In re M.S. CA4/2 ( 2022 )

Filed 5/5/22 In re M.S. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re M.S., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E077631
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. RIJ1600053)
v. OPINION
C.H. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Cheryl C. Murphy, Judge.
Affirmed.
Elena S. Min, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant C.H.
Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant I.S.
1
Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Prabhath D.
Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
On August 2, 2021, the juvenile court terminated parental rights to M.S. under
Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26 and selected adoption as the permanent
plan. On appeal, C.H. (mother) and I.S. (father) contend the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception applies to the termination of their rights. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Because the record fails to demonstrate the kind of deep bond
required to come within that exception, we conclude the court properly found that it does
not apply. We therefore affirm.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS
A. Mother’s Background.
Mother completed the 11th grade but did not graduate from high school. Mother
has three older children (M.S.’s half brothers).2 In a prior dependency action initiated by
the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department), mother
failed to reunify with M.S.’s half brothers.3
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.
2 M.S.’s half brothers are not subjects of the underlying dependency case or this
appeal; they are mentioned where relevant or for context.
3 The family was also the subject of a prior child welfare referral in January 2014
based on law enforcement’s discovery of methamphetamine and packing materials in the
family home, and its uncleanliness. The referral was closed after the father (whose name
was not disclosed in the record) said he had made a mistake trying to make money
illegally to provide a better life for his family.
2
In 2019, mother became pregnant with M.S. She began prenatal care at 12 weeks,
but she had limited visits with her doctor and was homeless. At the start of the Covid-19
pandemic, she moved in with her mother (the grandmother).
B. Detention.
M.S. was born in July 2020. She came to the attention of the department when it
received an immediate response referral from hospital personnel indicating mother had
tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine at delivery and had not been able
to respond to M.S.’s needs, requiring M.S. be moved to the neonatal intensive care unit.
Mother acknowledged her use of methamphetamine for several years and admitted that
she had used two days earlier. She was encouraged to visit and bond with the baby, but
she never left her room. She identified M.S.’s father but refused to provide identifiable
information.
The department visited the grandmother’s home. She stated she had legal
guardianship over two of M.S.’s half brothers, and mother had been staying with them
since mid-March 2020; she denied observing mother being under the influence. Mother’s
room at the grandmother’s home had a twin-size bed, a bassinet, diapers, and baby
clothes. The department identified the grandmother as the placement home for M.S.
given her home was already certified for placement for the older half brothers.
On July 10, 2020, the department filed a dependency petition under section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support); it was later
amended to correct the case number. The petition alleged: (1) M.S. was at substantial
risk of serious physical harm due to mother’s chronic and unresolved history of abusing
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controlled substances (amphetamines & methamphetamine) including at the time of
M.S.’s birth; (2) mother lacked resources to provide the necessary care for M.S.;
(3) mother had a transient lifestyle; (4) mother failed to benefit from prior reunification
services regarding M.S.’s half brothers, in that they were removed from her care; and
(5) father’s whereabouts were unknown.
On July 13, 2020, M.S. was detained, and the juvenile court ordered the following:
(1) reunification services, supervised visitation, and random drug testing for mother;
(2) M.S. be placed with the grandmother when appropriate; (3) mother was not to reside
with the grandmother; and (4) father was to be located. Mother confirmed the identity of
the biological father as I.S.
C. Jurisdiction/Disposition Reports and Hearing.
In the jurisdiction/disposition report filed July 29, 2020, the department
recommended that the juvenile court deny family reunification services to mother
(§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10), (b)(13)) and father (§ 361.5, subds. (a), (b)(1)) and set a
section 366.26 hearing to establish a permanent plan of adoption within 120 days. The
grandmother was considered for placement of the child, but it was on hold due to
concerns regarding an adult in her home. Mother refused to relinquish her parental rights
and stated that she would address all concerns and work with the department to reunify
with the child. Because she had failed to engage in services during her pregnancy, and
she had not enrolled in any treatment services since giving birth, the social worker opined
that “it is unknown if the mother will be able to adequately address her substance abuse
issues and be able to provide the child with a safe and stable home.”
4
According to the jurisdiction/disposition addendum report filed September 4,
2020, the department maintained its prior recommendations. The foster mother asked to
combine the two, hourly visits between mother and the child into one two-hour visit
because mother had difficulty arriving on time. Mother was not opposed to the change
because she was beginning substance abuse treatment sessions and was searching for
employment. Nonetheless, mother’s visitation remained inconsistent. On August 26,
2020, the social worker conducted an unannounced visit at the grandmother’s home. The
social worker opined that the grandmother was not being truthful about the number of
people living there or her grandsons’ use of marijuana. Mother was informed that the
department would not move forward with placement until the grandmother set boundaries
for extended relatives’ occupancy of her home and a new evaluation was completed. The
department remained unable to verify mother’s housing because she failed to provide her
current address. Father’s whereabouts remained unknown.
A contested jurisdiction hearing was held on September 10, 2020; neither parent
appeared. The juvenile court sustained the allegations in the amended petition and set a
contested disposition hearing.
According to an addendum report filed September 23, 2020, the department
maintained its prior recommendations based on mother’s history of chronic drug use,
failure to provide evidence of housing and appropriate provisions for the child, and
failure to enroll in a substance abuse treatment program, along with father’s absence from
the child’s life. The social worker spoke with the child’s caregiver who stated that, as of
September 18, mother had missed two weekly visits; however, when visitation occurred it
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went well. M.S. no longer experienced withdrawal issues. The caregiver was interested
in long-term placement. Mother had not enrolled in a substance abuse program and had
failed to respond to the social worker’s attempts to contact her.
On September 28, 2020, the juvenile court removed physical custody from the
parents, denied reunification services to mother under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)
and (b)(13), denied reunification services to father under section 361.5, subdivision (a),
and set a section 366.26 hearing.
D. Section 388 Petition, Section 366.26 Report, and Addendum Reports.
On December 28, 2020, mother filed a section 388 petition requesting the child be
placed with the “grandmother as a direct placement, as that is the mother’s preference
and a hearing under . . . [section] 361.3 is warranted.” Mother claimed that this
placement was in the child’s best interests because she “would have the opportunity to be
raised with siblings.” The hearing on the petition was set for January 28, 2021.
According to the section 366.26 report filed January 14, 2021, the department
recommended termination of parental rights and a permanent plan of adoption.
Following M.S.’s birth, she went through a few weeks of methamphetamine withdrawal
symptoms; however, she was now healthy and developmentally on track. On December
4, 2020, she was moved to a permanent adoptive placement, where she “appear[ed] very
engaged with the adoptive parents and their children.” On December 30, 2020, the social
worker spoke with the grandmother who presented with slurred speech and was unable to
respond fully to questions regarding who was staying in her home. Although she had
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moved to a new home, she had not replied to the department’s attempts to schedule the
annual assessment of her home required for placement of M.S.’s half brothers.
The social worker described mother’s visitation as appropriate, albeit “sporadic,”
with no concerns regarding her behavior or sobriety. Since the child had been placed in
an adoptive home on December 4, 2020, mother had ignored the department’s requests to
schedule visitation and offered no information regarding the services she had completed.
The department expressed concern that M.S. would be at a high risk of abuse or neglect if
returned to mother’s care.
In the addendum to the section 366.26 report filed January 15, 2021, the
department maintained its prior recommendations and attached the preliminary adoption
assessment for M.S.’s caregivers. The caregivers are in their early 40’s, have one
biologically child (age 11), two adopted children (ages 7 & 5), can meet M.S.’s physical,
emotional, and academic needs, and want to provide her with a loving and stable home.
M.S. was bonded and attached to the caregivers and their children.
On January 22, 2021, the department filed a report in response to mother’s
section 388 petition and as an addendum to the section 366.26 report; the department
recommended denying the section 388 petition, terminating parental rights, and adoption
as the permanent plan. The department reported the grandmother was “not being
truthful” about the individuals living in her home. According to the social worker,
mother denied living with the grandmother but stated that she did not know the Rialto
address where she was staying. Regarding father, mother initially stated that she “rarely
sees him or talks with him.” However, when questioned about the “hickey” on her neck,
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she indicated father had made it and admitted they “sometimes get together” and “hang
out at the park.” On January 13, 2021, father called the department to schedule an
interview. He was provided notice of the section 366.26 hearing and was informed the
social worker would contact him. Father failed to answer the social worker’s repeated
calls and messages.
On January 28, 2021, mother requested a contested section 366.26 hearing. The
juvenile court set a date (Mar. 23, 2021) for the combined sections 388/366.26 hearing.
The court ordered a DNA/paternity test for the child and father and authorized visitation
upon establishing paternity. Sibling visitation was authorized on the condition no one
was under the influence of marijuana. The parents’ educational rights and
developmental-services decisions for M.S. were transferred to her caregivers.
On March 5, 2021, another addendum report for the section 366.26 hearing was
filed. Between January 14 and February 26, 2021, the department made 14 attempts to
contact father to schedule a paternity test; however, he never answered the calls or
responded to the social worker’s messages. Father never asked for visitation or made
himself available for paternity testing. Mother failed to provide any information as to the
services she had completed, failed to consistently visit M.S., and was “not forthcoming as
to her relationship with the father and her current living situation.” The department,
therefore, maintained that if M.S. was returned to mother’s care, she “would be at high
risk of abuse and neglect.” Regarding placement of the child with relatives, the
department was only aware of the grandmother, and her home could not be assessed due
to a pending investigation into allegations of general neglect based on marijuana usage.
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The social worker stated that both mother and the grandmother “have shown a pattern of
dishonesty with the [d]epartment.” As for M.S., she was thriving in her current
placement, and her caregivers were committed to adopting her. The department
reiterated its request to deny mother’s section 388 petition, terminate parental rights, and
select adoption as the permanent plan.
On March 11, 2021, mother provided her current mailing address, and father’s
address was listed as the county jail. The combined sections 388/366.26 hearing was
continued to April 26, 2021.
In the addendum report filed April 21, 2021, the department maintained its prior
recommendations. It noted a mutual bond between M.S. and her caregivers. Regarding
placement with the grandmother, the investigation of her home was inconclusive and
required further staffing to determine whether it would be appropriate. During
unannounced visits to the home, mother was present on three separate occasions and
appeared to be living there. Father was arrested for grand theft on March 4, 2021, and
detained in the county jail. No DNA testing had been undertaken because father was
released on March 22, and the social worker was unable to locate him at his address on
file or via his cell phone.
On April 26, 2021, father appeared at the combined sections 388/366.26 hearing,
and the juvenile court granted another continuance (to June 7) to complete DNA testing.
Father provided his current mailing address.
In an addendum report filed June 2, 2021, the department stated that (1) approval
of the grandmother’s home was not complete, (2) father had not submitted to DNA
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testing, and (3) mother “hung up the phone” when the social worker called to inquire
about her attendance at the services provided by the department. On June 7, the
combined sections 388/366.26 hearing was continued to July 9.
Neither mother nor father appeared on July 9, 2021; father was incarcerated
following his arrest for grand theft, mail theft, and drug-related offenses. The juvenile
court again continued the combined sections 388/366.26 hearing, ordered the sheriff’s
department to cooperate with the department to allow DNA testing of father, and ordered
that father be physically present at the continued hearing.
According to the section 366.3 postpermanency status review report filed July 14,
2021, mother was living in Rialto with a cousin, remained in a relationship with father,
was working full time at a department store, and was working through her postpartum
depression with the help of her safety network and friends. Mother was attentive to M.S.
during weekly supervised visits, and there were no identified concerns. Nonetheless, the
department recommended decreasing visits to once a month due to the concurrent plan of
adoption. Father was incarcerated and had not made himself available for an interview or
visits with M.S. M.S. was healthy and very active, attached to her caregivers, and
continued to thrive in her placement, which was stable and suitable to her needs. The
department opined that it was in M.S.’s best interest to remain with her caregivers, who
wanted to adopt her.
E. Combined Sections 388/366.26 Hearing.
On July 27, 2021, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on mother’s section 388
petition. The grandmother testified that it would be in M.S.’s best interest to live with the
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grandmother because the child’s “brothers are there. It’s a loving home. We all can’t
wait until she’s there. She will be well provided for.” The grandmother was willing to
adopt M.S. and abide by the court’s directive regarding who may visit her. The
grandmother has 26 grandchildren and lives in a two-bedroom apartment with M.S.’s
half brothers and an 18-month-old great-grandchild. Another great-grandchild visits
three-to-four days each week. The grandmother had only seen M.S. once since her birth.
The matter was continued to August 2.
On August 2, 2021, mother’s counsel argued that the grandmother—guardian of
M.S.’s two older half brothers—was ready, and her home had been approved for the
placement of M.S. Given the preference that a child be placed with siblings, mother
requested that M.S. be placed with the grandmother. Both county counsel and the child’s
counsel opposed the request on the grounds the home was not appropriate, and the
grandmother was unable to provide appropriate supervision. More specifically, counsel
pointed out the department’s concerns about the grandmother’s candidness regarding who
was actually residing in her home, including an adult who was not to be left alone with
any children, and her failure to provide the name of the person who would watch M.S.
while the grandmother was at work. Counsel also noted that (1) some family members
had admitted to using marijuana in the home, (2) the evidence suggested the grandmother
“allows mother to have unsupervised visitation,” (3) the grandmother did not notice that
mother was under the influence prior to giving birth to M.S., and (4) the grandmother
never raised the issue of visitation when she was present in court, despite her claim that
she made several requests to the social workers. County counsel argued that the
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grandmother had not established any type of bond with M.S., and M.S.’s counsel argued
the child should remain with the current caregivers with whom she had bonded and where
she had thrived. Mother’s counsel reiterated that mother had filed the section 388
petition, and the grandmother should not be “penalized for having a number of
grandchildren [and] great-grandchildren,” and for “facilitat[ing] contact” with mother.
After reviewing the evidence presented, the juvenile court recognized the
department’s initial intent to place M.S. with the grandmother but noted that “some series
of delays and issues” ultimately prevented such placement. When the child’s placement
changed in December 2020, mother filed the section 388 petition. The court continued
the hearing on the petition and ordered the department to investigate whether the
grandmother’s home could be approved for placement. The court noted that the
department’s concerns that persisted “for the past year regarding maternal grandmother’s
house composition and truthfulness in relaying information” prevented the child’s
placement with the grandmother, and there had been no change in circumstance. The
court added that if it did see a change, “the only change would be that now maternal
grandmother’s home is approved conditionally.” After finding that it was not in the
child’s best interest to change placement, the court denied mother’s petition.
Proceeding with the section 366.26 hearing, the department requested the juvenile
court order a permanent plan of adoption for M.S. Mother’s counsel asked the court to
apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1)(B)(i) and select a plan of guardianship. Father read a letter he had written. He
explained that he was afraid to take a paternity test because his addiction to
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methamphetamine made him think mother was unfaithful to him, and he was “terrified to
find out the truth.” Father’s counsel asked the court to allow father a chance to reunify
with M.S. or select a less permanent plan such as legal guardianship.
The juvenile court found that mother had met the first prong (regular visitation)
but not the second (that M.S. would benefit from continuing the parent-child
relationship), and neither parent met the burden necessary to apply the beneficial parent-
child relationship exception. Thus, it terminated their parental rights and ordered
adoption as the permanent plan.
II. DISCUSSION
Mother argues the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the beneficial parent-
child relationship exception to the termination of her parental rights under section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).4 We disagree.
At a permanency planning hearing, once the juvenile court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that a child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time, the
court is required to terminate parental rights and select adoption as the permanent plan,
unless the parent shows that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child
under one of several statutory exceptions. (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308,
1314.) One exception is the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Last year, our Supreme Court examined this exception and held that a
4 Father joins in mother’s argument. He also asserts, “if the judgment terminating
the mother’s parental rights is reversed, the judgment terminating the father’s parental
rights must be reversed as well.”
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drug-addicted parent’s failure to succeed in drug rehabilitation programs and continuing
struggles with addiction did not, on its own, disqualify the parent from being accorded
the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614,
637-641 (Caden C.).) In other words, unless the factors that led to the dependency in the
first place also bear on the question of whether a child would benefit from continuing the
relationship and be harmed, on balance, by losing it, they are irrelevant. (Id. at p. 638.)
To show the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies, the parent
bears the burden of establishing three elements: (1) “regular visitation and contact with
the child,” (2) “the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent,”
and (3) “that terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 636; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) If all three elements have been
established, the exception applies, and the court should select a permanent plan other than
adoption. (Caden C., at pp. 636-637.) “Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only
after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child’s needs, it is only
in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the
Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350, disapproved on another ground in Caden C., at p. 636, fn. 5.)
In Caden C., the Supreme Court clarified that a “‘hybrid’” standard of review
applies to the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-641.) The first two elements are primarily factual, reviewed for
substantial evidence. (Id. at pp. 639-640.) On the third element, the “court makes the
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assessment by weighing the harm of losing the relationship against the benefits of
placement in a new, adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 640.) Thus, any factual determinations
underlying the juvenile court’s evaluation would also be reviewed for substantial
evidence, but the court’s ultimate balancing of the detriment of severing the parent-child
relationship against the benefits of adoption is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at
pp. 640-641.)
In the present case, there is no question mother established the first element of the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception, as she consistently visited M.S. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Thus, the issue before us is whether she met her burden on the other
elements of the exception. We do not agree the evidence favoring her position bound the
juvenile court to find that the exception applied or that this is one of the extraordinary
cases where the exception should have been applied. Contrary to mother’s suggestion,
the quality of her visits (mother focused on M.S.’s needs, M.S. was happy to see mother
and fell asleep in her arms) does not lead inevitably to a finding that the beneficial parent-
child relationship exception applies.
To prove the second element, mother needed to show that M.S. has a “substantial,
positive, [and] emotional attachment to [her]—the kind of attachment implying that the
child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 636.) In other words, was the attachment “significant” such that it conferred more than
“some incidental benefit” to the child. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575;
see Caden C. at pp. 632-633.) According to Caden C., “the focus is the child. And the
relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the
15
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect
of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ [Citation.] . . .
[C]ourts often consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their
parents. [Citations.] Doing so properly focuses the inquiry on the child, even as courts
must remain mindful that rarely do ‘[p]arent-child relationships’ conform to an entirely
consistent pattern. [Citations.] Certainly, it is not necessary . . . to calibrate a precise
‘quantitative measurement of the specific amount of “comfort, nourishment or physical
care” [the parent] provided during [his or] her weekly visits.’ [Citation.] . . . [O]ften
expert psychologists who have observed the child and parent and can synthesize others’
observations will be an important source of information about the psychological
importance of the relationship for the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 632-
633.)
According to mother, the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard in
assessing this element. (See, e.g., In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1228 [The
court improperly relied “on the fact that the parents had not completed their reunification
plans and were unable to care for the children based on their long-term and continued
substance abuse” rather than “examine how the parents’ continued substance abuse
impacted the nature of the parent-child relationship.”]; In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
261, 271 [“The court’s express findings that father did not act like a parent demonstrate it
considered factors which Caden C. has explained are inappropriate in determining
whether the parental-benefit exception applies.”].) At the hearing, the court stated, “But
in looking at mother’s role as a parent, day-to-day contact from a parent standpoint in
16
terms of the minor child, I feel the second prong is lacking. I do believe that the best
interest of the minor is in her continued placement with the permanent plan of adoption.”
Considering the court’s comments, it appears that the court relied on a factor—parental
role—which is no longer appropriate. (See B.D., at p. 1230 [reversing order terminating
parental rights because it was unclear how much weight the court placed on its
conclusion that the parents did not occupy a “parental role” in their children’s lives];
In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 864-865 [same]; D.M., at pp. 270-271 [same].)
Nonetheless, mother failed to carry her burden of establishing the kind of attachment
necessary to find that “the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
Under the circumstances of this case, mother had a very short window (the first
year of M.S.’s life) in which to develop a relationship with her child. M.S. was detained
soon after birth and removed from mother’s care. By the time of the section 366.26
hearing, she was almost 13 months old and had never lived with mother other than their
time in the hospital during the days following her birth. M.S. was too young to comment
on her relationship with mother and, thus, it was up to mother to create the bond
necessary to establish a beneficial parent-child relationship. Since mother’s visitation did
not become consistent until January 2021—visits during the first six months of M.S.’s
life were “sporadic”—the time available to create such a relationship was approximately
seven months. While mother may have bonded to M.S. during this time, when evaluating
the benefit of the parent-child relationship, the focus is on the child. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) Viewing the benefit of the parent-child relationship through M.S.’s
17
eyes, we conclude there was no substantial evidence to support a finding that she has a
“substantial, positive, [and] emotional attachment” to mother such that she (M.S.) would
benefit from continuing the relationship. (Caden C., at p. 636.)
Even if we assume mother did establish the first and second elements of the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception, she failed to show that the harm caused by
terminating mother’s parental rights outweighed the benefits of providing M.S. a
permanent adoptive home.5 At this stage of the proceedings, the court “must decide
whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the
benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 632.) In other words, “[w]hen the relationship with a parent is so important to the
child that the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination
would be ‘detrimental to the child due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship with a
parent.” (Id. at pp. 633-634.)
Here, there is no evidence that M.S. would suffer any harm from terminating her
relationship with mother. M.S. was thriving in her caregivers’ home where she appeared
to be “well adjusted.” She was one year old, had spent her entire life outside mother’s
care and had never exhibited any signs the separation from mother caused her distress.
5 Mother does not address the third element of the exception, whether termination
of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the child, in any detail. Rather,
mother asserts that the juvenile court never considered this element because it relied on
an inappropriate factor in the application of the second element. The court later stated
that “[t]ermination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the minor in that none
of the exceptions contained in WIC Section 366.26(c)(1)(A and/or B) are applicable in
this case.”
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And, while she appeared happy to see mother and fell asleep in her arms,6 a loving and
friendly relationship is “‘not enough to outweigh the sense of security and belonging an
adoptive home would provide.’” (In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 938.) At
best, the record shows the child had positive interactions with mother, not a “substantial,
positive, [and] emotional attachment” to her. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
Unfortunately for mother, an affectionate relationship with a young child is not what the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception was enacted to protect. We do not doubt
mother’s love for her child, but the record contains no evidence that adoption would be
detrimental to M.S.
In short, mother failed to carry her burden of establishing every element of the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception. She therefore has not shown that the
juvenile court erred when it terminated her parental rights.
6 Mother asserts that M.S.’s strong attachment to her (mother) is evidenced by the
department’s recommendation to reduce her visits to “once a month due to [the]
concurrent plan for [M.S.] being adoption at this time. [She] needs to continue to bond
with her [caregivers] without causing additional confusion for the child with having
weekly visits with the birth mother.” However, the department’s recommendation was
not based on a strong attachment between mother and M.S. Rather, it was based on the
need to not confuse M.S.
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III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
We concur:
MILLER
J.
CODRINGTON
J.
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