San Luis Obispo Local etc. v. Central Coast Development etc. ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 2/3/22
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    SAN LUIS OBISPO LOCAL                       2d Civ. No. B304144
    AGENCY FORMATION                         (Super. Ct. No. CV130383)
    COMMISSION et al.,                        (San Luis Obispo County)
    Cross-complainants and
    Appellants.
    v.
    CENTRAL COAST
    DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
    Cross-defendant and
    Respondent.
    A contract by a public agency that exceeds the agency’s
    statutory powers is void and will not support an award of
    attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code1 section 1717, subdivision
    (a). We reverse an award of fees against the public agency.
    1   All statutory references are to the Civil Code.
    FACTS
    I
    LAFCO I
    Central Coast Development Company (Central Coast) owns
    a 154-acre parcel of property within the sphere of influence of the
    City of Pismo Beach (City).2 Central Coast wants to construct
    252 single-family residences and 60 senior housing units on the
    parcel. The City approved Central Coast's application for a
    development permit for the property. The City and Central Coast
    applied to the San Luis Obispo Local Agency Formation
    Commission (LAFCO) to annex the property.
    The LAFCO application signed by the City and Central
    Coast contained the following indemnity agreement: “As part of
    this application, Applicant agrees to defend, indemnify, hold
    harmless and release the San Luis Obispo Local Agency
    Formation Commission (LAFCO), its officers, employees,
    attorneys, or agents from any claim, action or proceeding brought
    against any of them, the purpose of which is to attack, set aside,
    void, or annul, in whole or in part, LAFCO's action on the
    proposal or on the environmental documents submitted to or
    prepared by LAFCO in connection with the proposal. This
    indemnification obligation shall include, but not be limited to,
    damages, costs, expenses, attorneys' fees, and expert witness fees
    that may be asserted by any person or entity, including the
    Applicant, arising out of or in connection with the application. In
    the event of such indemnification, LAFCO expressly reserves the
    2 City of Pismo Beach is no longer a party to this action.
    This court dismissed its appeal pursuant to stipulation of the
    parties on January 3, 2022.
    2.
    right to provide its own defense at the reasonable expense of the
    Applicant.” (Italics added.)
    LAFCO denied the annexation application. The City and
    Central Coast sued LAFCO. LAFCO prevailed and presented a
    bill to the City and Central Coast for more than $400,000 in
    attorney fees and costs. The City and Central Coast refused to
    pay. The Special District Risk Management Authority (SDRMA),
    a public entity self-insurance pool, paid for LAFCO's fees and
    costs.
    The City sued Central Coast to recover fees and costs
    expended in the Central Coast action against LAFCO. LAFCO
    and SDRMA cross-complained against the City and Central
    Coast for fees and costs. The cross-complaint was based on the
    indemnity provision of the annexation application.
    The trial court granted the City and Central Coast’s
    judgment on the pleadings against LAFCO and SDRMA
    (hereafter collectively “LAFCO”). The court denied LAFCO's
    request for leave to amend its pleadings. LAFCO appealed.
    We affirmed in San Luis Obispo Local Agency Formation
    Com. v. City of Pismo Beach (2021) 
    61 Cal.App.5th 595
     (LAFCO
    I). We determined that the indemnity agreement was not
    supported by consideration and that LAFCO has no statutory
    authority to impose an indemnity agreement as a condition of
    LAFCO’s statutory duty to consider Central Coast’s application.
    LAFCO II
    While the appeal in LAFCO I was pending, the City and
    Central Coast moved for attorney fees based on section 1717.
    The trial court granted the motion. The court awarded $172,850
    to the City and $428,864 to Central Coast. LAFCO again appeals
    (LAFCO II).
    3.
    DISCUSSION
    Section 1717 Does Not Apply to a Void Contract
    LAFCO contends the indemnity agreement is void as an
    illegal and ultra vires contract.3 LAFCO asserts section 1717
    does not apply to a void contract.
    Section 1717, subdivision (a) provides: “In any action on a
    contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s
    fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall
    be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party,
    then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on
    the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the
    contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in
    addition to other costs.”
    LAFCO argues our opinion in LAFCO I determined that
    the indemnity agreement was an illegal contract. It cites Geffen
    v. Moss (1975) 
    53 Cal.App.3d 215
    , 227, for the principle that
    where a contract is illegal, it is void, a right to attorney fees
    created by the contract is unenforceable, and section 1717 does
    not apply. (See also Bovard v. American Horse Enterprises, Inc.
    (1988) 
    201 Cal.App.3d 832
    , 843 [citing Geffen].)
    Central Coast replies that the contract is not illegal, and
    our opinion in LAFCO I does not say that it is. Central Coast
    relies on a line of cases that state a contract is illegal where the
    object of the contract is unlawful. (Citing, e.g., McIntosh v. Mills
    (2004) 
    121 Cal.App.4th 333
    , 346.) Central Coast argues the
    3 Central Coast contends LAFCO has waived the argument
    by not raising it in the trial court. But the question is one of law
    that we can consider for the first time on appeal. (Sanchez v.
    Truck Ins. Exchange (1994) 
    21 Cal.App.4th 1778
    , 1787 [a party
    may raise for the first time on appeal a pure question of law
    which is presented by undisputed facts].)
    4.
    object of the contract involved here, an indemnity agreement, is
    not unlawful.
    In LAFCO I, we concluded that LAFCO was not authorized
    by statute to make the indemnity agreement. (LAFCO I, supra,
    61 Cal.App.5th at pp. 600-602.) Where a public agency is not
    authorized to make an agreement, the agreement is void and the
    public agency may neither enforce nor be liable on the contract.
    (Air Quality Products, Inc. v. The State of California (1979) 
    96 Cal.App.3d 340
    , 349; see 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th
    ed. 2017) Contracts, § 1011, p. 1053.) It follows that the public
    agency is not liable for attorney fees based on section 1717.
    Section 1717 is based on contract. The result should be no
    different than with contracts that are void for illegality. (See
    Geffen v. Moss, supra, 53 Cal.App.3d at p. 227.)
    II
    In Pari Delicto Does Not Apply
    Central Coast contends that the doctrine of in pari delicto
    applies to allow enforcement of the contract.
    Central Coast cites McIntosh for the principle that the
    doctrine of in pari delicto allows an illegal contract to be enforced
    “ ‘so long as the party seeking its enforcement is less morally
    blameworthy than the party against whom the contract is being
    asserted, and there is no overriding public interest to be served
    by voiding the agreement.’ ” (McIntosh v. Mills, supra, 121
    Cal.App.4th at p. 347.)
    But the doctrine does not apply to unauthorized contracts
    made by public agencies because there is an overriding public
    interest to be served by voiding the agreement. The overriding
    public interest is to protect the public fisc. Thus, a party who
    contracts with a public agency that lacks the authority to enter
    5.
    into the contract cannot even collect in quantum meruit for
    services rendered because of the need to limit a public entity’s
    contractual obligations. (Katsura v. City of San Buenaventura
    (2007) 
    155 Cal.App.4th 104
    , 109-110.)
    Moreover, the question of attorney fees arose because
    Central Coast brought a meritless action against LAFCO. For
    the same reason that LAFCO could not recover fees because the
    interpretation of the indemnity agreement lacked merit, so too
    Central Coast may not recover fees.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment (order) is reversed. Costs on appeal are
    awarded to appellants.
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
    GILBERT, P. J.
    We concur:
    YEGAN, J.
    PERREN, J.
    6.
    Ginger E. Garrett, Judge
    Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
    ______________________________
    McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth, James
    P. Wagoner, Timothy J. Buchanan, Brandon M. Fish, and Lejf E.
    Knutson for Cross-complainants and Appellants San Luis Obispo
    Local Agency Formation Commission and Special District Risk
    Management Authority.
    Richards, Watson & Gershon, T. Peter Pierce, Kyle H.
    Brochard; David M. Fleishman, City Attorney, for Cross-
    defendant and Respondent City of Pismo Beach.
    Jackson Tidus, Michael L. Tidus, and Gregory P. Regier for
    Cross-defendant and Respondent Central Coast Development
    Company.
    7.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B304144

Filed Date: 2/3/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/3/2022