Martin v. Cal. Coastal Commission CA4/1 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 6/23/21 Martin v. Cal. Coastal Commission CA4/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
    ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
    purposes of rule 8.1115.
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    GARY MARTIN et al.,                                                          D076956
    Plaintiffs and Appellants,
    v.                                                                (Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-
    00044048-CU-WM-NC)
    CALIFORNIA COASTAL
    COMMISSION,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
    Jacqueline M. Stern, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
    FisherBroyles and Paul J. Beard II, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
    Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Matthew Rodriguez, Acting Attorney
    General, Daniel A. Olivas, Assistant Attorney General, Jamee J. Patterson
    and Kimberly R. Gosling, Deputy Attorneys General for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Gary and Bella Martin appeal from a judgment entered after the trial
    court granted in part and denied in part their petition for writ of
    administrative mandate challenging the imposition of certain special
    conditions placed on the development of their property—a vacant, oceanfront
    lot in Encinitas—by the California Coastal Commission (Commission). The
    Commission also appeals the judgment. The Martins’ appeal challenges a
    condition requiring them to eliminate a basement from their proposed home,
    while the Commission challenges the trial court’s reversal of its condition
    requiring the Martins to set back their home 79 feet from the bluff edge.
    Because we agree with this court’s recent decision in Lindstrom v. California
    Coastal Com. (2019) 
    40 Cal.App.5th 73
     (Lindstrom) interpreting the same
    provisions of the Encinitas Local Coastal Program (LCP) and Municipal Code
    at issue here, we reverse the trial court’s invalidation of the Commission’s
    setback requirement. We affirm the court’s decision to uphold the basement
    prohibition.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    The Martins own an 11,394 square-foot, blufftop vacant lot in
    Encinitas. 5,400 square feet of the lot sits atop the bluff, with the rest
    extending west down the bluff’s face. They applied to the City of Encinitas
    (the City) for a Coastal Development Permit (CDP) to build a two-story, 3,110
    square-foot house with an additional 969 square-foot basement and 644
    square-foot garage. The proposed design set the first story of the home back
    40 feet from the 93-foot high bluff edge, and set back the second story
    cantilevered deck 32 feet. In support of the application, and as required by
    the LCP and Municipal Code, the Martins submitted geotechnical reports
    certifying the home satisfied the requirements of the LCP contained in
    Municipal Code section 30.34.020. The City’s third-party geotechnical
    consultant reviewed those reports and agreed with the analysis.
    2
    On April 21, 2016, the City Planning Commission adopted a resolution
    consolidating two lots owned by the Martins into one and approving the CDP
    for their home. On May 25, 2016, two Commissioners appealed the City’s
    approval to the Commission.1 At its meeting on July 13, 2016, the
    Commission found the appeal raised a “substantial issue on the grounds on
    which the appeal was filed” and continued the matter to a future hearing. In
    the subsequent months, the Martins’ geotechnical consultant GeoSoils, Inc.
    (GSI) and the Commission staff exchanged reports about the appropriate
    setback for the proposed development. The parties also met several times to
    discuss the project.
    At the Commission’s August 8, 2018 meeting, Commission staff
    presented a report recommending approval of the home but with additional
    conditions on the Martins’ development of their property, including that the
    home be set back 79 feet from the bluff’s edge and barring the design from
    including a basement. After a divided vote, the Commission adopted the
    staff’s recommendation and approved the development with the
    recommended additional conditions.2
    The Commission staff’s report explained its position that the City’s
    approval was inadequate because it failed to account for the LCP’s
    requirement that new development be set back far enough to provide for a
    safety factor of 1.5 at the end of 75 years. The safety factor is a calculation
    1     The Coastal Act allows an appeal of the local determination by the
    Coastal Commission if two or more of the Commissioners agree. (Pub.
    Resources Code, §§ 30603, 30625, subd. (a).) Here, Vice-Chair of the
    Commission Bochco and Commissioner Shallenberger appealed the City’s
    decision.
    2     Three of the eleven commissioners sided with the Martins.
    3
    that addresses bluff stability, i.e. the risk of landslides or bluff failure, while
    the time period of 75 years addresses bluff erosion over time.3
    The two “special conditions” imposed by the Commission at issue on
    appeal are special condition 1(a), requiring the 79-foot setback from the bluff
    edge, and special condition 1(c), the basement prohibition.4 In determining
    the 79-foot setback, the Commission relied on the analyses of its staff
    geologist, Dr. Joseph Street, and its staff engineer, Dr. Lesley Ewing.
    Drs. Street and Ewing reached their conclusions after considering the reports
    of GSI, hired by the Martins to evaluate the bluff for purposes of permitting
    the development. GSI opined that a 40-foot setback complied with the LCP,
    and certified that the home would be “safe from coastal bluff retreat over its
    3      A scientific paper in the administrative record supporting the
    Commission staff’s report explains the safety factor analysis: “In such an
    analysis, the forces resisting a potential landslide are first determined.
    These are essentially the strength of the rocks or soils making up the bluff.
    Next, the forces driving a potential landslide are determined. These forces
    are the weight of the rocks as projected along a potential slide surface. The
    resisting forces are divided by the driving forces to determine the ‘factor of
    safety.’ A value below 1.0 is theoretically impossible, as the slope would have
    failed already. A value of 1.0 indicates that failure is imminent. Factors of
    safety at increasing values above 1.0 lend increasing confidence in the
    stability of the slope. The industry-standard for new development is a factor
    of safety of 1.5, and many local grading ordinances in California and
    elsewhere (including the County of Los Angeles, and the Cities of Irvine,
    Malibu, and Saratoga, among others) require that artificial slopes meet this
    factor of safety.”
    4     In the trial court the Martins also successfully challenged special
    condition 3(a), which provides that, by accepting the permit, the Martins
    agree that no bluff or shoreline armoring device will ever be built to protect
    the new home. They have abandoned this challenge on appeal and thus we
    agree with the Commission that the trial court’s invalidation of special
    condition 3(a) should be reversed.
    4
    75-year design life without the need for shoreline protection.” Drs. Street and
    Ewing also reviewed reports by another consultant hired by the Martins,
    Dr. Ben Benumof, who likewise endorsed the development with a 40-foot
    setback.
    The Commission’s staff arrived at 79 feet by adding the setback
    required to achieve a 1.5 factor of safety (40 feet) and the anticipated erosion
    over 75 years (39 feet). As to the 1.5 factor of safety, the Commission agreed
    with GSI that it was presently located 40 feet back from the bluff edge. As to
    the erosion rate, the Commission staff also agreed with GSI’s historic rate of
    0.20 feet per year. The Commission staff, however, disagreed with GSI’s
    estimate of a long-term future rate of erosion of 0.27 feet per year.
    Drs. Street and Ewing concluded that rate did not “adequately account for
    the likely acceleration of bluff retreat rates in the future due to sea level
    rise….”
    The Commission staff calculated the future erosion rate to be 0.52 feet
    per year (39 feet over 75 years). It determined this rate using the SCAPE
    method, a scientifically supported methodology that incorporates site-specific
    information and sea level rise estimates.5 GSI had also used a methodology
    similar to SCAPE at one point, and had calculated an erosion rate of 0.344
    feet per year (which it later revised to 0.27 feet per year). Drs. Street and
    Ewing concluded GSI’s rate was not adequate because GSI had relied on a
    lower projection of future sea level rise than was supported by the most
    recent scientific literature.
    5      “SCAPE (Soft Cliff and Platform Erosion) is a detailed, process-based
    numerical model that was developed to simulate the sensitivity of shore
    profile response, including cliff retreat rates, to changes in sea level over
    timescales of decades to centuries.”
    5
    Drs. Street and Ewing concluded that 0.52 feet per year was more
    accurate based on the State of California’s most current sea level rise science
    and recommendations, as outlined in 2017 and 2018 reports by the State’s
    Ocean Protection Council Science Advisory Team. Using data and suggested
    risk profiles from those reports, the Commission staff adopted a
    recommended “medium-high risk aversion scenario” resulting in the 0.52 feet
    per year rate. Commission staff also noted this rate was generally consistent
    with the 0.49 feet per year erosion rate used by the Commission for the prior
    five new blufftop home approvals in Encinitas. The rate also fell within the
    range of uncertainty projected in CoSMoS, a state-of-the-art modeling tool
    developed by the U.S. Geological Survey.6
    The Commission staff report also addressed the impact of the proposed
    40-foot setback on the project’s compliance with the public access and
    recreation policies of the Coastal Act. The report explained that, in
    conjunction with sea level rise, if a shoreline protective device became
    necessary to protect the structure, the installation of such protection would
    lead to the loss of beach access. In the Commission staff’s view, a 79-foot
    setback, among the other conditions, was necessary to avoid this impact.
    As for the proposed basement, the Commission staff found that the
    Encinitas bluffs are hazardous and unpredictable, and bluff retreat may
    6     The Commission’s staff report describes CoSMos: “Coastal Storm
    Modeling System 3.0 (CoSMoS)” is “a new, state-of-the art tool developed by
    the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to predict year 2100 cliff
    positions based on various sea level rise scenarios. CoSMoS integrates eight
    complex cliff retreat models which take into account not only changes in
    mean sea level (and the rate of [sea level rise]), the historical bluff retreat
    rate (which is assumed to capture site-specific factors, such as geology), a
    range of likely wave climates based on historical variability and global
    climate models, and the progressive evolution of the shore and cliff profiles
    over time.”
    6
    eventually cause the basement to be exposed, even with a 79-foot setback.
    The Commission staff also found that removing or relocating the basement, if
    feasible, would significantly alter the bluff and could threaten its stability.
    The Martins submitted a plan for removing the basement, along with GSI’s
    certification of the plan. The Commission, however, found the removal plan
    was insufficient because it failed to “provide any detail related to geologic
    stability risks of removing a basement on an eroding blufftop site, [did] not
    detail how removal of the basement would impact stability of neighboring
    structures, and [did] not detail how the basement void could be filled” upon
    removal. Thus, the Commission concluded the proposed basement was
    inconsistent with the LCP’s requirement that all blufftop structures be
    removable.
    After the Commission’s conditional approval, the Martins filed a
    petition for writ of administrative mandate and complaint for declaratory and
    injunctive relief challenging special conditions 1(a) (the 79-foot setback), 1(c)
    (the basement prohibition) and 3(a) (the bluff and shoreline armoring device
    prohibition). In addition to seeking a writ of mandate reversing the
    Commission’s conditional approval, the Martins also sought a declaration
    that “the Commission’s bluff-edge setback methodology” is unlawful, an
    injunction to preclude the Commission’s future use of the methodology, a
    declaration that “the Commission’s policy of requiring the waiver of future
    shoreline protection as a condition” of approval is unlawful, and an injunction
    preventing “the Commission from enforcing or implementing such policy.”
    After briefing and a hearing, the trial court issued an order finding
    special condition 1(a) was inconsistent with the LCP and the Commission’s
    imposition of the condition was an abuse of discretion. The court also agreed
    with the Martins that the imposition of special condition 3(a) was an abuse of
    7
    the Commission’s discretion. The court rejected the Martins’ challenge to
    special condition 1(c), and denied their requests for injunctive and
    declaratory relief. Thereafter, the court entered judgment against the
    Commission and issued a peremptory writ of administrative mandate
    directing the Commission to set aside and reconsider its conditional approval.
    Both parties timely appealed the judgment.
    DISCUSSION
    I
    Legal Standards
    A
    Statutory Background
    “ ‘The Coastal Act “was enacted by the Legislature as a comprehensive
    scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.
    The Legislature found that ‘the California coastal zone is a distinct and
    valuable natural resource of vital and enduring interest to all the people’;
    that ‘the permanent protection of the state’s natural and scenic resources is a
    paramount concern’; that ‘it is necessary to protect the ecological balance of
    the coastal zone’ and that ‘existing developed uses, and future developments
    that are carefully planned and developed consistent with the policies of this
    division, are essential to the economic and social well-being of the people of
    this state....’ ([Pub. Resources Code,] § 30001, subds. (a) and (d).)” [Citation]
    The Coastal Act is to be “liberally construed to accomplish its purposes and
    objectives.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 30009.)’ ” (Lindstrom, supra, 40
    Cal.App.5th at p. 91, quoting Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v.
    City of Los Angeles (2012) 
    55 Cal.4th 783
    , 793–794 (Pacific Palisades).)
    “ ‘The Coastal Act expressly recognizes the need to “rely heavily” on
    local government “[t]o achieve maximum responsiveness to local conditions,
    8
    accountability, and public accessibility....” (Pub. Resources Code, § 30004,
    subd. (a).) As relevant here, it requires local governments to develop [LCPs],
    comprised of a land use plan and a set of implementing ordinances designed
    to promote the act’s objectives of protecting the coastline and its resources
    and of maximizing public access.’ (Pacific Palisades, supra, 55 Cal.4th at
    p. 794.) ‘The Coastal Act provides that a local government must submit its
    [land use plan] to the [Commission] for certification that the [land use plan]
    is consistent with the policies and requirements of the Coastal Act. ([Pub.
    Resources Code,] §§ 30512, 30512.2.) After the Commission certifies a local
    government’s [land use plan], it delegates authority over coastal development
    permits to the local government. (Pacific Palisades, at p. 794, citing [Pub.
    Resources Code,] §§ 30519, subd. (a), 30600.5, subds. (a), (b), (c).)’ ”
    (Lindstrom, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 91.)
    “After a local government grants a coastal development permit, certain
    types of permit decisions may be appealed to the Commission by the
    applicant, any aggrieved person, or two members of the Coastal Commission
    (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 30603, 30625, subd. (a)). As relevant here, an
    appeal to the Commission is authorized for ‘[d]evelopments approved by the
    local government between the sea and the first public road paralleling the sea
    or within 300 feet of the inland extent of any beach or of the mean high
    tideline of the sea where there is no beach, whichever is the greater distance.’
    (Id., § 30603, subd. (a)(1).) ‘ “If the Commission determines that an appeal
    presents a substantial issue, the permit application is reviewed de novo; in
    effect, the Commission hears the application as if no local governmental unit
    was previously involved, deciding for itself whether the proposed project
    satisfies legal standards and requirements.” ’ (McAllister v. California
    Coastal Com. (2008) 
    169 Cal.App.4th 912
    , 920, fn. 3; see also Pub. Resources
    9
    Code, §§ 30621 [de novo hearing on appeal]; 30625, subd. (b)(2) [substantial
    issue required].)” (Lindstrom, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 92.)
    “The Commission’s jurisdiction on appeal, however, is limited.
    [Citation.] Specifically, ‘[t]he grounds for an appeal ... shall be limited to an
    allegation that the development does not conform to the standards set forth
    in the certified local coastal program or the public access policies set forth in
    [the Coastal Act].’ (Pub. Resources Code, § 30603, subd. (b)(1).) In addition,
    the Commission’s jurisdiction on appeal includes imposing reasonable terms
    and conditions on the permit, as the Coastal Act provides ‘[a]ny permit that is
    ... approved on appeal, ... shall be subject to reasonable terms and conditions
    in order to ensure that such development or action will be in accordance with
    the provisions of this division.’ (Pub. Resources Code, § 30607.)” (Lindstrom,
    supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 92.) Further, “ ‘ “[u]nder the Coastal Act’s
    legislative scheme, ... the [LCPs] and the development permits issued by local
    agencies pursuant to the Coastal Act are not solely a matter of local law, but
    embody state policy.” [Citation] “In fact, a fundamental purpose of the
    Coastal Act is to ensure that state policies prevail over the concerns of local
    government.” ’ ” (Lindstrom, at p. 92.)
    B
    Standard of Review
    “To obtain judicial review of a decision or action of the Commission, any
    aggrieved person has the right to file a petition for writ of mandate pursuant
    to section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Pub. Resources Code,
    § 30801.) ‘ “ ‘The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions of
    whether the [Commission] has proceeded without, or in excess of jurisdiction;
    whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse
    of discretion.’ ” [Citation] An abuse of discretion is established if the
    10
    Commission failed to proceed in the manner required by law, its order or
    decision is not supported by the findings, or its findings are not supported by
    substantial evidence. [Citation.] [¶] The trial court presumes that the
    agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, and the party
    challenging that decision bears the burden of demonstrating the contrary.
    [Citation] In reviewing the agency’s decision, the court examines the whole
    record and considers all relevant evidence, including that evidence which
    detracts from its decision. [Citation.] “Although this task involves some
    weighing to fairly estimate the worth of the evidence, that limited weighing
    does not constitute independent review where the court substitutes its own
    findings and inferences for that of the Commission. Rather, it is for the
    Commission to weigh the preponderance of conflicting evidence, as [the court]
    may reverse its decision only if, based on the evidence before it, a reasonable
    person could not have reached the conclusion reached by it.” ’ ” (Lindstrom,
    supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 93.)
    “ ‘On appeal ... our role is identical to that of the trial court.’ [Citation]
    ‘ “ ‘Thus, the conclusions of the superior court, and its disposition of the
    issues in this case, are not conclusive on appeal.’ ” ’ ” (Lindstrom, supra, 40
    Cal.App.5th at p. 93.)
    C
    Lindstrom v. Commission
    In September 2019 this court issued its opinion in Lindstrom, a case
    presenting issues that overlap with those presented in this case, and which
    explicitly resolved the same setback question presented here in favor of the
    Commission. Like this case, Lindstrom involved the development of a home
    on a coastal bluff in Encinitas. (Lindstrom, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 82.)
    Like the Martins, the Lindstroms obtained a CDP from the City, which was
    11
    then challenged by the Commission. Unlike this case, the City’s approval
    was based on a geotechnical report prepared by the applicants’ consultant,
    Geotechnical Exploration, Inc. (GEI), which used the same methodology
    advocated for by the Commission (i.e. combining the expected erosion over 75
    years with the setback needed to achieve a bluff stability safety factor of 1.5).
    (Lindstrom, at pp. 83–84.) The setback recommended by GEI and approved
    by the City, however, was based on an erosion rate of 0.125 feet per year,
    which was far lower than the rate of 0.49 used by GEI for other recent
    development projects it had been engaged for that were located on “other
    portions of the Encinitas coast.” (Id. at p. 84, fn. 3.) As here, the Commission
    appealed the City’s approval of a 40-foot setback. (Id. at pp. 84–85.)
    Thereafter, GEI submitted a revised report to the Commission that
    “concluded that the erosion rate of 0.125 per year was in error” and “set forth
    a revised erosion rate of 0.40 per year, for total erosion of 30 feet in 75 years.”
    (Lindstrom, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 85.) GEI also revised its bluff
    stability analysis, concluding a safety factor of 1.5 would be achieved at a
    setback of 42.25 feet, not the 18.3 feet it originally calculated. (Ibid.) “GEI
    explained that if it combined the expected erosion of 30 feet over 75 years
    with the 42.25 foot setback required to achieve a safety factor of 1.5, the
    construction would have to be set back a total of 72.25 feet from the edge of
    the bluff.” (Ibid.) To avoid the large setback, GEI’s new report advocated for
    an alternative approach that “did not depend on achieving a safety factor of
    1.5” after 75 years and resulted in a lesser setback. (Ibid.)
    Before the Commission hearing, the Lindstroms engaged a different
    consultant, TerraCosta Consulting Group (TCG) to prepare a new
    geotechnical report. (Lindstrom, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 85.) TCG also
    concluded that the predicted bluff erosion rate was 0.40 feet per year. TCG’s
    12
    bluff stability setback calculation was lower, resulting in a factor of safety of
    1.5 at 23–25 feet from the bluff edge. (Id. at p. 86.) Like GEI’s revised
    report, TCG argued that adding the two setback calculations was
    unnecessary, opining that the factor of safety of 1.29 it expected at the end of
    75 years if a 40-foot setback was approved would be sufficient to prevent the
    need for a seawall or other bluff stabilization structure. (Ibid.) In support of
    this position, TCG explained that “ ‘the Coastal Commission does not
    typically approve seawalls unless the factor of safety at the structure is less
    than 1.2 and other instability factors are present.’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, it argued,
    “ ‘[t]here is no engineering reason that a 75-year-old structure near the end of
    its useful life would be required to have a factor of safety in excess of 1.29 in
    order to be considered safe.’ ” (Ibid.)
    As in this case, the Commission concluded the 40-foot setback
    advocated for by TCG was insufficient under the LCP because it failed to
    consider both the factor of safety (i.e. the bluff’s stability) and the predicted
    erosion rate of the coastline. In the proceedings before the Commission, staff
    geologist Dr. Mark Johnsson explained the LCP required the applicant to
    demonstrate that the factor of safety of 1.5 be maintained for the full 75
    years, not just under present conditions. (Lindstrom, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th
    at p. 87.) Thus, to assure “ ‘an adequate factor of safety for the expected life
    of the development,’ it was necessary to calculate the total setback as ‘equal
    to the sum of the bluff retreat setback and the slope stability setbacks.’ ”
    (Ibid.)
    Adopting this interpretation of the LCP, the Commission imposed a
    special condition requiring a 60–62 foot setback from the bluff edge (based on
    TCG’s calculations), which it found would allow the owners to construct a
    3,500 square foot home (or larger if a variance of the front setback
    13
    requirement was obtained). (Lindstrom, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at pp. 87–88.)
    The Lindstroms challenged the decision and, as in this case, the trial court
    concluded the Commission’s interpretation of the LCP was wrong. The court
    relied on correspondence, which the Martins also heavily rely on, written by a
    city planner in 2006 concerning coastal development. In the letter, the
    planner states that the City required applicants to provide a geotechnical
    report that calculated erosion over 75 years and the present 1.5. factor of
    safety, and to impose a setback requirement equal to the larger of the two
    calculations, but did not require the setbacks to be combined. (Id. at p. 90.)
    The Commission appealed and this court rejected the trial court’s
    interpretation of the LCP. We held the LCP, as implemented by Encinitas
    Municipal Code section 30.34.020, explicitly “ ‘requires a structure to ‘be
    reasonably safe from failure and erosion over its lifetime.’ (Encinitas Mun.
    Code, § 30.34.020D, italics added.) Further, [we held] the LCP specifically
    provides that the geotechnical report must ‘[d]emonstrate a safety factor
    against slope failure of 1.5’ and must ‘[a]ddress a time period of analysis of 75
    years.’ (Encinitas Mun. Code, § 30.34.020D.11, 2d par. b & c.)” (Lindstrom,
    supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 98.) We concluded that, “[w]hen read together,
    the plain meaning of these provisions is that, taking into account the erosion
    that will occur over 75 years, the geotechnical report must demonstrate a
    safety factor of 1.5 at the end of 75 years.” (Ibid., italics added.)
    Lindstrom concluded the interpretation of the LCP advanced by the
    Martins, “in which a safety factor of 1.5 must be shown only at the present
    time, not taking into account predicted erosion over the lifetime of the
    structure, defies the plain language of the LCP as well as common sense. A
    layman does not need special geotechnical training to understand the self-
    evident concept that for a structure to ‘be reasonably safe from failure and
    14
    erosion over its lifetime’ (Encinitas Mun. Code, § 30.34.020D), the combined
    effect of expected erosion and bluff instability must be considered. [Footnote
    omitted.] A structure that is reasonably safe today because it is located 40
    feet from the edge of the bluff will not be reasonably safe at the end of its
    lifetime when the bluff has eroded 37 feet, meaning that the structure is only
    three feet from the edge of the bluff.” (Lindstrom, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at
    p. 98.)
    II
    The Commission Correctly Interpreted the LCP and
    Encinitas Municipal Code Section 30.34.020D
    As the Commission rightly points out in its briefing, Lindstrom, which
    was issued after the trial court’s decision in this case, definitively rejected the
    argument advanced by the Martins that the Commission wrongly interpreted
    the LCP in its calculation of the required setback. The Commission asks this
    court to follow Lindstrom and again uphold its interpretation of the LCP.
    The Martins ask us to reconsider Lindstrom and argue “the methodology
    used to arrive at [the 79-foot] setback contravenes the LCP as interpreted by
    the City for a quarter century.”
    A
    The Commission certified the City’s LCP in 1995. The LCP is
    comprised of a Land Use Plan, which states the City’s general goals and
    policies, as well as Zoning Regulations. The Land Use Plan comprises a
    number of specific “elements,” including Land Use and Public Safety
    Elements. The City’s Zoning Regulations, codified in Title 30 of the Encinitas
    Municipal Code, implement the goals of the Land Use Plan. (Pub. Resources
    Code, § 30513.)
    15
    The LCP imposes specific requirements on the development of blufftop
    property within the Coastal Bluff Overlay Zone as defined by the City’s Land
    Use Plan. The LCP mandates that, with limited exceptions, no new principal
    or accessory structure can be constructed “within 40 feet of the top edge of the
    coastal bluff.” (Encinitas Mun. Code, § 30.34.020B.1.) The provision of the
    LCP at issue here, Encinitas Municipal Code section 30.34.020D, requires
    applicants seeking a permit or development approval for new construction
    within the Coastal Bluff Overlay Zone, to submit “a soils report, and either a
    geotechnical review or geotechnical report” that is “prepared by a certified
    engineering geologist who has been prequalified as knowledgeable in City
    standards, coastal engineering and engineering geology.” (Encinitas Mun.
    Code, § 30.34.020D.)
    Further, the report must “certify that the development proposed will
    have no adverse affect [sic] on the stability of the bluff, will not endanger life
    or property, and that any proposed structure or facility is expected to be
    reasonably safe from failure and erosion over its lifetime without having to
    propose any shore or bluff stabilization to protect the structure in the future.”
    (Encinitas Mun. Code, § 30.34.020D.) The ordinance then sets forth a list of
    specific items the report must address related to the geology of the property.
    (Ibid.) The geotechnical report must also “express a professional opinion as
    to whether the project can be designed or located so that it will neither be
    subject to nor contribute to significant geologic instability throughout the life
    span of the project.” (Ibid.) Finally, the report must:
    “include identification of the daylight line behind the top of the
    bluff established by a bluff slope failure plane analysis. This
    slope failure analysis shall be performed according to
    geotechnical engineering standards, and shall:
    a. Cover all types of slope failure.
    16
    b. Demonstrate a safety factor against slope failure of 1.5.
    c. Address a time period of analysis of 75 years.”
    (Encinitas Mun. Code, § 30.34.020D.)
    B
    The Martins make various arguments in support of their assertion that
    Lindstrom was wrongly decided. First, they contend the plain language of
    section 30.34.020D does not support the Commission’s method of calculating
    the setback. They argue the ordinance only requires that the “slope failure
    analysis” prepared by an applicant’s certified engineering geologist:
    (a) “ ‘[c]over all types of slope failure;’ ” (b) “ ‘[d]emonstrate a safety factor
    against slope failure of 1.5;’ ” and (c) “ ‘[a]ddress a time period of analysis of
    75 years,’ ” but that the provision does not require the calculations under (b)
    and (c) be combined.
    Next, the Martins argue that additional language in the ordinance
    relied on by Lindstrom to support its determination that the LCP requires
    the two setback calculations be combined—“that any proposed structure or
    facility is expected to be reasonably safe from failure and erosion over its
    lifetime”—also does not require the use of the Commission’s methodology.
    (Lindstrom, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 102.) They argue that because the
    phrase is not quantified, other methodology can also satisfy the standard.
    (Encinitas Mun. Code, § 30.34.020D.) Finally, the Martins argue the
    methodology used by the Commission is overly cautious and inconsistent with
    “State-established standards of practice….”
    We are not persuaded by these arguments. As Lindstrom explained,
    the LCP explicitly requires the structure “be reasonably safe from failure and
    erosion over its lifetime.” (Lindstrom, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 98, quoting
    Encinitas Mun. Code, § 30.34.020D, second italics added.) Further, the
    17
    ordinance requires the geotechnical report to “demonstrate a safety factor
    against slope failure of 1.5” (“the industry standard for new construction on
    slopes”) and “[a]ddress a time period of analysis of 75 years.” (Ibid.) “When
    read together, the plain meaning of these provisions is that, taking into
    account the erosion that will occur over 75 years, the geotechnical report
    must demonstrate a safety factor of 1.5 at the end of 75 years.” (Ibid., italics
    added.) The methodology proposed by the Martins, i.e. using only the greater
    of the two calculations, does not take “into account predicted erosion over the
    [full] lifetime of the structure, def[ying] the plain language of the LCP as well
    as common sense.” (Ibid.)
    With respect to the Martins’ assertion that other methodology can
    satisfy the LCP’s requirements, they propose no other method that accounts
    for both erosion and stability. Rather, they argue only that because “an
    owner wouldn’t even ‘qualify’ for shoreline protection until a structure’s factor
    of safety fell to 1.2 or below” the Martins’ proposed home is reasonably safe
    over its 75-year lifetime. The standard employed for the construction of
    shoreline protection, however, is not the same standard the LCP applies to
    new construction. We agree with our Lindstrom colleagues that a “layman
    does not need special geotechnical training to understand the self-evident
    concept that for a structure to ‘be reasonably safe from failure and erosion
    over its lifetime’ (Encinitas Mun. Code, § 30.34.020D), the combined effect of
    expected erosion and bluff instability must be considered.” (Lindstrom,
    supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 98.) “A structure that is reasonably safe today
    because it is located 40 feet from the edge of the bluff will not be reasonably
    safe at the end of its lifetime when the bluff has eroded [39] feet, meaning
    that the structure is only [one foot] from the edge of the bluff.” (Ibid.)
    18
    For this reason, we also reject the Martins’ contention that the
    methodology employed by the Commission is an “ ‘unrealistically
    conservative’ redundancy.” The methodology the Commission employs is the
    one required by the LCP; thus, whether the “American Society of Civil
    Engineers, Los Angeles Section” outlines a different requirement, as the
    Martins contend, is not controlling.7 As this court held previously, “the City’s
    LCP expressly states that the geotechnical report must ‘[d]emonstrate a safety
    factor against slope failure of 1.5’ ” at the “end of 75 years.” (Lindstrom,
    supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 99.)
    The Martins also argue that Lindstrom should not control because it
    wrongly assumed there was no “interpretive disagreement … between the
    City and the Commission concerning the LCP’s setback provisions.” The
    Martins base this assertion on the fact that the record in Lindstrom did not
    contain an explicit statement of the City’s current interpretation of the
    ordinance (since the City approved the development based on the Lindstroms’
    first consultant’s analysis which used the additive method), while here the
    City explicitly accepted the Martins’ interpretation. This argument is a red
    herring. As we held in Lindstrom, the existence of an interpretive
    disagreement between the Commission and City is irrelevant because the
    plain language of the LCP requires the additive methodology to determine
    the appropriate setback.8 (Lindstrom, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 96.)
    7     The Martins’ citation to this standard is a letter drafted by their
    geotechnical consultant that merely states this standard, but they do not
    provide the source material.
    8     For this same reason, we need not reach the parties’ dispute over which
    governmental agency’s interpretation of the LCP is entitled to greater
    deference.
    19
    The fact that various setbacks have been accepted by the Commission
    since the adoption of the LCP in 1995 also does not lead to the conclusion
    that the Commission’s interpretation of the ordinance is incorrect. Citing the
    trial court’s order in Lindstrom that this court reversed, the Martins assert
    the “Commission acknowledged it was moving away from the LCP to address
    the fact that ‘[w]e are in a new normal’ and ‘new world.’ ” The Lindstrom
    order goes on to state that the Commission’s staff noted that “[t]here have
    been circumstances where the Commission has not required development to
    be set back the sum of the factor of safety and the erosion rate over 75 years.”
    However, it next states that “[m]any of these analyses did not correctly apply
    the 1.5 factor of safety for the life of the new structure according to current
    Commission practice.” (Italics added.) Like the Lindstrom panel, we do not
    agree that because the ordinance may have been applied incorrectly in the
    20
    past, the City’s incorrect interpretation deserves deference.9 (Lindstrom,
    supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at pp. 96–98.)
    III
    Substantial Evidence Supported the Commission’s Imposition
    of Special Condition 1(a)
    The Martins next contend that even if the methodology used by the
    Commission was in accord with the LCP, there was not substantial evidence
    to support a 79-foot setback. Specifically, they argue there was no evidence
    9      The Commission staff’s report for the final hearing in this case sheds
    additional light on historical setback approvals in the area of the Martins’
    home. The report acknowledges the Commission did not appeal bluff
    approvals from 1995-2000 but explains the reason for inaction was that the
    Commission did not have a sufficiently experienced staff to challenge the
    approvals. The Commission report states, “it is likely that the geotechnical
    claims made by these applicants were inconsistent with the requirements of
    the City’s LCP and were not based on the cumulative setback needed to
    account for 75 years of expected erosion and the 1.5 Factor of Safety.” In
    2001, the Commission hired its first licensed geologist and since then has
    appealed 16 of 23 approvals by the City of new bluff top homes. Of those
    challenges, “[t]he interpretation of how to correctly determine the appropriate
    bluff edge setback was an appeal contention in … 10 appeals that the
    Commission took a final action on (either approval on De Novo or No
    Substantial Issue and not withdrawn or still pending). In 9 of the 10 appeals,
    the Commission found that the correct way to determine the [setback] is to
    find the distance from the bluff edge necessary to achieve a factor of safety of
    1.5 today and add to that the expected bluff retreat over the next 75 years.”
    In contrast, the only evidence the Martins submitted in support of their
    claim that smaller setbacks were approved by the Commission are
    photographs of the homes adjacent to their lot with no information
    concerning when those homes were permitted and, as in Lindstrom, “an
    unhelpful summary chart prepared by the [Martins] for the Commission
    hearing that is not accompanied by any supporting record citations.”
    (Lindstrom, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 96, fn. 22.)
    21
    to support the future erosion rate of 0.52 feet assumed by the Commission
    and that it is mere speculation. This argument is without merit.
    Like the trial court, we presume “ ‘that the [Commission’s] decision is
    supported by substantial evidence ….’ ” (Lindstrom, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at
    p. 93.) The party challenging the Commission’s decision “ ‘bears the burden
    of demonstrating the contrary.’ ” (Ibid.) Although our “ ‘ “task involves some
    weighing to fairly estimate the worth of the evidence, that limited weighing
    does not constitute independent review where the court substitutes its own
    findings and inferences for that of the Commission. Rather, it is for the
    Commission to weigh the preponderance of conflicting evidence, as [the court]
    may reverse its decision only if, based on the evidence before it, a reasonable
    person could not have reached the conclusion reached by it.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
    The parties agree that the rate of erosion will increase from the
    historical level as a result of sea level rise. The disagreement lies in how
    much they think the rate may rise. The Martins also contend the
    Commission did not factor in the strength of the material at the base of the
    bluff, material known as Torrey sandstone, and instead incorrectly assumed
    it was made of softer material more susceptible to erosion. According to the
    Martins, these errors resulted in erosion projections that are too
    conservative, and thus show the imposition of the 79-foot setback is not
    supported by substantial evidence. The administrative record, however,
    establishes the Commission’s staff used well-accepted scientific methodology
    to support its setback recommendation to the Commission, including with
    respect to projected erosion.
    22
    As discussed, Drs. Street and Ewing arrived at the erosion rate of 0.52
    feet per year using the SCAPE methodology.10 The Commission provided
    ample explanation for Drs. Street and Ewing’s conclusion that a higher
    projected level of rise was more appropriate than that advocated for by the
    Martins’ geotechnical consultant, GSI. Critically, the Commission staff used
    more recent sea level rise data and recommendations than those used by
    GSI.11
    Specifically, the staff relied on two recent reports, which it asserts
    constitute the “best available science on which to base future planning and
    investing decisions in California” and which GSI acknowledged provided
    current sea level rise estimates. The more recent of the two reports used by
    the Commission staff, titled State of California Sea-Level Rise Guidance 2018
    Update, expands on the other, earlier report by providing a framework for
    municipalities and other governance bodies to determine the appropriate sea
    level rise projections for various types of planning and policy decision making
    based on the level of risk aversion that applies to the decision. For types of
    development where the consequences of incorrect projections of sea level rise
    are greater, the report guides the decision maker to use more conservative
    projections.
    10     The Martins also attempt to discredit Drs. Street and Ewing because
    they are not “certified” engineering geologists. As the Commission points out,
    however, it is not required to have a certified engineering geologist on staff.
    The record shows both professionals are qualified to evaluate the submissions
    of the applicants and opine on the issues before this court. (See Lindstrom,
    supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 99, fn. 25.)
    11   Even GSI proposed using a similar methodology to SCAPE but
    assumed a lesser rate of sea level rise.
    23
    Applying the framework to this project, Drs. Street and Ewing
    concluded that 0.52 feet per year was an appropriate projection of future
    erosion. Drs. Street and Ewing then performed two checks on their
    conclusions, first using another scientifically accepted methodology, CoSMoS,
    and second by comparing the erosion rate to that used in the Commission’s
    five most recent approvals of new homes on the Encinitas blufftop. Both
    confirmed the projection.
    With respect to the relative strength of the material underlying the
    bluff, the Commission responded to GSI’s criticisms, explaining that the
    strength was accounted for in multiple ways, including using the site-specific
    historical erosion rate as the starting point for its SCAPE calculations and
    cross-checking the SCAPE calculations against CoSMos, which uses cliff-
    retreat projections for two 100-meter stretches of coast near the Martins’ site.
    In addition, the Commission staff explained that, contrary to the Martins’
    assertions, it did examine the geological specifics of the Martins’ site,
    agreeing that “the material strength of a bluff is absolutely crucial in
    determining the erosion rate,” but found it more appropriate to use a broader
    view of the surrounding coastline than GSI.
    Given these facts, the record contains ample support for the
    Commission’s use of the 0.52 feet per year rate of erosion. The Martins have
    not established that the Commission failed to adequately account for the
    strength of the material at the bottom of the bluff, or that this factor
    invalidates the Commission staff’s approach. At most, the Martins have
    shown disagreement between experts about the potential erosion in the area.
    It was the Commission’s role to evaluate this competing evidence, and it is
    not our role to reevaluate the Commission’s reasoned decision. (See
    Kirkorowicz v. California Coastal Com. (2000) 
    83 Cal.App.4th 980
    , 986
    24
    (Kirkorowicz) [“it is for the Commission to weigh the preponderance of
    conflicting evidence, as we may reverse its decision only if, based on the
    evidence before it, a reasonable person could not have reached the conclusion
    reached by it”].) Accordingly, we reject the Martins’ contention that
    insufficient evidence supports the Commission’s imposition of special
    condition 1(a).
    IV
    The LCP Requires All New Construction Be Designed and Constructed for
    Future Removal
    The Martins next contend that special condition 1(c), which prohibits
    the Martins from constructing a basement, was improperly imposed. They
    contend the LCP policy under which the condition was authorized applies
    only to construction that is within 40 feet of the bluff’s edge and therefore
    does not apply to their proposed development at all. The Commission
    responds that the trial court’s interpretation of the policy language to apply
    to all new construction was correct. We agree with the Commission.
    Policy 1.6 of the City’s LCP sets forth a list of specific actions the City
    must undertake to “provide for the reduction of unnatural causes of bluff
    erosion.…” Included within that list is subdivision (f), which states in full:
    “Requiring new structures and improvements to existing
    structures to be setback 25 feet from the inland blufftop edge,
    and 40 feet from coastal blufftop edge with exceptions to allow a
    minimum coastal blufftop setback of no less than 25 feet. For all
    development proposed on coastal blufftops, a site-specific
    geotechnical report shall be required. The report shall indicate
    that the coastal blufftop setback will not result in risk of
    foundation damage resulting from bluff erosion or retreat to the
    principal structure within its economic life and with other
    engineering evidence to justify the coastal blufftop setback.
    “On coastal bluffs, exceptions to allow a minimum setback of no
    less than 25 feet shall be limited to additions or expansions to
    25
    existing principal structures which are already located seaward
    of the 40 foot coastal bluff top setback, provided the proposed
    addition or expansion is located no further seaward than the
    existing principal structure, is set back a minimum of 25 feet
    from the coastal blufftop edge, and the applicant agrees to
    remove the proposed addition or expansion, either in part or
    entirely, should it become threatened in the future.
    “In all cases, all new construction shall be specifically designed
    and constructed such that it could be removed in the event of
    endangerment and the applicant shall agree to participate in any
    comprehensive plan adopted by the City to address coastal bluff
    recession and shoreline erosion problems in the City.
    “This does not apply to minor structures that do not require a
    building permit, except that no structures, including walkways,
    patios, patio covers, cabanas, windscreens, sundecks, lighting
    standards, walls, temporary accessory buildings not exceeding
    200 square feet in area, and similar structures shall be allowed
    within five feet from the bluff top edge ….” (Italics added.)
    The Martins argue that the italicized portion of the provision, the third
    paragraph, applies only to the immediately preceding paragraph and thus
    only to construction that is exempted from the 40 foot setback requirement.
    The Martins reason that this interpretation is “consistent with the overall
    policy of protecting only realistically vulnerable structures at or near the
    bluff edge.”
    “ ‘The construction of an ordinance is a pure question of law for the
    court, and the rules applying to construction of statutes apply equally to
    ordinances.’ ” (Lindstrom, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 94.) “We give the
    language its usual and ordinary meaning, and ‘[i]f there is no ambiguity, then
    we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of
    the language governs.’ ” (Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co. (2002) 
    28 Cal.4th 222
    , 227.) We agree with the Commission that the Martins’
    26
    interpretation of Policy 1.6.(f) conflicts with the provision’s plain language,
    which states explicitly it applies “in all cases.”
    As the Commission contends, the paragraph at issue stands alone, after
    one paragraph setting forth the general setback rules for new structures and
    improvements, and a second paragraph containing the exception for additions
    and expansions of existing structures. This structure, addressing distinct
    issues in each paragraph, in conjunction with the policy’s use of the phrases
    “[i]n all cases” and “all new construction,” makes clear that the third
    paragraph applies to both preceding paragraphs, not just the second and
    immediately preceding paragraph. (See People v. Cole (2006) 
    38 Cal.4th 964
    ,
    975 [“We must harmonize the various parts of the enactments by considering
    them in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.”].) Accordingly,
    we reject the Martins’ contention that special condition 1(c) was not
    authorized because the removability requirement it applied to the proposed
    basement is only applicable to construction within 40 feet of the bluff edge.
    The Martins also cite Encinitas Municipal Code Section 30.34.020B.1,
    in support of their position. They state the provision mirrors Policy 1.6(f) and
    thus requires the same interpretation. We disagree. Subdivision B.1 of
    section 30.34.020 restates the prohibition on the construction of structures
    less than 40 feet from the top edge of the bluff. It then lists four exceptions to
    the prohibition. The first, found in subdivision B.1.a, on which the Martins
    rely, states:
    “Principal and accessory structures closer than 40 feet but not
    closer than 25 feet from the top edge of the coastal bluff, as
    reviewed and approved pursuant to subsection C, Development
    Processing and Approval, of this section. This exception to allow
    a minimum setback of no less than 25 feet shall be limited to
    additions or expansions to existing principal structures which are
    already located seaward of the 40-foot coastal blufftop setback,
    provided the proposed addition or expansion is located no further
    27
    seaward than the existing principal structure, is setback a
    minimum of 25 feet from the coastal blufftop edge and the
    applicant agrees to remove the proposed addition or expansion,
    either in part or entirely, should it become threatened in the
    future. Any new construction shall be specifically designed and
    constructed such that it could be removed in the event of
    endangerment and the property owner shall agree to participate in
    any comprehensive plan adopted by the City to address coastal
    bluff recession and shoreline erosion problems in the City.”
    (Italics added.)
    As the trial court pointed out, this provision is not applicable to the
    Martins’ proposed development of a new home. Although the italicized
    language mirrors that found in Policy 1.6(f), unlike 1.6(f) it is plainly
    addressed only to new construction that falls within the exception at issue,
    i.e. construction of additions or expansions of existing structures that are
    seaward of the 40-foot setback line. We fail to see how this ordinance
    supports the imposition of a limitation on Policy 1.6(f)’s broader requirement
    that all new construction be designed and constructed for removal.
    V
    The Imposition of Special Condition 1(c) Is
    Supported by Substantial Evidence
    The Martins’ final contention on appeal is that insufficient evidence
    supported the imposition of special condition 1(c) prohibiting them from
    constructing a basement. Specifically, they assert that there is no evidence in
    the record to support the Commission’s findings that removal of the basement
    would require alteration of the bluff and that excavation of the basement, if
    necessary, would threaten the bluff’s overall stability. The Martins further
    contend that the “Demolition and Removal Plan” they submitted establishes
    that the basement could be removed without disturbing the bluff’s stability.
    28
    The Commission counters that substantial evidence in the
    administrative record supports this special condition. Specifically, they
    assert the evidence shows the bluff is both highly susceptible to landslides
    and “actively eroding.” The Commission also asserts that in addition to this
    existing threat, the increasing sea level rise and the uncertainty of its impact
    intensifies the risk the basement could be exposed in the future.
    Additionally, the Commission asserts its staff provided significant evidence
    that removal of the basement would threaten the overall stability of the bluff
    and the neighboring structures.
    We agree with the Commission that there is sufficient evidence to
    support the Commission’s finding a basement cannot be safely removed,
    justifying the imposition of special condition 1(c). The Martins, in essence,
    contend that the only evidence relevant to the determination is the report of
    GSI who opined there are no “geologic stability risks” associated with the
    removal of the basement. Their report, however, does not negate the
    substantial evidence relied on by the Commission.
    With respect to the fragility of the bluff, the geotechnical review report
    prepared by Drs. Street and Ewing explained that “the bluff at the project
    site is actively eroding, as evidenced by the bluff toe notching, occasional
    block fall talus, bluff face rilling, and minor upper bluff retreat that is visible
    in historical aerial photographs (California Coastal Records Project,
    http://www.californiacoastline.org).” The Commission staff report also cited a
    2010 report prepared by GSI stating that “while there is no evidence of
    historic or ancient deep-seated landslides, the upper terrace materials have a
    potential for retreat through rotational landslides (GSI 2010).” Additionally,
    Commission staff reported that “the entire Encinitas coastline has been
    identified by the California Division of Mines and Geology as an area ‘most
    29
    susceptible’ to landslides (Tan and Giffen 1995),” and explained “several
    significant landslides have occurred in the project vicinity, including a 400-
    foot wide, deep-seated slide at Beacon’s Beach (900 block of Neptune Ave.)
    that was initiated in 1982-83 (URS 2014), and a large bluff failure (100-ft
    wide, 10-ft thick) on the 400 block of Neptune Ave. that occurred in 1993
    (USACE 1996).” Drs. Street and Ewing also opined that higher levels of
    erosion than those projected for their setback calculations were possible.
    This evidence sufficiently supported the Commission’s finding that the
    proposed basement might become endangered.
    Likewise, substantial evidence supported the Commission’s finding
    that removal of the basement would threaten the stability of the bluff. In
    addition to the significant evidence concerning the risk of landslides in the
    area of the Martins’ lot, Dr. Ewing testified that the basement would be
    “placed into terrace materials, which is mostly somewhat consolidated sand.”
    Dr. Ewing explained that if bluff erosion or recession necessitates the
    removal of the basement, the nearby sand “is going to be lacking support and
    … is not going to stay on that vertical face, and so it’s going to slump in.
    [¶] ... [T]hat collapse of the sand [will] come through to the bluff face itself.”
    Dr. Ewing also stated that if the basement is removed, the home above would
    likely require removal as well, further threatening the bluff’s stability.12
    This testimony and documentation constitutes substantial evidence
    supporting the Commission’s conclusion that removing or relocating the
    12     The Surfrider Foundation, a non-profit environmental advocacy group,
    similarly testified that “[r]emoval of the basement in the future could
    significantly alter the bluff’s natural state, which is also inconsistent with the
    LCP.” The Surfrider Foundation’s letter submission advocated elimination of
    the proposed basement “to make the structure more moveable, if ever
    threatened by erosion.”
    30
    basement would alter and potentially destabilize the bluff. The Martins’
    conflicting evidence, consisting of GSI’s contrary opinion that the proposed
    removal of the basement would not be harmful, does not require reversal. As
    with special condition 1(a), it is not our role to reweigh the evidence in the
    manner the Martins advocate or to substitute our view for that of the
    commission. (See Kirkorowicz, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 986; Pescosolido v.
    Smith (1983) 
    142 Cal.App.3d 964
    , 970 [“The burden is upon the appellant to
    show there is no substantial evidence whatsoever to support the findings.”].)
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is reversed in part as to special conditions 1(a) and (3)(a)
    and affirmed in part as to special condition 1(c). The trial court’s writ of
    administrative mandate requiring the Commission to set aside and
    reconsider its August 8, 2018 decision conditionally approving Coastal
    Development Permit No. A-6-ENC-16-0060 is vacated. The parties to bear
    their own costs of appeal.
    McCONNELL, P. J.
    WE CONCUR:
    DATO, J.
    DO, J.
    31
    

Document Info

Docket Number: D076956

Filed Date: 6/23/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/23/2021