People v. Dibble CA2/5 ( 2015 )


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  • Filed 12/18/15 P. v. Dibble CA2/5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FIVE
    THE PEOPLE,                                                          B265379
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. VA034948)
    v.
    BARRY DIBBLE,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, William C.
    Ryan, Judge. Affirmed.
    Richard Lennon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and
    Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Defendant, Barry Dibble, appeals from an order denying his section 1170.126
    resentencing petition. Defendant is serving indeterminate life terms for crimes
    committed in 1995. The first indeterminate term resulted from defendant’s conviction of
    second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, 1 § 211.) The second indeterminate term resulted
    from defendant’s conviction of assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm or by
    any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Former § 245, subd. (a)(1),
    Stats. 1993, ch. 369, § 1, pp. 2168-2169.) Defendant swung a six-to-eight inch knife at
    the victims. The jury found defendant personally used a knife during the commission of
    the robbery within the meaning of former section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). (Stats. 1995,
    ch. 377, § 8, p. 1949.) The jury also found defendant personally used a deadly and
    dangerous weapon, a knife, in the commission of the aggravated assault within the
    meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23). As noted above, the trial court denied
    defendant’s section 1170.126 sentencing recall petition. The trial court ruled, “One of
    defendant’s current convictions is for robbery (. . . section 211), which is a violent felony
    pursuant to . . . section 667.5[, subdivision] (c)(9), making [d]efendant ineligible for
    resentencing under . . . section 1170.126[, subdivision] (e)(1).”
    Defendant argues: “[Defendant] is serving a third-‘strike’ indeterminate sentence
    for assault which is not a serious or violent felony. That he was also convicted of, and
    sentenced to prison, on a robbery charge, which is a serious felony does not render him
    ineligible for recall and resentencing on the charge which is not a serious felony. (People
    v. Johnson and Machado (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 674
    .)” We disagree and affirm the order.
    Defendant is ineligible for resentencing. (§ 1170.126, subds. (e)(1), (e)(2).) He is
    not serving an indeterminate life term for any nonserious, nonviolent felony. Defendant
    is currently serving indeterminate life terms for second degree robbery, a violent and a
    serious felony. (§§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9), 1192.7, subd. (c)(19).) In addition, defendant is
    serving an indeterminate term for felonious aggravated assault in which he personally
    used a dangerous or deadly weapon, a serious felony. (§ 1192.7, subds. (c)(23), (c)(31).)
    1      Further statutory references are to the Penal Code except where otherwise noted.
    2
    Thus, both of defendant’s terms disqualify him from resentencing. (§ 1170.126, subds.
    (b), (e)(1).) And during the commission of the current robbery and aggravated assault,
    defendant was armed with a deadly weapon thereby disqualifying him from resentencing.
    (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii), 1170.126, subd. (e)(2).)
    In addition, defendant’s appellate counsel has interposed two objections which
    warrant comment. First, defendant contends there is no showing he was armed.
    Defendant reasons that the jury convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon or by
    means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. This is incorrect. The jury’s verdict
    reads “assault great bodily injury and with deadly weapon, to wit, a knife” which
    demonstrates he was armed with a deadly weapon (Italics added.) Moreover, the jury
    found defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife, within the
    meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23), in the commission of the aggravated
    assault. We may judicially notice that finding. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd.
    (a); Bennett v. Regents of University of California (2005) 
    133 Cal.App.4th 347
    , 358, fn. 7
    [“Judicial notice can be taken only of the contents of orders, findings of fact, conclusions
    of law, and judgments”]; Kilroy v. State (2004) 
    119 Cal.App.4th 140
    , 145 [same].) There
    is ample evidence defendant used a knife and thus was armed.
    Second, defense counsel contends he “does not have the appellate record” we have
    judicially noticed. On September 11, 2015, we gave notice of our intention to judicially
    notice the record on direct appeal in People v. Dibble (July 1, 1998, B110751) [nonpub.
    opn.]. (Evid. Code §§ 452, subd. (d), 455, subd. (a), 459, subds. (a), (b).) These
    judicially noticed documents have been available for appellate counsel’s review at all
    times. Appellate counsel’s office is approximately four blocks from the clerk’s office
    where the documents at issue have always been maintained.
    3
    The order under review is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    TURNER, P. J.
    We concur:
    MOSK, J.
    BAKER, J.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B265379

Filed Date: 12/18/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/19/2015