People v. Duff-Guardado CA1/3 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 9/7/21 P. v. Duff-Guardado CA1/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
    ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
    CALIFORNIA,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    A160850
    v.                                                                  (San Mateo County
    DORIAN DREW DEMOURIE                                                Super. Ct. Nos. 18NF002227A,
    DUFF-GUARDADO,                                                      18SF013129B)
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Appellant Dorian Drew Demourie Duff-Guardado contends his excess
    presentence custody credits should apply to eliminate the three-year parole
    period he is subject to as part of his sentence in Case No. 18NF002227A
    (Case 227A).1 He also contends the parole revocation restitution fine imposed
    on him in that case should be stricken. We modify the judgment in Case
    227A to apply appellant’s excess presentence credits against his parole term
    1
    Appellant concurrently appeals his sentence in Case No. 18SF013129B
    (Case 129B). In Case 129B, appellant pleaded no contest to discharging a
    firearm with gross negligence (Pen. Code, § 246.3, subd. (a)) and street
    terrorism (id. § 186.22, subd. (a)) and admitted a gang enhancement (id. §
    12022, subd. (a)). He was sentenced to seven years in state prison and
    ordered to pay a parole revocation restitution fine. However, appellant’s
    opening brief raises no issues with his Case 129B sentence. Accordingly,
    Case 227A is the only proceeding we address in our analysis.
    1
    and to strike the parole revocation restitution fine. As modified, the
    judgment is affirmed.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, appellant pleaded no contest to
    aiding a felony after the fact (Pen. Code, § 32).2 The trial court sentenced
    him to two years (730 days) in state prison and awarded him total
    presentence custody credits of 1,825 days. He was subject to a three-year
    parole period (1,095 days) pursuant to section 3000, subdivision (b)(2)(B). In
    addition, the court imposed and stayed a $300 parole revocation restitution
    fine pending successful completion of parole. Appellant appeals his sentence.
    DISCUSSION
    A.    Parole Period
    Appellant contends his excess presentence custody credits should be
    applied against his three-year parole term. The People agree, as do we.
    It is a “long-established rule that, in the ordinary situation of original
    sentencing, excess presentence credits can reduce any period of parole.”
    (People v. Morales (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 399
    , 405 (Morales); see In re Sosa (1980)
    
    102 Cal.App.3d 1002
    , 1005 (Sosa).)
    Section 1170, subdivision (a)(3), states in relevant part: “In any case in
    which the amount of preimprisonment credit under Section 2900.5 or any
    other law is equal to or exceeds any sentence imposed pursuant to this
    chapter, . . . the entire sentence shall be deemed to have been served, except
    for the remaining period of mandatory supervision, and the defendant shall
    not be actually delivered to the custody of the secretary or to the custody of
    the county correctional administrator. The court shall advise the defendant
    that they shall serve an applicable period of parole, postrelease community
    2
    All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2
    supervision, or mandatory supervision, and order the defendant to report to
    the parole or probation office closest to the defendant’s last legal residence,
    unless the in-custody credits equal the total sentence, including both
    confinement time and the period of parole, postrelease community
    supervision, or mandatory supervision. (§ 1170, subd. (a)(3), italics added.)
    Section 2900.5, subdivision (a) adds in relevant part: “If the total
    number of days in custody exceeds the number of days of the term of
    imprisonment to be imposed, the entire term of imprisonment shall be
    deemed to have been served.” (§ 2900.5, subd. (a).) “ ‘[T]erm of
    imprisonment’ ” includes any period of imprisonment imposed as a condition
    of probation or otherwise ordered by a court in imposing or suspending the
    imposition of any sentence, and also includes any term of imprisonment,
    including any period of imprisonment prior to release on parole and any
    period of imprisonment and parole, prior to discharge, whether established or
    fixed by statute, by any court, or by any duly authorized administrative
    agency.” (§ 2900.5, subd. (c), italics added.)
    As the Supreme Court summarized in Morales, “section 2900.5 states
    two things relevant here: (1) the person is entitled to credit for time served,
    and (2) the credit can reduce or eliminate the period of parole.” (Morales,
    supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 406.)
    Here, as discussed, appellant was sentenced to two years in state
    prison (730 days) and subject to a three-year parole term (1,095 days). There
    is no disagreement that appellant’s 1,825 days of presentence custody credits
    applied against his two-year prison sentence (§ 1170, subd, (a)(3); Sosa,
    supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1005–1006), resulting in 1,095 days of excess
    presentence credits. Under the authorities referenced above, these 1,095
    days of excess presentence credits further apply against the parole portion of
    3
    appellant’s sentence. (§§ 1170, subd. (a)(3), 2900.5; Sosa, supra, 102
    Cal.App.3d at p. 1005 [presentence credit applies against parole portion of
    sentence].) Accordingly, appellant’s 1,095 days of excess presentence credits
    apply to eliminate his 1,095-day parole term, and he is no longer subject to
    parole in this case.
    B.    Parole Revocation Restitution Fine
    Appellant also contends the $300 parole revocation restitution fine
    imposed on him pursuant to section 1202.45 should be stricken. Again, the
    People agree, as do we. Under section 1202.45, in “every case where a person
    is convicted of a crime and his or her sentence includes a period of parole,” a
    court must “assess an additional parole revocation restitution fine” when a
    restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b) is imposed. (§
    1202.45, subd. (a).) Given appellant’s three-year parole period is eliminated
    and his sentence no longer includes a period of parole, the parole revocation
    restitution fine is stricken. (See People v. Hannah (1999) 
    73 Cal.App.4th 270
    ,
    274–275 [concluding it would be inappropriate to impose a section 1202.45
    fine when sentence does not include period of parole].)
    DISPOSITION
    In Case 227A, appellant’s excess presentence credits are to be applied
    against his parole term, and the $300 parole revocation fine under section
    1202.45 is stricken. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. The clerk of
    the superior court is directed to modify the abstract of judgment to reflect
    this modification and to forward a copy of the new amended abstract to the
    Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In Case 129B, the judgment
    is also affirmed.
    4
    _________________________
    Petrou, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    _________________________
    Tucher, P.J.
    _________________________
    Fujisaki, J.
    A160850/People v. Duff-Guardado
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A160850

Filed Date: 9/7/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/7/2021