In re D.A. ( 2018 )


Menu:
  • Filed 6/19/18
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    In re D.A., a Person Coming            2d Juv. No. B283932
    Under the Juvenile Court Law.        (Super. Ct. No. VJ45807)
    (Los Angeles County)
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    D.A.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    The juvenile court determined that D.A. committed
    misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 242), and ordered her to serve
    six months of probation. D.A. contends there was insufficient
    evidence to establish the corpus delicti of her crime independent
    of her statements to the responding police officer. We affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In April 2017, Officer Carlos Silva responded to a
    disturbance call at a residence in Bell. When he arrived, D.A.
    was standing in the driveway. She appeared upset. Officer Silva
    asked what had happened, and she said that she found
    something on her boyfriend’s cell phone and confronted him
    about it. When he refused to apologize, D.A. slapped and pushed
    him. He then went to his bedroom and locked himself inside.
    D.A. told Officer Silva that her boyfriend was still in
    his bedroom. Officer Silva went to the bedroom and spoke with
    the man inside, C.H. C.H. appeared upset; his head was down,
    his arms were crossed in front of him, and he spoke in a low, sad
    voice. There was a scratch on his forehead—“like [a] blood-type
    sting”—and redness on the upper part of his left eye. No one else
    was in the house.
    The prosecutor could not locate C.H. to testify at
    trial. The trial proceeded with Officer Silva as the sole testifying
    witness.
    DISCUSSION
    D.A. contends the prosecutor presented insufficient
    evidence to establish the corpus delicti of misdemeanor battery
    independently of her statements to Officer Silva. We disagree.
    Misdemeanor battery is the “willful and unlawful use
    of force or violence upon the person of another.” (Pen. Code,
    § 242.) To sustain D.A.’s conviction of this crime, there must be
    sufficient proof that the crime actually occurred and that D.A.
    was the perpetrator. (People v. Alvarez (2002) 
    27 Cal. 4th 1161
    ,
    1164-1165 (Alvarez).) The first of these elements—the corpus
    delicti—must be established “independently from [D.A.’s]
    extrajudicial statements, confessions, or admissions.” (People v.
    Wright (1990) 
    52 Cal. 3d 367
    , 403, disapproved on another ground
    by People v. Williams (2010) 
    49 Cal. 4th 405
    , 459.)
    “Such independent proof may consist of
    circumstantial evidence [citations], and need not establish the
    2
    crime beyond a reasonable doubt [citations].” (People v. Jones
    (1998) 
    17 Cal. 4th 279
    , 301.) “The amount of independent proof of
    a crime required for this purpose is . . . ‘slight.’” (Ibid.) It need
    only permit a “‘“reasonable inference that a crime was
    committed”’” (ibid.), “even if a noncriminal explanation is also
    plausible” 
    (Alvarez, supra
    , 27 Cal.4th at p. 1171). Where, as
    here, the facts are undisputed, we independently review whether
    the prosecutor put forth the requisite independent proof to
    establish the corpus delicti. (Jones, at p. 302 [undisputed facts
    raise a legal question]; People v. Arroyo (2016) 
    62 Cal. 4th 589
    ,
    593 [legal questions reviewed de novo].)
    She did. C.H. was inside his bedroom. (People v.
    King (1938) 
    30 Cal. App. 2d 185
    , 195-196 [corroboration of details
    of a crime provides independent proof of corpus delicti].) He was
    upset. (People v. Navarette (2003) 
    30 Cal. 4th 458
    , 513-514
    [victim’s demeanor is relevant to show the circumstances of a
    crime].) And he had injuries on his face. (People v. Sheldon
    (1948) 
    84 Cal. App. 2d 177
    , 182-183 [corpus delicti of battery
    established where victim’s glasses were broken and he had cuts
    around his eye].) Such evidence permits a reasonable inference
    that D.A. committed battery against C.H. That C.H. may have
    been crying and rubbing his eye does not negate that inference.
    
    (Alvarez, supra
    , 27 Cal.4th at p. 1171.)
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
    TANGEMAN, J.
    We concur:
    GILBERT, P. J.                       YEGAN, J.
    3
    Kevin L. Brown, Judge
    Superior Court County of Los Angeles
    ______________________________
    Mary Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler,
    Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Shawn McGahey Webb, Supervising
    Deputy Attorney General, Blythe J. Leszkay, Deputy Attorney
    General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.