People v. Davis CA2/6 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 9/10/21 P. v. Davis CA2/6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    THE PEOPLE,                                                  2d Crim. No. B308513
    (Super. Ct. No. CR42412B)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Ventura County)
    v.
    BILLY LYN DAVIS,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Billy Lyn Davis appeals an order denying his petition for
    relief under Penal Code section 1170.95.1 We affirm.
    FACTS
    Davis was convicted of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) with the
    special circumstances that the murder was committed while the
    defendant was engaged in kidnapping (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B))
    and the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of
    torture (id., subd. (a)(18)).
    1   All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    Davis was convicted by a slow plea; that is, he submitted
    the matter on transcripts that included the testimony of 17
    witnesses who testified before the grand jury and 12 witnesses
    who testified at the trial of his codefendant, Spencer Brasure.
    The trial court sentenced Davis to life without the possibility of
    parole for the murder with special circumstances. Davis
    appealed, and we affirmed. (People v. Davis (Nov. 22, 2000,
    B137098) [nonpub. opn.].)
    Section 1170.95 Petition
    Davis petitioned for relief under section 1170.95. He
    checked the box on the form petition stating that he was
    convicted of first or second degree murder under the felony
    murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
    He also checked boxes stating that he was not an active
    participant in the murder, that he did not act with reckless
    indifference to human life, and that the victim was not a peace
    officer.
    At Davis’s request, the trial court took judicial notice of the
    entire trial court record in the underlying case, Senate Bill No.
    1437, and Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 48.
    The trial court appointed counsel for Davis.
    The People filed opposition to Davis’s petition. The People
    argued that the true finding on the torture special circumstances
    alone shows Davis is not entitled to relief, and that the record of
    conviction shows Davis was a major participant in the crimes and
    that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.
    Davis waived an evidentiary hearing and submitted the
    matter on his pleadings.
    2.
    Ruling
    The trial court reviewed the record of conviction, including
    our opinion in Davis’s original appeal.
    The record of conviction shows that Davis and Brasure had
    grievances against Anthony Guest. They conspired to kidnap
    him. They brought Guest to Davis’s house where they tortured
    him for hours. Davis helped transport Guest to a remote location
    where they murdered him and lit him on fire. Davis supplied a
    magnesium plate from his father’s printing business to attach to
    Guest’s head. Davis believed the plate would burn so hot that it
    would make it difficult to identify Guest.
    The trial court found that Davis was a major participant in
    the crime and acted with reckless indifference to human life. The
    court denied Davis relief under section 1170.95.
    DISCUSSION
    I
    Davis contends he should have received a hearing on major
    participation with reckless indifference. He also contends that he
    should have been allowed to challenge the special circumstances
    finding that he acted with the intent to kill.
    Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature amended the
    definition of murder to eliminate the felony murder rule and the
    natural and probable consequences theory of malice. (§§ 188,
    189; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2, 3.) Thus, malice can no longer be
    imputed from the intent to commit some other target offense.
    As part of the reform, the Legislature enacted section
    1170.95. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Section 1170.95,
    subdivision (a) provides:
    “(a) A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a
    natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition
    3.
    with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the
    petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on
    any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply:
    “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed
    against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed
    under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and
    probable consequences doctrine.
    “(2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second
    degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of
    a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree
    or second degree murder.
    “(3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second
    degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
    effective January 1, 2019.”
    The changes to sections 188 and 189 in the 2019
    amendment include the addition of subdivision (a)(3) to section
    188:
    “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order
    to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with
    malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person
    based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd
    (a)(3), added by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)
    Section 189, subdivision (e) now provides:
    “(e) A participant in the perpetration or attempted
    perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death
    occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:
    “(1) The person was the actual killer.
    “(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the
    intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
    4.
    solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
    commission of murder in the first degree.
    “(3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
    felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
    described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”
    By the terms of section 1170.95, it applies only to persons
    “convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and
    probable consequences theory” and who “could not be convicted of
    first or second degree murder because of the changes made to
    Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
    That does not describe Davis. His record of conviction
    shows he was an active participant in every phase of the
    kidnapping, torture, and murder of Guest. Even more definitive
    is that the true finding of torture special circumstances is based
    on a finding of intent to kill. Davis was not convicted of felony
    murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
    theory, and the changes made to section 188 or 189 would have
    had no effect on his conviction.
    There is nothing about the record of conviction that even
    arguably indicates Davis is entitled to relief under section
    1170.95. Instead, the record affirmatively shows Davis is not
    entitled to relief. Section 1170.95 does not authorize a collateral
    attack on all murder convictions.
    Moreover, the record shows that Davis waived an
    evidentiary hearing and agreed to submit the matter on his
    pleadings.
    5.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment (order) is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    GILBERT, P. J.
    We concur:
    YEGAN, J.
    TANGEMAN, J.
    6.
    Benjamin F. Coats, Judge
    Superior Court County of Ventura
    ______________________________
    Ralph H. Goldsen, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
    Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and Michael C. Keller, Deputy
    Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    7.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B308513

Filed Date: 9/10/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/10/2021