Flores v. Keller CA4/1 ( 2015 )

Filed 12/2/15 Flores v. Keller CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SERGIO PEDROZA FLORES, D067215
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00075156-
CU-PO-CTL)
DANIEL KELLER,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Ronald L.
Styn, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Elic Anbar and Elic Anbar for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester and Darin L. Wessel for Defendant and
Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Sergio Pedroza Flores appeals from the grant of judgment
on the pleadings in favor of defendant and respondent Daniel Keller (Daniel). The court
granted Daniel's motion after it granted summary judgment in favor of Daniel's spouse,
Linda Lee Keller (Linda), which judgment Flores inexplicably did not appeal. Flores, a
landscape maintenance worker, initially sued only Linda for negligence after Flores fell
from a ladder while trimming a tree at defendants' residence, owned by Linda as her sole
and separate property. While Linda's summary judgment motion was pending, Flores
amended his complaint to add Daniel as "Doe 1."1 Flores contended Daniel was liable as
Linda's agent.
As we explain, we independently conclude judgment on the pleadings was
properly granted based on principles of res judicata. Affirmed.
OVERVIEW
A. Summary Judgment in Favor of Linda
In granting summary judgment for Linda,2 the court in its September 12, 2014
order ruled in part as follows:
"It is undisputed and the parties agree that . . . at the time of the incident, Plaintiff
was an employee of [Linda] Keller (not an independent contractor); Plaintiff was not an
employee entitled to workers' compensation coverage (because he did not meet the
minimum requirements for time worked or wages earned); and that, because of the
1 Although not the subject of this appeal, it is not clear that Flores's Doe amendment
was even proper because it appears Flores was neither truly ignorant of Daniel's identity
nor Daniel's relation to the injuries when Flores initiated the action against Linda. (See
Miller v. Thomas (1981) 121 Cal. App. 3d 440, 444–445; see also Munoz v. Purdy (1979)
91 Cal. App. 3d 942, 947 [noting the ignorance for purposes of a proper Doe amendment
must be " 'real and not feigned' "].)
2 The court in its order granting summary judgment referred to Linda as "Keller"
and to Daniel as "Mr. Keller."
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household domestic employees exemption, Keller, as a homeowner, was not required to
comply with California OSHA tree-trimming regulations [citation]. [¶] . . . [W]hat
remains is a cause of action for negligence.
"Keller submits evidence that Plaintiff trimmed the trees at Keller's house, as
needed, during each of the six to eight years he worked for Keller [citation]; on each of
these occasions Plaintiff used Keller's aluminum extension ladder because Plaintiff's
ladder was too small [citation]; on September 11, 2013 [i.e., the day of the accident],
Plaintiff let himself into the backyard and retrieved Keller's ladder from where it was
usually kept in the backyard [citation]; Plaintiff never experienced any problems with the
operation of the ladder on any prior occasion [citation]; Plaintiff took the ladder, in its
unextended position as he found it (with possibly one step extended) and placed the
ladder against the first tree he was going to trim [citation]; the top of the ladder was at a
height of between 13-15 feet [citation]; no one assisted Plaintiff in placing the ladder
against the tree [citation]; in placing the ladder against the tree, Plaintiff relied on his own
experience in using ladders with regard to how he set the ladder [citation]; Mr. Keller
never told Flores how to set up the ladder against the trees to be trimmed or how Plaintiff
should use the ladder [citation]; Plaintiff did not have any conversations with Keller or
Mr. Keller on the day of the slipping and does not have evidence to establish that a defect
contributed to Plaintiff's fall [citation]; Plaintiff climbed up the ladder while holding his
chainsaw in his right hand and when reaching the top, he was reaching for a palm tree
branch with his other hand bringing the chainsaw up to rest on the top rung when the
ladder slid out away from the tree and he fell [citation]. Keller also submits evidence that
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at some point prior to September 11, 2013, Plaintiff told the Kellers that the trees in the
front were too tall for him to trim and arranged for the tree trimmer he worked with to
trim the front trees [citation] and on September 11, 2013 the trees in the front yard had
already been trimmed by tree trimmer Raul Rodriquez with the indication that Plaintiff
would trim the trees in the back yard [citation]. [¶] . . . [¶]
"The court finds the evidence similar to that presented on summary judgment in
Zaragoza v. Ibarra (2009) 174 Cal. App. 4th 1012 [(Zaragoza)] . . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
". . . The undisputed evidence is that Plaintiff was the sole person who placed,
adjusted, and then climbed the ladder before he fell. There are no allegations that the
ladder was defective. Like Zaragoza, Plaintiff engaged in a maneuver from a height of
13-15 feet that any ordinary adult person would know posed a significant risk. Evidence
that Plaintiff required that taller trees be trimmed by a professional tree trimmer, that Mr.
Keller observed a professional tree trimmer trimming the trees in the front yard using
safety equipment, and that Plaintiff was directed to trim all trees which could be trimmed
using Keller's ladder is insufficient to create triable issues of material fact as to whether
Keller breached a duty of care to Plaintiff or whether such breach was the cause of
Plaintiff's alleged injuries. Similarly, Plaintiff's declaration that he was not provided with
safety equipment . . . does not create a triable issue because, under the authorities cited
above, Keller did not have a duty to provide such safety equipment."
B. Judgment on the Pleadings
As noted, Daniel moved for judgment on the pleadings after the court granted
Linda summary judgment. In connection with that motion, Daniel requested the court
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take judicial notice of portions of Linda's summary judgment motion and opposition
thereto; the court's September 12, 2014 order granting summary judgment; and a grant
deed dated May 8, 2013—before plaintiff's accident—transferring ownership of the
Kellers' residence to Linda as her sole and separate property.
In granting the motion, the court ruled in part as follows:
"The complaint alleges one cause of action for negligence against the owner of the
property, Linda Lee Keller. Plaintiff named Daniel Keller as Doe 1 on August 12, 2014.
As pled, the complaint alleges liability against Daniel Keller only in his capacity as agent
for the owner of the property, Linda Lee Keller. Daniel Keller submits judicially
noticeable evidence establishing that he is not an owner of the property. Thus, the
liability of Daniel Keller is predicated on his alleged capacity as agent for the owner of
the property.
"As set forth in this court's [September 12, 2014 order] granting Linda Lee Keller's
motion for summary judgment, Zaragoza . . . addresses the issue of negligence, under
facts virtually identical to those presented on this motion. [¶] . . . [¶]
". . . The judicially noticeable and undisputed evidence is that Plaintiff was the
sole person who placed, adjusted, and then climbed the ladder before he fell [citation];
[and] that Plaintiff is unaware of any defects in the ladder that contributed to the ladder
slipping and that Plaintiff does not have evidence to establish a defect contributed to
Plaintiff's fall. [Citation.] As the court reasoned in its prior ruling, . . . Plaintiff engaged
in a maneuver from a height of 13-15 feet that any ordinary adult person would know
posed a significant risk. Thus, allegations and evidence that Daniel Keller observed a
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professional tree trimmer trimming the trees in the front yard using safety equipment are
insufficient to establish that Daniel Keller breached a duty of care to Plaintiff or that any
such breach was the cause of Plaintiff's alleged injuries. Therefore, the court finds the
complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for negligence."
DISCUSSION
"Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action
in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them." (Mycogen
Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal. 4th 888, 896.) "To operate as a bar a judgment
must be final, on the same claim or cause of action, between the same parties, and must
be an adjudication on the merits." (McKinney v. County of Santa Clara (1980) 110
Cal. App. 3d 787, 794.)
"The term 'privity' refers to some relationship or connection with the party which
makes it proper to hold 'privies' bound with the actual parties. ' "Who are privies requires
careful examination into the circumstances of each case as it arises." ' [Citations.] The
courts have abandoned application of rigid categories in favor of a practical approach
which addresses the question of 'whether the non-party is sufficiently close to the original
case to afford application of the principle of preclusion.' " (Martin v. County of Los
Angeles (1996) 51 Cal. App. 4th 688, 700.)
As relevant here, res judicata arises when one party is in privity with another
because the parties' relationship is "that of principal and agent." (Triano v. F.E. Booth &
Co. (1932) 120 Cal. App. 345, 347 (Triano).) "If the party who actually causes the injury
is free from liability by reason of his acts, it must follow that his principal is entitled to a
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like immunity. In other words, a judgment in favor of the immediate actor is a bar to an
action against one whose liability is derivative from or dependent upon the culpability of
the immediate actor." (Id. at pp. 347–348, italics added.)
We independently conclude (see Kapsimallis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2002) 104
Cal. App. 4th 667, 672) the court properly granted Daniel's motion for judgment on the
pleadings as a result of its September 12, 2014 order granting Linda's motion for
summary judgment, which judgment Flores did not appeal. (See Howard v. Thrifty Drug
& Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal. 4th 424, 443 [noting as a court of review, " '[w]e uphold
judgments if they are correct for any reason' "].)
As noted, the court in its September 12, 2014 order found there were no triable
issues of material fact to show breach of duty or causation because the undisputed
evidence showed: that Flores was the sole person who placed, adjusted, and then climbed
the ladder before he fell; that there was no evidence or allegations that the ladder was
defective; and that Flores engaged in a maneuver from a height of 13-15 feet that any
ordinary adult would know posed a significant risk of potential harm. As a party in
privity with Linda whose potential liability was, in any event, derivative, Daniel was
entitled to assert the bar of res judicata based on Linda's judgment. (See Triano, supra,
120 Cal.App. at p. 347.)3
3 In light of our decision, we decline to address Daniel's alternative contentions.
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DISPOSITION
The order granting Daniel's motion for judgment on the pleadings and the
judgment entered thereon are affirmed. Daniel to recover his costs of appeal.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McINTYRE, J.
IRION, J.
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