Imperial County Department of Social Services v. S.S. ( 2015 )


Menu:
  • Filed 11/19/15; pub. order 12/10/15 (see end of opn.)
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    D068026
    IMPERIAL COUNTY DEPARTMENT
    OF SOCIAL SERVICES et al.,
    (Super. Ct. No. JJP3201)
    Plaintiffs and Respondents,
    v.
    S.S.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of Imperial County, William D.
    Quan, Judge. Affirmed.
    Valerie N. Lankford for Defendant and Appellant A.A. (Minor).
    Rosemary Bishop for Defendant and Appellant S.S.
    Katherine K. Turner, County Counsel, and Rosario T. Gonzalez, Deputy County
    Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    We are confronted with the legal issue of whether a juvenile court may retain
    jurisdiction over a dependency case after the subject child has died, for the purpose of
    learning the child's cause of death and/or appointing a guardian ad litem to investigate
    potential tort claims for the child's estate. The juvenile court determined it must
    terminate its jurisdiction under the circumstances. We agree and affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In November 2014, 21-month-old A.A.1 (Child) was detained and removed from
    the home and care of her mother, As.A. (Mother). While in the family home, Child had
    been allowed to play with lit matches, exposed to heavy marijuana smoke, and
    surrounded by a variety of drug paraphernalia and drugs in plain sight. Mother was
    arrested and temporarily incarcerated. Child's father, S.S. (Father), who lived separately,
    had a history of substance abuse and declined to take custody of Child.
    Mother and Father did not contest the juvenile court's jurisdiction under Welfare
    and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b),2 and Child was placed with foster
    parents, the C.'s. At the C.'s, Child was reportedly healthy, happy, and enjoying visits
    with Mother, who wanted to regain custody of Child.
    At the December 15, 2014 disposition hearing, the Imperial County Department of
    Social Services (the Department) reported that Child had passed away the previous day.
    1      Child's legal name varied throughout the record. Her birth certificate indicates a
    legal name with initials "A.A.," but she is sometimes referred to by a name with initials
    "A.D."
    2     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
    otherwise stated.
    2
    Almost a week prior, Child had been found unresponsive in the C.'s home and taken to
    the hospital, but died several days later. Child had suffered a severe brain injury, among
    other injuries, and a doctor at the children's hospital where Child was brought opined that
    it was "very likely inflicted trauma." The Department informed the court that multiple
    investigations were ongoing regarding the circumstances of Child's death. The
    Department was conducting a separate investigation for the welfare of other children who
    had been living in the C.'s home. The police department was conducting a criminal
    investigation, and other governmental agencies were investigating the C.'s for foster care
    and day care licensing purposes.
    The next day, the court considered the Department's request for "Disclosure of
    Juvenile Case File," in which the Department sought certain documents from Child's case
    file for use in a different dependency case. The court granted the Department's request.
    Mother asked that Child's case be held open for another 30 days so that a death certificate
    could be obtained, and the court agreed.
    At a review hearing in January 2015, the Department reported that it could obtain
    an informational copy of Child's death certificate within a few days, but it would not
    contain an official "cause of death" because the medical examiner's report would not be
    finalized for another 60 days. Mother and Father stated that they knew that Child was
    dead, but wished to know the cause of their daughter's death. The court, observing it still
    did not have Child's official death certificate, agreed to hold open the case for another 90
    days.
    3
    In April 2015, the Department filed a "Request to Terminate Jurisdiction and
    Dismiss Dependency Petition," arguing that Child was not a person described in section
    300 for purposes of the court's jurisdiction and attaching a copy of Child's death
    certificate. In a hearing on the Department's request, Child's counsel stated that he would
    be filing a motion for appointment of separate counsel to investigate whether Child had a
    potential tort claim, i.e., a guardian ad litem (GAL). Although Mother was represented
    by counsel in a separate civil proceeding regarding Child's death, Mother and Father
    wanted the juvenile case held open due to their desire to know what had caused Child to
    die.3 In colloquy with counsel, the court commented that it believed the Department's
    role in the case was terminated, Mother and Father had other legal avenues for seeking
    information, and any GAL would benefit Child's estate rather than Child. The court
    requested the parties to file points and authorities on the issues so that the court might
    fully understand its obligations prior to terminating its jurisdiction. A further hearing was
    set in May 2015.
    In the interim, Child's counsel moved for a GAL to investigate potential civil
    claims on behalf of Child's estate, as well as objected to dismissal of the juvenile case
    until any GAL's investigation was complete. In response, the Department filed a "Second
    Request to Terminate Jurisdiction and Dismiss Dependency Petition and Opposition to
    Motion to Appoint Tort Guardian Ad Litem." The Department's position continued to be
    that Child was no longer "a person" falling into the court's jurisdiction under section 300,
    3       On appeal, Father states that he is also separately represented by counsel in the
    civil proceeding.
    4
    and the juvenile court had proof of Child's death. Likewise, the Department argued that
    the court's authority to appoint a tort GAL was premised on the need to protect the
    interests of a living child, distinct from a child's estate.
    Following a hearing, the court terminated its jurisdiction and denied Child's
    motion for a GAL. The court stated: "I don't understand or see how we can retain or
    continue jurisdiction over a file or a child once the child has deceased, especially under
    Welfare and Institutions Code, when our goal is to protect the welfare of the child[,] and
    in the court's opinion, that would require a living child . . . ." The court further discussed
    that any cause of action arising from the child's death (e.g., a wrongful death suit) would
    run to the child's heirs or parents. The court also commented that when a person has
    died, the person's interests need to be championed in a different venue, such as probate
    court.
    Child filed a timely appeal of the court's order terminating jurisdiction and
    denying appointment of a GAL. Father timely appealed the court's order terminating
    jurisdiction.
    DISCUSSION
    Despite Child's undisputed death, Child and Father contend the juvenile court had
    authority to maintain an open case, and issue orders, for the purpose of obtaining Child's
    cause of death. Child also contends that the court was authorized to appoint a GAL to
    investigate potential tort claims on behalf of Child's estate. The facts of this case are
    undisputed, and we review questions of law de novo. (Pack v. Kings County Human
    Services Agency (2001) 
    89 Cal. App. 4th 821
    , 835.)
    5
    The issue presented to us is not addressed in the Welfare and Institutions Code nor
    has it been discussed in case law. Perhaps inherent in the notion of child protection—at
    the heart of dependency cases—is the existence of a living child, such that a need for
    review has not previously presented itself. In any event, we conclude the juvenile court
    properly terminated jurisdiction when it did.
    "The juvenile court is a special department of the superior court and has powers
    limited to those granted by and incidental to the Juvenile Court Law, Welfare and
    Institutions Code section 200 et seq. [Citation.] 'Under the Juvenile Court Law, the
    juvenile court is authorized to make orders pertaining to abused or neglected children
    who come within the court's jurisdiction.' " (In re C.F. (2011) 
    198 Cal. App. 4th 454
    ,
    466.)
    In dependency cases, a juvenile court has jurisdiction to make orders pertaining to
    "[a]ny child who comes within any of the [statutory] descriptions" set forth in
    subdivisions (a) through (j) of section 300. (§ 300.) The purpose of dependency law "is
    to provide maximum safety and protection for children who are currently being
    physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to
    ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are
    at risk of that harm." (§ 300.2, italics added.) As numerous courts have reiterated, "[t]he
    paramount purpose underlying dependency proceedings is the protection of the child.
    [Citations.] 'The parents do not represent a competing interest in this respect.' " (In re
    Jason L. (1990) 
    222 Cal. App. 3d 1206
    , 1214-1215.)
    6
    Specifically here, where the juvenile court maintained jurisdiction over Child
    under section 300, subdivision (b), the Legislature has explicitly declared, "[t]he child
    shall continue to be a dependent child pursuant to this subdivision only so long as is
    necessary to protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness."
    (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) When Child's death was confirmed, there could no longer be any
    risk of her suffering future harm. Moreover, the legal framework surrounding
    dependency cases, with its desire for reunification of families, or if not possible,
    development of a permanent placement plan, contemplate that a juvenile court's orders
    will be made for the benefit of living children. (See, e.g., §§ 361.5 [discussing provision
    of reunification services]; 366.21 [schedule of hearings to review child's placement and
    progress]; 366.26, subd. (b) [placement preference to ensure stable, permanent homes for
    children].)
    Father argues that the juvenile court had "inherent authority" to keep the case
    open and determine Child's cause of death. We disagree since a court is first required to
    have jurisdiction before it can rely on "inherent powers" to issue orders. (In re 
    C.F., supra
    , 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 466 [inherent powers permit a court to adopt new methods
    of practice not specified by statute or rule, but the court must first have jurisdiction].) A
    juvenile court is authorized to consider a request for disclosure of a child's case file. (In
    re Elijah S. (2005) 
    125 Cal. App. 4th 1532
    , 1551; § 827, subd. (a)(2).) Further, the court
    can satisfy itself that a child is, in fact, deceased as represented to be, and therefore, no
    longer in need of protection. However, once a juvenile court has performed its statutorily
    7
    authorized duties and made any necessary incidental orders, continued judicial action
    would exceed its jurisdiction.
    Given that the court properly terminated its jurisdiction, it correctly denied Child's
    motion for a GAL. Child's counsel cites cases pertaining to the court's authority to
    appoint a GAL to investigate minors' potential tort claims, but in each cited case, the
    minor was alive. (E.g., In re Nicole H. (2011) 
    201 Cal. App. 4th 388
    , 392-393 [separate
    GAL required to investigate potential tort claim arising from 13-year-old girl's report of
    rape by another minor in foster home]; San Diego County Department of Social Services
    v. Superior Court (2005) 
    134 Cal. App. 4th 761
    , 765 [12-year-old boy reported he was
    molested at a group home].) The court's authority to appoint a separate GAL for a living
    child was consistent with dependency law's overarching purpose of protecting the child,
    which is not the case here. The law provides that Child's successor-in-interest may
    pursue any of her surviving claims (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.30), and Child's heirs may
    pursue any of their own tort claims arising from Child's death (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60
    [wrongful death action]). It appears that Child's parents have taken steps in this regard.
    Child's parents understandably wish to know how their daughter passed away
    while placed in a foster home. They and other members of the public have a method of
    accessing Child's case file for relevant information. (In re Elijah 
    S., supra
    , 125
    Cal.App.4th at p. 1556 [purpose of changes to statute governing disclosure of juvenile
    case files was to make "it easier for the press and the public to investigate the death of
    suspected victims of abuse and neglect" and to " 'open the workings of the dependency
    court and the foster care system to public scrutiny . . . .' " (Original italics.)].)
    8
    Regardless, the juvenile court was not authorized to retain jurisdiction indefinitely for the
    purpose of determining Child's cause of death. Consequently, the trial court properly
    terminated its jurisdiction.
    DISPOSITION
    The juvenile court's order terminating jurisdiction and denying appointment of a
    GAL is affirmed.
    HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
    WE CONCUR:
    HALLER, J.
    IRION, J.
    9
    Filed 12/10/15
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    D068026
    IMPERIAL COUNTY DEPARTMENT
    OF SOCIAL SERVICES et al.,
    (Super. Ct. No. JJP3201)
    Plaintiffs and Respondents,
    v.
    S.S.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    THE COURT:
    The opinion in this case filed November 19, 2015 was not certified for publication.
    It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules
    of Court, rule 8.1105(c), respondent 's request pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule
    8.1120(a), for publication is GRANTED.
    IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for publication
    specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
    ORDERED that the words "Not to Be Published in the Official Reports" appearing
    on page one of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be published in the Official
    Reports.
    HUFFMAN
    Acting Presiding Justice
    cc: All Parties
    

Document Info

Docket Number: D068026

Judges: Huffman, Haller, Irion

Filed Date: 12/10/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/3/2024