People v. Pickett CA3 ( 2015 )


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  • Filed 12/21/15 P. v. Pickett CA3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    (Shasta)
    ----
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                                 C077422
    v.                                                                       (Super. Ct. Nos. 14F135,
    13F6732 )
    JENELL WIND PICKETT,
    Defendant and Appellant.                                     OPINION ON DISMISSAL
    Defendant Jenell Wind Pickett claims this court must remand her matter for
    resentencing or permit her to withdraw her plea because her plea agreement provided for
    a 10-year split sentence and she was instead sentenced to serve 9 years in county jail.
    The People argue this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s challenge because
    she did not appeal the order imposing this sentence. As defendant did not appeal from
    the order granting probation in which the sentence was imposed and execution
    suspended, but from the subsequent order revoking defendant’s probation and requiring
    1
    her to serve the previously imposed sentence, we agree with the People and dismiss the
    appeal.
    A detailed recitation of the facts is unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal.
    Defendant pleaded no contest to bringing a controlled substance into a county jail (Pen.
    Code, § 45731) in case No. 13-06732, transportation of a controlled substance (Health
    & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and three counts of receiving stolen property (§ 496,
    subd. (a)), and admitted an on-bail enhancement (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)) in case No. 14-
    00135, in exchange for a stipulated 10-year split sentence pursuant to section 1170,
    subdivision (h),2 referral to the “re-entry court” for supervision, and dismissal of other
    charges. In the plea agreement, defendant acknowledged the maximum period of
    incarceration she may have to serve would be 10 years, and her maximum period of
    probation would be 5 years.
    On April 7, 2014, the trial court pronounced judgment and sentence in both cases.
    After considering the report of the probation officer and the stipulation of counsel that the
    maximum period of confinement was 9 years rather than the previously agreed-upon 10
    1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2      When defendant was sentenced, section 1170, subdivision (h)(5), provided, in
    relevant part, a defendant sentenced to county jail pursuant to the provisions of
    section 1170 could be sentenced either: “(A) For a full term in custody as determined
    in accordance with the applicable sentencing law,” or “(B) (i) For a term as determined
    in accordance with the applicable sentencing law, but suspend execution of a concluding
    portion of the term selected in the court’s discretion, during which time the defendant
    shall be supervised by the county probation officer in accordance with the terms,
    conditions, and procedures generally applicable to persons placed on probation, for the
    remaining unserved portion of the sentence imposed by the court. The period of
    supervision shall be mandatory, and may not be earlier terminated except by court order,”
    which period is known as “mandatory supervision.” (Stats. 2013, ch. 508, § 5.)
    2
    years, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve an aggregate term of 9 years -- the
    upper term of 4 years for transportation of a controlled substance, a consecutive 2 years
    for the on-bail enhancement, 3 consecutive 8-month terms for the receipt of stolen
    property offenses, and a consecutive 1 year for bringing a controlled substance into jail.
    The trial court suspended execution of the sentence for 3 years and ordered defendant to
    formal probation under enumerated terms and conditions.3
    One week later, defendant’s probation was revoked and reinstated following her
    termination from a residential treatment facility. Then, in June 2014, defendant’s
    probation was again revoked and reinstated, this time following her failure to report to
    the probation department and failure to keep her global positioning system monitor
    charged. Finally, in July 2014, defendant’s probation was revoked after her failure to
    (1) keep her monitor charged, (2) appear in court, (3) enter a treatment program, and (4)
    stay away from a location as required by the conditions of her probation.
    After she admitted violating her probation, defendant requested that a split
    sentence be imposed. The People argued defendant had been granted a suspended
    sentence even though she was presumed ineligible for probation, and she had already
    “been sentenced to nine years.” Defendant’s counsel responded that the plea agreement
    had initially been premised on a split sentence, and that agreement had been “amended”
    to order defendant on probation with a suspended sentence. On September 8, 2014, the
    3      The judgment was subsequently amended by the trial court on July 28, 2014, to
    indicate defendant’s confinement was to “local prison” pursuant to section 1170,
    subdivision (h), rather than state prison.
    3
    trial court terminated defendant’s probation and ordered her to county jail to complete the
    sentence previously imposed. It is from this order defendant appeals.4
    Pursuant to section 1237, subdivision (a), a defendant may appeal from an order
    granting probation. “In general, an appealable order that is not appealed from becomes
    final and binding and may not subsequently be attacked on an appeal from a later
    appealable order or judgment. [Citations.] Thus, a defendant who elects not to appeal an
    order granting or modifying probation cannot raise claims of error with respect to the
    grant or modification of probation in a later appeal from a judgment following revocation
    of probation. [Citations.]” (People v. Ramirez (2008) 
    159 Cal.App.4th 1412
    , 1421; see
    also People v. Dagostino (2004) 
    117 Cal.App.4th 974
    , 997 [failure to file a timely notice
    of appeal from the court’s order granting conditions of probation bars challenge to
    conditions from being raised on appeal from a later order revoking probation]; accord
    People v. Kelly (2013) 
    215 Cal.App.4th 297
    , 307 [involving failure to appeal from an
    order imposing and suspending execution of a sentence and granting probation].)
    Here, defendant did not timely appeal the April 2014 order granting probation in
    which the 9-year sentence was imposed. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a) [“notice
    of appeal . . . must be filed within 60 days after the rendition of the judgment or the
    making of the order being appealed”].) Therefore, defendant is jurisdictionally
    foreclosed in this court from raising any issues relative to that judgment, including
    whether a split sentence should have been imposed.
    4      Defendant filed a notice of appeal on September 11, 2014. Even if this notice
    were construed as a notice of appeal from the April 7, 2014 judgment, it would be
    untimely because it was filed more than 60 days after the judgment. (See Cal. Rules of
    Court, rule 8.308(a).) In her briefs, defendant does not claim she meant this appeal to
    apply to the April 7, 2014 judgment, but argues the breach of the plea agreement arose on
    September 8, 2014.
    4
    DISPOSITION
    The appeal is dismissed.
    /s/
    HOCH, J.
    We concur:
    /s/
    BLEASE, Acting P. J.
    /s/
    BUTZ, J.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: C077422

Filed Date: 12/21/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/22/2015