In re S.C. CA4/1 ( 2015 )

Filed 12/21/15 In re S.C. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re S.C., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
D068598
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. J519200)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
K.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Ronald L.
Johnson, Judge. Affirmed.
Daniel G. Rooney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County
Counsel, and Emily K. Harlan, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
K.C. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court's judgment declaring her minor
daughter, S.C., a dependent and placing her with the maternal grandparents out-of-state,
contending the court abused its discretion because the placement impeded reunification.
The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) maintains the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion, given the circumstances of the case and the
relative placement factors under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.3.1 We agree
and affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
S.C. was born in New Jersey in December 2004 to Mother and her husband A.C.
A.C. died in an automobile accident in 2006. The Agency opened S.C.'s dependency
case when she was 10 years old, following an incident during which Escondido,
California police found Mother and S.C. walking along a road, with S.C. covered in a bed
sheet. S.C told the police they had traveled to California from Chicago for a festival one
week prior. She reported, among other things, that she had only showered one time all
1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise
noted.
Mother also appealed "7/30/15 - all orders," but asserts no claim of error as to any
other order. Accordingly, we deem that portion of her appeal abandoned. (In re Sade C.
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.) S.C. filed a letter brief with this court indicating she joins in
the Agency's arguments. S.C.'s father is deceased.
2
week, ate once per day and had no place to sleep. She also said Mother believed she was
Mother Nature. The police determined Mother could not formulate a plan for her and
S.C.'s care, and they placed Mother on a section 5150 hold, pursuant to which she was
admitted to the hospital.2 S.C. was detained at Polinsky Children's Center (Polinsky).
The Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition on S.C.'s behalf, on the grounds Mother
could not provide regular care for S.C. due to her mental illness.3
Social worker Shari Tharp prepared the detention report. S.C. grew up in New
Jersey. She recalled living with her grandparents when she was seven years old because
her " 'mom was acting funny' " and " 'doing the same things she's doing now.' " She
expressed a desire to return to Chicago, where she had her bed and clothes, but also said
she did not want to return to Mother's care. In a follow-up telephone conversation, S.C.
told Tharp she did not want to attend the detention hearing, but wanted the judge to know
she wanted to live with her aunt and did not want to go back with Mother. She then
called back and said she did want to go to court because she was concerned Mother
would lie and wanted the judge to understand she did not want to return to Mother's care.
When Tharp asked Mother about her about family, in connection with safety
planning, she said they were not allowed near S.C. She indicated she had two sisters and
2 Section 5150 permits peace officers and specified mental health professionals to
take a person into custody if there is probable cause to believe the person is a danger to
herself or others. (City of San Diego v. Kevin B. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 933, 936;
§ 5150, subd. (a).)
3 The Agency initially brought a second count based on S.C. being without support
due to Mother's hospitalization. This count was dismissed.
3
did not get along with them. She claimed her father was controlling and hit her for
discipline and said she spoke with a social worker as a minor, but " 'guess[es] [she] didn't
give them enough information.' " Mother would not answer all of Tharp's questions
about her childhood and Tharp found her evasive. Mother wanted to move to San Diego
because everybody was healthy and it was a better environment. She also realized she
needed to start over again and told Tharp " 'something is not right' " and " 'something was
dark.' " When Tharp asked why she did not return to Chicago to pack, she indicated her
ex-boyfriend robbed her house, killed or hurt her cat and took her dog to a shelter, which
she knew because she prayed and got answers. She stated she refused to return to
Chicago.
The maternal grandparents told Tharp they cared for S.C. for seven of her 10
years. They first obtained a guardianship through New Jersey family court when S.C.
was approximately two years old and relinquished it when Mother was in a better
position to care for S.C.4 They also had custody of S.C. when she was removed from
Mother's care at age five and during the dependency case that followed.5 Mother was
able to reunify approximately two years later. One year after that, Mother left New
Jersey with S.C. and ended contact with the family. The maternal grandparents obtained
4 S.C.'s New Jersey child welfare history reflects Mother recovered custody "with
the support of the [maternal grandparents] after receiving services for her issues at that
time." The history was attached to the addendum report, discussed post.
5 The record suggests the remaining portion of the seven years encompassed times
when Mother (and her husband, for a period of time after S.C.'s birth) also lived with
them.
4
a family court visitation order, but were unable to visit because Mother had left the state
and refused to communicate. They were willing to care for S.C. and were concerned
about her safety and well-being. Tharp also spoke with one of the two maternal aunts,
who indicated she and her parents were available to care for S.C. and that her sister also
was interested in helping.6
At the detention hearing on June 3, Mother made a request that S.C. be detained
with her pending trial, to which S.C.'s counsel objected. County counsel asked if the
Agency could begin an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) process
for the maternal grandparents and a maternal aunt. The court ordered S.C. detained at
Polinsky (or other placements upon notice) and directed the Agency to evaluate relatives
for placement and support. The court also ordered liberal, supervised visitation. The
Agency noted S.C. did not wish to visit Mother at this time, but would do its best to
encourage visits.7
In the jurisdiction/disposition report, the Agency recommended placement in a
licensed foster home and continuing supervised visitation. Mother's proposed case plan
6 The maternal grandparents also reported a child welfare referral for Mother
herself, involving a situation where she bruised her thigh on a bedpost, but told a
classmate her father hit her. Social workers investigated and Mother admitted the bruise
was from the bedpost. The maternal grandfather denied physical abuse of Mother. The
maternal aunt with whom Tharp spoke acknowledged physical discipline was used in the
household, but also denied abuse and stated they were a "loving, happy family."
7 The juvenile court also found temporary jurisdiction at the detention hearing,
pending an inquiry under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
to determine whether Illinois wished to take jurisdiction. At a subsequent hearing, the
juvenile court noted the Illinois court had declined jurisdiction and confirmed that it had
jurisdiction.
5
included counseling, a psychiatric/psychological evaluation, parenting education, dual
diagnosis substance abuse treatment, substance abuse testing and supervised visits. The
report also provided additional information on Mother's whereabouts and visitation
efforts, as well as S.C.'s wishes.
On June 10, Mother advised Tharp she still planned to move to San Diego, but
was trying to decide if she would return to Chicago to make preparations or stay in San
Diego longer and try to locate housing. On June 17, Mother told Tharp by telephone that
she had returned to Chicago. She still wanted to move to San Diego, but thought it was
more logical and a better financial plan to pack and secure housing before returning. She
also wanted S.C. to return to Chicago until they could move to California. Tharp asked
why she had not returned initially, so she could pack and S.C. could finish the school
year. Mother said she had not felt safe, because she thought her boyfriend was in her
home. When Tharp asked why she had not asked for police assistance, Mother said she
had lost her phone, ran out of money and had a bad couple of days.
Mother made repeated efforts throughout June 2015 to communicate with S.C.,
but S.C. refused to see or speak with her. At one point, Mother wrote a letter and
attempted to leave it with clothing and other items; S.C. refused to take them, but agreed
to let Tharp read parts of the letter over the telephone.
S.C. told Tharp she wanted to tell the judge about how Mother treated her and
reiterated she did not want to live with her again. S.C. also wrote a letter to the judge,
stating she did not feel safe with Mother, did feel safe with her grandparents, and that
Mother had abused her and she wanted to share some stories about what Mother had
6
done. A maternal aunt had visited over a weekend and S.C. was excited and happy to be
visiting with her extended family. Tharp also reached S.C.'s paternal grandparents in
New York; they were available to care for S.C. if needed, and if not, were interested in
being involved as grandparents.
The juvenile court held the initial jurisdictional and disposition hearing on
June 23. S.C.'s counsel stated she still wanted to live with her maternal grandparents.
Mother's counsel requested ICPC reviews for Illinois, explaining she lived in Illinois,
needed a backup plan to permit visits if they were unsuccessful at trial and intended to
stay if they could get an ICPC. Her counsel stated if they could not get the ICPC, she
would "have no choice but to move back to California if she wants to reunify . . . , since
she needs to visit on a regular basis." The court deferred the Illinois ICPC request;
confirmed its prior order for liberal, supervised visits; and noted the Agency's duty of
good faith and diligence to carry it out.
The Agency's addendum report recommended S.C. be placed with the maternal
grandparents upon receipt of an approved ICPC and provided further information on
Mother's services and plans. On July 9, Tharp provided her with service referrals in
Chicago and San Diego, and referrals for housing, food and other resources in San Diego.
On July 16, Mother told Tharp she still wished to move to San Diego, but would stay in
Chicago if she could not find a place soon. She explained she was getting a driver's
license in Chicago, just became familiar with the city, and was thinking it might be best
to stay for reunification and possibly relocate later to San Diego. She did not want S.C.
7
placed with relatives in New Jersey or New York because, if and when S.C. decided to be
in contact with her again, distance would make it difficult.
A New Jersey social worker informed Tharp she approved the ICPC placement for
the maternal grandparents, found they "historically cared for this child for a good portion
of her life," and believed it would be in S.C.'s best interest to return to that stable
environment. The ICPC report provided information on their living situation and
resources, other adults in the home and their ability to parent. They lived in a residential
neighborhood in a four-bedroom house in which S.C. could have her own room. The
home presented no safety concerns. The grandparents had two vehicles in good operating
condition. They were retired, but receiving monthly pensions, doing well financially and
able to support a child. The maternal great-grandmother and a maternal great-uncle also
lived in the home. None of the adults had a history of criminal arrests or child abuse or
neglect. The report found the maternal grandparents had "good parenting skills," an
"excellent familial and friend support system," and "realistic expectations in regards to
the Division's goals," while also being willing to provide permanent care if needed.8 It
concluded they were "exceptionally competent to provide a safe, structured, and
nurturing home environment" to S.C.
The court held a settlement conference on July 23. Mother's counsel asked the
court to order an ICPC for a foster home in Chicago and to reinforce visitation was not
8 A 2010 report in connection with S.C.'s prior dependency proceeding, attached to
the ICPC report, likewise found the maternal grandparents "underst[ood] and agree[d]
with the . . . case goal of 'family reunification.' "
8
optional. County counsel indicated it was not opposing an Illinois ICPC, but it did not
make sense until they knew where Mother would be. Later in the hearing, Mother's
counsel described the Chicago foster home as a backup and said Mother's plan was to
return to San Diego within the week and stay through reunification. With respect to
visitation, County counsel noted Mother chose to leave San Diego, but the Agency would
continue to facilitate telephone contact and encourage Mother to write letters, stating it is
considered part of visitation. County counsel requested detention with the maternal
grandparents until the disposition hearing and noted they would be willing to stay in a
hotel in San Diego. Mother's counsel opposed detention in New Jersey, but submitted on
detention with the grandparents in San Diego.
The court again deferred the Illinois ICPC request, observing "Mother may not be
there more than a week anyhow." It provided the Agency discretion to detain S.C. with a
suitable relative upon arrival in San Diego. It also reaffirmed its order for supervised
visitation and ordered telephonic visitation no more than once per day, if in-person visits
were not possible. The court encouraged S.C. to meet with Mother prior to the trial and
for Mother to send her a letter or two in the interim.
On July 30, the court held the contested adjudication and disposition proceeding
and accepted the Agency reports and ICPC evaluation into evidence. Mother and Tharp
testified. Mother was living in Chicago, but planned to move to San Diego to be
reunified with S.C. She had taken many steps toward relocating, including visiting
several apartments (one of which she did not get due to a low credit rating), looking
online for them and having a yard sale in Chicago to help her downsize for the move.
9
Mother's plan after finding an apartment was to get into therapy, parenting classes, a dual
diagnosis program and anything that would help her. She was willing to start services
once she was set up in San Diego, which she could not do for financial reasons until
August 15.
Mother acknowledged she had neither moved to San Diego, nor started services.
She was aware S.C. told others she wanted to live with the maternal grandparents and
testified S.C. had no friends or family in San Diego, but she wanted S.C. to stay in San
Diego so she could visit. Mother explained: "I'm not moving back to New Jersey, so I
don't see that happening . . . , [h]er and I reuniting, if she goes to New Jersey." In
response to County counsel's inquiry whether she could take the same steps to find a New
Jersey apartment that she had for San Diego, Mother stated, "I refuse to do that, no." She
elaborated: "If this has anything to do with my . . . mental health, going back to New
Jersey is not going to help. It will make things way worse . . . . I get very depressed
there. And I would definitely need medication staying there. I don't, technically, need
medication. . . . If I was there, I would be a basket case. I would be a mess." She agreed
if a doctor ordered her to take medication and it meant getting S.C. back, she would do
so.
Social worker Tharp testified Mother had in-person visits, but they stopped when
S.C. began refusing to see her. She acknowledged Mother kept trying to visit and call.
Tharp had asked Mother to write letters as an alternative to in-person visits, noting S.C.
had been open to her sharing Mother's letter, and placed no limit on the number. Mother
10
wrote one or two. Tharp did not consider this a failure to visit, but was concerned about
why Mother had not pursued that avenue further.
The juvenile court declared S.C. a dependent and removed her from Mother's
custody. It ordered her placed in the approved home of a relative and authorized
placement with the maternal grandparents. It found the placement appropriate, noting
S.C.'s "lifetime relationship" with them and their ability to "offer [her] a solid[,] . . .
safe[,] and appropriate facility in which to live while the mother is offering hope that she
might be able to find some kind of housing in San Diego at some point in time." The
court also ordered services for Mother consistent with her case plan and reasonable
supervised visitation. Mother appealed.
II
DISCUSSION
The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Placing S.C. with the Maternal Grandparents
The sole issue presented in Mother's appeal is whether the juvenile court erred in
placing S.C. with her maternal grandparents in New Jersey.
A. Applicable Law
When the juvenile court orders removal under section 361, it places the "care,
custody, control, and conduct of the child . . . under the supervision of the social worker."
(§ 361.2, subd. (e).) "The social worker may place the child in several locations,
including the approved home of a relative. (§ 361.2, subd. (e)(1)-(8).) Relatives who
request placement are given preferential consideration. (§ 361.3, subd. (a).) In
11
determining whether to place the child with the requesting relative, the court and social
worker consider the factors enumerated in section 361.3, subdivision (a)."
(In re Alicia B. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 856, 862 (Alicia B.).)
Those factors are: "(1) The best interest of the child, including special physical,
psychological, educational, medical, or emotional needs. [¶] (2) The wishes of the
parent, the relative, and child, if appropriate. [¶] (3) The provisions of Part 6
(commencing with Section 7950) of Division 12 of the Family Code regarding relative
placement. [¶] (4) Placement of siblings and half siblings in the same home, unless that
placement is found to be contrary to the safety and well-being of any of the siblings, as
provided in Section 16002. [¶] (5) The good moral character of the relative and any
other adult living in the home, including whether any individual residing in the home has
a prior history of violent criminal acts or has been responsible for acts of child abuse or
neglect. [¶] (6) The nature and duration of the relationship between the child and the
relative, and the relative's desire to care for . . . the child . . . . [¶] (7) The ability of the
relative to do the following: [¶] (A) Provide a safe, secure, and stable environment for
the child. [¶] (B) Exercise proper and effective care and control of the child. [¶]
(C) Provide a home and the necessities of life for the child. [¶] (D) Protect the child
from his or her parents. [¶] (E) Facilitate court-ordered reunification efforts with the
parents. [¶] (F) Facilitate visitation with the child's other relatives. [¶] (G) Facilitate
implementation of all elements of the case plan. [¶] (H) Provide legal permanence for
the child if reunification fails. [¶] . . . [¶] (I) Arrange for appropriate and safe child
care, as necessary. [¶] (8) The safety of the relative's home. . . ." (§ 361.3, subd. (a).)
12
"However, the 'best interests of the child' is the linchpin of the analysis."
(In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1068 (Robert L.); Alicia B., supra, 116
Cal.App.4th at p. 862 [accord].) The "fundamental duty of the juvenile court is to 'assure
the best interest of the child.' " (Alicia B., at p. 864, quoting In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7
Cal.4th 295, 321.)
"We review a juvenile court's custody placement orders under the abuse of
discretion standard of review; the court is given wide discretion and its determination will
not be disturbed absent a manifest showing of abuse." (Alicia B., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th
at p. 863.) "Broad deference must be shown to the trial judge. The reviewing court
should interfere only ' "if we find that under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in
support of the trial court's action, no judge could reasonably have made the order that he
did." ' " (Robert L., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067.)
B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Placing S.C. with Her
Maternal Grandparents
We find the placement was within the juvenile court's discretion. By prioritizing
S.C.'s history with her maternal grandparents and their ability to provide a safe and
appropriate home, over Mother's desire to live in San Diego (or, at least, outside of New
Jersey), the court focused on S.C.'s best interest, as appropriate. (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(1);
Robert L., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1068.) Its findings expressly touched on multiple
section 361.3 factors, including the nature and duration of S.C.'s relationship with her
grandparents, their capacity to offer a stable environment and the safety of their home,
and were fully supported by the record. (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(6), (7)(A) & (8).)
13
The record contained additional evidence to support the court's exercise of
discretion within the section 361.3 framework. (§ 361.3, subd. (a).) Although Mother
wanted S.C. with her in San Diego, the trial court was entitled to consider the wishes of
S.C. and the maternal grandparents for her to be placed with them in New Jersey.
(§ 361.3, subd. (a)(2).) The various factors related to protection, care and permanency
planning likewise support the placement. The ICPC report confirmed the adults in the
house had no history of violence, abuse or neglect. (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(5).) It also made
clear the grandparents could exercise proper child control, offer a home and necessities,
facilitate visitation with relatives and provide appropriate child care. (§ 361.3,
subd. (a)(7)(B), (C), (F) & (I).) The record further reflects they could protect S.C. from
Mother if needed and, in the event Mother could not reunify, provide legal permanence.
(§361.3, subd. (a)(7)(D) & (H).)
The other relevant factors here pertain to parental proximity and facilitation of
reunification and the case plan. (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(3), (7)(E) & (G).) The evidence
before the court reflected Mother was unwilling to live in New Jersey, but also that the
maternal grandparents recognized reunification was the goal, had supported it in the past
and had the financial means to travel. The record also showed Mother had not
commenced services, despite receiving referrals. As addressed post, we find
unpersuasive Mother's position that the placement compromised visitation or
reunification. Even if it did, the court would have to balance these concerns with S.C.'s
best interest and the remaining section 361.3 factors, which support placement with the
14
maternal grandparents. Given the placement did not prevent visitation, the court was
well within its discretion to place S.C. with them.
Mother maintains the placement was an abuse of discretion, suggesting
reunification is the focus of the relative placement assessment and it "effectively
nullified" her right to reunification by impeding visitation and conjoint therapy. Her
arguments are not persuasive. We begin by addressing those regarding the legal
standards.
First, Mother contends a court must consider facilitation of reunification and the
case plan, noting just two of the many section 361.3 factors. As discussed ante, the court
had evidence on these matters and was entitled to find the benefits of the placement
outweighed the potential detriment to reunification and the case plan. The only other
factor Mother discusses is the child's best interest, which she states is important but not
controlling. It is well-settled the child's best interest is the most important factor.
(Robert L., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1068; Alicia B., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 862.)
She then contends best interest has been defined as reunification throughout the family
preservation phase, relying on In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102 (Lauren Z.).
However, Lauren Z. confirms a child's best interest must be considered in light of the
circumstances and take precedence over other concerns. (See id. at p. 1112 [affirming
placement with California foster parents, rather than a maternal aunt in Florida (where the
mother was incarcerated), observing the child bonded with her foster parents, while the
aunt remained a stranger, and finding that under "these circumstances, Lauren's best
15
interests have to prevail over all other considerations"].)9 This attempt to narrow the
section 361.3 analysis to focus primarily on reunification is misguided, as it would render
the other factors meaningless. " ' "An interpretation that renders statutory language a
nullity is obviously to be avoided." ' " (In re J.D. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1390.)
In addition, to the extent Mother fails to address the other factors, she impliedly concedes
they support the placement or, at least, do not render it inappropriate.
Next, Mother argues that when reunification remains a possibility, it is an abuse of
discretion to place a minor out-of-state with a relative, relying on In re Luke L. (1996) 44
Cal.App.4th 670. However, Luke L. does not hold such a placement is always an abuse
of discretion. Rather, it found an out-of-state placement with cousins problematic under
the circumstances and is therefore factually distinguishable. (Id. at p. 680.) There, unlike
here, the cousins were not relatives under section 361.3, the placement divided a sibling
group and it violated the ICPC. (See Luke L., at p. 680.) The case also did not address
the child's history with the cousins, in contrast to S.C's lifelong relationship with her
grandparents and their significant role in her life. (See id. at pp. 674-678.) Mother also
notes Luke L. found the proposed visitation plan insufficient and observes there is no plan
here; again, however, that finding was fact-specific and, as discussed post, there is no
9 Mother's citation is to Justice Rothschild's dissent in Lauren Z., supra, 158
Cal.App.4th 1102, 1113, without identifying it as such, and, moreover, from its
discussion of the background legal principles at issue. There is no dispute reunification is
the goal, but the child's best interest remains the central concern. (In re Christopher H.
(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006 ["At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court must
order . . . services . . . to facilitate reunification of the family. [Citations.] The court has
broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child's interest and to
fashion a dispositional order in accord with this discretion."].)
16
evidence Mother cannot arrange for her own visitation here. (See id. at p. 681 [finding
the "proposed arrangement . . . an unrealistic one here"] (italics added).)
Finally, Mother argues she had a "fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody,
and companionship" of S.C. and a right to visit her, and the placement interfered with her
constitutional rights. The general principles — her interest in S.C. and right to visit —
are not in dispute, but Mother fails to establish the placement interferes with her rights.
She relies on In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41 and In re James R. (2007) 153
Cal.App.4th 413. However, these cases focus on unlawful delegation of authority over
visitation and Mother does not allege improper delegation. (James R., at p. 434; see also
Julie M., at pp. 43, 48-50.) Julie M. is instructive, though, in articulating the relationship
between the parent's liberty interest and the child's well-being; it confirms the former
cannot be maintained at the expense of the latter, and that "[w]hile visitation is a key
element of reunification, the court must focus on the best interests of the children . . . ."
(Julie M., at p. 50; see also In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1423 [observing
that although a parent's liberty interest " 'may not be interfered with in the absence of a
compelling state interest, the welfare of a child is a compelling state interest that a state
has not only a right, but a duty, to protect' "]; § 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A) ["Visitation shall
be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child." (Emphasis
added.)].)
We turn next to Mother's claim that the placement interferes with her ability to
visit and reunify, and determine she has not carried her appellate burden on this issue.
17
First, and critically, Mother admits she can call, write and fly to New Jersey for
visits. However, she suggests frequent visits would be difficult due to her limited
financial means and that moving back to New Jersey would negatively impact her mental
health. This argument minimizes the importance of calling and writing here, especially
given S.C.'s willingness to let the social worker share Mother's letter with her. Mother
also does not explain how her financial situation would limit visits to New Jersey; she
simply notes her monthly income, that she was turned down for an apartment for poor
credit and that flights are expensive. She is capable of at least some air travel, as
evidenced by the trip to California during which S.C. was detained. As for a move to
New Jersey, she cites no evidence besides her own testimony to establish it would affect
her mental health.
Second, Mother contends her difficulties with S.C. warrant conjoint counseling
and out-of-state placement would impede this. However, conjoint counseling is not in
her case plan and she identifies nothing in the record to suggest it would be appropriate in
the near future.10 (Cf. In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 965 [reunification plan
called for conjoint counseling after minor received eight sessions of individual
counseling].) Further, as of the disposition hearing, Mother had not even commenced the
therapy that was in her case plan.
Finally, Mother claims her family in New Jersey can do little to facilitate
reunification in San Diego; although she acknowledges their prior support, she notes she
10 Mother does cite to a portion of the social worker's testimony at the contested
disposition hearing, but it contains no discussion of conjoint therapy.
18
no longer lives near them and expresses doubts about their ability to bear travel expenses.
As a preliminary matter, we question Mother's assumption that reunification would take
place in San Diego. She was still in Chicago as of the contested disposition hearing, had
been equivocal about when she would return to San Diego and had not yet secured
housing there. In any event, we find her concerns speculative. She provides no evidence
to suggest the maternal grandparents would be unable or unwilling to facilitate visits or
reunification. To the contrary, the record reflects the maternal grandparents have cared
for S.C. when Mother was unable to do so, understand the goal of the process and that
Mother successfully reunified with S.C. previously. (See Robert L., supra, 21
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1068-1069 [reversing order denying placement with grandparents,
finding juvenile court's concern they would obstruct reunification "wholly speculative,"
where the record lacked evidence of obstruction and instead showed they had been
" 'completely cooperative' "].)
We conclude S.C.'s placement with her maternal grandparents was appropriate
under section 361.3 and there was no abuse of discretion.
19
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCDONALD, Acting P. J.
AARON, J.
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