Rhue v. Superior Court ( 2017 )


Menu:
  • Filed 11/28/17
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    HAROLYN RHUE,                       No. B283248
    Petitioner,                  (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BC590227)
    v.
    THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
    Respondent;
    ______________________________
    SAM NAM LLC, et al.,
    Real Parties in Interest.
    ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; application for writ of
    mandate. Writ granted.
    Harolyn Rhue, in pro. per.; Bahar Law Office and Sarvenaz
    Bahar, for Petitioner.
    Frederick R. Bennett, County Council, Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County, for Respondent.
    No appearance by Real Parties in Interest.
    _________________________
    In California, litigants who comply with relevant statutes
    and rules have a right to appeal an adverse judgment; the trial
    court may not arbitrarily deny a litigant that right. In this
    matter, the trial court refused a timely request by petitioner to
    preserve a record so that she might appeal. Because the trial
    court abused its discretion in doing so, we grant the petitioner’s
    request for a writ of mandate and order the preparation of a
    settled statement.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
    Petitioner Harolyn Rhue sued Signet Domain, LLC and
    Sam Nam (real parties in interest) in August 2015, in an action
    to quiet title. Neither of the real parties appeared in the action,
    and, in December 2015, the court entered their default. In May
    2016, the trial court, on its own motion, set a hearing to dismiss
    the complaint. Two months later, the court vacated the default
    against Sam Nam, who still had not appeared, and offered Rhue
    an opportunity to amend her complaint. In August, on Rhue’s
    motion for reconsideration, the court denied the motion and
    granted judgment on the pleadings against Rhue. The court’s
    order stated no reason for its action.
    Rhue moved to obtain a settled statement, as the August
    hearing had not been reported. The trial court denied the motion
    in May 2017, concluding, “no settled statement is necessary or
    required.”1 Rhue filed a writ, seeking relief from this Court; we
    1     “Plaintiff’s
    motion to use a settled statement on appeal
    (which implicitly also includes a request to have a statement
    ordered and prepared) is denied. As Plaintiff herself admits, the
    motion in issue was ruled upon based only on the papers before
    the Court and argument. No independent evidence was
    2
    issued an order to show cause on June 28, 2017. Real parties
    filed no response in this Court; the Superior Court served a letter
    brief, which it requested be deemed the argument of amicus
    curiae.
    DISCUSSION
    In August 2016, almost a year before the trial court in this
    case determined that no record was necessary for this Court’s
    review, we published Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th
    929. In that case, we made clear that the discretion of the trial
    court to deny a request for a settled statement is limited: “When
    a proper motion is made, it is the obligation of the parties and the
    court to work together to prepare the settled statement.
    California law has long recognized this obligation: a trial court
    may not ‘deprive a litigant of his right of appeal by simply
    refusing to perform a plain duty.’” (Id. at 931.)
    In Randall, we acknowledged the problem faced by too
    many litigants in California’s courtrooms, where there is no
    longer a court reporter provided as a matter of course. We
    provided guidance as to the scope of the trial court’s discretion in
    considering whether to order a settled statement and emphasized
    that the court must exercise that discretion “in a manner that
    introduced at the hearing meaning none outside of whatever
    appeared in the papers before the Court. No testimony was
    taken. It is also impossible to attempt to reconstruct-even were it
    appropriate or necessary to do so-what was specifically said in
    oral argument, which, in all events, is generally not to exceed the
    points and especially facts pled in the papers before the Court.
    The ‘correctness’ of the Judge’s ruling is reviewed based on the
    papers before the trial court, no settled statement is necessary or
    required and Plaintiff’s motion is denied.”
    3
    does not interfere with the litigant’s right to appeal. (Burns v.
    Brown (1946) 
    27 Cal. 2d 631
    , 636, 
    166 P.2d 1
    ; see also St. George
    v. Superior Court (1949) 
    93 Cal. App. 2d 815
    , 817, 
    209 P.2d 823
    [trial court’s power over the record must not be exercised in an
    arbitrary manner]; Eisenberg v. Superior Court (1956) 
    142 Cal. App. 2d 12
    , 18, 
    297 P.2d 803
    [‘full and plenary power over [the
    record] is reposed in the trial judge, subject only to the limitation
    that he does not act arbitrarily”’].)” (Randall v. 
    Mousseau, supra
    ,
    2 Cal.App.5th at p. 934.)
    California Rule of Court, rule 8.1372 governs requests for
    statements of decision, and sets the relevant parameters. The
    initial obligation is on the litigant seeking to proceed by way of
    settled statement. Rule 8.137(a) requires the litigant to file a
    motion which demonstrates that one of three criteria is satisfied.
    (Rule 8.137(a)(2).) Rhue satisfied her obligation under that rule
    by showing the designated proceedings were not reported. (Rule
    8.137(a)(2)(B).) The trial court then had the obligation to grant
    or deny the motion, in writing. (Mooney v. Superior Court (2016)
    
    245 Cal. App. 4th 523
    , 531.) When a trial court denies the motion,
    as the trial court did here, it must provide reasons demonstrating
    a “‘justifiable excuse’ why a settled statement could not be
    produced using the established procedures.” (Id. at 533.)
    The trial court failed to provide a “justifiable excuse” in this
    case. First, it undertook to decide what this Court would need to
    review the judgment; that determination, however, is not
    properly before the trial court. It is the litigant who must make a
    judgment whether he or she intends “to raise any issue that
    requires consideration of the oral proceedings in the superior
    2     All further references to rules are to the California Rules of
    Court.
    4
    court.” (Rule 8.120(b).) If the litigant does not provide a record of
    the proceedings, the reviewing court may order the record
    augmented by oral proceedings to “prevent a miscarriage of
    justice.” (Rule 8.130(a)(4).) This is not the trial court’s decision
    to make.
    The trial court’s second reason, that it would be difficult for
    it to reconstruct the hearing, also fails to provide a justifiable
    basis for its denial of the motion. Instead, it stands in the face of
    settled case law: a trial court’s stated difficulty in remembering
    what happened during the proceedings is not a ground to deny a
    settled statement. (Western States Const. Co. v. Municipal Court
    (1951) 
    38 Cal. 2d 146
    , 147-148; see also Mooney v. Superior 
    Court, supra
    , 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 532-533.)3
    The letter brief filed on behalf of the Superior Court does
    not address this authority. Instead it argues the court’s denial
    was justified because no evidence was taken at the hearing and
    the ruling was a legal ruling requiring de novo review. The brief
    argues that these facts demonstrate that no statement of decision
    was necessary.
    Counsel for the Superior Court relied only on one case:
    Chodos v. Cole (2012) 
    210 Cal. App. 4th 692
    . There the appellate
    court, over a dissent, determined that a transcript of the oral
    3      The trial court also indicated its belief that, in light of the
    fact that oral argument generally cannot exceed the points made
    in the filings, no settled statement was necessary. If that were
    correct, on appeal, we would have to conclude in all cases that the
    parties forfeited any point related to, but not unequivocally
    stated in, their filings. Given the purpose of oral argument, to
    allow the parties to respond to the court’s concerns about the
    issues, this position ignores reality.
    5
    argument was not necessary for its determination of the matter
    on the merits. The court noted that neither party relied on the
    oral argument before the trial court, the issue was purely one of
    law, and the standard of review was de novo. None of that is the
    case here.
    Here, the trial court vacated the entry of default and later
    dismissed the action without stating the grounds for either
    decision; it denied the motion for reconsideration. Two of these
    decisions involved the exercise of discretion by the trial court;
    accordingly, we review those determinations for abuse of
    discretion. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2013) 
    218 Cal. App. 4th 96
    , 106 [motion for reconsideration]; Rappleyea v.
    Campbell (1994) 
    8 Cal. 4th 975
    , 981 [relief from default]. In such
    a case, a settled statement may be indispensable. (Southern
    California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 476, 483 [In
    contrast to cases involving de novo review, “[i]n many cases
    involving the substantial evidence of abuse of discretion standard
    of review . . . a reporter’s transcript or an agreed or settled
    statement of the proceedings will be indispensable.”]
    In this case, the trial court stated no reasons for its rulings
    in its minute orders. Moreover, all of the rulings were based on
    the trial court’s own motions and not on filings made with the
    court by real parties. The court took the extraordinary action of
    vacating an unchallenged default and dismissing the entire
    action without providing any explanation of the grounds for doing
    so. In these circumstances, the trial court’s denial of the request,
    if allowed to stand, would deprive this Court of the information
    necessary to rule on the merits of Rhue’s appeal.4
    4     That result implicates other serious issues as well. (See
    Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, Canon 3 (b)(7) [“[a] judge shall accord to
    6
    Here, as in Randall, the decision of the trial court to deny
    the request for a settled statement would be fatal to Rhue’s
    attempt to obtain review of the trial court’s decisions. “The
    failure to comply with the Rule and resulting absence of a record,
    is more than significant to the appellant. Appealed judgments
    and orders are presumed correct, and error must be affirmatively
    shown. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 
    2 Cal. 3d 557
    , 564, 
    86 Cal. Rptr. 65
    468 P.2d 193
    .) Consequently, appellant has the
    burden of providing an adequate record. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987)
    
    43 Cal. 3d 1281
    , 1295, 
    240 Cal. Rptr. 872
    , 
    743 P.2d 932
    ; Jade
    Fashion & Co., Inc. v. Harkham Industries, Inc. (2014) 
    229 Cal. App. 4th 635
    , 644, 
    177 Cal. Rptr. 3d 184
    .) Failure to provide
    an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be
    resolved against appellant. (Maria 
    P., supra
    , at pp. 1295-1296,
    
    240 Cal. Rptr. 872
    , 
    743 P.2d 932
    .) Without a record, either by
    transcript or settled statement, a reviewing court must make all
    presumptions in favor of the validity of the judgment. (Elena S.
    v. Kroutik (2016) 
    247 Cal. App. 4th 570
    , 
    202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 318
    .) As
    has occurred here, appellant is effectively deprived of the right to
    appeal.” (Randall v. 
    Mousseau, supra
    , 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 935.)
    As in Randall, the trial court here could, by its own actions,
    have denied Rhue’s right to appeal. That was an abuse of
    discretion.
    every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that
    person's lawyer, the full right to be heard according to law”].)
    7
    DISPOSITION
    The petition for writ of mandate is granted. Let a
    peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to
    prepare a settled statement.
    ZELON, Acting P. J.
    We concur:
    SEGAL, J.
    BENSINGER, J.
    
    Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
    Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
    Constitution.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B283248

Filed Date: 11/28/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/28/2017