People v. Monges CA4/1 ( 2014 )

Filed 12/19/14 P. v. Monges CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D064222
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD243573)
VALENTIN CRUZ MONGES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael
Smyth, Judge. Affirmed.
Heather L. Beugen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Jennifer B.
Truong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Valentin Cruz Monges was convicted of the unlawful
taking and driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and admitted prior felony
convictions and a prior prison term (Pen. Code,1 §§ 666.5, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (b),
668).2
The trial court sentenced Monges to four years in prison. On appeal, Monges
contends that he was subjected to an unlawful detention prior to his arrest and that the
detention in turn led to the discovery of incriminating evidence. As we explain,
Monges's detention was lawful and the trial court did not err in denying his motions to
suppress. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Detention and Arrest
At 5:00 a.m. on the morning of September 27, 2012, San Diego Police Officer
John Cortez saw Monges getting out of Honda in an area where stolen cars were often
left. Cortez was suspicious not only because of the area where the Honda was parked but
also because Hondas are the most commonly stolen brand of vehicles.
After Monges and a female companion left the Honda, they met a second woman
and walked away. At that point, Cortez attempted to determine whether the Honda was
stolen by running the license plate through a system available in his patrol car, but it did
not appear as a stolen vehicle. Cortez nonetheless examined the Honda and noticed that
its hood was warm and that there was a key in the ignition that did not appear to be a
Honda key. Based on the fact that at one time he had owned both Hondas and Chevys,
Cortez believed the key was a Chevy key that had been "shaved" so it could be used to
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The jury also found Monges guilty of on a separate count of receiving a stolen
vehicle (section 496d), however the trial court set aside his conviction that count.
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steal cars. Cortez then located Monges who was in the passenger seat of a Chrysler with
the woman he had met after getting out of the Honda.
Cortez asked Monges to step out of the Chrysler, and Monges complied. Because
Cortez was alone, he handcuffed Monges and advised Monges he was investigating a
possible stolen car. Because the car was registered to a person in El Cajon, Cortez asked
his dispatcher to contact the El Cajon police department and request that someone from
that agency contact the registered owner of the Honda.
During the detention, Cortez explained to Monges that he had seen Monges leave
the Honda. Monges explained that a man named Carlos owned the Honda and that
Carlos had given him a ride to the location where the Honda was parked. About 20
minutes after Monges was detained, Cortez's dispatcher advised Cortez that the Honda
had in fact been stolen. Cortez then placed Monges under arrest and returned to the
parked Honda. Cortez opened an unlocked door on the Honda and photographed the key
in the ignition; he then removed the key and discovered it was in fact a shaved Chevy
key.
B. Motions to Suppress
At the time of his preliminary hearing, Monges moved to suppress evidence
obtained as a result of his detention, including his statements. The trial court denied the
motion and bound Monges over on the charges filed by the district attorney. Some weeks
later, Monges filed a new motion to suppress evidence and present new evidence. The
trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied Monges's second motion.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Monges once again argues that his detention was unlawful and that the
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evidence Cortez obtained as a result of the detention should have been suppressed. As
we indicated at the outset, we find no error in the trial court's orders denying Monges's
motions to suppress.
A. Legal Principles
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial
court's factual findings, express or implied, when they are supported by substantial
evidence. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal. 4th 354, 362.) We exercise our own
independent judgment in determining, whether, on the facts found, a search or seizure
was lawful. (Ibid.)
With respect to investigative detentions, such as the one that occurred here, the
cases are clear that a police officer's seizure of a person need not be justified by probable
cause to arrest for a crime. (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal. 4th 224, 230 (Souza).) "In
United States v. Cortez [(1981) 449 U.S. 411, 417 & fn. 2], the high court stressed the
importance of taking into account 'the totality of the circumstances' in determining the
propriety of an investigative stop or temporary detention: 'Courts have used a variety of
terms to capture the elusive concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop
a person. Terms like "articulable reasons" and "founded suspicion" are not self-defining;
they fall short of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual situations that
arise. But the essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the
circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into account. Based upon that whole
picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.' [Citation.]
"In United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7, the high court reiterated its
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view that the 'reasonable suspicion' necessary to justify a brief, investigative detention is
a level of suspicion that is 'obviously less demanding than that for probable cause' and
can be established by 'considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of
the evidence.' Thereafter, in Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 330, the United
States Supreme Court characterized 'reasonable suspicion' as a standard less demanding
than probable cause 'not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established
with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish
probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information
that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.'
"From these decisions by the United States Supreme Court we distill this
principle: A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining
officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be
involved in criminal activity." (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 230-231.)
B. Analysis
Here, the information available to officer Cortez was more than sufficient to
justify Monges's detention. In the early morning hours, a vehicle prone to theft was left
in an area known to the officer as a dumping ground for stolen cars. Although the car
had not yet been reported as stolen in the system available to Cortez, Cortez noted
evidence the car had recently been driven, and, most suspiciously, a key had been left in
the car's ignition that did not appear to match the make of the car. This fact suggested to
Cortez the key was a "shaved" key commonly used to steal cars. Each of these facts are
articulable and taken together raised a reasonable suspicion that the car was stolen and
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that Monges, who Cortez had seen leaving the car, was involved in a possible theft.
Contrary to Monges's argument on appeal, given the totality of the circumstances
apparent to Officer Cortez, no more was required to justify Monges's detention. (Souza,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 230-231.)
Although Monges attacks the import of each of the circumstances Cortez relied
upon as unreliable and argues that each circumstance was not by itself particularly
suspicious, he ignores the requirement that we look at the totality of the circumstances
and the fact that in detaining a suspect, Cortez was permitted to act on information that
would not support an arrest or a conviction. (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 230-231.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
IRION, J.
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