People v. Moore ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 9/10/21
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    THE PEOPLE,                              B308386
    Plaintiff and Respondent,        (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. TA043305)
    v.
    GREGORY MOORE,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County. H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Affirmed.
    Wayne C. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S.
    Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
    Respondent.
    _________________________________
    Gregory Moore appeals from the order of the court denying
    his petition for a youth offender evidence preservation proceeding
    in accordance with People v. Franklin (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 261
    (Franklin). Appellant also requests that the five-year prior
    serious felony enhancement imposed under Penal Code1 section
    667, subdivision (a) be stricken.
    PROCEDURAL2 BACKGROUND
    In 1997, appellant was convicted following a jury trial of
    one count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), three counts of
    possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); counts 2,
    5, & 10), two counts of second degree robbery (§ 211; counts 3 &
    4), two counts of attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated
    murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a); counts 6 & 7), and two counts of
    shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246; counts 8 & 9).
    Appellant was charged with and admitted one prior strike
    conviction under the Three Strikes law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
    1170.12, subds. (a)–(d).) The trial court sentenced appellant
    under the Three Strikes law to an aggregate term of 107 years to
    life in state prison.
    On September 29, 2020, the trial court denied appellant’s
    petition for a Franklin proceeding on the ground that appellant is
    ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051,
    subdivision (h) because he was sentenced under the Three Strikes
    law based on his prior strike conviction.
    1   Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2 Because this appeal raises no issues concerning the facts
    of the underlying offenses, we omit a statement of facts. (See
    People v. White (1997) 
    55 Cal.App.4th 914
    , 916, fn. 2.)
    2
    DISCUSSION
    I. Section 3051, subdivision (h) Does Not Violate
    Equal Protection
    Appellant was 21 years old when he committed the offenses
    in this case and contends that the exclusion of youth offenders
    who were sentenced under the Three Strikes law from eligibility
    for a youth offender parole hearing violates equal protection. We
    disagree.
    A. Youth offender parole hearings
    With the enactment of section 3051 in 2013, the Legislature
    declared its intent “to create a process by which growth and
    maturity of youthful offenders can be assessed and a meaningful
    opportunity for release established.” (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.)
    To this end, section 3051 “establish[ed] a parole eligibility
    mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes
    that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain
    release when he or she has shown that he or she has been
    rehabilitated and gained maturity.” (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1; see
    In re Trejo (2017) 
    10 Cal.App.5th 972
    , 980–981.) Under section
    3051, subdivisions (a) and (b), persons aged 25 years or younger
    at the time of their controlling offenses3 are eligible for a youth
    offender parole hearing after serving 15, 20, or 25 years in prison,
    depending on the sentence. (§ 3051, subds. (a)–(b); People v.
    Wilkes (2020) 
    46 Cal.App.5th 1159
    , 1164 (Wilkes).) However,
    section 3051, subdivision (h) specifically excludes from youth
    offender parole consideration offenders such as appellant who
    3The “controlling offense” is “the offense or enhancement
    for which any sentencing court imposed the longest term of
    imprisonment.” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
    3
    were sentenced under the Three Strikes law.4 (Ibid.) Appellant
    maintains this disparate treatment of Three Strikes youth
    offenders violates equal protection.
    B. Equal protection jurisprudence
    Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution
    all persons are guaranteed equal protection under the law.
    “ ‘ “ ‘The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal
    protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a
    classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in
    an unequal manner.’ [Citations.] This initial inquiry is not
    whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but
    ‘whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law
    challenged.’ ” [Citation.] In other words, we ask at the threshold
    whether two classes that are different in some respects are
    sufficiently similar with respect to the laws in question to require
    the government to justify its differential treatment of these
    classes under those laws.’ ” (People v. Foster (2019) 
    7 Cal.5th 1202
    , 1211–1212.) “ ‘Where a class of criminal defendants is
    similarly situated to another class of defendants who are
    4  Section 3051, subdivision (h) provides: “This section shall
    not apply to cases in which sentencing occurs pursuant to Section
    1170.12, subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, of Section 667, or
    Section 667.61, or to cases in which an individual is sentenced to
    life in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling
    offense that was committed after the person had attained 18
    years of age. This section shall not apply to an individual to
    whom this section would otherwise apply, but who, subsequent to
    attaining 26 years of age, commits an additional crime for which
    malice aforethought is a necessary element of the crime or for
    which the individual is sentenced to life in prison.”
    4
    sentenced differently, courts look to determine whether there is a
    rational basis for the difference.’ ” (Wilkes, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th
    at p. 1165, quoting People v. Edwards (2019) 
    34 Cal.App.5th 183
    ,
    195 (Edwards); People v. Chatman (2018) 
    4 Cal.5th 277
    , 289
    (Chatman).)
    “A classification in a statute is presumed rational until the
    challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment
    is reasonably conceivable. [Citations.] The underlying rationale
    for a statutory classification need not have been ‘ “ever actually
    articulated” ’ by lawmakers, and it does not need to ‘ “be
    empirically substantiated.” ’ [Citation.] Nor does the logic
    behind a potential justification need to be persuasive or
    sensible—rather than simply rational.” (Chatman, supra, 4
    Cal.5th at p. 289.)
    To successfully challenge a statute as violative of equal
    protection under a rational basis standard, the party must negate
    every conceivable basis for the disparate treatment. (Heller v.
    Doe (1993) 
    509 U.S. 312
    , 320; Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at
    p. 195.) Indeed, a classification does not violate equal protection
    if there is any rational relationship between the disparity of
    treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose. (Heller, at
    p. 320.) “If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, ‘[e]qual
    protection analysis does not entitle the judiciary to second-guess
    the wisdom, fairness, or logic of the law.’ ” (Edwards, at pp. 195–
    196; Wilkes, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1165; People v. Turnage
    (2012) 
    55 Cal.4th 62
    , 74.)
    5
    C. The exclusion of offenders sentenced under the Three
    Strikes law from youth offender parole consideration is
    rationally related to a legitimate penal interest
    Appellant contends he is similarly situated to youth
    offenders who were not sentenced under the Three Strikes law
    and the differential treatment of youth offenders with prior
    strikes and those without under section 3051, subdivision (h) is
    not rationally related to any legitimate public interest. But even
    assuming both groups of violent youthful offenders are similarly
    situated for purposes of section 3051, we conclude the Legislature
    could rationally determine that the youth offender with one or
    more prior strikes⎯“ ‘a recidivist who has engaged in significant
    antisocial behavior and who has not benefited from the
    intervention of the criminal justice system’ [citation]⎯presents
    too great a risk of recidivism to allow the possibility of early
    parole,” thus justifying the disparate treatment. (Wilkes, supra,
    46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1166, quoting People v. Cooper (1996) 
    43 Cal.App.4th 815
    , 829 (Cooper).)
    Wilkes observed, “Numerous courts have rejected equal
    protection challenges to the differential treatment of Three
    Strikes offenders, concluding that such offenders are not
    similarly situated to nonrecidivist offenders and/or that a
    rational basis exists to treat them differently.” (Wilkes, supra, 46
    Cal.App.5th at p. 1165.) Thus, as the court in Cooper reasoned:
    “A person who has committed and been convicted of two serious
    or violent felonies before the instant offense is a recidivist who
    has engaged in significant antisocial behavior and who has not
    benefited from the intervention of the criminal justice system.
    He is the prototype of the repeat offender for whom the three
    strikes legislation was drafted. It is reasonable for the
    6
    Legislature to distinguish between those felons, like appellant,
    who come to court with a history of serious or violent felony
    convictions and those who do not. Such exercise of legislative
    discretion cannot be defeated simply by the argument that at the
    end of a mathematical process the offenders have committed an
    equal number of serious and nonserious felonies. The Legislature
    is entitled to treat recidivist felons of the type described in the
    three strikes law more harshly than those recidivists who have
    not yet qualified.” (Cooper, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 829; see
    People v. Kilborn (1996) 
    41 Cal.App.4th 1325
    , 1332 [“The system
    of imposing greater punishment on all persons who commit a
    felony-grade crime after having committed one or more serious or
    violent felonies in the past, is rationally related to the legitimate
    public objective of discouraging recidivism”]; People v. Spears
    (1995) 
    40 Cal.App.4th 1683
    , 1688 [“It is clear the Legislature
    intended to set appellant and other recidivists with prior ‘strike’
    convictions apart from first time offenders and those with less
    serious criminal histories; it is equally clear it did so with a
    legitimate objective in mind”]; People v. McCain (1995) 
    36 Cal.App.4th 817
    , 820 [“The Legislature has seen fit to increase
    the severity of punishment for recidivists who have committed
    serious or violent felonies and who again commit felony offenses.
    . . . [W]e cannot say harsher treatment for such recidivists is
    irrational or arbitrary such that it denies them equal protection
    under the law”].)
    Appellant relies on Edwards, supra, 
    34 Cal.App.5th 183
     to
    argue there is no rational basis to distinguish between a youth
    offender whose immaturity, impulsiveness, and susceptibility to
    peer pressure caused him to commit a crime earlier in his youth
    that qualifies as a strike and the youth offender who, despite a
    7
    long criminal record, has no prior strike convictions. In Edwards,
    Division Four of the First District Court of Appeal held section
    3051, subdivision (h) violated equal protection by categorically
    excluding youth offenders sentenced under the “One Strike” law
    (§ 667.61) from the early parole consideration available even to
    youthful murderers. (Edwards, at p. 199.) Based on the
    “consistent theme in constitutional jurisprudence” that
    “ ‘ “[d]efendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life
    will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious
    forms of punishment than are murderers,” ’ ” Edwards concluded:
    “Because the Legislature made youthful-offender parole hearings
    available even for first degree murderers (except those who
    committed murder as an adult and received an LWOP sentence),
    there is no rational basis for excluding One Strike defendants
    from such hearings.” (Edwards, at pp. 196–197.)
    We agree with Wilkes that Edwards is distinguishable. As
    Wilkes explained, “ ‘The “One Strike” law is an alternative,
    harsher sentencing scheme that applies to specified felony sex
    offenses,’ such that ‘ “a first-time offense can result in one of two
    heightened sentences.” ’ (Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at
    pp. 192, 193.) The distinguishing characteristic of Three Strikes
    offenders, of course, is that they are not being sentenced for a
    first-time offense. Thus, the ample authority rejecting equal
    protection challenges from Three Strikes offenders did not apply
    in Edwards. Indeed, Edwards itself took pains to ‘note that
    criminal history plays no role in defining a One Strike crime’ and
    that ‘[t]he problem in this case is’ the categorical exclusion of ‘an
    entire class of youthful offenders convicted of a crime short of
    homicide . . . , regardless of criminal history . . . .’ (Edwards, at
    8
    p. 199, italics added.)” (Wilkes, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at
    pp. 1166–1167.)
    In sum, we conclude the differential treatment of youth
    offenders sentenced under the Three Strikes law for purposes of
    early parole consideration for youth offenders is rationally
    related to the legitimate governmental purpose of addressing
    recidivism and does not violate equal protection.
    II. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Rule on
    Appellant’s Claim that the Imposition of the
    Five-year Enhancement Pursuant to Section
    667, Subdivision (a) Resulted in an
    Unauthorized Sentence
    Wholly unrelated to the denial of his petition for a Franklin
    proceeding, appellant also challenges his sentence on the ground
    that the imposition of a five-year enhancement under section 667,
    subdivision (a) was unauthorized and must be stricken because
    the prosecution did not comply with the pleading and proof
    requirements of section 1170.1, subdivision (e).5 Appellant’s
    claim, brought for the first time over 20 years after he was
    sentenced in 1997, and not raised in the proceedings below, is not
    subject to this court’s jurisdiction in an appeal from the denial of
    a petition for a Franklin proceeding.
    “As a general rule, a criminal defendant who fails to object
    at trial to a purportedly erroneous ruling forfeits the right to
    challenge that ruling on appeal.” (People v. Anderson (2020) 
    9 Cal.5th 946
    , 961.) But there is an exception to this rule for an
    5 Section 1170.1, subdivision (e) provides that “[a]ll
    enhancements shall be alleged in the accusatory pleading and
    either admitted by the defendant in open court or found to be
    true by the trier of fact.”
    9
    unauthorized sentence, which may be challenged despite a final
    judgment of conviction, even after affirmance on appeal. (In re
    G.C. (2020) 
    8 Cal.5th 1119
    , 1130 (G.C.).) “The unauthorized
    sentence doctrine is designed to provide relief from forfeiture for
    ‘obvious legal errors at sentencing that are correctable without
    referring to factual findings in the record or remanding for
    further findings.’ [Citation.] It applies when the trial court has
    imposed a sentence that ‘could not lawfully be imposed under any
    circumstance in the particular case.’ ” (Anderson, at p. 962; G.C.
    at p. 1130.)
    By permitting a defendant to challenge an unauthorized
    sentence on appeal even in the absence of an objection below, the
    unauthorized sentence rule constitutes a narrow exception to the
    forfeiture doctrine (In re Sheena K. (2007) 
    40 Cal.4th 875
    , 886–
    887), “ ‘not to the jurisdictional requirement of a timely notice of
    appeal’ ” or other means of properly challenging the judgment of
    conviction. (G.C., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1129.) In order to invoke
    the unauthorized sentence rule in the first instance, our Supreme
    Court has held the reviewing court “must have jurisdiction over
    the judgment.” (G.C. at p. 1130.)
    In G.C., the juvenile court’s disposition order found the
    minor had committed a so-called “wobbler” offense, but the court
    failed to make the requisite declaration under Welfare and
    Institutions Code section 702 that the offense was a misdemeanor
    or a felony. (G.C., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1122.) The question
    before our Supreme Court was “whether G.C. may challenge the
    [juvenile] court’s neglect of this mandatory duty in an appeal
    from a later dispositional order after the time to appeal the
    original disposition expired.” (Ibid.) The court held that because
    there was no correlation between the Welfare and Institutions
    10
    Code section 702 error in the original disposition and the
    judgment before the Court on Appeal, the appellate court lacked
    jurisdiction to remedy the defect. (G.C. at p. 1130.)
    So it is here. Not only is appellant attempting to challenge
    his sentence more than 20 years after his judgment of conviction
    became final, but he is doing so for the first time on appeal from
    the denial of his request for a Franklin proceeding. A Franklin
    proceeding, however, “is unrelated to the validity of the
    defendant’s sentence. Neither the entitlement to a youth
    offender parole hearing, nor the evidence preservation process
    ‘disturb[s] the finality of state convictions.’ ” (In re Cook (2019) 
    7 Cal.5th 439
    , 451.) By the same token, the trial court’s denial of
    appellant’s petition for a Franklin proceeding and his appeal
    from that denial did not confer jurisdiction on this court over the
    judgment. The unauthorized sentence doctrine has no
    application here, and we have no jurisdiction to consider
    appellant’s challenge to his sentence in this appeal.
    Moreover, even if we had jurisdiction to review appellant’s
    claim, he has not presented a sufficient record on appeal to
    permit consideration of the challenge to his sentence. In support
    of his contention, appellant points to the omission of any
    reference to the prior serious felony enhancement in the amended
    information and the absence of an admission to the enhancement
    by appellant or a true finding by the trier of fact in the record in
    this appeal. But the record in this appeal⎯consisting of the
    amended information, minute orders from sentencing, the
    abstract of judgment, and the transcript from the hearing on
    appellant’s petition for a Franklin proceeding⎯is woefully
    inadequate for determining the merits of appellant’s claim. Of
    course, “the defendant . . . bears the burden to provide a record on
    11
    appeal which affirmatively shows that there was error below, and
    any uncertainty in the record must be resolved against the
    defendant.” (People v. Sullivan (2007) 
    151 Cal.App.4th 524
    , 549.)
    Because appellant has failed to provide an adequate record for
    review, his claim fails. (People v. Chubbuck (2019) 
    43 Cal.App.5th 1
    , 12.)
    DISPOSITION
    The postjudgment order is affirmed.
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
    LUI, P. J.
    We concur:
    ASHMANN-GERST, J.
    HOFFSTADT, J.
    12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B308386

Filed Date: 9/10/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/10/2021