C.H. Reynolds Electric v. Powers CA6 ( 2021 )


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  •          Filed 8/24/21 C.H. Reynolds Electric v. Powers CA6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    C.H. REYNOLDS ELECTRIC, INC.,                                       H046554
    (Santa Clara County
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                Super. Ct. No. 17CH007422)
    v.
    GAVIN JOHN POWERS,
    Defendant and Respondent.
    Appellant C.H. Reynolds Electric, Inc. (CHRE) initiated contempt proceedings
    against its former employee, respondent Gavin John Powers,1 after he violated a
    workplace violence restraining order. On appeal, CHRE challenges the trial court’s order
    denying CHRE recovery of security costs from Powers and asserts they are recoverable
    under the governing statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a).2 For
    the reasons we explain below, we affirm the order.
    I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In 2017, CHRE obtained a workplace violence restraining order against Powers,
    who had worked as a foreman for CHRE on a construction project. After Powers later
    violated the 2017 restraining order, CHRE initiated contempt proceedings. In September
    1
    Powers has not participated in this appeal.
    2
    Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
    2017, the trial court found Powers in contempt based on numerous violations of the
    restraining order and stayed imposition of the sentence which, by agreement of the
    parties, was six days in the county jail and a $1,000 fine.
    In July 2018, the trial court again held Powers in contempt, finding he had
    willfully sent texts and e-mails to parties protected by the restraining order. The trial
    court lifted the stay on the 2017 sentence and imposed a modified jail term of five days
    (instead of six) and a $1,000 fine. The trial court also imposed a 15-day jail term and a
    fine of $4,000 for the new contempt violations. The trial court allowed CHRE to seek
    attorney fees and costs under section 1218, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 1218(a)) for
    both contempt proceedings.
    CHRE filed a motion and supporting papers under section 1218(a) seeking, among
    other fees and costs, approximately $30,000 for private security guard expenses
    (hereafter security costs). CHRE argued that it had to retain armed security to protect its
    employees because local law enforcement and the trial court failed to act quickly and
    Powers’s conduct was increasingly unstable. In a declaration, CHRE’s attorney stated
    that “CHRE was forced to incur private security guard and emergency intercom expenses
    in the amount of $29,935.00 because local law enforcement and the Court did not redress
    the contemptuous activity in a speedy manner and it had a duty to provide its employees
    with a safe and secure workplace.” That declaration also attached, among other
    documents, supporting invoices and a 2002 federal OSHA fact sheet regarding workplace
    violence that detailed additional protections an employer could take to secure the
    workplace, including hiring security guards. The motion contended, based on certain
    legislative history of section 1218, the Legislature intended for “an employer prosecuting
    a contempt action to be ‘made whole.’ ”
    On November 16, 2018, following a hearing, the trial court issued the written
    order that is the subject of this appeal. The trial court ordered Powers to pay CHRE
    approximately $4,000 in various court costs and approximately $83,000 in attorney fees.
    2
    However, the trial court rejected CHRE’s request for reimbursement of security costs.
    The trial court stated that, although the claimed costs were “reasonable” in light of
    Powers’s conduct, the costs were “not ‘connected’ sufficiently with the contempt
    proceeding to fall within section 1218(a).” Furthermore, the trial court found that the
    “snippet of somewhat-ambiguous legislative history” suggesting that employers should
    be made whole could not overcome the plain language of section 1218(a) requiring a
    connection to the contempt proceeding. The court therefore declined to order Powers to
    reimburse CHRE for the security costs.
    CHRE filed a notice of appeal of the November 16, 2018 order, asserting it was
    appealing from “[a]n order after judgment under Code of Civil Procedure, § 904.1(a)(2).”
    II. DISCUSSION
    CHRE challenges the trial court’s denial of its request for security costs, which it
    asserts are recoverable under section 1218(a). CHRE argues we should apply de novo
    review to the question whether, on these facts, its security costs were sufficiently
    connected to the contempt proceedings to be recoverable. CHRE maintains the security
    costs were logically related to the contempt proceedings as the company had to incur
    them due to delays by law enforcement and courts in responding to Powers’s violations
    of the restraining order.
    A. Appealability
    In its statement of appealability (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(B)),
    CHRE contends section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1), authorizes its appeal from the partial
    denial of its motion for attorney fees and costs. CHRE acknowledges that a “ ‘judgment
    of contempt’ is nonappealable” (see § 1222). However, it asserts that the November 16,
    2018 order issued in the contempt proceedings is appealable as a final judgment, relying
    primarily on Los Angeles Times v. Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority (2001) 
    88 Cal.App.4th 1381
    , 1388 (LA Times). Alternatively, CHRE requests that we treat its
    appeal as a writ proceeding.
    3
    A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there is (1) an
    appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com.
    (2001) 
    25 Cal.4th 688
    , 696 (Griset).) Because the existence of an appealable judgment
    or order “is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal” (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 
    8 Cal.4th 121
    , 126), a reviewing court must resolve any doubts regarding finality of a
    judgment or appealability of an order before turning to the merits of the appeal. (Ibid.)
    Whether a trial court’s order is appealable is determined by statute. (Griset, 
    supra,
    25 Cal.4th at p. 696.) Section 904.1 provides the main statutory authorization for civil
    appeals. (Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2004) 
    121 Cal.App.4th 1371
    , 1377.) It states in
    relevant part that an appeal may be taken from a final judgment (§ 904.1 subd. (a)(1)).3
    Based on the circumstances here, we conclude that the order at issue in this case
    fits under the rubric of an appealable final judgment. In LA Times, the appellate court
    concluded it had jurisdiction under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1), over an order
    denying attorney fees incurred in a California Public Records Act lawsuit, even though
    the underlying judgment was not itself appealable. (LA Times, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at
    pp. 1384, 1388–1389.) The Court of Appeal in LA Times reasoned that the attorney fees
    order was appealable because, “[n]othing remains for future consideration, and no other
    opportunity exists for appellate review” and it “is therefore ‘properly viewed as a final
    judgment and hence appealable as such’ under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1).” (Id. at
    p. 1389; see also Estate of Miramontes-Najera (2004) 
    118 Cal.App.4th 750
    , 755.) We
    reach the same conclusion here.
    With respect to the trial court’s order denying CHRE the security costs, nothing
    remains to be adjudicated, and there exists no other avenue for appellate review. While a
    3
    As CHRE points out in its briefing, CHRE’s notice of appeal relied on another
    listed ground in section 904.1—section 904.1, subd. (a)(2)—that applies to an order made
    after an appealable judgment. CHRE asserts that its reliance on that ground was in error
    because contempt judgments are nonappealable. We agree and therefore do not address
    this ground further.
    4
    judgment or order of contempt is not directly appealable (see § 1222; Bermudez v.
    Municipal Court (1992) 
    1 Cal.4th 855
    , 861, fn. 5), we are not faced with an order of
    contempt, but rather an order setting costs and attorney fees. We further note that the
    reasons for prompt writ review (rather than a direct appeal) of a judgment or order of
    contempt are not at issue here. (Cf. In re M.R. (2013) 
    220 Cal.App.4th 49
    , 65 [“A
    challenge to a judgment of contempt requires writ review because it is vital that an order
    of incarceration be reviewed promptly.”].) We are therefore satisfied that the order under
    these circumstances is an appealable final judgment, and we have jurisdiction to review
    it.
    B. Analysis
    Turning to the merits of the appeal, we do not agree with CHRE that the trial court
    committed reversible error in declining to award the claimed security costs under section
    1218(a). That statute provides: “[A] person who is subject to a court order as a party to
    the action . . . who is adjudged guilty of contempt for violating that court order may be
    ordered to pay to the party initiating the contempt proceeding the reasonable attorney’s
    fees and costs incurred by this party in connection with the contempt proceeding.”
    CHRE asserts we should review the trial court’s conclusion de novo. Although we
    have not located a published decision articulating the standard of review for a trial court’s
    order under section 1218(a), we reject CHRE’s argument that its challenge presents a
    pure question of law. Instead, we conclude we should review the order for abuse of
    discretion. Notably, the statute uses the word “may” to describe the trial court’s authority
    to order costs and therefore invests discretion in the court. (See Chaaban v. Wet Seal,
    Inc. (2012) 
    203 Cal.App.4th 49
    , 52 [holding, in context of order denying motion to tax
    costs and allowing costs under section 1033.5, “[t]o the extent the statute grants the court
    discretion in allowing or denying costs or in determining amounts, we reverse only if
    there has been a ‘ “clear abuse of discretion” and a “miscarriage of justice” ’ ”].)
    5
    We analogize our review of a costs order under section 1218(a) to an award for
    attorney fees under that statute. “ ‘ “ ‘ “An order granting or denying an award of
    attorney fees is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review;
    however, the ‘determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and
    costs have been met is a question of law.’ . . . ” ’ ” . . . An issue of law concerning
    entitlement to attorney fees is reviewed de novo.’ ” (Rickley v. Goodfriend (2012) 
    207 Cal.App.4th 1528
    , 1533.) With respect to what constitutes an abuse of discretion,
    “ ‘[d]iscretion is abused whenever, in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason,
    all of the circumstances before it being considered. The burden is on the party
    complaining to establish an abuse of discretion, and unless a clear case of abuse is shown
    and unless there has been a miscarriage of justice a reviewing court will not substitute its
    opinion and thereby divest the trial court of its discretionary power.’ ” (Denham v.
    Superior Court (1970) 
    2 Cal.3d 557
    , 566.)
    With these principles in mind and having carefully reviewed the record, we
    conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. There is no indication that the trial
    court misunderstood the relevant law or believed it generally lacked authority to grant
    security costs. We disagree with CHRE’s contention that the trial court “improperly
    interpreted the statutory phrase ‘in connection with contempt proceedings.’ ” Under the
    permissive terms of section 1218(a), the trial court was not required to order Powers to
    pay any costs incurred by CHRE, regardless whether security costs are theoretically
    recoverable under the statute. Rather, “the Legislature intended to authorize a trial court
    to, in its discretion, require a contemner to pay the complainant’s reasonable attorney fees
    and costs incurred in connection with the contempt proceeding.” (Goold v. Superior
    Court (2006) 
    145 Cal.App.4th 1
    , 10.)
    CHRE argues it had to incur these security costs because local law enforcement
    failed to “properly” enforce the restraining order and Powers posed a “credible threat.”
    But whether Powers should be ordered to pay them is a question the statute commits to
    6
    the discretion of the trial court. Although another trial court may well have reached a
    different decision, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that the
    security costs were too attenuated from the contempt proceedings in this case to justify
    ordering Powers to pay for them. While we are sympathetic to the security concerns
    faced by CHRE, we cannot conclude the trial court erred. We therefore affirm its order.
    III. DISPOSITION
    The appeal from the November 16, 2018 order is affirmed.
    7
    ______________________________________
    Danner, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    ____________________________________
    Greenwood, P.J.
    ____________________________________
    Grover, J.
    H046554
    C.H. Reynolds Electric, Inc. v. Powers
    

Document Info

Docket Number: H046554

Filed Date: 8/24/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/24/2021