People v. Morrison CA4/1 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  • Filed 11/5/15 P. v. Morrison CA4/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    THE PEOPLE,                                                         D068067
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. FWV1202508)
    JUAN MORRISON et al.,
    Defendants and Appellants.
    APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County,
    Gregory S. Tavill, Judge. Affirmed.
    Patricia L. Brisbois, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant, Juan Morrison.
    James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
    and Appellant, Carlos Marquez Morrison.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Meagan J.
    Beale, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    INTRODUCTION
    A jury convicted two brothers, Carlos Marquez Morrison and Juan Morrison,1 of
    second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)2 and found true allegations they committed the
    robbery for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang
    (gang benefit enhancement) (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The court sentenced Carlos to
    an aggregate term of 13 years in prison based on the middle term of three years for
    second degree robbery plus 10 years for the gang enhancement. The trial court found
    true allegations Juan had two prior strike convictions, two prior serious felony
    convictions and a prison prior.3 After striking one prior strike conviction and one prior
    serious felony conviction, the court sentenced Juan to an aggregate term of 20 years in
    prison based on the mitigated term of two years for second degree robbery doubled to
    four years as a second strike offender plus 10 years for the gang benefit enhancement, a
    consecutive term of five years for the prior serious felony conviction, and one year for the
    prison prior.
    1      Because the defendants share a surname, we refer to them by their first names. No
    disrespect is intended. We refer to them collectively as defendants.
    2      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
    3      Although the court did not make an express finding regarding the prison prior on
    the record, it admitted evidence of Juan's prior prison commitment showing he had not
    remained free from prison custody for a period of five years after the conclusion of the
    term before committing the instant offense. The court sentenced Juan based on the prison
    prior without objection and Juan does not raise this as an issue on appeal.
    2
    Carlos contends on appeal: (1) the admission of his statements to a jail officer
    about his gang affiliation violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) the
    admission of the gang expert's testimony about field investigation or field identification
    cards (FI cards) from prior police contacts documenting self-admissions of gang
    affiliation was improper hearsay and violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation right;
    (3) the introduction of Juan's admission of gang affiliation to the jail officer violated
    Carlos's Sixth Amendment confrontation right; (4) the combination of the foregoing
    errors was prejudicial; and (5) there was no substantial evidence to support the gang
    benefit enhancement finding. Juan joins Carlos's first, second and fourth arguments.
    Juan contends: (1) there was no substantial evidence to support his robbery
    conviction; (2) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during supplemental
    closing arguments about aiding and abetting second degree robbery; and (3) his defense
    counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor's statements.
    Carlos joins any of Juan's arguments that are beneficial to him. Finding no prejudicial
    error, we affirm the judgments.
    3
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A
    On the morning of October 3, 2012, Shane Mack rode his Italian fold-up bicycle to
    a liquor store in Rancho Cucamonga. Mack purchased the bicycle two days before as a
    gift from his father.4
    As he approached the store, Mack got off his bicycle and walked it across the
    street. Before he got to the liquor store, Carlos approached him and said, "This is
    Compton, cuz'." Juan then approached and said, "This is Nutty Block."
    Mack responded by saying, "I'm a college student" and "[w]hat's the problem?"
    Carlos punched Mack's jaw and they started fighting. Juan jumped in and started hitting
    Mack. During the fight, Mack felt the lanyard being removed from around his neck and
    someone going through his pocket. His garage door opener and wallet were taken out of
    his pocket. While Mack was being hit, he heard someone say, "Grab that."
    Mack ran across the street with Carlos following him until Mack reached and
    entered a grocery store. Mack looked back during the pursuit and saw Juan with his
    bicycle.5
    4      Mack testified he purchased the bicycle for $3,000. On the day of the incident, he
    told the investigating officer he estimated its value at $700.
    5      The liquor store clerk testified he saw Carlos with the bicycle after Carlos returned
    from chasing Mack across the street. When the clerk asked Carlos if it was his bicycle,
    Carlos said it was his. The clerk did not see Carlos walk away with the bicycle.
    4
    Mack called a friend from the store and then went home. He returned to the liquor
    store with his girlfriend and another friend. Mack asked the store clerk if he had seen
    anything or if there was video footage. The clerk said he did not want to get involved.
    Mack found most of his items in the grass except for his lanyard and bicycle.
    Mack went to the gas station near the liquor store and went to apartments across
    the street to see if anyone had seen anything or his bicycle. Mack had seen Carlos around
    the apartments before and recognized the letters "CR" tattooed on his neck, but denied
    knowing him personally.
    When Mack returned to the liquor store, he met the defendants who were also
    walking toward the store. Mack approached them and asked for his bicycle. Carlos said
    Mack was not getting it back and they started fighting again. At least one of the
    defendants took his shirt off. Mack saw a "Raymond" tattoo and a "Nutty Block" tattoo.
    Juan said, this is "Nutty Block" and Carlos said this is "Raymond Crip." Mack assumed
    they meant it was a Crip hood. Mack started fighting with Carlos and Juan jumped in
    again.
    The fight stopped when a police officer arrived. The officer observed four males
    facing off in the parking lot, with two closing in on each other. When the officer
    detained Mack's friend, Mack said he had the wrong person. Mack pointed to the
    defendants and said they had robbed him. Both defendants took off running.
    The officer pursued the defendants across the street. The officer was able to stop
    and handcuff both defendants. When another officer searched the defendants, he found
    Mack's lanyard in Carlos's pocket.
    5
    B
    A deputy with the San Bernardino County Sheriff's department conducted
    classification interviews with Carlos and Mack after they were arrested and booked into
    jail. These classification interviews help determine where inmates are housed for the
    security of the correctional facility.
    Carlos stated he was a member of the Raymond Street Crips gang (Raymond),
    which he joined when he was in the fifth grade. He denied being a dropout. Carlos had
    "Raymond" tattooed across his chest and "R$H," which the deputy understood to stand
    for Raymond Street Hustler. Carlos also had the letters "CR" tattooed on his neck.
    Although Juan initially denied being active in a gang, he later admitted being a
    member of the Nutty Block Crips (Nutty Block). Juan was "jumped" into the Nutty
    Block gang at age 16. He also denied being a gang dropout. Juan has visible tattoos
    identifying him as a gang member including "Nutty by Choice," the letters "NY" for
    young and nutty, and the letters "NBCC" for Nutty Block Compton Crip.
    The court admitted the deputy's testimony regarding his classification observations
    and the statements of the defendants. However, the court instructed the jury not to
    consider Carlos's classification statements for the case against Juan and not to consider
    Juan's classification statements for the case against Carlos.
    C
    A gang investigator for the Los Angeles County Sheriff's department served as the
    People's gang expert. He testified regarding his familiarity with the Nutty Block gang,
    which is a West Side Crips gang within the city of Compton. The primary activities of
    6
    Nutty Block include narcotic sales, firearm sales, firearm possession, robberies, home
    invasions, burglaries, and murder. Members advance in the gang by committing crimes,
    increasing status, and putting time in with the gang. There are approximately 225 to 250
    members of Nutty Block. A common symbol for Nutty Block are the letters "NY" using
    the New York Yankees logo. Other symbols include "NBCC" or "Young Nutty."
    Raymond is also a Crip gang from Compton. Raymond Street is within the Nutty
    Block turf. Raymond members use the symbol "R$H." The letters "CR," using the
    Colorado Rockies' logo, are used as an abbreviation for Crip. The gang expert opined
    Nutty Block and Raymond are essentially one gang. "A lot of people will cross claim."
    In the gang expert's opinion, Raymond is a clique of older members within Nutty
    Block. The expert stated, "You really don't see younger generation of the [Raymond]
    anymore. Nobody's been getting jumped in. Nobody's been, you know, arrested
    claiming Raymond." Some claim it, but not as often. There are 10 to 15 active members
    of Raymond who would also claim and be accepted by Nutty Block members. In his
    opinion, not as many people claim Raymond because the Raymond identity is becoming
    Nutty Block. It is common for an individual to say they are from Raymond, but are
    really a member of Nutty Block.
    Nutty Block and Raymond share a "hood day," which marks the formation of the
    gang. They gather at a park, usually in Compton, and conduct business such as firearms
    or narcotics trafficking. Nutty Block has a pecking order and a leader. The gang expert
    is not aware of a separate command structure for Raymond. Blue and gray are the colors
    used for Nutty Block and Raymond members.
    7
    The gang expert reviewed FI cards regarding Juan from two police contacts in
    2011. On each occasion, Juan admitted being a member of Nutty Block, bore Nutty
    Block tattoos, and was found with other gang members including Carlos. The gang
    expert also reviewed photographs of Juan's tattoos, which included: "NY"; "Nutty by
    Choice"; "NBCC"; "Young" and "Nutty" on his forearms, which together would read
    "Young Nutty"; the numbers "165" and "166" for streets within the area controlled by
    Nutty Block; and the number "2" on each tricep. The number "2" corresponds to the
    letter C on a telephone keypad, so "22" would mean "CC" or Compton Crip. The gang
    expert opined Juan was a member of the Nutty Block criminal street gang based on the FI
    cards, tattoos, self-admissions, and associates.
    The gang expert also reviewed the FI cards for Carlos regarding two contacts in
    the Nutty Block area of Compton in 2008. Carlos claimed he was a member of Raymond
    in January 2008, but claimed Nutty Block in September 2008. The expert testified it is
    common for someone to claim both Nutty Block and Raymond, and to interchange them.
    The expert opined Carlos was a member of the "Nutty Block, Raymond Crips." He based
    this opinion on Carlos's tattoos, among other things, which included "Raymond" and
    "R$H." He also had the number "2" tattooed on each of his triceps and the letters "CC"
    tattooed on his abdomen. Carlos had a dollar sign tattooed on his neck, representing the
    importance of making money. He also had the letters "CR" tattooed on his neck.
    The gang expert testified regarding separate criminal offenses committed by other
    members of the Nutty Block criminal street gang. These included assault with a deadly
    weapon, dissuading a witness from reporting a crime, and being a felon in possession of a
    8
    firearm, all of which are crimes or activities associated with the Nutty Block criminal
    street gang, which would include Raymond.
    The gang expert opined the robbery in this case was committed for the benefit of,
    at the direction of, or in association with the Nutty Block criminal street gang. This
    crime, committed in broad daylight at a busy location in front of witnesses, would benefit
    the criminal street gang because it was a brazen act committed to instill fear in the
    general community and showed dominance. The defendants also benefitted because the
    crime would enhance their reputation in the gang based on stories that would be told
    about the incident and could entice younger potential gang members.
    It is not uncommon for a Compton gang to commit a crime in another county, such
    as San Bernardino. A crime committed outside of the gang territory would indicate the
    gang is claiming the area or trying to move in on an existing gang claiming the territory.
    The expert opined Carlos and Juan acted in association to benefit the gang based
    on the fact they committed the crime together as gang members and threw out gang
    names during the commission of the crime. It is common for gang members to commit
    crimes together or with members of other gangs. This helps the gang because it increases
    the likelihood of success and increases the status of the individual within the gang.
    D
    Carlos testified in his own defense. Carlos grew up in Compton, but visited
    Rancho Cucamonga frequently because his girlfriend lived across the street from the
    liquor store. He testified he was at the liquor store on the morning of the incident waiting
    9
    for a friend to arrive on a bus. He went into the store to purchase something. When he
    came out, he saw Mack and they locked eyes.
    Carlos testified he had previously met Mack in the apartment complex and bought
    marijuana from him. They communicated by cell phone and text messages and saw each
    other around the apartment complex and at the liquor store. Carlos stated they "fell off
    through the texting" and established they were going to fight when they saw each other.
    On the day of the incident, they exchanged words. Carlos dropped his bag and Mack
    dropped his bike before Carlos hit Mack. Carlos testified Juan became involved in the
    fight when Juan pushed Mack away from hitting Carlos again. When Mack ran across
    the street, Carlos pursued him. Carlos testified he and Juan ran across the street and
    down the steps, but, since they did not know where Mack went, they returned to the
    liquor store. Carlos denied either he or Juan took Mack's bicycle.
    Carlos testified he picked up his bag from outside the store and spoke to the store
    clerk briefly about a cell phone. Carlos testified Juan lost his cell phone and they went to
    look for it. When they could not find it, they returned to the store to see if there was a
    video showing four individuals who were in front of the liquor store.
    Upon their return, they met Mack in the parking lot with Mack's girlfriend and
    another individual. Carlos and Juan took their shirts off and Carlos began fighting with
    Mack while Juan and the other individual refereed. Carlos denied mentioning Raymond
    or Nutty Block.
    Carlos stated the Raymond tattoo on his chest is a street in Compton where his
    family members live. The "R$H" tattoo on his left hand is for Raymond Street Hustler.
    10
    Carlos testified he has the number "2" tattooed on each of his arms because 22 is his
    favorite number, having adopted it from his older brother. He stated the "CR" tattoo
    stands for Central and Reeves, which is a cross street near his mother's house in
    Compton. He denied he told a detective it stood for Raymond Crip. He stated he has a
    dollar sign tattooed on his neck because he likes money. He said the "CC" tattoo on his
    stomach stands for Compton, California, but conceded it can stand for Compton Crip. He
    considers himself part of Raymond, but denied it is a gang. He also denied being part of
    Nutty Block. He denied telling a detective he was born and raised a Crip and will always
    be a Crip.
    Carlos said Juan's "NBC" tattoo stands for Nutty Block Crip because Juan used to
    be part of the Nutty Block Crips. Juan has the number "2" tattooed on each arm, as does
    Carlos. Both Juan and Carlos have a dollar sign tattooed on one side of their necks. Juan
    has "NY" tattooed on the other side of his neck while Carlos has "CR" tattooed on his
    neck.
    E
    On rebuttal, a detective with the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department
    testified Carlos initially told him Raymond stood for the street he lived on, but he later
    admitted it stood for Raymond Crip. When asked if he was a Crip, Carlos stated, "I was
    born and raised a Crip. I'll always be a Crip."
    11
    DISCUSSION
    I
    Classification Statements
    Carlos and Juan contend their admissions of gang affiliation during the jail
    classification interviews were inadmissible because they were given without the
    prophylactic admonitions required to protect their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
    Amendments (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 478-479 (Miranda)) and because
    the admissions were allegedly coerced based on promises they would be housed together
    if they told the truth about their gang affiliations. The People contend the admissions
    were admissible because questions about gang affiliation made for legitimate
    administrative purposes fall within the booking exception to Miranda and the statements
    were not coerced.
    The Supreme Court recently clarified correctional officers are permitted to ask
    routine questions regarding gang affiliation for institutional security purposes, but un-
    Mirandized responses or admissions to such questions are not admissible against the
    defendant in the criminal trial. (People v. Elizalde (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 523
    , 527, 540-541
    (Elizalde).) "Gang affiliation questions do not conform to the narrow exception
    contemplated in [Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 
    446 U.S. 291
     (Innis)] and [Pennsylvania v.
    Muniz (1990) 
    496 U.S. 582
    ] for basic identifying biographical data necessary for booking
    or pretrial services. Instead, they must be measured under the general Innis test, which
    defines as 'interrogation' questions the police should know are 'reasonably likely to elicit
    an incriminating response.' " (Elizalde, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 538.) Applying Innis, the
    12
    court concluded the gang affiliation questions posed during booking without Miranda
    warnings were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. (Ibid.) Since the
    Elizalde defendant was charged with murder "a crime frequently committed for the
    benefit of criminal street gangs, and a qualifying offense establishing a ' "pattern of
    criminal gang activity" ' " the Supreme Court determined questions about gang affiliation
    were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response because the defendant was
    subject to enhanced punishment under California's scheme of penal statutes directed to
    eradicating criminal activity by street gangs. (Id. at pp. 539-540.)
    Similarly here, Carlos and Juan were questioned about their gang affiliations
    during the classification process without receiving Miranda warnings. The interviewing
    officer did not know the facts of the case leading to the arrest, but he knew the charges.
    Carlos and Juan were charged with robbery in violation of section 211, which, as in
    Elizalde, is a qualifying offense establishing a pattern of criminal gang activity.
    (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(2).) Therefore, the officer should have known the gang affiliation
    questions posed in this case were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses. The
    unadmonished statements made during the classification interviews were inadmissible at
    trial. (Elizalde, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 540.)
    Nevertheless, as in Elizalde, the error was harmless. The Supreme Court applied
    the standard of prejudice as established by Chapman v. California (1967) 
    386 U.S. 18
     [87
    S.Ct.824, 
    17 L.Ed.2d 705
    ], which requires proof " 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' " (Elizalde, supra, 61
    Cal.4th at p. 542.)
    13
    In this case, gang affiliation was convincingly established based on evidence other
    than the jail classification admissions. Both Carlos and Juan had conspicuous gang
    tattoos on their bodies and they made statements about gang affiliation during the crime.
    The expert opined they were gang members based on his knowledge of Nutty Block and
    Raymond, his observations of the defendants' tattoos, the facts of the case, and facts
    documented from field interviews such as where Carlos and Juan were contacted within
    Nutty Block territory, the presence of other gang members, and self-admissions during
    those field interviews. In addition, Carlos admitted to an investigating detective his "CR"
    tattoo represented Raymond Crip and he said, "I was born and raised a Crip. I will
    always be a Crip." He admitted he considers himself to be part of Raymond, which the
    expert testified is part of Nutty Block. Given this evidence, we conclude the admission
    of the classification statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Elizalde,
    supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 542.)
    For the same reason, we reject Carlos's contention the admission of Juan's
    admission of gang membership in the classification interview violated Carlos's
    confrontation right pursuant to People v. Aranda (1965) 
    63 Cal.2d 518
     and Bruton v.
    United States (1968) 
    391 U.S. 123
    . The court instructed the jury not to consider Juan's
    admission in connection with the case against Carlos and there was clear evidence of
    Carlos's gang membership even without the classification statements. Therefore, even if
    there was error, it was harmless. It is not reasonably probable Carlos would have
    obtained a more favorable verdict in a separate trial. (People v. Ortiz (1978) 
    22 Cal.3d 38
    , 46.)
    14
    II
    Gang Expert Testimony Based on FI Cards
    Carlos and Juan contend the court erred in allowing the gang expert to testify
    about their admissions of gang affiliation made during prior encounters with law
    enforcement as documented on FI cards. They contend these self-admissions were
    testimonial hearsay and the admission of these statements violated their rights under the
    confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
    Assuming, without deciding, the notations on the FI cards of gang self-admissions were
    hearsay, i.e. offered for the truth of the matter stated (Evid. Code, § 1200), we conclude
    they are not testimonial and the gang expert's testimony about them did not violate the
    confrontation clause.6
    We apply the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the trial court's
    admission of expert testimony. (People v. Valadez (2013) 
    220 Cal.App.4th 16
    , 29
    (Valadez).) We apply the de novo standard of review for claims implicating federal
    constitutional rights such as the confrontation clause. (People v. Seijas (2005) 
    36 Cal.4th 291
    , 304.)
    6      The court did not admit the FI cards into evidence, but allowed the gang expert to
    discuss them as one basis, among others, for his opinions that Juan and Carlos were
    active gang members. The court noted the expert could be cross-examined regarding his
    knowledge, or lack thereof, of the encounters documented on the FI cards. The
    defendants only challenge the expert's testimony about the self-admission notations on
    the FI cards, not other observations noted on the cards.
    15
    California law generally permits an expert to testify regarding his or her opinions
    based on "matter (including his [or her] special knowledge, skill, experience, training,
    and education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him
    [or her] at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that
    reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to
    which his [or her] testimony relates." (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b).)
    Under current law, gang experts are allowed to describe reliable hearsay evidence,
    including written material and information drawn from many sources, used to form their
    opinions even if the evidence is otherwise inadmissible. (People v. Gonzalez (2006) 
    38 Cal.4th 932
    , 949; People v. Gardeley (1996) 
    14 Cal.4th 605
    , 618 (Gardeley).) However,
    "a witness's on-the-record recitation of sources relied on for an expert opinion does not
    transform inadmissible matter into 'independent proof' of any fact." (Gardeley, 
    supra,
     14
    Cal.4th at p. 619.)
    Although Gardeley, 
    supra,
     
    14 Cal.4th 605
     did not involve the Sixth Amendment's
    confrontation clause, courts have interpreted Gardeley to suggest there can be no
    violation of the confrontation clause for basis evidence used by a gang expert because it
    is not offered for the truth, but rather to assist the jury in evaluating the expert's opinion.
    (Valadez, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 30; People v. Thomas (2005) 
    130 Cal.App.4th 1202
    , 1210.) This analysis has been criticized by cases noting "the jury will often be
    required to determine or assume the truth of the [out-of-court] statement in order to
    utilize it to evaluate the expert's opinion." (People v. Hill (2011) 
    191 Cal.App.4th 1104
    ,
    1131.) Nevertheless, Hill and other courts have concluded they are bound by Gardeley
    16
    and its progeny to hold the admission of out-of-court statements, as expert opinion basis
    evidence does not violate the confrontation clause. (Hill, supra, at p. 1131, citing Auto
    Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 
    57 Cal.2d 450
    , 455; Valadez, supra, 220
    Cal.App.4th at pp. 30-31.) The question of whether an expert's reliance on testimonial
    hearsay to form his or her opinion violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
    confrontation is now pending before the California Supreme Court. (See People v.
    Sanchez (2014) 
    223 Cal.App.4th 1
    , review granted May 14, 2014, S216681 and People v.
    Archuleta (2014) 
    225 Cal.App.4th 527
    , review granted June 11, 2014, S218640.)
    We conclude the self-admissions documented on the FI cards were not testimonial
    hearsay and do not violate the confrontation clause. The confrontation clause of the Sixth
    Amendment guarantees a defendant in a criminal prosecution " 'the right … to be
    confronted with the witnesses against him.' " (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 42 (Crawford).) The United States Supreme Court held it is a violation of the
    confrontation clause to admit a testimonial hearsay statement from a declarant who is
    unavailable to testify unless the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
    (Id. at pp. 59, 68.) The Supreme Court did not provide a comprehensive definition of
    "testimonial" noting only, "[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to
    prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to
    police interrogations." (Id. at p. 68.)
    The California Supreme Court, however, has identified two critical components
    for a testimonial statement. "First, to be testimonial the statement must be made with
    some degree of formality or solemnity. Second, the statement is testimonial only if its
    17
    primary purpose pertains in some fashion to a criminal prosecution." (People v. Dungo
    (2012) 
    55 Cal.4th 608
    , 619 (Dungo); see People v. Lopez (2012) 
    55 Cal.4th 569
    , 581-582
    (Lopez).)
    In Dungo, the court held the facts related by an expert from an autopsy report
    "were not so formal and solemn as to be considered testimonial for purposes of the Sixth
    Amendment's confrontation right, and criminal investigation was not the primary purpose
    for recording the facts in question." (Dungo, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 621.) In Lopez, the
    court held a laboratory report, which included computer generated results and a
    laboratory technician's notation linking the blood sample with a statement it contained
    0.09 percent alcohol, lacked the formality necessary to be testimonial. (Lopez, supra, 55
    Cal.4th at pp. 584-585.)7
    We conclude the self-admission statements documented on the FI cards in this
    case do not bear the formality or solemnity necessary for testimonial statements. (People
    v. Cage (2007) 
    40 Cal.4th 965
    , 987.) The gang expert explained FI cards are small cards
    used by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to document contact with an
    individual. Officers use the FI cards to record the individual's name, date of birth, height
    and weight, time and location of the contact, other gang members with whom the
    7       The Lopez court distinguished the laboratory report before it from those cases in
    which the United States Supreme Court found a signed laboratory report and a report
    referencing rules of court sufficiently formal to be testimonial. (Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th
    at p. 584 distinguishing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 
    557 U.S. 305
    , 310 [
    129 S.Ct. 2527
    , 
    174 L.Ed.2d 314
    ] and Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) 564 U.S. ___ [
    131 S.Ct. 2705
    , 2717, 
    180 L.Ed.2d 610
    ].)
    18
    individual is associated, what the individual is wearing, and the individual's tattoos.
    Officers use these cards as tools to track individuals and information about the gang, such
    as the number of members. The cards are also useful for future investigations. There is
    no training for preparation of the FI cards, but officers use them regularly and other
    departments use similar cards.
    The FI cards are used for consensual contacts, investigational contacts where there
    are no arrests, or arrests. The expert testified it is not uncommon for individuals to admit
    gang membership in the course of consensual contacts and for these to be documented on
    FI cards.
    Carlos and Juan were not arrested in connection with any of the contacts
    documented in the FI cards. This suggests the cards were prepared in connection with a
    consensual contact or where they were free to leave even if the contact was related in
    some way to an investigation.
    Additionally, the fact the gang expert used these FI cards as a basis for his opinion
    does not mean the primary purpose in documenting the information was to use it against
    the defendants in a later criminal prosecution. (Valadez, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 36.) The gang expert testified he had conducted hundreds of interviews of gang
    members in the Compton area, including monthly contacts with some individuals.
    Gathering information through such routine contacts and disseminating the information
    by the use of FI cards serves purposes other than to establish past events for criminal
    prosecution. "Day in and day out such information would be useful to the police as part
    of their general community policing responsibilities quite separate from any use in some
    19
    unspecified criminal prosecution." (People v. Valadez, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 36.)
    Therefore, the self-admissions the expert relied upon from the FI cards to support his
    opinion were not testimonial hearsay and did not violate the confrontation clause.
    Even if it could be deemed error to admit testimony about the self-admissions
    documented on the FI cards, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v.
    California, 
    supra,
     386 U.S. at p. 24; People v. Rutterschmidt (2012) 
    55 Cal.4th 650
    , 661.)
    The gang expert testified to his years of personal experience and knowledge regarding
    criminal street gangs in Compton, including Nutty Block and the Raymond clique within
    Nutty Block. He opined the defendants were gang members based on the numerous gang
    tattoos on their bodies, the statements they made during the robbery, the facts of the
    robbery itself, and information he gathered from talking to other detectives. This is in
    addition to unchallenged observations recorded on the FI cards regarding the locations
    within gang territory where Juan and Carlos were contacted and their association with
    gang members known to the expert. In light of this overwhelming evidence, it is beyond
    reasonable doubt the exclusion of information regarding self-admissions from the FI
    cards would not have affected the outcome of the trial.
    III
    Cumulative Error
    We also reject Carlos's claim of cumulative error. In the context of the entire trial,
    there is no reasonable possibility any of the foregoing claims of error, considered singly
    or cumulatively, affected the outcome. (People v. Dykes (2009) 
    46 Cal.4th 731
    , 820.)
    20
    IV
    Substantial Evidence
    Carlos contends insufficient evidence was presented to support his gang benefit
    enhancement finding. Juan contends insufficient evidence was presented to support his
    robbery conviction. We reject both of these contentions.
    A
    Standard of Review
    In evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence claim, " 'we review the whole record to
    determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
    crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The record must disclose substantial
    evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
    value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
    reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence
    of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.]
    "Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the
    reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to
    determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a
    determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary
    conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]" [Citation.] A reversal for
    insufficient evidence "is unwarranted unless it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever
    21
    is there sufficient substantial evidence to support' " the jury's verdict.' " (People v.
    Manibusan (2013) 
    58 Cal.4th 40
    , 87.)
    B
    Evidence Supporting Carlos's Gang Benefit Enhancement Finding
    Carlos contends there was insufficient evidence for the gang benefit enhancement
    finding against him because there was no substantial evidence Raymond was a criminal
    street gang or that he committed the crime for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
    association with a criminal street gang with the intent to promote criminal conduct by
    gang members. We disagree.
    In an effort to combat gang-related crimes and violence, section 186.22,
    subdivision (b), imposes sentencing enhancement if the prosecution establishes a
    defendant committed a felony "for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
    with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any
    criminal conduct by gang members." (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1); People v. Prunty (2015) 
    62 Cal.4th 59
    , 67 (Prunty).) To establish the truth of a gang benefit enhancement allegation
    under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), the prosecutor must prove: "first, that the
    defendant committed a felony (a) for the benefit of, (b) at the direction of, or (c) in
    association with a criminal street gang; and second, that in connection with the felony,
    the defendant harbored the specific intent to (a) promote, (b) further, or (c) assist in any
    criminal conduct by gang members." (In re Daniel C. (2011) 
    195 Cal.App.4th 1350
    ,
    1358; accord, Gardeley, 
    supra,
     14 Cal.4th at pp. 616-617; People v. Williams (2009) 
    170 Cal.App.4th 587
    , 625.) In other words, the prosecution must prove a criminal street gang
    22
    exists, as defined by the statute, and the defendant "sought to benefit that particular gang
    when committing the underlying felony." (Prunty, supra, at p. 67.)
    Section 186.22, subdivision (f), "defines a 'criminal street gang' as an 'ongoing
    organization, association or group.' [Citation.] That 'group' must have 'three or more
    persons,' and its 'primary activities' must consist of certain crimes. [Citation.] The same
    'group' must also have a common name or common identifying sign or symbol,' and its
    members must be proven to have engaged in a 'pattern of criminal gang activity' by
    committing predicate offenses." (Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 71.)
    The Supreme Court recently held, "where the prosecution's case positing the
    existence of a single 'criminal street gang' for purposes of section 186.22[, subdivision]
    (f) turns on the existence and conduct of one or more gang subsets, then the prosecution
    must show some associational or organizational connection uniting those subsets."
    (Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 71.) "Evidence—even indirect evidence—showing
    collaboration among subset members, long-term relationships among members of
    different subsets, use of the same 'turf,' behavior demonstrating a shared identity with one
    another or with a larger organization, and similar proof will show that individual subsets
    are part of a larger group." (Id. at pp. 73-74.)8 The prosecution may meet its burden of
    proving a gang benefit enhancement allegation by presenting testimony from a gang
    expert. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 
    45 Cal.4th 789
    , 820; People v. Hernandez (2004) 
    33 Cal.4th 1040
    , 1047-1048; Gardeley, 
    supra,
     14 Cal. 4th at pp. 617-620.)
    8      At our request, the parties provided supplemental briefing regarding this case.
    23
    Carlos acknowledges the gang expert in this case testified Nutty Block and
    Raymond were the same gang, but contends the expert's opinion lacked foundation. We
    cannot agree. The gang expert provided un-refuted testimony regarding his knowledge of
    the Nutty Block gang and its subset, Raymond, based on his years of experience with
    Compton gangs and hundreds of interviews with gang members. He testified Nutty
    Block and Raymond are the same gang and Raymond is a small clique of older members
    from a street within Nutty Block territory. The members who would claim Raymond
    would also claim and be accepted by the Nutty Block members. This included Carlos,
    who claimed both Nutty Block and Raymond in the FI cards.
    It is common for members of Nutty Block and Raymond to commit crimes
    together. Nutty Block and Raymond share a common "hood day" when they meet at a
    park to "conduct business" such as firearms and narcotics trafficking. Organizationally,
    Nutty Block has a command structure run by a single individual, whereas Raymond does
    not have a separate command structure.
    Carlos was previously contacted in Nutty Block territory with other gang
    members, including his brother. Carlos and Juan committed the robbery at issue together,
    declaring an area in Rancho Cucamonga as Nutty Block and Raymond territory. All of
    this evidence of communication between members and joint work was sufficient to allow
    the jury to infer Nutty Block and Raymond should be treated as a single street gang.
    Additionally, the statute does not require the defendant to be an active or current
    member of the gang benefiting from the crime. (People v. Bragg (2008) 
    161 Cal.App.4th 1385
    , 1402; see People v. Albillar (2010) 
    51 Cal.4th 47
    , 67-68 [applicability of gang
    24
    enhancement "does not depend on membership in a gang at all"].) There was substantial
    evidence Carlos committed the crime for the benefit of Nutty Block even if he was not a
    member of Nutty Block or if Raymond did not qualify as a criminal street gang. Nutty
    Block qualifies as a criminal street gang. Carlos committed the robbery with Juan, a
    Nutty Block member, while they both claimed territory in San Bernardino County for
    Nutty Block and Compton Crips. There is more than ample evidence to support the jury's
    true finding of the gang benefit enhancement for Carlos.
    C
    Evidence Supporting Juan's Robbery Convictions
    Juan contends there is insufficient evidence he intended to steal Mack's property or
    to aid and abet the taking of his property to support his conviction for robbery. Again,
    we cannot agree.
    1
    Background
    During deliberations, the jury sent out a note asking, "If we believe that [Juan]
    participated willfully in the fight in which a theft occurred by someone in his party, in
    which he is [aligned], but Juan did not take the items in question, is he also guilty of the
    theft even though he did not personally take any items. By association with the
    crime/event." The court responded by giving standard jury instructions regarding aiding
    and abetting and allowed supplemental closing arguments on this issue.
    25
    2
    Analysis
    " 'Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of
    another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by
    means of force or fear.' (§ 211.) To be convicted of robbery, the perpetrator must intend
    to deprive the victim of the property permanently. [Citations.] Robbery requires the
    'intent to steal … either before or during the commission of the act of force' [citation],
    because '[i]f [the] intent to steal arose after the victim was assaulted, the robbery element
    of stealing by force or fear is absent.' " (People v. Huggins (2006) 
    38 Cal.4th 175
    , 214.)
    A defendant may be guilty as an aider and abettor if he "act[s] with knowledge of the
    criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of committing, or
    of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense." (People v. Beeman (1984) 
    35 Cal.3d 547
    , 560; see People v. McCoy (2001) 
    25 Cal.4th 1111
    , 1117-1118.)
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presuming
    in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have
    inferred from the evidence (People v. Zamudio (2008) 
    43 Cal.4th 327
    , 357), substantial
    evidence supports Juan's second degree robbery conviction. Juan did not just join in the
    first fight. When Carlos approached Mack with his bicycle and challenged him by saying
    "This is Compton, cuz'," Juan also made a gang claim saying, "This is Nutty Block."
    During the first fight, in which both Carlos and Juan participated, Mack felt someone
    going through his pockets, taking his lanyard from around his head and he heard someone
    say "grab that." The jury reasonably could have inferred Juan was working in concert
    26
    with Carlos to commit the robbery whether or not he took the items himself. While
    Carlos pursued Mack across the street and through a parking lot, Mack turned back and
    saw Juan with his bicycle. When Mack returned the bicycle was gone. From this
    evidence, the jury reasonably could have inferred either Juan committed the robbery
    himself by taking the bicycle and other items, or he was guilty under an aiding and
    abetting theory.9
    Later in the day, Mack approached both Carlos and Juan to ask for his bicycle.
    Mack initially testified "they told me I'm not getting it and we just started fighting."
    Mack then said Carlos actually made the statement. However, Juan did more than stand
    idly by. He took off his shirt to fight and again claimed the area for Nutty Block. The
    jury reasonably could have inferred Juan communicated, verbally or nonverbally, an
    intention to permanently deprive Mack of the bicycle through force or fear. Therefore,
    even if Juan did not actually take the bicycle himself, there was substantial evidence to
    support the second degree robbery conviction.
    V
    Prosecutor Remarks During Closing Argument
    Finally, Juan contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in violation of his
    due process rights by misstating the facts and the law in supplemental closing arguments
    regarding the aiding and abetting theory and his counsel rendered ineffective assistance
    9     The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a verdict. (People v.
    Zavala (2005) 
    130 Cal.App.4th 758
    , 766.) We do not reassess the credibility of the
    witnesses. (People v. Friend (2009) 
    47 Cal.4th 1
    , 41.)
    27
    by failing to object. Specifically, Juan contends the prosecutor misstated the facts when
    she argued both defendants said Mack could not have his bicycle whereas he later said
    Carlos made the statement. Juan also contends the prosecutor misstated the law by
    saying Juan was liable for "any crime" because Juan participated in the fight and referred
    to Nutty Block. We find no merit in these contentions.
    "Because defendant did not object to, or request that the jury be admonished in
    light of, any of the foregoing remarks, the claim has been forfeited." (People v. Huggins,
    
    supra,
     38 Cal.4th at p. 205.) Nevertheless, even exercising our discretion to consider the
    issue, we conclude there was no prejudicial misconduct. (People v. Fuiava (2012) 
    53 Cal.4th 622
    , 679.)10
    Although counsel may not mischaracterize evidence or state facts not in evidence,
    counsel is allowed " 'great latitude at argument to urge whatever conclusions counsel
    believes can properly be drawn from the evidence' " and " ' "[w]hether the inferences the
    prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to decide." ' " (People v. Valdez (2004) 
    32 Cal.4th 73
    , 133-134.) As discussed in section IV.C.2, infra, the jury could have drawn a
    10      Because we exercise our discretion to consider the merits of the prosecutorial
    misconduct argument, we need not reach the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.
    We note, however, " '[f]ailure to object rarely constitutes constitutionally ineffective legal
    representation . . . .' [Citation.] Moreover, '[i]f the record on appeal fails to show why
    counsel acted or failed to act in the instance asserted to be ineffective, unless counsel was
    asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no
    satisfactory explanation, the claim must be rejected on appeal.' [Citation.] These were
    not situations in which there could be no satisfactory explanation for counsel's failing to
    object to the remarks of which defendant now complains. For example, counsel could
    have preferred not to draw the jurors' attention to particular comments by the prosecutor
    by objecting to them." (People v. Huggins, 
    supra,
     38 Cal.4th at p. 206.)
    28
    reasonable inference both defendants conveyed Mack was not getting back his bicycle,
    even if Juan did not say so in so many words.
    In the context of discussing the first and second aiding and abetting elements, the
    prosecutor made the comment Juan was liable for "any crime that happened to the victim
    that day" because he referred to Nutty Block and joined the fight. The prosecutor then
    argued Juan intended to aid Carlos because Juan saw Carlos approach Mack with the
    bicycle and claim Compton. Juan claimed Nutty Block and participated in the fight in
    which items were taken, whether he took them or not. Before the second fight, both
    defendants conveyed they were not going to return Mack's bicycle. Both defendants fled
    the scene when Mack told police the defendants robbed him.
    The trial court correctly instructed the jury regarding the aiding and abetting
    theory and further instructed the jury the arguments of counsel were not evidence and
    "[o]nly the witness' answers are evidence." We presume the jury followed the
    instructions of the court absent any contrary indication. (People v. Gray (2005) 
    37 Cal.4th 168
    , 217.)
    Considering the record as a whole, we cannot conclude there is a reasonable
    likelihood the jury construed or applied the prosecutor's statements in an objectionable
    fashion. (People v. Caldwell (2013) 
    212 Cal.App.4th 1262
    , 1269.)
    29
    DISPOSITION
    The judgments are affirmed.
    MCCONNELL, P. J.
    WE CONCUR:
    HUFFMAN, J.
    NARES, J.
    30