People v. McRay CA4/2 ( 2015 )

Filed 7/16/15 P. v. McRay CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E060821
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1105973)
LARRY McCRAY, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Richard Todd Fields,
Judge. Affirmed.
Gary V. Crooks, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Michael
Pulos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Appellant and defendant Larry McCray appeals from his conviction for attempted
voluntary manslaughter, mayhem and assault with a deadly weapon. He contends that
there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he did not act in self-
defense; that the trial court erred in omitting certain language from the self-defense
instructions; and that the court abused its discretion in denying his request to strike his
strike prior.
We find no prejudicial error, and we will affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
By a first amended information, defendant was charged with attempted willful,
deliberate and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187;1 count 1); assault with a
deadly weapon, a screwdriver (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2); and mayhem (§ 203;
count 3). In connection with count 2, the information alleged that defendant personally
used a deadly or dangerous weapon, within the meaning of section 12022,
subdivision (b)(1) and section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23), and that he personally inflicted
great bodily injury on the victim, within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a)
and section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). The information also alleged that defendant had a
prior conviction for criminal threats (§ 422), both as a serious prior offense within the
meaning of section 667, subdivision (a), and as a special prior offense within the meaning
of section 667, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1), and section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1).
1 All statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless another code is specified.
2
A jury convicted defendant of attempted voluntary manslaughter on count 1, as a
lesser included offense of attempted murder. It convicted him on counts 2 and 3 as
charged. It found true the allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily
injury in the commission of count 2, and it found true that defendant personally used a
deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense alleged in count 1 of the
information, “or of the lesser offense of assault.”2 Defendant admitted the prior felony
conviction allegations.
The court imposed a sentence of four years in state prison on count 3 (mayhem),
and doubled it pursuant to section 667, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1), and section 1170.12,
subdivision (c)(1). It imposed a consecutive term of five years pursuant to section 667,
subdivision (a). The court stayed terms of two years each on counts 1 and 2, and stayed
them pursuant to section 654. The court struck the personal weapon use enhancement
pursuant to section 1385. It imposed a term of three years for the great bodily injury
enhancement, and stayed it pursuant to section 654.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
2 The first amended information did not allege personal use of a deadly or
dangerous weapon in connection with count 1. The jury did not return a personal use
finding as to count 2, which was alleged in the information. Accordingly, there does not
appear to be a legal basis for the personal use finding. However, the court struck the
enhancement in the interest of justice.
3
FACTS
On December 21, 2011, around 5:10 p.m., Kory Harris rode his bike to the S&K
Liquor Store in Perris. In the parking lot, he saw his friend Nigel Devine and another
man. Devine was standing in a defensive posture, with his hands positioned as though he
was “getting ready to block”; the other man had a screwdriver in his hand and was
waving it around or poking it in a threatening manner. Harris parked his bike and went to
the door of the liquor store and said to the clerk, “Hey, you might want to call somebody.
Somebody’s trying to stick Nigel with a screwdriver.” When Harris turned back toward
the parking lot about 20 seconds later, he saw Devine standing with blood squirting out of
his head. The other man, whom Harris identified as defendant, was walking back to his
truck. Harris saw him get into the truck and drive away.
When law enforcement arrived, Harris told them what he had seen and gave them
a description of the truck and a few numbers from the license plate. Defendant was
stopped a short while later, and Harris identified him in a field show-up. The screwdriver
was recovered from inside the truck. The parties stipulated that blood on the blade of the
screwdriver was Devine’s.
During the incident, Harris heard defendant and Devine exchanging words but for
the most part could not make out the words. He did not hear Devine utter any threats.
He did hear defendant yell, “I’ll [expletive] kill you.” He did not see a weapon in
Devine’s hand or see him hit defendant, and Devine did not appear to be in a “fighting
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mode,” but rather in a defensive mode. Defendant seemed “really angry” and had a
“weird” demeanor. He was talking in a “random” manner and acting “kind of crazy.”3
Devine described the events as well, but as he repeatedly stated, he had suffered
brain damage in the incident, which resulted in memory loss. He stated that he also lost
most of the vision in his right eye as a result of the stabbing. Before the stabbing, he was
already blind in his left eye. Because of his vision deficits, he was unable to identify
anyone in the courtroom as his assailant. He had identified defendant at the preliminary
hearing, but his vision had deteriorated since then.
Defendant testified that when he arrived at the liquor store, he took the
screwdriver out of the truck because he needed to make an adjustment to the engine. As
he got out of the truck, Devine approached him and said, “I’m going to kick your ass.”
Devine brushed against defendant and patted his pockets. Devine was with another man,
who was wearing a trench coat. Defendant thought they were going to hurt him or rob
him. Defendant said he was “a little concerned,” but was more curious about what the
two men were going to do. At some point, Devine shrugged his shoulders toward
defendant as though to taunt him. At that point, defendant thought Devine was going to
hit him. He was also angry because he thought Devine was taunting him. In response to
Devine’s movements, defendant “reflexed” and unintentionally stabbed Devine in the eye
3 The trial court twice referred defendant for assessment of his competence to
stand trial. He was found competent. However, at sentencing, the court noted that
defendant had a long history of mental illness. The court held that even though defendant
was competent to stand trial, his mental illness operated as a factor in mitigation of
sentence. For that reason, the court imposed the middle term rather than the upper term,
which the court felt would otherwise have been the appropriate sentence.
5
with the screwdriver. However, defendant admitted that when he is angry, he becomes
violent. After he stabbed Devine, defendant pulled the screwdriver out of Devine’s eye.
He got into his truck and drove away.
When Devine arrived at the emergency hospital, a doctor determined that he had
suffered a broken nose and broken bones around his eye sockets, as well as fractures in
various parts of his skull. His right eye protruded from its socket. He had a large bruise
behind his right eye which threatened the vision in his eye. He ultimately lost some or all
of the vision in that eye. He had traumatic brain bleeding and a significant brain injury.
He was very combative with staff during his hospitalization, but that is not uncommon
with a traumatic injury.
Devine was known to local law enforcement as a person who got into frequent
fights. He was trained as a boxer and in martial arts.4 He also had a history of being
drunk in public.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
1.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE VERDICT
Defendant asserted that he was defending himself from Devine and the other man
when he stabbed Devine. He now contends that the prosecution failed to meet its burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, with respect to all three offenses, that he was not
acting in self-defense.
4 There was no evidence that defendant was aware of Devine’s propensity for
fighting or his training in boxing and martial arts.
6
When the evidence raises the possibility that the defendant acted in self-defense or
with another justification, the burden is on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant did not act in self-defense or with another legal justification.
(People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 462; Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S. 684,
684-685, 703-704.) Because the burden of proof as to self-defense is phrased in the
negative—that the prosecution must prove that the defendant did not act in self-defense—
defendant appears to believe that because there is evidence that supports his claim of self-
defense, we must find that the evidence was insufficient to support a contrary finding.
This is incorrect. Where there is conflicting evidence, some of which tends to show that
the killing or attempted killing was justified and some of which tends to show that it was
not, justification is a question for the jury: “[W]here the evidence is uncontroverted and
establishes all of the elements for a finding of self-defense it may be held as a matter of
law that the killing was justified; however, where some of the evidence tends to show a
situation in which a killing may not be justified then the issue is a question of fact for the
jury to determine. [Citation.] Where the evidence is uncontroverted, but reasonable
persons could differ on whether the resort to force was justified or whether the force
resorted to was excessive, then the issue is a question of fact for the trier of fact.
[Citations.]” (People v. Clark (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 379, abrogated on another
point by People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 92.) Here, although there may have
been some evidence that defendant acted in self-defense, we review the jury’s contrary
finding under the substantial evidence standard: We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment and determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable,
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credible and of solid value, such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1129.) We
presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.
(Ibid.) We do not reweigh evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and we
resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the judgment. (People v. Young (2005) 34
Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)
Defendant described Devine threatening to “kick [his] ass” and brushing against
him and patting his clothing as though to see if he had a wallet, while a man in a trench
coat loitered nearby. However, although he was “a little concerned” about Devine’s
threat to kick his ass, he was not really afraid when Devine followed him toward the
store. He was not really concerned about Devine at that point because “after [Devine] did
what he did, he acted like he was through.” Defendant had shifted his attention to the
other man, who was a little distance away. When defendant turned back to Devine,
Devine looked like he was about to throw a punch. It was reflex that caused him to stab
at Devine. He did not intentionally stab him, and did not aim for his eye. This evidence
was contradicted by other testimony. Harris, who saw only defendant and Devine in the
parking lot, testified that in the seconds just before defendant stabbed Devine, defendant
was the aggressor, yelling that he was going to kill Devine and “slashing” the screwdriver
at him, while Devine stood in a defensive posture. Devine also denied having acted
aggressively toward defendant or having threatened him. The testimony of Harris and
Devine, if believed by the jury, is sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant
did not act in self-defense. It is solely within the province of the jury to resolve conflicts
8
in the evidence and to determine what evidence has greater credibility or persuasive
force. (People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181.) Accordingly, even if defendant’s
testimony was sufficient to support a finding that he acted in the reasonable belief in the
need to defend himself and used a reasonable amount of force in light of the perceived
threat, the jury was not compelled to accept it. (Ibid.) For these reasons, defendant’s
argument fails.
2.
INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR
A. Antecedent Threats
The court instructed the jury with both CALCRIM 505, entitled “Justifiable
Homicide: Self-defense or Defense of Another,” and CALCRIM 3470, entitled “Right to
Self-Defense or Defense of Another (Non-Homicide).” Both instructions include an
optional paragraph which states: “[If you find that
threatened or harmed the defendant [or others] in the past, you may consider that
information in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct and beliefs were reasonable.]”
Both instructions also include the following optional paragraph: “[Someone who has
been threatened or harmed by a person in the past, is justified in acting more quickly or
taking greater self-defense measures against that person.]” The instructions as given did
not include those paragraphs. Defendant did not request that those paragraphs be
included in the instructions. He now contends that the court had a sua sponte duty to
include them.
9
A court’s duty to instruct on antecedent threats was addressed in People v. Garvin
(2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 484 (Garvin). There, the court said, “‘“‘It is settled that in
criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the
general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The
general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly
connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case.’ [Citation.]”’ [Citation.] The court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct on defenses when ‘“it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or
if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not
inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.”’ [Citation.] Yet this duty is
limited: ‘the trial court cannot be required to anticipate every possible theory that may fit
the facts of the case before it and instruct the jury accordingly. [Citation.] Thus, the
court is required to instruct sua sponte only on general principles which are necessary for
the jury’s understanding of the case. It need not instruct on specific points or special
theories which might be applicable to a particular case, absent a request for such an
instruction.’ [Citations.] Alternatively expressed, ‘[i]f an instruction relates “particular
facts to the elements of the offense charged,” it is a pinpoint instruction and the court
does not have a sua sponte duty to instruct.’ [Citation.] For example, our Supreme Court
has recently held there is no sua sponte obligation to instruct on after-formed intent.
[Citation.]
10
“Defendant offers no reasons supporting imposition of a sua sponte instructional
duty other than that the rule concerning antecedent threats is not a recent, ‘abstruse,
underdeveloped theory of law’ and that such an instruction is supported by the evidence.
We are not convinced. The trial court was obligated to instruct on the basic principles of
self-defense. It satisfied this duty by giving the standard CALJIC instructions on this
topic. These instructions are legally correct and the concept of antecedent assaults is
fully consistent with the general principles that are expressed therein. [Citation.] The
issue of the effect of antecedent assaults against defendant on the reasonableness of
defendant’s timing and degree of force highlights a particular aspect of this defense and
relates it to a particular piece of evidence. An instruction on the topic of antecedent
assaults is analogous to a clarifying instruction. It is axiomatic that ‘[a] defendant who
believes that an instruction requires clarification must request it.’ [Citation.] Therefore,
we conclude that this is a specific point and is not a general principle of law; the trial
court was not obligated to instruct on this issue absent request.” (People v. Garvin,
supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at pp. 488-489.) We agree with this analysis. Accordingly, the
court in this case had no sua sponte duty to instruct on antecedent threat.
We also reject defendant’s contention that his attorney’s failure to request
inclusion of the antecedent threat language in the instructions constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel. “‘Reviewing courts defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions
in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a “strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.”’ [Citations.] ‘[W]e accord great deference to counsel’s tactical decisions’
11
[citation], and we have explained that ‘courts should not second-guess reasonable, if
difficult, tactical decisions in the harsh light of hindsight’ [citation]. ‘Tactical errors are
generally not deemed reversible, and counsel’s decisionmaking must be evaluated in the
context of the available facts.’ [Citation.] [¶] In the usual case, where counsel’s trial
tactics or strategic reasons for challenged decisions do not appear on the record, we will
not find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there could be no conceivable
reason for counsel’s acts or omissions. ([Citation]; see also People v. Fosselman (1983)
33 Cal.3d 572, 581 [on appeal, a conviction will be reversed on the ground of ineffective
assistance of counsel ‘only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel
had no rational tactical purpose for his act or omission’].)” (People v. Weaver (2001) 26
Cal.4th 876, 925-926.)
Here, the record on appeal does not affirmatively disclose that counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for failing to request the omitted language. On the contrary, it
clearly discloses that the defense was not relying on antecedent threats as a justification
for defendant’s use of force. On direct, defendant testified that when he thought Devine
was going to hit him, he “reflexed” and because they were standing so close to each
other, the screwdriver went into Devine’s eye. On cross-examination, he said he was “a
little concerned” about Devine’s threat to “kick [his] ass,” but that he was not really
afraid while Devine followed him toward the store. He was not really concerned about
Devine at that point because “after [Devine] did what he did, he acted like he was
through.” Defendant had shifted his attention to the other man, who was a little distance
away. When defendant turned back to Devine, Devine looked like he was about to throw
12
a punch. It was reflex that caused him to stab at Devine. He did not intentionally stab
him, and did not aim for his eye. In effect, defendant said, the stabbing was accidental.5
The instruction on antecedent threat directly contradicts defendant’s testimony and his
theory of the case. Accordingly, it would have served no tactical purpose for counsel to
have requested the omitted language.
B. Unlawful Touching
Defendant also contends that it was error to fail to define “unlawful touching,”
even though the phrase was used twice in the self-defense instruction given in connection
with the nonhomicide offenses. That instruction included the following language: “The
defendant is not guilty [of the crimes alleged] if he used force against the other person in
lawful self-defense. The defendant acted in lawful self-defense if: [¶] 1. The defendant
reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of suffering bodily injury or was in
imminent danger of being touched unlawfully . . . .” CALCRIM 3470 defines “unlawful
touching” as follows: “The slightest touching can be unlawful if it is done in a rude or
angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is
enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.” Here, the trial
court omitted that portion of the instruction.
5 The court did instruct on accident.
13
In his opening brief, defendant merely makes the assertion that definition was
required but does not develop any argument or cite any authority in connection with this
assertion, nor does he argue how the omission was prejudicial. In his reply brief,
however, he amplifies his contention. There, defendant acknowledges that the evidence
most forcefully supported a finding that he reasonably feared that Devine, a trained
fighter who was acting aggressively toward him and had his fists up as though he was
about to hit defendant.6 He acknowledges that the jury would most likely have
understood the instruction to refer to defendant’s belief that he was about to suffer bodily
injury from being punched. However, he contends, if the court had defined “unlawful
touching,” the jury could have found that defendant reasonably feared an unlawful
touching similar to what Devine had done earlier, by brushing defendant and patting him
to see if he had any money.
Defendant is correct that those actions could have been found to be an unlawful
touching. He is also correct that “unlawful touching” is a legal term which required
definition. (See, e.g., People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011-1012.) However,
a defendant is allowed to use only reasonable force, i.e., the amount of force a reasonable
person would consider necessary to defend himself from the particular threat the person
feared. (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1065.) The use of fists does not
ordinarily justify the use of a deadly weapon in response. (People v. Enriquez (1977)
19 Cal.3d 221, 228 [there is a “limitation on the amount of retaliatory force which may be
6 There was no evidence that defendant knew Devine was a trained fighter.
14
used against an assault with fists. Such an assault does not justify the use of a deadly
weapon in self-defense”], overruled on another ground in People v. Cromer (2001) 24
Cal.4th 889, 898.) A fortiori, a rude or angry unlawful touching which falls short of the
use of fists cannot justify the use of a deadly weapon. Because the evidence does not
support a finding of self-defense based on a fear of an unlawful touching, it was not error
to omit the definition of “unlawful touching.” For the same reason, counsel’s failure to
request a definition did not constitute ineffective assistance.
3.
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
DEFENDANT’S ROMERO MOTION
Defendant admitted a serious prior felony conviction for criminal threats. (§ 422.)
Before sentencing, he submitted an invitation to the court to strike the prior conviction
for sentencing purposes, pursuant to section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero)
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504 (Romero). The court discussed the various factors it weighed
in considering whether to strike the prior conviction and concluded that defendant fell
within the spirit of the three strikes law. The court denied the request. Defendant now
contends that this was an abuse of discretion.
In People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, the California Supreme Court held,
“[I]n ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction
allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law, on its own motion, ‘in furtherance of
justice’ pursuant to Penal Code section 1385(a), or in reviewing such a ruling, the court
in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present
15
felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his
background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the [three
strike] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had
not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (Id. at
p. 161.) When a trial court decides not to strike a strike prior, we review the decision
“under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 374.) Under that standard, “we are guided by two fundamental precepts.
First, ‘“[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the
sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a
showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve the legitimate sentencing
objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be
set aside on review.”’ [Citations.] Second, a ‘“decision will not be reversed merely
because reasonable people might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized
nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’”’
[Citation.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its
discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could
agree with it.” (Id. at pp. 376-377.)
Here, defendant has not shown that the trial court’s denial of his request was
irrational or arbitrary. The trial court considered the nature of the present offense, saying,
“There’s no way to express the Court’s sense of how violent this particular crime was.
And I have heard many, many cases over many years, and it just, short of killing
somebody, it really doesn’t get more violent. I don’t know that I’ve heard too many
16
cases where I heard the person jammed a screwdriver through somebody’s eye, right
there in the eye, breaking multiple bones, entering—literally, fracturing the skull, going
into the brain, causing a loss of vision. There’s no way to understate [sic] the
extraordinary violent nature of this crime.” This view of the nature of the current
offenses is entirely supported by the record.
Next, the court considered defendant’s prior offenses. Defendant’s strike prior, for
criminal threats (§ 422), involved a threat to kill a family member. A prior conviction for
vandalism involved defendant going to a neighbor’s house with a knife to confront
someone. Defendant also has a prior conviction for possession of an assault weapon and
brandishing a weapon, and one for throwing an object at a car with the intent to cause
great bodily injury. These convictions all occurred between 2001 and 2008 and were
interspersed with periods of incarceration and hospitalization. The court considered
defendant’s mental health problems, which were described in the probation report.
However, the court found that despite having an opportunity for treatment—of which
defendant did not regularly avail himself—defendant “remains extraordinarily violent.”
The court found that because of the past and current violent offenses, defendant “falls
right within the meaning of the three-strikes law” and is precisely the kind of person the
Legislature wanted off the streets.
Defendant contends that it was an abuse of discretion for the court not to find that
his mental illness, which causes him to commit crimes, takes him out of the spirit of the
three strikes law. Citing the probation report, defendant explains that he is a 60-year-old
man who served in the Army beginning in 1974 but was honorably discharged in 1975
17
after being diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. He received treatment for nearly
20 years, but stopped seeking treatment in 1998 because of a divorce. Since then, despite
his illness, he was able to remain employed until he “retired” in 1999, and did not begin
committing crimes until 2001. The probation report states that his criminal history
derives from his mental illness and that the court had found him legally incompetent on
two occasions and ordered him hospitalized at Patton State Hospital for treatment. He
states that according to two mental health experts, he is a paranoid schizophrenic who
would benefit from regular and continuous treatment with antipsychotic medication. He
was found incompetent by the court and hospitalized at Patton State Hospital and
Metropolitan State Hospital.
What defendant ignores, however, is the probation officer’s report that even
though defendant is aware that the medication helped him and prevented him from
getting into trouble with the law, he had not consistently taken his medication.
Moreover, defendant has for years apparently attempted to self-medicate with marijuana,
cocaine, methamphetamine and alcohol, but denies that he has a drug or alcohol problem.
Defendant does not cite any authority—nor are we aware of any—that suggests
that a court should grant a Romero motion where the defendant makes a showing that
mental illness played some role in his criminal history. In fact, in People v. Carrasco
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, where the defendant’s Romero motion was based on the fact
that he had “‘significant mental health history and issues’” and was “suffering from the
effects of long-term drug use” (id. at p. 992), the Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s
claim that “the [trial] court erroneously found it lacked authority to consider [his] mental
18
condition as a factor.” (Id. at p. 993.) In denying the motion, the trial court commented
that case law did not authorize consideration of the defendant’s “‘mental state, his mental
condition, the reasons why he wanted to do these things.’” (Id. at p. 993.) The appellate
court explained, “The record reflects the trial court considered a wide range of
appropriate factors in passing sentence, particularly the nature and circumstances of
appellant’s present and past convictions.” (Ibid.) Since the trial court had expressly
considered the defendant’s “background and character in ruling on the motion,” its
remarks about his mental condition amounted to “an acknowledgement that the court
could not give undue weight to an inherently speculative argument that defendant’s
mental state ‘made him do it.’” (Id. at pp. 993–994.)
Here, the court took defendant’s history of mental illness into consideration, along
with his criminal history, in reaching its conclusion that defendant remains
extraordinarily violent despite the opportunity for treatment. Where a court has taken the
defendant’s background, the nature of his present offenses, and other individualized
considerations into account (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 530–531), we cannot say
that it abused its discretion unless its conclusion was irrational or arbitrary. (People v.
Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) The court did consider the appropriate factors,
and its conclusion was neither irrational nor arbitrary. Accordingly, it acted within its
discretion in denying defendant’s Romero motion.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
We concur:
KING
J.
MILLER
J.
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