People v. Brown CA2/8 ( 2016 )


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  • Filed 1/29/16 P. v. Brown CA2/8
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION EIGHT
    THE PEOPLE,                                                          B262343
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. TA131437)
    v.
    INDIA MONAE BROWN,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
    Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
    Emily Lowther, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez and Viet
    H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    ________________________________
    India Monae Brown filed a petition for resentencing under Proposition 47, the
    Safe Neighborhood and Schools Act. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18; hereafter Proposition 47 or
    the Act). The trial court denied the petition. We affirm.
    FACTS
    On June 4, 2014, Brown pled nolo contendere to a felony count of receiving stolen
    property in violation of Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a).1
    On November 4, 2014, the voters of California passed Proposition 47. The Act
    went into effect the next day. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a).) As relevant here,
    Proposition 47 reduced certain felony offenses to misdemeanors and enacted a
    resentencing provision –– section 1170.18 –– under which persons currently serving a
    felony sentence for an offense that is today a misdemeanor may file a petition to be
    resentenced for the misdemeanor offense. The offense of receiving stolen property is
    amenable to such Proposition 47 treatment, provided the value of the property taken does
    not exceed $950.
    On February 24, 2015, Brown filed a proposition 47 petition in the trial court to be
    resentenced as a misdemeanant on her receiving stolen property conviction. The District
    Attorney alleged Brown was ineligible for relief because the value of property exceeded
    $950.
    The trial court denied Brown’s petition after reviewing the preliminary hearing
    transcript, stating: “I think the spirit of Prop 47, if the property is below a certain
    amount, then it would fall under that. I don’t think Ms. Brown falls into that category.”
    Read in context, the court’s statement must be interpreted to mean that it was making a
    factual finding, based on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, that the value
    of the property involved in Brown’s crime exceeded the $950 threshold for Proposition
    47’s reclassification of her felony to a misdemeanor. The court did not make any express
    statements about whether it had placed the burden of proof on Brown to establish that the
    value of the property was less than $950. However, we find it safe to conclude from the
    1
    All further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
    2
    court’s comments that it placed the burden on Brown to show the value of the stolen
    property she had received.
    Brown filed a timely notice of appeal.
    DISCUSSION
    Brown contends the trial court’s decision to deny her Proposition 47 petition must
    be reversed because the People did not establish –– beyond a reasonable doubt –– that the
    value of the stolen goods that she received was worth more than $950. We find no error.
    Section 1170.18 is silent on burden of proof matters on a Proposition 47 petition.
    It does not specify whether the petitioner must prove his or her eligibility for resentencing
    or, alternatively, whether the People must prove his or her ineligibility for resentencing.
    Further, Proposition 47 does not prescribe the applicable burden of proof, for example,
    beyond a reasonable doubt or preponderance of the evidence.
    In People v. Sherow (2015) 
    239 Cal.App.4th 875
     (Sherow), the trial court denied a
    petition pursuant to Proposition 47 seeking resentencing on multiple convictions for the
    offense of commercial burglary in violation of section 459. Division One of the Fourth
    District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that a Proposition 47 petitioner bears the
    burden of proof to establish that he or she is eligible for resentencing by showing that the
    value of property involved in an offense did not exceed $950, and finding the petition at
    issue gave “virtually no information regarding [the petitioner’s] eligibility for
    resentencing.” (Id. at pp. 879-880.) The court affirmed the denial of the petition
    “without prejudice to subsequent consideration of a properly filed petition.” (Id. at
    p. 881.)
    We find that Sherow provides sound guidance for Proposition 47 petitions.
    Further, in accord with Sherow, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny Brown’s
    Proposition 47 petition. Brown failed to meet her burden of proof under any possible
    standard because her petition provide no meaningful information as to her eligibility for
    resentencing. Her petition included no evidence at all concerning the value of the stolen
    property she had received. As did the Sherow court, we affirm the denial of Brown’s
    3
    Proposition 47 petition “without prejudice to subsequent consideration of a properly filed
    petition.”
    DISPOSITION
    The order denying Brown’s Proposition 47 petition for resentencing is affirmed
    without prejudice to consideration of a petition properly supported by a showing that she
    is eligible for resentencing in accord with the Act.
    BIGELOW, P.J.
    We concur:
    RUBIN, J.
    FLIER, J.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B262343

Filed Date: 1/29/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/29/2016