    1) People v. Harris (2021) 
    60 Cal.App.5th 557
    , 565-571 [Fourth Appellate
    District, Division Two]; 2) People v. Sanchez (2020) 
    48 Cal.App.5th 914
    , 916,
    918-921 [Fourth Appellate District, Division Two]; 3) People v. Paige (2020)
    3
    
    51 Cal.App.5th 194
    , 197-198 [First Appellate District, Division Two];
    4) People v. Turner (2020) 
    45 Cal.App.5th 428
    , 435-439 (Turner) [Fourth
    Appellate District, Division One]; 5) People v. Flores (2020) 
    44 Cal.App.5th 985
    , 992-997 [Fourth Appellate District, Division One]; and 6) People v.
    Cervantes (2020) 
    44 Cal.App.5th 884
    , 887-888 [Second Appellate District,
    Division Six].
    We have reviewed the cases listed above, all of which have rejected all
    of Albarran’s arguments. We agree with the analysis in each of the cases.
    In Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pages 435 through 439, this court
    analyzed the arguments that are now presented in this appeal. We carefully
    considered the same arguments and found them to not be persuasive. We
    continue to hold to the views we expressed in Turner. For the reasons set
    forth in Turner, we once again hold that a person convicted by plea of
    voluntary manslaughter is not eligible for resentencing under
    section 1170.95. We further hold that denial of eligibility for relief to persons
    convicted of voluntary manslaughter does not violate equal protection.
    II
    The Attempted Murder Convictions
    Senate Bill No. 1437 substantially modifies the definitions on malice in
    murder cases. It alters the definitions as far as they involve aiders and
    abettors who are prosecuted under felony murder. (See §§ 188 and 189.)
    While new definitions of malice affect current prosecutions that are not final
    on appeal, the new remedy for past convictions under section 1170.95 applies
    only to persons who were previously convicted of murder. (People v. Munoz
    (2019) 
    39 Cal.App.5th 738
    , 753, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258234;
    People v. Dennis (2020) 
    47 Cal.App.5th 838
    , 844-847, review granted July 29,
    2020, S262184; People v. Sanchez (2020) 
    46 Cal.App.5th 637
    , 642-644, review
    4
    granted June 10, 2020, S261768; People v. Alaybue (2020) 
    51 Cal.App.5th 207
    , 222.)
    There are some differences between the courts on the issue of the
    impact of the changes in definitions of malice on non-final cases, but the
    appellate courts have been in agreement that section 1170.95 does not
    provide relief for persons convicted of only attempted murder.
    Our Supreme Court has granted review in a number of cases to
    determine the effect of Senate Bill No. 1437 on the elements of attempted
    murder. The court has framed the issue as “Does Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats.
    2018, ch. 1015) apply to attempted murder liability under the natural and
    probable consequences doctrine?” (People v. Lopez (2019) 
    38 Cal.App.5th 1087
    , review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S258175.)
    Given the number of courts which have rejected Albarran’s arguments,
    including this court, we will not revisit the discussions from those cases.
    Suffice that we agree with the unanimous rejections of the arguments
    Albarran makes here. For the reasons stated in the multiple opinions, we
    again reject the contentions and find the trial court correctly found Albarran
    was not entitled to relief under section 1170.95.
    5
    DISPOSITION
    The order denying Albarran’s petition for resentencing under
    section 1170.95 is affirmed.
    HUFFMAN, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    McCONNELL, P. J.
    O'ROURKE, J.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: D077893

Filed Date: 6/9/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/9/2021