Best Energy Solutions etc. v. State Air Resources Bd. CA5 ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 5/27/22 Best Energy Solutions etc. v. State Air Resources Bd. CA5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    BEST ENERGY SOLUTIONS &
    TECHNOLOGY CORP.,                                                                           F082207
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        (Super. Ct. No. BCV-20-102198)
    v.
    OPINION
    STATE AIR RESOURCES BOARD,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. David R. Lampe,
    Judge.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Matthew Rodriquez, Acting Attorney General,
    Robert W. Byrne, Assistant Attorney General, Gary E. Tavetian, Gwynne B. Hunter,
    Ross H. Hirsch, Theodore A. McCombs, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Larson, Stephen S. Larson, Steve E. Bedsoe, and Andrew J. Bedigian for Plaintiff
    and Respondent.
    -ooOoo-
    Plaintiff Best Energy Solutions & Technology Corp. (Best Energy) filed a
    complaint against the State Air Resources Board (ARB) seeking a declaratory judgment
    stating it had complied with California’s alternative diesel fuel regulation in obtaining
    certification of a biodiesel additive called BC-EC1c. ARB responded by filing an anti-
    SLAPP motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.1 ARB contends the
    declaratory relief action arose from protected activity and Best Energy failed to establish
    a reasonable probability it would prevail on its claim.
    The trial court denied the motion. Based on our independent review of the record,
    we agree with the trial court and conclude Best Energy’s declaratory relief action did not
    arise from activity “in furtherance of [ARB’s] right of petition or free speech.”
    (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
    We therefore affirm the order.
    FACTS
    In December 2014, ARB released documents to the public that included “newly
    proposed regulations addressing alternative diesel fuels.” (POET, LLC v. State Air
    Resources Bd. (2017) 
    12 Cal.App.5th 52
    , 66.) The alternative diesel fuels regulations
    (ADF Regulation or ADF Reg.) are set forth in sections 2293 through 2293.9 and
    appendix 1 of subarticle 2, “In-use Requirements for Pollutant Emissions Control,” of
    title 13 to the California Code of Regulations. (POET, LLC, at p. 66, fn. 11.) The ADF
    Regulation’s “purpose is ‘to establish a comprehensive, multi-stage process governing
    the commercialization of alternative diesel fuels (ADF) in California.’ ” (Ibid.) In POET,
    LLC, this court concluded that the ADF Regulation was not tainted by ARB’s violation of
    the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.)
    in connection with its 2015 adoption of a low carbon fuel standards regulation. (POET,
    LLC, supra, at p. 93.)
    1       A “SLAPP” is a strategic lawsuit against public participation and a special motion
    to strike under section 425.16 is referred to as an anti-SLAPP motion. (Bonni v. St.
    Joseph Health System (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 995
    , 1007, fn. 1 (Bonni).) Unlabeled statutory
    references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
    2.
    “Biodiesel” is a type of alternative diesel fuel recognized by the ADF Regulation.
    (ADF Reg., § 2293.2, subd. (a)(2).) It is derived from vegetable oils or animal fats.
    (Ibid.) Biodiesel can reduce greenhouse gas emissions but potentially can increase
    oxides of nitrogen (NOx) emissions, a smog precursor associated with health and
    environmental harm. As a result, the ADF Regulation provides that certain biodiesel
    blends may be sold commercially only if NOx control mechanisms are applied. (ADF
    Reg., § 2293.5, subd. (c).)
    Best Energy is a research and development company and a supplier, producer and
    distributor of (1) petroleum additives and fuels and (2) engine and petrochemical
    technologies. Its founder and president is George Sturges. In connection with
    developing a biodiesel additive called BC-EC1c, Best Energy began communicating with
    ARB about certification in October 2017.
    After discussions, Best Energy requested approval and certification of the BC-
    EC1c as an emissions equivalent additive under appendix 1 of the ADF Regulation.
    Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) prepared the initial test protocol and submitted it to
    ARB in February 2018. SwRI submitted the final test protocol on March 7, 2018.
    ARB’s staff found the final submission complete and approved it on April 11, 2018.
    Later in April, SwRI began testing BC-EC1c using the approved protocol. After the
    testing was complete, SwRI prepared a final report and, in May 2018, submitted it to
    ARB.
    On June 5, 2018, ARB issued Executive Order G-714-ADF05 certifying BC-EC1c
    at a treat rate of 100 parts per million. The executive order stated in part:
    “The candidate fuel was properly tested in accordance with Appendix
    1(a)(2)(F) of the ADF regulation. The candidate fuel emissions tests
    showed NOx emissions were equivalent and a particulate matter emissions
    reduction of 18 percent compared to the reference fuel (ARB diesel). The
    candidate fuel emissions satisfied all of the requirements under Appendix 1
    (a)(2)(G) of the ADF regulation.
    3.
    “NOW, THEREFORE, (IT IS ORDERED AND RESOLVED) that the
    additive BC-EC1c is approved and certified pursuant to Appendix 1
    (a)(2)(H) of the ADF regulation as an emissions equivalent additive for use
    with biodiesel blends B20 and below or for use with biodiesel blendstock
    when applied in accordance with [the conditions specified in this executive
    order].” (Boldface and underlining omitted.)
    The executive order also stated ARB reserved the right to review the order and the
    certification to assure the certified fuel met the standard and procedures of the ADF
    Regulation.
    The day after the executive order was issued, California Fueling, LLC questioned
    the legitimacy of the testing of Best Energy’s additive, claiming that it had insider
    information about a problem in the chain of custody of the additive tested. Andrew V.
    Jablon of RPB, LLP, acting on behalf of its client California Fueling, LLC, sent ARB a
    September 6, 2018, letter expressing concerns about the certification of Best Energy’s
    additive. Best Energy describes California Fueling, LLC as its only market competitor.
    ARB initiated an investigation into the concerns raised. Its investigation sought to
    verify whether the test fuels used to conduct the certification testing of Best Energy’s
    additive were the same fuels represented in the test protocol that ARB’s staff had
    approved. The investigation resulted in ARB’s staff recommending ARB conclude that
    (1) the same fuels had been used and (2) Executive Order G-714-ADF05 was valid and
    would remain in effect.
    On October 16, 2018, an attorney from ARB’s legal office sent Jablon a letter
    describing the actions taken by ARB to follow up on the concerns raised. The letter
    stated: “Staff’s investigation uncovered no evidence of deficiencies in adherence to chain
    of custody requirements or any other part of the executive order approval process. Staff
    confirmed that the evidence continues to support the conclusion that the certification fully
    met the requirements of the ADF regulation.” As a result, the letter “concluded that the
    evidence does not support any modification to that Executive Order … or other further
    action related to that order.”
    4.
    ARB’s October 16, 2018 letter also stated that Jablon’s “letter contains several
    factual inaccuracies that your other subsequent communications continue to repeat and
    expand upon.” The letter then explained those inaccuracies. For example, a concern
    expressed by a member of ARB’s staff about a typographical error in the executive order
    had been described by Jablon as a concern about the chain of custody.
    Also on October 16, 2018, ARB sent Best Energy’s president an e-mail stating
    ARB’s investigation had been completed and found nothing that would change the
    executive order issued for Best Energy’s additive. That e-mail, however, did not close
    ARB’s inquiry into certified biodiesel additives.
    In late 2018 or early 2019, ARB contracted with the Center for Environmental
    Research and Technology at University of California, Riverside (CE-CERT) to conduct
    emissions testing of the additives of Best Energy and its competitor, California Fueling,
    LLC. The stated objectives of the project were to (1) confirm the two additives met
    existing regulatory requirements for certification, (2) broadly examine the efficacy of
    additives in reducing NOx emissions from diesel blends containing 20 percent biodiesel,
    and (3) determine whether ARB’s existing certification requirements ensured NOx
    mitigation with biodiesel additive packages.
    When Best Energy learned of the CE-CERT testing, it told ARB its view that the
    new tests could not confirm or replicate the prior results for many reasons, including the
    new tests would necessarily use different fuels, with different physical properties, from
    different geographical sources, and produced with different manufacturing processes. 2 In
    addition, Best Energy was doubtful that a laboratory with no track record of testing
    alternative diesel fuels could confirm the testing performed by SwRI.
    2      For instance, Best Energy alleges that the testing performed by SwRI used a
    reference diesel fuel with a cetane number of 49 and the testing performed by CE-ERT
    used a cleaner burning diesel fuel with a cetane number of 53.
    5.
    On March 29, 2019, ARB issued an amended order, Executive Order G-714-
    ADF05A, modifying the certified treat rate for BC-EC1c to 20 parts per million, which
    corrected a clerical error that had resulted in the original certification at 100 parts per
    million.
    On October 31, 2019, the results of the CE-CERT testing were released. ARB’s
    letter to Best Energy’s president attached a summary of the testing results and stated the
    testing showed Best Energy’s “certified additive, BC-EC1c, failed to effectively mitigate
    to the regulatory standard.” The letter concluded by stating that, “in addition to sending
    you this letter and sending similarly situated applicants for other certified additives
    similar letters, I have asked [ARB’s] staff to issue a public product alert to notify
    interested stakeholders that we are working to develop appropriate action to address
    issues with potential ineffectiveness of these additives.”
    The October 31, 2019 product alert stated, among other things, that the ARB
    certified NOx mitigation additives could continue to be used to comply with the ADF
    Regulation’s NOx mitigation requirements. It also advised that, to provide regulated
    parties with time to transition to other compliance strategies, any changes to existing
    certifications would not be effective before January 1, 2020.
    In February 2020, ARB issued an administrative subpoena duces tecum to Best
    Energy in connection with an investigation into whether Best Energy complied with the
    ADF Regulation and, more broadly, why BC-EC1c was shown effective in the
    certification testing yet failed to mitigate NOx emissions in the CE-ERT testing. A
    declaration of an ARB investigator stated that, to further the investigation, it was
    necessary to review Best Energy’s records related to BC-EC1c.
    PROCEEDINGS
    In September 2020, Best Energy filed a complaint for declaratory relief against
    ARB. The complaint alleged an actual controversy had arisen between Best Energy and
    ARB concerning their respective rights and duties with respect to the executive orders
    6.
    ARB issued for BC-EC1c. The complaint alleged that Best Energy “complied with the
    ADF Regulation in obtaining the Executive Order, and asks this Court to declare as
    such.” The prayer for relief requested “a declaration, pursuant to Code of Civil
    Procedure § 1060, that Best [Energy] complied with the ADF Regulation in obtaining its
    certification for BC-EC1c.” No other relief, such as damages or an injunction, was
    requested.
    To demonstrate the existence an actual controversy, the complaint alleged that
    ARB (1) launched an investigation against Best Energy to determine whether Best
    Energy complied with the ADF Regulation, (2) contracted with CE-CERT to conduct
    emissions tests, (3) released the results of the testing in the October 31, 2019 product
    alert, and (4) could potentially issue a notice of violation, decertify the additive, or both.
    The complaint also alleged the investigation was initiated in bad faith and without good
    cause and the investigation was likely “to distract from [ARB’s] failure to draft and
    implement an ADF Regulation consistent with the stated purpose and goals of the ADF
    Regulation.”
    ARB responded to the complaint by filing an anti-SLAPP motion. In December
    2020, after an opposition and reply were filed, the trial court held a hearing on the
    motion. At the start of the hearing, the court announced its tentative ruling to deny the
    motion and stated the gravamen of the case did not relate to protected activity,
    statements, or communications of ARB’s staff and, instead, sought an adjudication
    related to ARB’s investigation and to its interpretation of its regulations. The court then
    heard argument from counsel and took the matter under submission.
    After the hearing, the trial court denied ARB’s anti-SLAPP motion. The court’s
    signed order stated that “the gravamen of the case is a challenge to the lawfulness of
    [ARB’s] administrative actions, not any claim of right arising from [ARB’s] protected
    activity.” ARB filed a timely appeal.
    7.
    In May 2022, ARB filed a notice of related case stating it had filed an enforcement
    complaint against Best Energy and its principal, George Sturges, in the Sacramento
    County Superior Court. The existence of an enforcement action does not affect the
    merits of this appeal.
    DISCUSSION
    I.     BASIC PRINCIPLES
    Section 425.16 provides an expedited procedure for dismissing lawsuits filed
    primarily to inhibit the valid exercise of the constitutionally protected rights of speech or
    petition. (§ 425.16, subd. (a).) Subdivision (b)(1) of section 425.16 provides:
    “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that
    person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under
    the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection
    with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the
    court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability
    that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”
    This provision creates a “two-step inquiry” for resolving anti-SLAPP motions.
    (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 
    39 Cal.4th 299
    , 317.) “First, the defendant must establish that
    the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. [Citation.] If the
    defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate
    the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 
    1 Cal.5th 376
    , 384 (Baral).) Alternatively, if the defendant fails to demonstrate that any of
    the challenged claims for relief arise from protected activity, the court properly denies the
    motion to strike without addressing the probability of success (the second step). (City of
    Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 
    29 Cal.4th 69
    , 80-81 (Cashman); Verceles v. Los Angeles
    United School Dist. (2021) 
    63 Cal.App.5th 776
    , 784.)
    Appellate courts review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.
    (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 
    2 Cal.5th 1057
    , 1067
    (Park).) Under this standard of review, appellate courts “exercise independent judgment
    in determining whether, based on our own review of the record, the challenged claims
    8.
    arise from protected activity.” (Ibid.) Appellate courts also may consider affidavits
    addressing the facts upon which liability is based. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)
    II.    CLAIM ARISING FROM PROTECTED ACTIVITY
    The trial court determined Best Energy’s claim for declaratory relief did not arise
    from ARB’s protected activity. ARB contends the court erred in making this
    determination. As explained below, the trial court properly concluded Best Energy’s
    claim did not arise from protected speech or petitioning activity.
    “A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the
    basis for the claim.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1062-1063; Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th
    at p. 1009.) “The defendant’s first-step burden is to identify the activity each challenged
    claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.
    A ‘claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong
    complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for
    which liability is asserted.’ ” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 
    7 Cal.5th 871
    ,
    884, original italics.)
    An anti-SLAPP motion need not challenge an entire cause of action as pleaded in
    the complaint. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010; Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 382.)
    Instead, “courts should analyze each claim for relief—each act or set of acts supplying a
    basis for relief, of which there may be several in a single pleaded cause of action—to
    determine whether the acts are protected and, if so, whether the claim they give rise to
    has the requisite degree of merit to survive the motion.” (Bonni, at p. 1010; see Baral, at
    p. 395.) Stated another way, to determine if a particular claim arises from protected
    activity, “courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions
    by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.”
    (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063.)
    9.
    A.     Protected Activity
    In this appeal, before considering “each act or set of action supplying a basis for
    relief” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010), we consider the acts ARB contends are
    protected activity. A “defendant’s burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim
    rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of
    protected activity.” (Id. at p. 1009.) Those categories are set forth in subdivision (e) of
    section 425.16, which states:
    “As used in this section, ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of
    petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
    connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement
    or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or
    any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral
    statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration
    or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
    proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing
    made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an
    issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the
    exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of
    free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
    (Italics added.)
    These statutory categories were designed to “provide objective guidelines that lend
    themselves to adjudication on pretrial motion.” (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 
    1 Cal.5th 409
    , 422.) A moving party can meet its burden by demonstrating that the act or
    set of acts underlying the plaintiff’s claim for relief fits one of the categories in section
    425.16, subdivision (e). (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 
    29 Cal.4th 82
    , 88.)
    ARB contends its investigation into Best Energy’s additive and the release of the
    October 31, 2019 product alert are protected activities. We conclude the product alert is
    a “written … statement … made in connection with an issue under consideration or
    review by [an] executive … body” and, therefore, qualifies as a protected activity under
    subdivision (e)(2) of section 425.16. We also conclude ARB was authorized by law to
    conduct its internal investigation and further conclude the investigation and statements
    made during the course of the investigation qualify as protected activities. Best Energy’s
    10.
    counsel essentially conceded these conclusions at oral argument. (See Guarino v. County
    of Siskiyou (2018) 
    21 Cal.App.5th 1170
    , 1181 [county’s internal investigation into
    plaintiff’s wrongdoing was an official proceeding authorized by law and any statements
    made before or in connection with that investigation arose from protected activity].)
    B.     Acts Providing the Basis for the Claim for Relief
    Having identified the activities ARB contends are protected by section 425.16, we
    next examine “each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief.” (Bonni, supra, 11
    Cal.5th at p. 1010.) The identification of Best Energy’s claims for relief is relatively
    straightforward because there is only one, narrowly drawn claim for relief in its
    complaint. The prayer for relief seeks “a declaration … that Best [Energy] complied with
    the ADF Regulation in obtaining its certification for BC-EC1c” and nothing more.
    The activity that provides the basis for the declaratory relief is summarized by the
    allegation that Best Energy “complied with all the requirements of the ADF Regulation.”
    Thus, the allegations focus on Best Energy’s activities—not ARB’s. Best Energy
    provided a more specific description of its compliance activities by alleging it (1)
    regularly checked in with ARB during the certification process to ensure that the fuels
    and protocol it used in its certification testing fully complied with applicable regulations;
    (2) submitted all necessary information regarding the chain of custody and physical
    properties of the fuels used in testing; (3) received ARB approval for its test protocol,
    including its fuel sources, fuel quality results, emissions test procedures, quality
    assurance procedures, additive composition, and additive treat rates; (4) submitted its test
    schedule for ARB’s review and approval one week in advance of testing; and (5)
    undertook the testing only after receiving ARB’s approval of the test schedule. In short,
    the allegations that form the basis for relief are that Best Energy did everything right in
    accordance with the ADF Regulation, not that ARB did anything wrong.
    Best Energy’s complaint also included allegations designed to satisfy section
    1060’s requirement that an “actual controversy” exists between the parties. To show an
    11.
    actual controversy existed, Best Energy alleged that ARB launched an investigation into
    whether Best Energy complied with the ADF Regulation; ARB did not follow its own
    regulation in conducting the investigation; ARB issued a product alert on October 31,
    2019; and ARB potentially could issue a notice of violation, decertify the additive, or
    both. Earlier we concluded that ARB’s investigation and the issuance of the product alert
    qualified as protected activity. Here, we must resolve whether those protected acts
    “supply the basis for” the claim for declaratory relief. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
    1010.)
    We reject ARB’s argument that its protected investigation and issuance of a
    product alert provide the basis for Best Energy’s claim for declaratory relief. Best
    Energy can prove its claim and obtain a declaration that it complied with the ADF
    Regulation without addressing ARB’s investigation or the product alert. ARB’s
    investigation and issuance of the product alert occurred after Best Energy had completed
    the certification process. As a result, ARB’s postcertification activity in conducting that
    investigation and in issuing the product alert is not the basis for Best Energy’s claim for a
    declaratory judgment stating that its precertification actions complied with the ADF
    Regulation.
    We recognize the complaint includes allegations about ARB’s postcertification
    protected activity to show the existence of an “actual controversy.” (§ 1060) The legal
    question presented is whether that activity is part of the “grounds for relief.” (Baral,
    supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 395.) This question can be restated as whether ARB’s protected
    activity supplies an element of the claim for declaratory relief. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
    p. 1063.) To resolve this issue, we turn to Cashman, 
    supra,
     
    29 Cal.4th 69
    , a case in
    which an anti-SLAPP motion was brought to strike a claim for declaratory relief.
    In Cashman, the owners of mobilehome parks had filed a federal lawsuit against
    the city challenging its rent stabilization ordinance. (Cashman, 
    supra,
     29 Cal.4th at p.
    71.) Subsequently, the city filed a complaint a state court action containing a cause of
    12.
    action for declaratory relief. (Id. at p. 72.) The complaint alleged an actual controversy
    had arisen between the city and the owners relative to their respective rights and duties
    under the rent stabilization ordinance. (Ibid.) The city requested a judgment “ ‘declaring
    the respective rights and duties of the parties under the ordinance in question and that the
    ordinance is constitutional, valid, and enforceable.’ ” (Ibid.) The owners responded to
    the state court action by filing an anti-SLAPP motion. (Ibid.) The trial court granted the
    motion and the appellate court reversed. (Id. at p. 73.) The Supreme Court affirmed the
    reversal, concluding the city’s cause of action for declaratory relief arose out of the
    challenged ordinance rather than from the owners’ federal lawsuit, which was a protected
    petitioning activity. (Id. at pp. 80–81.)
    In Cashman, the Supreme Court addressed the question of “[w]hat activity or facts
    underlie the City’s cause of action for declaratory relief.” (Cashman, supra, 29 Cal.4th at
    p. 79.) The court recognized that the “ ‘basis of declaratory relief is the existence of an
    actual, present controversy over a proper subject.’ ” (Ibid.) The owners argued the only
    basis for alleging an actual controversy existed was the fact they had filed a federal
    lawsuit, an act protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. (Ibid.) The city countered this
    argument by asserting “that Owners’ federal court action informed City of the existence
    of an actual controversy justifying declaratory relief, not that Owners’ federal action,
    itself, constituted that controversy.” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court agreed with the city’s
    argument and concluded the actual controversy was the constitutionality of the ordinance
    and that controversy was a proper subject for declaratory relief. (Ibid.)
    In the present case, we conclude ARB’s investigation and its product alert (like the
    owners’ federal lawsuit in Cashman) informed Best Energy of the existence of an actual
    controversy, but neither the investigation nor the product alert themselves constitute the
    controversy. This is not a lawsuit where Best Energy seeks to impose liability on ARB or
    its employees for statements made, or acts done, during the course of ARB’s
    investigation. For instance, Best Energy is not claiming damages because the product
    13.
    alert was defamatory or wrongfully interfered with a prospective business advantage.
    (Cf. Guarino v. County of Siskiyou, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1182 [Guarino attempted
    to impose liability on individual members of the county’s board of supervisors for votes
    related to investigation into complaints Guarino had created a hostile work environment
    for county employees].) Instead, the controversy is limited to whether Best Energy
    complied with the ADF Regulation. Consequently, just as Cashman concluded the city’s
    declaratory relief action regarding the constitutionality of the city’s ordinance did not
    arise from the owners’ federal lawsuit, we conclude Best Energy’s declaratory relief
    action regarding its compliance with the ADF Regulation did not arise from ARB’s
    investigation or product alert.3
    Consequently, the trial court correctly denied the anti-SLAPP motion on the
    ground that Best Energy’s claim for declaratory relief was not based on an act in
    furtherance of ARB’s right of petition or free speech.
    DISPOSITION
    The order denying ARB’s anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. Respondent shall
    recover its costs on appeal.
    FRANSON, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    DETJEN, ACTING P. J.
    MEEHAN, J.
    3      We note that Best Energy’s declaratory relief action may have been in response to
    ARB’s investigation and product alert, but our Supreme Court has determined the phrase
    “arising from” in section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) does not mean “in response to.”
    (Cashman, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 77.)
    14.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: F082207

Filed Date: 5/27/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/27/2022