People v. Sotelo-Urena , 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 259 ( 2016 )


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  • Filed 10/26/16
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    A144021
    v.
    VLADIMIR SOTELO-URENA,                             (Sonoma County
    Super. Ct. No. SCR644374)
    Defendant and Appellant.
    In April 2016, George Lowery, a 50-year-old homeless man, was beaten to death
    in San Diego County. Two brothers were charged with his kidnapping, torture, and
    murder. That same month, the homeless 51-year-old John Gerald Holiday was murdered
    near a dumpster in downtown Fresno.
    The next month saw the murders of two more homeless individuals: 66-year-old
    Stephen Williams was found dead in a pond in Golden Gate Park. It was reported that
    two men, along with other assailants, had tortured Williams over a three-day period,
    eventually killing him and dumping his body in the pond. And 37-year-old Joshua
    William Clark died in Santa Rosa following a one-sided fight with another man over
    either cigarettes or a debt owed for marijuana. Both men were homeless and downtown
    Santa Rosa regulars.
    In July 2016, the police arrested a man suspected of committing a series of attacks
    in San Diego that left three homeless men dead and at least two others seriously injured.
    These tragedies in those few months are not anomalies—studies show that
    homeless individuals are the victims of crime at a significantly higher rate than housed
    individuals.
    1
    Here, on trial for the first degree murder of Nicholas Bloom, defendant Vladimir
    Sotelo-Urena—who was homeless—sought to introduce expert testimony to this effect,
    via an expert prepared to testify that as a result of this higher rate of victimization,
    homeless individuals experience a heightened sensitivity to perceived threats of violence.
    This evidence, defendant submitted, was relevant to his claim that he acted in
    self-defense or, at the very least, imperfect self-defense. The trial court excluded the
    testimony on the ground that it was irrelevant to defendant’s claim that he actually and
    reasonably believed he needed to use lethal force to defend himself—that homelessness
    was a “common experience with the jurors and not subject to expert testimony.”
    On appeal, defendant contends among other things, that the exclusion of the expert
    testimony was an abuse of discretion and deprived him of his constitutional right to
    present a complete defense, and that this error was prejudicial. We agree, and we reverse
    on that ground, without a need to address defendant’s other arguments.
    EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
    In December 2013, 31-year-old defendant had been homeless for over two years.
    He had been living in Santa Rosa for five or six months, having moved from Las Vegas
    to attend Santa Rosa Junior College. While in Santa Rosa, he frequently spent the night
    downtown behind the Santa Rosa public library. Nicholas Bloom was also homeless and
    camped in downtown Santa Rosa.
    Around 8:30 or 9:00 p.m. on December 24, Donovan Sweeden was in a downtown
    Santa Rosa homeless encampment that he shared with Bloom. He watched Bloom inject
    “a fat one”—an 80cc syringe of methamphetamine—described by a medical expert as a
    dosage large enough to kill someone who was not a regular user habituated to the drug.
    After shooting up, Bloom became “agitated,” “upset,” and “aggressive.” Sweeden
    described him as “hot. . . . [S]eemed to be somewhat out of it,” and said he “could be
    perceived” as violent and “explosive.”
    Around 10:00 p.m., Bloom left the encampment and walked down Jeju Way, an
    alley that runs behind the Russian River Brewing Company and the Santa Rosa public
    library. He soon encountered defendant, an encounter that ended when defendant
    2
    admittedly stabbed Bloom to death. Because defendant did not testify at trial, his version
    of what happened during that encounter came from two interviews with Santa Rosa
    police officers after his arrest. The recordings of those interviews were played for the
    jury, and were in substance as follows:
    Defendant generally camped in the back of the library, most nights sleeping
    “down at the bottom level.” Defendant, who was Muslim, was sitting alone on the rear
    steps of the library reading the Quran when Bloom approached him from the direction of
    the Russian River Brewing Company. From Bloom’s mannerisms, defendant believed he
    was “probably” intoxicated.
    With an aggressive demeanor, Bloom asked if defendant had a cigarette.
    Defendant did not respond and continued to read. With an angry voice, Bloom asked if
    he spoke English, and defendant responded that he did. Bloom again asked if he had a
    cigarette, and defendant answered that he did not. Bloom moved even closer with a
    belligerent attitude, as if he wanted to fight.
    Defendant had been stabbed a few weeks earlier, and he was “pretty sure” he
    recognized Bloom as one of his attackers: “[H]e was one of the people that, one of the
    individuals that, you know, tried to harm me, tried to kill me in the past . . . .”1 Bloom
    approached “like he’s gonna do something,” and defendant thought, “[O]h shit, another
    fight.” Bloom “went to grab something” from his pocket or waistband, and defendant
    believed he was grabbing a knife: “I didn’t see a knife but I’m, but I’m pretty sure he had
    something in his hand ‘cause he kept like, like he wanted, you know, and like I was
    getting stabbed again, essentially.” Defendant did not have good eyesight, but he thought
    he saw “something thin” with a “linear line” to it, and he believed Bloom was “gonna
    poke [him] or stab [him] or something.”
    As Bloom got closer, defendant felt he was in danger because he had been through
    this before: “I just felt like I was in a position of danger and it was, and it got my nerves
    1
    It was stipulated that Bloom was in fact in custody on November 11, the day
    defendant was stabbed.
    3
    rattled, ya know? My adrenaline just jumped up.” He grabbed his backpack and pulled
    out a kitchen knife he had bought for protection after he was stabbed. At that point,
    Bloom was “[p]retty close.” Defendant told Bloom to get away or he was “gonna send
    [him] straight to hell.” Bloom said, “oh really?” and laughed like he wanted to hurt
    defendant.
    They then “got tangling” and “just started going at it.” They “kinda
    walked . . . kinda waltzed” down to the end of the street, where defendant grabbed
    Bloom’s shirt and went for his throat, stabbing him. Bloom fell to the ground on his
    back, and defendant “got on top of him [and] made sure that he didn’t get up,” “made
    sure that he didn’t pose a threat . . . .” Defendant explained: “I wasn’t gonna wait for
    him to get stabbed. Last time it happened is because I waited. And because ya know, I
    let, you know, him get the best of me, you know, and I wasn’t gonna do that a second
    time.” Defendant continued to stab Bloom after he was down because he “had to make
    sure he didn’t . . . move.” After it was over, defendant was “pissed,” and he kicked
    Bloom in the head. According to defendant, the altercation started at the library steps and
    ended almost at the end of the street. He did not know how they got that far, although
    they were “lunging at each other . . . .”
    When asked if he knew how many times he had stabbed Bloom, defendant
    responded, a “Bunch of times,” and “A lot.” “Enough, enough to mess somebody up
    permanently.” When asked if he was trying to kill Bloom, defendant answered,
    “Essentially, yes. I wasn’t tryin’ to tickle him,” and “Obviously. I’m not gonna lie, yes.”
    After stabbing Bloom, defendant walked back to the steps, put the knife in his
    backpack, and “just sat there.” He felt “sick,” “sad,” “kinda weak,” and “disgusted.” He
    then waited for the police to arrive: “I mean, I wasn’t gonna run. I wasn’t gonna be like
    well, I didn’t do it. ‘Cause, I mean, I’m not gonna lie, I’m not supposed to lie about
    anything.”
    Defendant denied that he tried to rob Bloom, that Bloom asked for money, or that
    they had been engaged in any kind of transaction. Bloom had not solicited a sexual
    encounter with defendant, and defendant denied having a sexual relationship with him.
    4
    He denied that he had wanted payback for having been stabbed a few weeks earlier.
    Defendant claimed he did not know anything about money that was found on the ground
    and in Bloom’s hands.
    Defendant also told the police officers about another incident that occurred about
    six days before he was stabbed. It was a verbal altercation with someone else, and he did
    not know why but “they wanna hurt me. They wanna kill me.”
    Jeffrey Jones, a passerby, testified at defendant’s trial. Around 10:30 p.m. on
    December 24, 2013, Jones left the Russian River Brewing Company and walked through
    Jeju Way on his way home. He passed by defendant, who was sitting on the library steps
    10 to 12 feet away. As he continued walking, he noticed a crumpled $20 bill on the
    ground. About 30 steps away in a very dark area of the alley, he saw a body on the
    ground and blood everywhere. Next to the body, there was a wallet and four crumpled
    $20 bills. In Bloom’s hand, there were crumpled $20 bills and a tube of lip balm.
    Jones immediately called 911. While he was on the phone, he turned back in the
    direction of the steps and saw defendant still sitting there with a bag next to him. He
    walked back towards defendant, who stood up, picked up his bag, and then sat back down
    again. Jones stopped about 60 feet away from defendant and called out to ask if he had
    seen anything.
    The police arrived almost immediately. When they arrived, Jones pointed out
    defendant sitting on the steps.
    Defendant was arrested shortly thereafter. An officer on the scene asked him what
    had happened, and he responded, “I got them before they got me.” Another officer asked
    defendant if he was okay,2 and he answered, “No, he was trying to kill me.” Asked
    where the knife was, defendant said it was in his backpack. A large kitchen knife
    covered in blood was found in defendant’s backpack.
    Raymond Hoey, who was nearby at the time of Bloom’s stabbing and overheard
    part of the assault, also testified at trial. Hoey was homeless and generally slept in a
    2
    Defendant suffered a cut on his hand from his own knife.
    5
    stairwell behind the public library, a spot he chose because it was below eye level, it
    seemed less likely that anybody would see him down there, and for safety reasons, to
    avoid being seen while bedding down for the night. He had been settling in to sleep
    when he heard what sounded like gears of a 10-speed bike and then scuffling in the
    parking lot area above him. He then heard two distinct voices. The first one made a
    guttural noise, “almost a growl,” that sounded “very malicious and malevolent in nature,”
    “animalistic,” “as if someone was not well disposed towards another.” He heard a second
    voice yell, “Stop, stop,” and then moments later, “Help, help,” as if in distress. After the
    verbal exchange, it was quiet for a few moments and then the police arrived. Because he
    did not know what the situation was, he stayed put until the police found him.
    In a police interview, Hoey said he first heard two people arguing and that it
    immediately got heated and one of the voices started violently yelling. When asked at
    trial to elaborate, he testified, “What I heard sounded like—like two subjects disagreeing
    in the form of what I interpret to be a scuffle, such as when two males push each other or
    threaten one another in some physical way.” He described the first voice—the one that
    made the guttural noises—as the more aggressive of the two.
    Bloom’s body was found 135 feet from where defendant had been sitting on the
    steps. He suffered 70 to 80 sharp force injuries that could have been inflicted by a knife.
    He had eight stab wounds to his chest and abdomen, which caused severe internal
    injuries. The majority of the knife wounds were to his neck area, causing a 9.75 inch
    gaping wound. The primary cause of death was multiple sharp force injuries to his torso.
    Additional contributing factors were sharp force injuries to his neck, head, and
    extremities, as well as acute methamphetamine intoxication.
    Bloom’s body showed signs of intravenous drug use. His blood and urine tested
    positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, THC, and opioids.
    Defendant’s blood sample was devoid of any intoxicants.
    6
    PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Defendant was charged with Bloom’s first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187,
    subd. (a).) It was also specially alleged that he personally used a knife (id., § 12022,
    subd. (b)(1)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury (id., § 12022.7).
    On September 30, 2014, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and
    found the two special allegations to be true. Defendant was sentenced to 26 years to life,
    comprised of 25 years to life for the murder conviction plus a consecutive, one-year term
    for the personal use of a knife enhancement. The enhancement for inflicting great bodily
    injury was stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
    Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
    DISCUSSION
    1. Defendant’s Arguments
    Defendant asserts three arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court abused its
    discretion and deprived him of his constitutional right to present a complete defense by
    excluding expert testimony concerning chronic homelessness; (2) there was insufficient
    evidence to support the jury’s first degree murder verdict because there was no
    substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation; and (3) the trial court erred in
    enhancing defendant’s sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.7. For the reasons
    detailed below, we conclude defendant’s first argument is well taken. Because we
    reverse on that ground, we need not address his two remaining contentions.
    2. Background
    Defendant’s defense to the charge that he murdered Bloom was that he believed he
    needed to use lethal force to defend himself from an attack by Bloom because Bloom had
    (defendant incorrectly believed) stabbed him a few weeks earlier and was going to do it
    again if defendant did not get him first. In other words, he acted in self-defense or,
    alternatively, imperfect self-defense. In support, defendant’s motion in limine no. 32
    sought to admit the testimony of the Honorable Robert C. Coates (Retired) as an expert
    7
    witness on “Homelessness, and Substance Abuse.”3 More particularly, he proposed that
    Judge Coates would testify on the following two topics: “The Experience of
    Homelessness, specifically as it relates to different classifications of homelessness, as
    well as recent data and studies showing that, nationwide and in the County of Sonoma,
    homeless individuals experience higher incidences of victimization and violence than do
    non-homeless persons,” and “[H]ow a person experiencing homelessness would react in a
    hypothetical situation tracking the defense version of the facts of this case, as shown by
    the evidence.” Judge Coates’s testimony, defendant submitted, was relevant to his
    defense because it would demonstrate why he actually believed he needed to use lethal
    force to defend himself from Bloom. Further, he argued, it would be relevant to the
    jury’s assessment of his credibility.
    In a supporting memorandum, defendant identified the following topics as
    potential subjects of Judge Coates’s testimony: empirical studies indicating that
    homeless people are exposed to violence at a substantially higher rate than housed
    individuals, and that the risk of violence has increased over recent years due to a number
    of factors, including the release of approximately 37,000 individuals with felony
    convictions on parolee status, many of whom have become homeless; new and more
    dangerous drugs that cause the users (many of whom are homeless) to become aggressive
    and violent; and veterans returning from service with post-traumatic stress disorder
    joining the homeless populations. His expertise included research on violence
    experienced by homeless individuals in the City of San Diego and the County of Sonoma,
    and he also relied on national and international studies addressing fear among and
    victimization of homeless individuals. Based on this research, Judge Coates was
    prepared to testify that the vulnerability to violence experienced by homeless people
    tends to create a greater than normal sensitivity to perceived threats of violence.
    3
    In his opening brief, defendant represents that Judge Coates served as a judge on
    the San Diego County Superior Court from 1982 until his retirement in 2011. He then
    resumed his law practice and subsequently joined the San Diego law firm of Olins,
    Riviere, Coates & Bagula.
    8
    The hearing on defendant’s motion began with the trial court expressing its “initial
    thoughts” that “what homeless people do or what they’re capable of doing or factors that
    may affect them” is “a common experience with the jurors and not subject to expert
    testimony.”
    In response, defense counsel argued that Judge Coates’s expert testimony
    concerning homelessness was relevant to the issue of defendant’s subjective belief that he
    was in danger and needed to use lethal force to defend himself, which went to his claim
    that he acted in imperfect self-defense. The prosecutor disagreed, arguing that the
    evidence was irrelevant to the charges and had the potential to lead the jury astray.
    The court stated that the issue was not whether defendant was homeless, but rather
    “what risk did he face that anybody would face sitting behind the library on Christmas
    eve at night?” And, in the court’s opinion, “Homelessness has nothing to do with his
    possible victimization.”
    Defense counsel countered, “Judge Coates has been intimately involved with the
    issue of homelessness as well as substance abuse issues as they affect the homeless
    and—to the point where he wrote a book on it and was involved in several boards down
    in San Diego and has developed opinions about this particular demographic and how it
    has changed and gotten more dangerous for people on the street and the sort of context of
    fear that exists out there among the homeless due to the increasing violence inflicted on
    the homeless by persons unknown, just for the fact that they’re homeless, and the
    evidence of growing numbers of homeless vets with PTSD issues, other mental disorders
    and, again, substance abuse problems, particularly methamphetamine, being ever more
    rampant on the streets, adding to the—the culture of fear and dangerousness.”
    The court was unpersuaded, observing, “Everyone is subject to the same risks. I
    don’t think it’s a subject for expert opinion, and I don’t think this judge has particular
    knowledge that’s relevant to the issues in this case. I am not going to allow the
    testimony.”
    Defense counsel queried whether that rationale also applied to defendant’s
    assertion of imperfect self-defense, “where the relevance, it would seem, to his subjective
    9
    beliefs is apparent?” The court agreed that defendant’s “state of mind is relevant” but
    believed that “some general opinion of a judge who’s dealt with homelessness” was not,
    explaining:
    “You know, we all deal with homelessness and substance abuse at one time or
    another in our work as judges. Perhaps all of us don’t write books on it, but I don’t think
    there’s specialized knowledge here that is relevant to specific issues in the case. You
    know, if you can point out something specific that the judge was going to testify to that
    was relevant, I would consider it. But his generalized testimony that you’ve outlined, and
    possible testimony, you know, I think is—it’s not directly applicable to this community.
    It’s his experiences in another community.
    “For instance, the number of homeless people that have drug abuse problems, you
    know, that’s not the population that was possibly a threat to Mr. Sotello. It’s the number
    of criminals that are on the streets in Santa Rosa after dark.”
    The court then ruled that it was not going to permit Judge Coates’s testimony.
    3. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Excluding Judge Coates’s
    Expert Opinion Concerning Chronic Homelessness
    A. The Law of Self-Defense and Imperfect Self-Defense
    A homicide is considered justified as self-defense where the defendant actually
    and reasonably believed the use of deadly force was necessary to defend himself from
    imminent threat of death or great bodily injury. Under such circumstances, the killing is
    not a crime. (People v. Elmore (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 121
    , 133–134; Pen. Code, § 197;
    1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 67 et seq., p. 507 et
    seq.) Where the defendant kills while actually but unreasonably believing the use of
    deadly force was necessary, defendant is considered to have acted in imperfect
    self-defense. Imperfect self-defense is not a complete defense to a killing, but negates the
    malice element and reduces the offense to voluntary manslaughter. (People v. Elmore,
    supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 134; People v. Blakely (2000) 
    23 Cal.4th 82
    , 88; People v. Flannel
    (1979) 
    25 Cal.3d 668
    , 672.) “The subjective elements of self-defense and imperfect
    10
    self-defense are identical. Under each theory, the [defendant] must actually believe in the
    need to defend . . . against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury.” (People v.
    Viramontes (2001) 
    93 Cal.App.4th 1256
    , 1262.) As the California Supreme Court
    summarized it in People v. Humphrey (1996) 
    13 Cal.4th 1073
    , 1082 (Humphrey)
    (fn. omitted): “For killing to be in self-defense, the defendant must actually and
    reasonably believe in the need to defend. [Citation.] If the belief subjectively exists but
    is objectively unreasonable, there is ‘imperfect self-defense,’ i.e., ‘the defendant is
    deemed to have acted without malice and cannot be convicted of murder,’ but can be
    convicted of manslaughter. [Citation.] To constitute ‘perfect self-defense,’ i.e., to
    exonerate the person completely, the belief must also be objectively reasonable.
    [Citations.]”
    As this well-settled law applied at defendant’s trial, if the jury found that
    defendant actually and reasonably believed he needed to use lethal force to defend
    himself from Bloom, then he acted in self-defense, a complete defense to the murder
    charge. If it found he actually but unreasonably believed he needed to use lethal force,
    then he lacked the malice required for a murder finding and was guilty only of voluntary
    manslaughter. But if the jury rejected defendant’s claim that he actually believed he
    needed to use lethal force to defend himself from Bloom, then a murder conviction would
    result, as it did. Defendant’s actual belief in the need to use lethal force, and the
    reasonableness of that belief, were thus squarely at issue in his trial. The trial court ruled
    that Judge Coates’s expert opinion was inadmissible on these questions for two primary
    reasons. First, the court did not believe the evidence was relevant and, second, it did not
    believe the subject matter was sufficiently beyond common experience to warrant expert
    testimony. We review this ruling for abuse of discretion. (People v. Lucas (2014)
    
    60 Cal.4th 153
    , 226; People v. Manriquez (1999) 
    72 Cal.App.4th 1486
    , 1492.) And
    conclude there was such abuse here.
    11
    B. Judge Coates’s Expert Opinion Was Relevant to Defendant’s Actual
    Belief in the Need to Use Lethal Force to Defend Himself
    Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any
    disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code,
    § 210.) Under Evidence Code section 351, all relevant evidence is admissible unless
    specifically excluded by statute. (People v. Riggs (2008) 
    44 Cal.4th 248
    , 289–290, citing
    Evid. Code, § 351.) A defendant claiming self-defense or imperfect self-defense is
    required to “prove his own frame of mind.” (People v. Davis (1965) 
    63 Cal.2d 648
    , 656;
    see also People v. Minifie (1996) 
    13 Cal.4th 1055
    , 1065 [“ ‘The defendant’s perceptions
    are at issue . . . .’ ”].) Because defendant’s frame of mind was at issue, the jury in
    defendant’s trial was expressly instructed that “In evaluating the defendant’s beliefs,
    consider all the circumstances as they were known and appeared to the defendant.”
    (CALCRIM No. 571.) In other words, the jury was to evaluate defendant’s belief in the
    need to use lethal force from his perspective. Evidence that would assist the jury in
    evaluating the situation from defendant’s perspective was thus relevant.
    Defendant’s perspective was that of a man who had been living for years on city
    streets. He had been stabbed a few weeks earlier (as corroborated by medical records),
    and he had also been involved in a verbal altercation just days before his encounter with
    Bloom. According to defendant’s account, Bloom approached him in an aggressive
    manner, was hostile when asking defendant if he spoke English or had a cigarette, and
    continued to belligerently approach while he sat on the steps. Defendant also told the
    police that when Bloom approached him, he believed Bloom was one of the assailants
    that had stabbed him and that he “was in a position of danger” because Bloom was going
    to do it again.
    Judge Coates was prepared to testify that individuals who are chronically
    homeless, like defendant, are subjected to a high rate of violence by both housed and
    unhoused individuals, and that the experience of living for years on the streets instills a
    perpetual fear of violence that would have affected defendant’s belief in the need to
    defend himself with lethal force. The relevance of this testimony to defendant’s actual
    12
    perception of the situation is evident: it would have helped the jury understand the
    situation from defendant’s perspective, that is, from the perspective of a chronically
    homeless man who had recently been violently assaulted and was aggressively
    approached by someone he believed to be the assailant. It would have explained his
    heightened sensitivity to aggression and why he was inclined to react more acutely to the
    perceived threat.
    The relevance of expert testimony to show a defendant’s perception of a threat of
    imminent harm has long been recognized in a different context that we find instructive
    here—cases involving intimate partner battering.4 The first case to recognize the
    admissibility of such expert opinion was People v. Aris (1989) 
    215 Cal.App.3d 1178
    (Aris). There, defendant was found guilty of second degree murder after she shot and
    killed her abusive husband while he slept. The trial court excluded expert testimony that
    would have informed the jury that defendant was a victim of domestic violence and
    explained “ ‘how the psychological impact of being a battered woman affected her
    perception of danger at the time she shot her husband.’ ” (Id. at p. 1193.)
    The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the expert testimony was “highly
    relevant to . . . defendant’s actual, subjective perception that she was in danger and that
    she had to kill her husband to avoid that danger.” (Aris, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at
    p. 1197.) The expert would have testified that one of the symptoms of intimate partner
    battering was “a greater sensitivity to danger. ‘[T]hey don’t misperceive it; they perceive
    it very honestly, but it’s faster than somebody who [has not been] battered. And we call
    that a hypervigilance to cues of any kind of impending violence. That makes
    them . . . just a little bit more edgy, a little bit more responsive to situations than
    somebody who has not been battered might be.’ ” (Id. at p. 1194.) And, the court
    explained, “The relevance to the defendant’s actual perception lies in the opinion’s
    4
    Previously referred to as “battered women’s syndrome” (see, e.g., Humphrey,
    
    supra,
     13 Cal.4th at p. 1076), the preferred terminology is now “intimate partner
    battering.” (Evid. Code, § 1107, subd. (f); People v. Wright (2015) 
    242 Cal.App.4th 1461
    , 1492, fn. 11.)
    13
    explanation of how such a perception would reasonably follow from the defendant’s
    experience as a battered woman.” (Id. at p. 1197; see also Humphrey, 
    supra,
     13 Cal.4th
    at pp. 1085–1087, 1096 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.) [“hypervigiliance generated by”
    repeated physical abuse]; In re Walker (2007) 
    147 Cal.App.4th 533
    , 553; People v. Day
    (1992) 
    2 Cal.App.4th 405
    , 419–420; Paine v. Massie (10th Cir. 2003) 
    339 F.3d 1194
    ,
    1199; Ibn-Tamas v. United States (D.C. 1979) 
    407 A.2d 626
    , 634.)
    The same rationale applies here. According to Judge Coates, a homeless
    individual who has repeatedly been subjected to violence and the threat of violence will
    experience a heightened sensitivity to such threats and will have a reduced threshold at
    which he or she subjectively perceives an imminent threat. As in Aris, supra,
    215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1197, this opinion would elucidate defendant’s perception of the
    threat Bloom posed in the darkened alley.
    In excluding Judge Coates’s testimony as irrelevant to defendant’s actual
    perception of the situation, the court rejected the fundamental premise that homeless
    individuals are subjected to a higher rate of violence, as evidenced by its statements that
    “Homelessness has nothing to do with [defendant’s] possible victimization” and
    “Everyone is subject to the same risks.” Studies on chronic homelessness demonstrate
    that the court’s statements were incorrect: as Judge Coates proposed to testify, homeless
    individuals are victims of violent crime at a much higher rate than the general population.
    (See, e.g., In re Eichorn (1998) 
    69 Cal.App.4th 382
    , 386 [“Homeless individuals were
    10 times as likely to be victimized by crime than the average population.”])
    The National Coalition for the Homeless (NCH) conducts an annual survey
    tracking violent attacks on homeless individuals by housed individuals. In its June 2014
    report entitled Vulnerable to Hate: A Survey of Hate Crimes & Violence Committed
    Against Homeless People in 2013 (Vulnerable to Hate), NCH reported that from 1999 to
    2013, there were 1,437 documented acts of serious violence against homeless individuals
    by housed perpetrators, 375 of which were fatal. (Id. at p. 4.) In 2013 alone, NCH
    documented 109 attacks, 18 of which resulted in death. (Id. at p. 6.) That year, 30
    percent of the attacks occurred in California. (Id. at p. 8.) The attacks included
    14
    unprovoked shootings, stabbings, and beatings with fists, sticks, tools, bottles, and other
    deadly weapons, and sometimes involved torture. (Id. at pp. 10–21.) The data depicted a
    pattern of violence whereby the offender arbitrarily—but intentionally—chose the victim
    because he or she was homeless.5
    NCH also reported on a 2010 survey designed and administered by the National
    Consumer Advisory Board of the National Health Care for the Homeless Council.
    According to NCH, in that survey, “516 individuals experiencing homelessness over the
    age of 18, located in Detroit, Fort Lauderdale, Nashville, Houston, and Worchester,
    experienced violence 25 times more frequently than the general U.S. population. While
    49 percent of homeless individuals report being victims of violence, only 2 percent of the
    general population does the same.” (Vulnerable to Hate, supra, p. 22.)
    While the NCH report addresses only attacks on homeless individuals by housed
    individuals, there is also a high rate of homeless-on-homeless crime, likely due to
    proximity, vulnerability, and untreated mental illness and substance abuse. In one article
    on the subject, the author reported: “Despite pressures toward under-reporting (due to
    embarrassment, an inability to document incidents, and the like), over one-half of all
    homeless [survey] respondents say that they have been victims of crime, primarily theft
    but also beatings and sexual assault. Results from other studies demonstrate substantial
    victimization rates for homeless women, youth, seniors, and shelter occupants. . . . [¶]
    Homeless persons are easy marks for domiciled predators and unscrupulous business
    operators (e.g., labor contractors who withhold pay, liquor store clerks who overcharge),
    but they also victimize each other. Close physical proximity, limited guardianship,
    5
    Because its survey in part relies on self-reporting, NCH believes that its results
    understate the violence inflicted on homeless individuals by housed individuals. (See
    Vulnerable to Hate, p. 5 [data is collected from published news reports, service providers,
    and self-reported incidents], p. 6 [“While this report provides alarming statistics, it is
    important to note that people experiencing homelessness are often treated so poorly by
    society that attacks are forgotten or unreported”; “many violent acts against homeless
    populations go unreported and therefore, the true number of incidents is likely to be
    substantially higher”].)
    15
    retaliation, pre-emptive displays of ‘toughness,’ and a low probability of sanctions are
    conducive to homeless-on-homeless crime. In general, street and shelter settings give
    rise to a vicious cycle in which some homeless people alternate between victim and
    offender roles.” (Barrett A. Lee, et al., The New Homelessness Revisited, Ann. Rev.
    Sociology, Vol. 36 (Aug. 1, 2010) pp. 506–507.)
    This empirical evidence is consistent with Judge Coates’s proffered testimony.
    And contrary to the trial court’s concern that his “generalized testimony” was not
    “directly applicable to this community,” Judge Coates’s expertise included Sonoma
    County, the homeless population of which both defendant and Bloom were members. In
    fact, the City of Santa Rosa, the very city in which defendant killed Bloom, declared an
    emergency of homelessness in August 2016, indicative of the extent of the homeless
    crisis in that city.
    The People counter that the exclusion of Judge Coates’s expert testimony did not
    preclude defendant from introducing evidence that would help the jury consider the
    relevant circumstances from defendant’s perspective. As the People put it: “The jury
    was made aware that appellant had been attacked in the past. Indeed, according to
    appellant he had even purchased the murder weapon—an actual kitchen knife that was
    figuratively a double-edged sword—to defend himself from future attacks. And the jury
    was allowed to hear appellant’s statements attempting to justify his actions and
    attempting to explain his state of mind.” But it has long been recognized that the
    introduction of the defendant’s narrative does not necessarily satisfy the defendant’s right
    to introduce relevant evidence, illustrated, for example, by People v. Smith (1907)
    
    151 Cal. 619
     (Smith), where the trial court excluded testimony of a doctor whom
    defendant called to testify about his physical condition on the day defendant allegedly
    committed a murder. Rejecting the People’s argument on appeal that defendant was not
    prejudiced because he testified himself about the subject, the Supreme Court observed
    that defendant was entitled to not only have the jury consider his own words “on the
    subject, but to introduce [expert testimony] to corroborate” his own narrative. (Id. at
    16
    p. 629.) This would permit him to “present the matter to the jury fully and under the
    most favorable circumstances.” (Ibid.) Likewise here.
    The People also cite two cases—United States v. Abdush-Shakur (10th Cir. 2006)
    
    465 F.3d 458
     (Abdush-Shakur) and People v. Romero (1999) 
    69 Cal.App.4th 846
    (Romero)—in an attempt to persuade us that expert opinion on chronic homelessness was
    irrelevant to defendant’s self-defense and imperfect self-defense claims. Neither case is
    availing. In Abdush-Shakur—described by the People as “on point”—defendant was a
    prison inmate on trial for attempted murder of a prison employee. He unsuccessfully
    sought to introduce the expert testimony of a “ ‘corrections consultant,’ ” who would
    have testified to the “ ‘culture of violence’ in federal penitentiaries [to] explain why an
    inmate who is ‘disrespected’ by a corrections officer might retaliate in a violent manner.”
    Defendant challenged the exclusion of the testimony on appeal, arguing that the evidence
    went directly to his motive for attacking the victim and supported his claim that he only
    intended to wound him. (Abdush-Shakur, 
    supra,
     465 F.3d at p. 466.)
    The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the evidence was inadmissible. It
    noted that the proffered testimony would not excuse defendant’s attack on a corrections
    officer nor would it negate any elements of the charged crime. Rather, it simply
    highlighted a possible motive for his action. (Abdush-Shakur, 
    supra,
     465 F.3d at
    pp. 466–467.) In contrast, Judge Coates’s testimony, if persuasive to the jury, may have
    supported defendant’s self-defense claim or negated the element of malice.
    The second case, Romero, supra, 
    69 Cal.App.4th 846
    , is no more helpful. Romero
    involved a defendant who was charged with the murder of a car driver after a minor
    traffic incident resulted in a verbal exchange that escalated into lethal street violence.
    Defendant sought to introduce expert testimony on “the sociology of poverty, and the role
    of honor, paternalism, and street fighters in the Hispanic culture.” (Id. at p. 848.) More
    specifically, the expert would have testified that “(1) street fighters have a special
    understanding of what is expected of them; (2) for a street fighter in the Hispanic culture,
    there is no retreat; (3) the Hispanic culture is based on honor, and honor defines a person;
    and (4) in this culture a person ‘would be responsible to take care of someone,’ i.e.,
    17
    defendant had a strong motivation to protect his younger brother.” (Id. at p. 853.) The
    trial court excluded the evidence, finding it irrelevant to whether defendant actually
    believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, and whether such a
    belief was objectively reasonable. (Id. at p. 848.)
    The Court of Appeal affirmed. It held that the proffered testimony was irrelevant
    to whether deadly force was warranted under the circumstances. (Romero, supra,
    69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 854–855.) Specifically, “whether a person should or should not
    retreat from a ‘street fight,’ has no bearing on whether that person may lawfully use
    deadly force.” (Id. at p. 854.) In other words, the evidence merely described defendant’s
    motive and was irrelevant to his self-defense claim. That is not the situation here.
    In short, we conclude that Judge Coates’s expert testimony on chronic
    homelessness was relevant to the issue of defendant’s actual belief in the need to use
    lethal force to defend himself from Bloom.
    C. Judge Coates’s Expert Opinion Was Relevant to the Reasonableness
    of Defendant’s Belief in the Need to Use Lethal Force to Defend
    Himself
    On appeal, defendant represents that he did not argue self-defense below, claiming
    that he only asserted imperfect self-defense and conceding here that his “statements to the
    police certainly did not describe a reasonable response to Bloom’s belligerent
    approach . . . .” We read the record differently: while defendant’s primary theory was
    imperfect self-defense, his counsel also argued perfect self-defense. And the jury was
    instructed on both theories. Because defendant could assert both theories on remand, we
    address the admissibility of Judge Coates’s expert testimony on the reasonableness of
    defendant’s belief in the need to use lethal force to defend himself from Bloom. And
    conclude expert opinion was also relevant to the reasonableness of his belief.
    As discussed above, Aris, supra, 
    215 Cal.App.3d 1178
     held that expert testimony
    on intimate partner battering was relevant to the defendant’s actual belief in the need to
    use lethal force to defend herself from an imminent threat. (Id. at p. 1197.) It also held,
    however, that “upon request whenever the jury is instructed on perfect self-defense, trial
    18
    courts should instruct that [expert] testimony is relevant only to prove the honest belief
    requirement for both perfect and imperfect self-defense, not to prove the reasonableness
    requirement for perfect self-defense.” (Id. at p. 1199.) However, in Humphrey, supra,
    
    13 Cal.4th 1073
    , the Supreme Court overruled Aris on this point, holding “that evidence
    of battered women’s syndrome is generally relevant to the reasonableness, as well as the
    subjective existence, of defendant’s belief in the need to defend, and, to the extent it is
    relevant, the jury may consider it in deciding both questions.” (Humphrey, at pp.
    1088–1089.) In other words, where defendant claimed self-defense, “ ‘expert testimony
    on battering and its effects’ ” was relevant not only to whether the defendant actually
    believed in the need to defend herself from imminent harm, but also to whether that belief
    was objectively reasonable. (Id. at pp. 1083, fn. 3, 1088–1089.)
    Concerning the jury’s role in assessing the reasonableness of defendant’s belief in
    the need to defend, the Humphrey court explained: “Although the belief in the need to
    defend must be objectively reasonable, a jury must consider what ‘would appear to be
    necessary to a reasonable person in a similar situation and with similar knowledge . . . .’
    [Citation.] It judges reasonableness ‘from the point of view of a reasonable person in the
    position of defendant . . . .’ [Citation.] To do this, it must consider all the ‘ “ ‘facts and
    circumstances . . . in determining whether the defendant acted in a manner in which a
    reasonable man would act in protecting his own life or bodily safety.’ ” ’ [Citation.] As
    we stated long ago, ‘. . . a defendant is entitled to have a jury take into consideration all
    the elements in the case which might be expected to operate on his mind . . . .’
    [Citation.]” (Humphrey, 
    supra,
     13 Cal.4th at pp. 1082–1083.) By failing to permit the
    jury to consider the evidence as it pertained to the reasonableness element of self-defense,
    the trial court “failed to consider that the jury, in determining objective reasonableness,
    must view the situation from the defendant’s perspective.” (Id. at p. 1086.)
    For the same reasons, expert testimony explaining why a chronically homeless
    individual would experience a heightened fear of aggression would assist a jury in
    weighing the reasonableness of defendant’s belief of imminent harm, as was central to
    defendant’s self-defense claim. Given the earlier assault on defendant and heightened
    19
    sensitivity to violence experienced by the chronic homeless, the jury may have concluded
    that defendant was “ ‘justified in acting more quickly and taking harsher measures for
    [his] own protection in event of assault, than would a person’ ” who was not chronically
    homeless. (People v. Moore (1954) 
    43 Cal.2d 517
    , 528.) Paraphrasing the Humphrey
    court, “Evidence of [chronic homelessness] not only explains how a [chronically
    homeless individual] might think, react, or behave, it places the behavior in an
    understandable light.” (Humphrey, 
    supra,
     13 Cal.4th at p. 1088.)
    Contrary to the People’s assertion, this does not turn an objective standard—how a
    reasonable person would have perceived the risk—into a subjective one, creating a
    reasonable homeless person standard. Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected a similar
    argument in People v. Ochoa (1993) 
    6 Cal.4th 1199
    , where the court considered whether
    the defendant’s state of mind was relevant to a charge of gross vehicular manslaughter
    while intoxicated. The charge requires gross negligence, which is evaluated by an
    objective standard, namely, whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position
    would have been aware of the risk involved. Rejecting defendant’s claim that his
    subjective state of mind was irrelevant and prejudicial, the court held: “In determining
    whether a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have been aware of the risks,
    the jury should be given relevant facts as to what defendant knew, including his actual
    awareness of those risks.” (People v. Ochoa, 
    supra,
     6 Cal.4th at p. 1205.)
    The Humphrey court found the same rationale applicable to the defendant’s
    self-defense claim: “What we said in Ochoa about the defendant’s actual awareness
    applies to this case. Although the ultimate test of reasonableness is objective, in
    determining whether a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have believed in
    the need to defend, the jury must consider all of the relevant circumstances in which
    defendant found herself.” (Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1083.) This did not replace
    the reasonable person standard with a reasonable battered woman standard, because the
    question remained what a reasonable person would have believed about the need to use
    lethal force, taking into consideration defendant’s situation and knowledge. (Id. at
    p. 1087.)
    20
    The same can be said here. A question before the jury was what a reasonable
    person would have believed about the need to use lethal force, taking into consideration
    defendant’s situation and knowledge. Judge Coates’s expert opinion would have shed
    light on this question.
    D. Judge Coates’s Expert Opinion Was Relevant to Defendant’s
    Credibility
    Judge Coates’s expert opinion was relevant to a third issue: defendant’s
    credibility. Although defendant did not testify at trial, the jury heard his account of the
    incident as he related it to the police just hours later and then again a few days later. By
    finding him guilty of first degree murder, the jury clearly did not accept defendant’s
    statements that he killed Bloom because he believed he posed an imminent threat of death
    or serious injury. Judge Coates’s opinion may have bolstered defendant’s credibility by
    providing a context within which the jury could assess defendant’s claims that he felt
    threatened by Bloom’s aggressive and belligerent demeanor and voice in the dark
    alleyway—and why defendant’s “adrenaline just jumped up” in response. (See People v.
    Day, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 415 [“[I]f the jury had understood [defendant’s] conduct
    in light of [intimate partner battering] evidence, then the jury may well have concluded
    her version of the events was sufficiently credible to warrant an acquittal on the facts as
    she related them.”]; accord, Humphrey, 
    supra,
     13 Cal.4th at p. 1087 [expert testimony on
    battered women’s experience was relevant to the victim’s credibility because it would
    assist the jury “by dispelling many of the commonly held misconceptions about battered
    women”].)
    E. The Subject of Judge Coates’s Expert Opinion Was Sufficiently
    Beyond Common Experience That It Would Have Assisted the Jury
    In the case of expert testimony, it is not enough that it is relevant to an issue in the
    case. It must also satisfy the criteria of Evidence Code section 801, which limits such
    testimony to that “[r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience
    that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd.
    21
    (a).)6 The People contend Judge Coates’s opinion was inadmissible under section 801
    because “[h]omelessness is not a subject beyond the knowledge of the average citizen.”
    The trial court was of the same view, stating that “what homeless people do or what
    they’re capable of doing or factors that may affect them” is “a common experience with
    the jurors and not subject to expert testimony.” We conclude otherwise: jurors in a case
    involving homeless violence may have a rudimentary understanding of the hazards of life
    on the street, but the realities of being homeless for a long period of time are beyond the
    understanding and life experience of the average juror. Judge Coates’s testimony may
    have dispelled “ ‘commonly held misconceptions’ ” or misguided “ ‘ “ ‘common sense’
    conclusions” ’ ” that may have prevented the jury from understanding the circumstances
    as defendant actually perceived them. (Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1086–1087.)
    In order for an expert’s opinion to be admissible, the subject matter need not be
    completely unfamiliar to the jury. Rather, expert testimony has been held admissible in a
    range of cases where the general subject matter of the expert’s testimony may be familiar
    to the average juror, yet critical aspects of that subject “are not likely to be fully known to
    or understood by the jury.” (People v. McDonald (1984) 
    37 Cal.3d 351
    , 377
    (McDonald)). One such subject matter, touched on above, is the behavior of victims of
    domestic violence. In such cases, courts have recognized that leaving jurors to rely solely
    on their personal experiences and common sense about domestic relationships—and how
    the average person evaluates and reacts to a threat of imminent danger—will tend not to
    result in reliable fact-finding by the jury. Instead, it will create a grave risk that the jury
    will decide the case based on commonly held misconceptions and intuitive but erroneous
    assumptions about domestic violence victims. As explained in Humphrey, expert
    testimony on intimate partner battering was “ ‘aimed at an area where the purported
    6
    Evidence Code section 801 provides that expert testimony is admissible if it is
    “(a) [r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion
    of an expert would assist the trier of fact; and [¶] (b) [b]ased on matter (including his
    special knowledge” “that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in
    forming an opinion upon the subject.”
    22
    common knowledge of the jury may be very much mistaken, an area where jurors’ logic,
    drawn from their own experience, may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion, an area
    where expert knowledge would enable the jurors to disregard their prior conclusions as
    being common myths rather than common knowledge.’ ” (Humphrey, 
    supra,
     13 Cal.4th
    at p. 1099 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.), quoting State v. Kelly (1984) 
    478 A.2d 364
    , 378; see
    also People v. Brown (2004) 
    33 Cal.4th 892
    , 904–907; People v. Day, supra,
    2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 415–418, overruled on other grounds in Humphrey, 
    supra,
    13 Cal.4th at p. 1089.)
    Similarly, in McDonald, supra, 
    37 Cal.3d 351
    , the Supreme Court recognized the
    relevance of expert testimony on the reliability of eye witness identification, despite
    acknowledging that jurors generally know that eyewitness identification can be
    unreliable. There, defendant appealed a decision of the trial court excluding expert
    testimony of a psychologist on psychological factors affecting the accuracy of eyewitness
    identification. (Id. at p. 363.) Reversing, the Supreme Court highlighted numerous cases
    recognizing the “ ‘well-known’ ” “ ‘vagaries of eyewitness identification . . . .’ ” (ibid.),
    and noted a proliferation of “empirical studies of the psychological factors affecting
    eyewitness identification . . . .” (Id. at p. 364.) It then went on to discuss Evidence Code
    section 801, observing, “The statute does not flatly limit expert opinion testimony to
    subjects ‘beyond common experience’; rather, it limits such testimony to such subjects
    ‘sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the
    trier of fact’ (italics added). The emphasized words . . . make it clear that the
    admissibility of expert opinion is a question of degree. The jury need not be wholly
    ignorant of the subject matter of the opinion in order to justify its admission; if that were
    the test, little expert opinion testimony would ever be heard. Instead, the statute declares
    that even if the jury has some knowledge of the matter, expert opinion may be admitted
    whenever it would ‘assist’ the jury. It will be excluded only when it would add nothing
    at all to the jury’s common fund of information, i.e., when ‘the subject of inquiry is one
    of such common knowledge that men of ordinary education could reach a conclusion as
    intelligently as the witness’ [citation].” (McDonald, at p. 367.)
    23
    Applying that test to expert testimony on eyewitness identification, the court
    acknowledged that “from personal experience and intuition all jurors know that an
    eyewitness identification can be mistaken, and also know the more obvious factors that
    can affect its accuracy, such as lighting, distance, and duration.” (McDonald, supra,
    37 Cal.3d at p. 367.) It went on to note, however, that according to professional literature
    “other factors bearing on eyewitness identification may be known only to some jurors, or
    may be imperfectly understood by many, or may be contrary to the intuitive beliefs of
    most.” (Id. at pp. 367–368.) The proffered expert testimony, the court concluded, would
    have assisted the jury in evaluating these many factors. (Id. at p. 368.)
    In Delia S. v. Torres (1982) 
    134 Cal.App.3d 471
    , 478–480 (disapproved on other
    grounds in Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 
    54 Cal.3d 868
    , 905, fn. 28), the court
    held that expert testimony regarding “the reactions of rape victims and the characteristics
    and motivations of rapists” was properly admitted because, while most jurors hold
    opinions on those topics generally, expert testimony could clear up misconceptions that
    many jurors likely harbor and allow the jury to more accurately assess the credibility of
    the witnesses.
    Similar reasoning warranted the admission of expert testimony regarding the
    behavior of the parents of abused children in People v. McAlpin (1991) 
    53 Cal.3d 1289
    .
    There, the Supreme Court recognized that, while virtually all jurors have experience,
    direct or indirect, with parenthood, they tend to hold the intuitive but erroneous belief that
    the “parent of a molested child, naturally concerned for the welfare of the child and of
    other children, would promptly report the crime to the authorities.” (Id. at p. 1302.)
    According to the court, expert testimony was properly admitted to assist the trier of fact
    by clearing up this common misconception and allowing the jury to more reliably
    evaluate the credibility of a critical witness. (Id. at pp. 1300–1302; see also People v.
    Housley (1992) 
    6 Cal.App.4th 947
    , 955–956 [expert testimony allowed to disabuse the
    jury of commonly held misconceptions about the behavior of abused children]; People v.
    Bowker (1988) 
    203 Cal.App.3d 385
    , 390–394 [same].)
    24
    To this line of cases recognizing subject matters “sufficiently beyond common
    experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact” (Evid. Code,
    § 801), we add chronic homelessness and its psychological impact. Most, if not all,
    jurors have likely encountered homelessness to some degree in their daily lives and,
    through these encounters, have an elementary understanding that life on the streets is
    unpleasant and more challenging than life as a housed individual. But, based on this
    court’s “personal experience and intuition” (MacDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 367), we
    believe that the extent to which the homeless are confronted with persistent danger, as
    demonstrated by the evidence of the violence experienced by the homeless, and the
    psychological consequences of experiencing chronic homelessness, is beyond the ken of
    most. Judge Coates’s testimony would have dispelled the commonly held
    misconception—shared by the trial court—that “Everyone is subject to the same risks.”
    F. Defendant Was Prejudiced by the Exclusion of Judge Coates’s
    Expert Opinion
    Defendant urges that the exclusion of Judge Coates’s expert testimony deprived
    him of his constitutional right to present a complete defense, and Chapman v. California
    (1967) 
    386 U.S. 18
    , 24 mandates reversal unless the error was harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt. But “the routine application of provisions of the state Evidence Code
    law does not implicate a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.” (People v. Jones
    (2013) 
    57 Cal.4th 899
    , 957; accord, People v. Robinson (2005) 
    37 Cal.4th 592
    , 626–627
    [“ ‘[A]s a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on
    the accused’s [state or federal constitutional] right to present a defense.’ ”].) This is so
    because “only evidentiary error amounting to a complete preclusion of a defense violates
    a defendant’s federal constitutional right to present a defense.” (People v. Bacon (2010)
    
    50 Cal.4th 1082
    , 1104, fn. 4.) As such, the trial court’s error was one of state evidentiary
    law only (People v. McNeal (2009) 
    46 Cal.4th 1183
    , 1203), and the proper standard of
    review is whether it is reasonably probable that defendant would have obtained a more
    favorable result in the absence of the error. (People v. Watson (1956) 
    46 Cal.2d 818
    ,
    25
    836; see also People v. Bacon, 
    supra,
     50 Cal.4th at p. 1104, fn. 4; Humphrey, 
    supra,
    13 Cal.4th at p. 1089.) Under this standard, we conclude the error was prejudicial.
    The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, meaning it did not believe
    his statement to the police that he believed Bloom was going to attack him, and so he
    “got” Bloom before Bloom could get him. Thus, the question of defendant’s actual belief
    in the need to use lethal force to protect himself from Bloom was critical. A reasonable
    probability exists that, if presented with Judge Coates’s expert testimony on chronic
    homelessness, the jury would have found defendant guilty of a lesser included offense of
    first degree murder (either voluntary manslaughter or second degree murder) or would
    have found the killing justifiable homicide. Judge Coates would have testified regarding
    empirical data showing that the homeless population experiences violence and the threat
    of violence at a much greater rate than the general population, and that the resulting
    vulnerability tends to create a greater sensitivity to threats of violence. Such testimony
    would have bolstered the credibility of defendant’s statements in his two police
    interviews that he actually perceived an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm
    when Bloom aggressively approached him in the darkened alleyway wielding an object
    that defendant mistook for a knife.
    Judge Coates’s testimony on the experience of chronic homelessness would also
    have tied into the testimony of witness Raymond Hoey, the homeless man who heard, but
    did not see, the fatal fight between defendant and Bloom. First, Hoey’s testimony
    provided anecdotal evidence regarding the dangers of being homeless when he described
    the fear of violence he generally experienced while living on the streets—a theme, not
    incidentally, defense counsel touched on during closing argument. Judge Coates’s expert
    opinion would have provided a broader context within which the jury could connect
    Hoey’s statements regarding the dangers he routinely faced with the experiences of the
    homeless more generally. Within such a broader context, the jury may have found
    defendant’s statements that he actually perceived an imminent threat from Bloom more
    credible. (See Smith, supra, 151 Cal. at pp. 627–629.)
    26
    The second way that Judge Coates’s testimony would have reinforced aspects of
    Hoey’s corroborating testimony related to Hoey’s description of how the altercation
    between defendant and Bloom began. Hoey heard the fight start with two men arguing,
    then quickly begin fighting each other, or “scuffling.” This testimony was entirely
    consistent with defendant’s statement that he was sitting on the steps when Bloom
    aggressively approached him, and that they argued before Bloom “came at” defendant
    holding an object that, in the darkness of the alley, defendant thought was a knife.
    Moreover, it was undisputed that Bloom was under the influence of an extremely
    large dose of methamphetamine, his friend Donovan Sweeden having testified that
    Bloom injected a large dose of methamphetamine and acted “agitated” and “aggressive.”
    And, defendant told the officers, he believed Bloom was on drugs as soon as he saw him
    approaching. This aspect of the case may have gained a valuable contextual background
    from Judge Coates’s proposed testimony regarding the prevalence of substance abuse
    among the homeless, which would have corroborated defendant’s assertion that he
    perceived Bloom as an imminent threat.
    Thus, had the jury heard Judge Coates’s expert opinion, there is a reasonable
    probability of a more favorable result, namely that the jury would have concluded that
    defendant actually believed he needed to use lethal force to defend himself from Bloom
    and would have accepted his theory of either perfect or imperfect self-defense. There is
    also a reasonable probability that even if the jury still rejected defendant’s claim that he
    actually believed he needed to kill Bloom to protect himself—and thus rejected his
    claims of perfect or imperfect self-defense—it might have returned a verdict of
    second degree rather than first degree murder.
    During deliberations, the jury made only two requests: the first, for the transcripts
    of defendant’s statements to the police, the second, for a further explanation of the
    meaning of premeditation and deliberation. From this, we can reasonably infer that the
    elements of premeditation and deliberation were difficult questions for the jury. (See
    People v. Carrera (1989) 
    49 Cal.3d 291
    , 314, fn. 14.) Judge Coates’s expert opinion on
    chronic homelessness might have provided sufficient context for defendant’s
    27
    hypersensitivity to the threat of violence such that the jury would not have found the
    premeditation and deliberation necessary for a first degree murder conviction.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment of conviction is reversed.
    _________________________
    Richman, Acting P.J.
    We concur:
    _________________________
    Stewart, J.
    _________________________
    Miller, J.
    28
    Trial Court: Sonoma County Superior Court
    Trial Judge: Hon. Rene Auguste Chouteau
    Counsel:
    Geoffrey M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin,
    Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Gregg E. Zywicke, Deputy Attorney General
    for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    29