P. v. Loza CA4/1 ( 2013 )

Filed 3/12/13 P. v. Loza CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D060099
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD228746)
MICHAEL ANGELO LOZA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Howard H. Shore, Judge. Affirmed.
A jury found Michael Angelo Loza guilty of two counts of unlawfully
possessing a firearm, and one count each of assault with a firearm and shooting at an
occupied motor vehicle. It found true a firearm enhancement and three gang
enhancements. Loza admitted a prior strike allegation. He also pleaded guilty to
committing assault with a firearm, a count that arose on a different date and on which
the jury had failed to reach a verdict, and a connected prior strike allegation. The
trial court sentenced him to a total prison term of 30 years to life, plus 13 years 4
months.
Loza claims the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the
offense of negligent discharge of a firearm as a lesser included offense to shooting at
an occupied motor vehicle. He also asserts that his sentence is cruel and unusual.
We reject his contentions and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the evening of May 25, 2010, Alex Vejar drove his truck behind a blue
pickup truck with a Chargers logo on the rear window. The blue pickup truck was
driven by Loza, a self-proclaimed member of a criminal street gang. Loza pulled his
truck over to the right side of the street and stopped. As Vejar drove past, Loza shot
at Vejar's truck several times.
A police officer described Vejar's truck as a "mess" with "a whole bunch of
bullet holes." The back window and the passenger window had been shot out. The
truck had shotgun pellet holes in the front hood and rear tailgate. The interior roof of
the truck also suffered damage from either the shotgun pellets or broken glass. The
gunshot damage was consistent with someone opening fire on the truck as it drove by
the shooter. On the street, officers found broken glass, the rubber gasket for a
window, two shotgun shells and two shotgun waddings. The expended shells were
fired from a shotgun later found in Loza's backyard. Police also found a revolver and
holster in Loza's home, with the holster testing positive for Loza's DNA.
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DISCUSSION
I. Instruction on Lesser Included Offense
Loza asserts the trial court erred when it failed to sua sponte instruct the jury
regarding negligent discharge of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 246.3, subd. (a)) as a lesser
included offense to shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied vehicle (Pen. Code,
§ 246, undesignated statutory references are to this code). The Attorney General
concedes that negligent discharge of a firearm is a lesser included offense to shooting
at an inhabited dwelling or vehicle, but asserts there is no substantial evidence from
which the jury could have concluded that Loza was guilty of the lesser offense. We
agree.
"[T]he sua sponte duty to instruct on a lesser included offense arises if there is
substantial evidence the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense, but not the charged
offense. [Citation.]" (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 177.) "In
deciding whether evidence is 'substantial' in this context, a court determines only its
bare legal sufficiency, not its weight. [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
The crimes of shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246) and grossly negligent
discharge of a firearm (§ 246.3) " 'involve the intentional discharge of a firearm in a
grossly negligent manner which presents a significant risk that personal injury or
death will result.' " (People v. Ramirez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, 986.) The greater
crime of shooting at an occupied vehicle "proscribes discharging a firearm at specific
targets, the act of which presumably presents a significant risk that personal injury or
death will result." (Id. at p. 986.) In contrast, the lesser crime of grossly negligent
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discharge of a firearm is aimed at deterring the dangerous practice of discharging
firearms into the air in celebration of festive occasions. (Id. at p. 987.) This lesser
crime does not require that a specific target be in the defendant's firing range. (Id. at
p. 986.)
Here, there was no substantial evidence that the offense was less than that
charged as the record is clear that Loza intended to shoot at Vejar's truck. Loza fired
multiple shotgun rounds directly into Vejar's truck as Vejar drove by. The rear
window and passenger side window of Vejar's truck were shot out and the truck
suffered damage from its hood to its tailgate. Loza necessarily knew, at a minimum,
that a driver occupied the truck. Because the evidence established that Loza shot at
an occupied vehicle in a manner which presented a significant risk that personal
injury or death would result, the trial court had no duty to instruct the jury on the
lesser included offense of negligent discharge of a firearm.
II. Cruel and/or Unusual Punishment
A. Facts
After considering sentencing briefs, the probation report and hearing argument
on Loza's motion to strike his prior strike conviction under People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, the trial court denied Loza's Romero motion. The
trial court noted that Loza's prior strike conviction was a restaurant robbery that had
occurred about three years ago when Loza was a juvenile. It remarked that the
instant crime involved violent conduct and stated, "[I]t was obvious that [Loza] did
not have any concerns about whether anyone inside the vehicle lived or died."
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The trial court sentenced Loza to a total prison term of 30 years to life, plus 13
years 4 months, detailing the law and facts that supported its decisions. Before doing
so, it commented that Loza had a history of violent criminal behavior dating back to
when he was 15 years old, most related to his gang membership, that he "repeatedly
failed on juvenile probation," used drugs and alcohol daily and obtained education
only while incarcerated.
B. Analysis
Loza contends that his sentence for the current offense constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment under the federal and California Constitutions. (U.S. Const., 8th
Amend. [prohibits infliction of "cruel and unusual" punishment]; Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 17 [prohibits infliction of "[c]ruel or unusual" punishment].) Loza, however, did
not raise this objection at the sentencing hearing and therefore waived it. (People v.
Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229.) In any event, we exercise our discretion
to consider his contention on its merits to avoid a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel.
(Id. at p. 230.)
The Eighth Amendment of the federal Constitution is violated when a
sentence is " 'grossly disproportionate' " to the crime. (Harmelin v. Michigan (1991)
501 U.S. 957, 1001.) Similarly, the California Constitution is violated when the
punishment "is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks
the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity." (In re Lynch
(1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424, fn. omitted (Lynch).) Nonetheless, lengthy prison
sentences imposed under a recidivist statute have survived scrutiny under both
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Constitutions. (See, e.g., In re Rosencrantz (1928) 205 Cal. 534, 539–540; People v.
Weaver (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 119, 125.) " 'Whether a punishment is cruel or
unusual is a question of law for the appellate court, but the underlying disputed facts
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment. [Citations.]' [Citation.]"
(People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 358.) A defendant must overcome
a "considerable burden" when challenging a penalty as cruel or unusual. (People v.
Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 169, 174.)
We examine three factors to determine whether a sentence is proportionate to
the offense and the defendant's circumstances such that it does or does not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment: (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty; (2) sentences imposed for other crimes in the same jurisdiction; and (3)
sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. (Ewing v. California
(2003) 538 U.S. 11, 22; Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 425–427 [comparable three-
prong test].) Loza does not address any comparison of penalties for similar offenses
in other states, nor does he compare sentences imposed for other crimes in the same
jurisdiction. Accordingly, he fails to demonstrate disproportionality on these
grounds. Accordingly, we analyze the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty.
"The gravity of an offense can be assessed by comparing the harm caused or
threatened to the victim or society and the culpability of the offender with the
severity of the penalty." (People v. Carmony (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1077.)
Here, Loza's criminal conduct started at age 15, he has been involved in almost
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continuous and escalating criminal behavior until he committed the instant offense at
age 18, and was on juvenile probation at the time of the crime. His current offense of
shooting at a random passing vehicle is extremely violent and, when viewed in
context with his criminal history, it is evident that Loza presents a danger to society.
In light of the nature of the offense and the offender, Loza's sentence does not shock
the conscience or offend notions of human dignity. (Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p.
424.)
We reject Loza's suggestion that his situation is similar to a juvenile that has
been sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) because he may not
be eligible for parole until about the time he is expected to die. Our high court has
held that the death penalty cannot be imposed on persons under the age of 18 when their
crimes were committed. (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 578 (Simmons).) It
also held that LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders who committed nonhomicide
offenses are categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. (Graham v. Florida
(2010) 560 U.S. __ [130 S.Ct. 2011, 2030] (Graham).) Also, a California appellate
court found unconstitutional a juvenile's sentence of 84 years because it was equivalent
to LWOP. (People v. Mendez (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 47, 62–63, 68 (Mendez).)
Loza's reliance on Simmons, Graham and Mendez is misplaced because he was
not a minor when he committed the instant offense and he was not sentenced to the death
penalty. Moreover, Loza is eligible to receive conduct credits for his determinate
sentence of 13 years 4 months (see People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, 509, fn. 7; In re
Monigold (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 485, 494; §§ 667, subd. (c)(5), 669), and then serve 30
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years before parole eligibility. Assuming he serves his entire 43-year sentence, he would
be eligible for parole at age 61, which is 15 years below the 76 years of age the court in
Mendez determined to be the average life expectancy for an 18-year-old male. (Mendez,
supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at pp. 62–63.) Fifteen years is enough time to allow Loza to
have a "meaningful opportunity" to be released within his lifetime. (Graham, supra, 560
U.S. at p. __ [130 S.Ct. at p. 2033].)
We conclude that Loza's sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under either the state or federal Constitutions.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MCINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
NARES, J.
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