In re P.V. CA2/6 ( 2023 )

Filed 1/17/23 In re P.V. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re P.V., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B319622
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Super. Ct. No. 2021020959)
(Ventura County)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
P.V.,
Defendant and Appellant.
P.V. appeals the juvenile court’s order sustaining a
wardship petition after finding that she aided and abetted the
crime of arson. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, § 451, subd.
(c).)1 Appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support
the juvenile court’s true finding because she lacked the requisite
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
1
unless otherwise indicated.
intent to aid and abet and took no affirmative action to assist her
friend in starting the fire. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
In July 2021, during the early morning hours between 1:00
a.m. and 2:00 a.m., appellant, who was 15 years old at the time,
engaged in a series of destructive acts together with her friend,
E.S., including setting fire to an elementary school that destroyed
three classrooms and caused over $1 million dollars-worth of
damage. Appellant memorialized her actions that night by
recording several videos and uploading them to her Snapchat
account under the caption, “‘It be like that.’”
For example, appellant recorded a video of herself and E.S.
hanging out at a local middle school near E.S.’s house, drinking
Malibu Rum with a filter that showed the girls with devil horns
on their heads. Appellant also recorded a video of herself and
E.S. breaking into an elementary school by throwing large rocks
through the classroom window. After the girls entered the
classroom, appellant set her phone up to automatically record as
they destroyed equipment, knocked over a filing cabinet and
threw paper around the room. Appellant also dumped hand
sanitizer on the countertops and threw the fire extinguisher
outside the door of the classroom.
Shortly thereafter, appellant recorded and posted a video of
E.S. holding an American flag and lighting it on fire as pieces of
the burning flag fell to the floor igniting the paper that appellant
had earlier thrown about the classroom. Appellant then took
“selfie” videos that showed the girls smiling and dancing to music
as the piles of debris burned on the classroom floor. Appellant
also recorded and posted an image of the moon, followed by a
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video clip of the elementary school engulfed in flames that she
had taken from E.S.’s backyard.
A fellow student who saw the videos and recognized
appellant and E.S. reported them to school officials. The student
also provided officials with a copy of the Snapchat videos that she
had recorded from her cell phone.
During an interview with the Director of Student Support
Services for Ventura Unified School District, appellant initially
denied knowing why she was there, but eventually admitted that
she and E.S. had broken into the classroom and vandalized it.
Appellant claimed it was E.S. who started the fire when
appellant had her back turned. Appellant provided the director
with a written statement and was later arrested.
In August 2021, a petition was filed against appellant
alleging she committed felony arson of a structure (§ 451, subd.
(c), count 1), felony burglary with the intent to commit larceny (§
459, count 2), and felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1), count 3).
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.)
During the contested hearing, appellant testified that she
had only met E.S. the day before, and although she knew that
E.S. had vandalized the elementary school on a prior occasion,
appellant claimed she had no knowledge that E.S. intended to
vandalize the school or start a fire in the classroom that night.
Appellant testified that she only discovered E.S. had a lighter
after she used it to light a cigarette while they were at the middle
school.
According to appellant, she just wanted to hang out, listen
to music, and make videos. Appellant testified that she and E.S.
decided to walk over to the elementary school to find the
playground, but appellant was soon cold and wanted to warm up.
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E.S. tried to open the classroom doors, but they were locked, so
the girls took turns throwing rocks at a classroom window until it
broke. After appellant kicked the broken window in, E.S. climbed
inside and let appellant in through the classroom door.
Appellant testified that after they had been inside the
classroom for approximately 10 minutes, she and E.S. began
“destructing” things, throwing papers around the room, and
dancing. Appellant claimed she threw the fire extinguisher out of
the classroom because it was “just another thing to throw.”
Although she claimed she was surprised when she discovered
that E.S. had started the fire, she acknowledged that she took no
action to stop E.S. or to call for help, even after the fire grew out
of control.
After the hearing, the juvenile court found true each of the
allegations, declared appellant a ward of the court, and ordered
that she be committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice.
Discussion
Appellant only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the juvenile court’s true finding that she aided and
abetted the crime of arson of a structure in count 1.
Standard of Review
When a minor challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the juvenile court’s true finding of the criminal
allegations contained in a Welfare and Institutions Code section
602 petition, we apply the same standard of review that applies
in adult criminal cases where a defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence. (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020,
1026.) We review the entire record in the light most favorable to
the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that
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a reasonable trier of fact could find appellant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Ibid.; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557,
576-578.)
We presume in support of the judgment the existence of
every fact the trier of fact could reasonably have deduced from
the evidence. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of
fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. (In
re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1026.) We resolve neither
credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Manibusan
(2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.)
Sufficient Evidence of Aiding and Abetting Arson
“A person is guilty of arson when he or she willfully and
maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who
aids, counsels, or procures the burning of, any structure . . . or
property.” (§ 451.) “All persons concerned in the commission of a
crime . . . whether they directly commit the act constituting the
offense, or aid and abet in its commission . . . are principals in
any crime so committed. (§ 31.) A person aids and abets the
commission of a crime when he or she, “acting with (1) knowledge
of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or
purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the
commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes,
encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.” (People v.
Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560-561.)
“Among the factors which may be considered in making the
determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of
the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the
offense. [Citations.] In addition, flight is one of the factors which
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is relevant in determining consciousness of guilt. [Citation.]” (In
re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094-1095.) “Whether a
person has aided and abetted in the commission of a crime
ordinarily is a question of fact. [Citations.] Consequently, ‘“all
intendments are in favor of the judgment and a verdict will not
be set aside unless the record clearly shows that upon no
hypothesis whatsoever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support it.”’” (Id. at p. 1094.)
Here, appellant acknowledges that she vandalized the
classroom with E.S. and was present when E.S. started the fire.
However, appellant contends there is insufficient evidence that
she knew of E.S.’s intent to start the fire, that she intended to
assist E.S. in starting the fire, or that she took affirmative action
to assist E.S. in starting the fire.
But appellant’s contentions are not supported by the
record. As the juvenile court observed, appellant’s actions that
night cannot be viewed “independently in a vacuum.” For
example, the videos showed appellant and E.S. engaging in a
series of destructive behaviors together in which both girls
danced and enjoyed themselves as they intentionally destroyed
property and threw papers around the classroom before E.S.
started the fire.
Appellant also intentionally threw the fire extinguisher out
of the classroom. Shortly thereafter, she recorded E.S. lighting
the American flag on fire with the lighter and continued to record
as embers dropped to the floor littered with paper. The juvenile
court emphasized that appellant knew the paper was there, and
appellant testified that she knew it was combustible, yet she
continued to take “selfies” with E.S. and make videos of the fire
as it grew from only inches to approximately four feet in height.
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As the juvenile court observed, the circumstantial evidence of
appellant’s aiding and abetting liability is “strong.” We agree.
The general rule is that “neither presence at the scene of a
crime nor knowledge of, but failure to prevent it, is sufficient to
establish aiding and abetting” liability, even where a person later
expresses approval of the crime, so long as he or she takes no
action to aid or encourage it. (See People v. Campbell (1994) 25
Cal.App.4th 402, 409; In re K.M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 323, 329.)
In this case, appellant’s presence at the scene coupled with her
conduct, both before and after E.S. started the fire, is strong
evidence that she intended to encourage and promote E.S.’s
actions.
Moreover, even if appellant did not know that E.S.
intended to start a fire when they entered the classroom, she
would have known the moment she saw E.S. light the flag on fire.
But appellant made no attempt to stop E.S. or disassociate
herself from the situation. Instead, she decided to record E.S.
lighting the fire and immediately post the video to her Snapchat
story. Appellant’s actions are also inconsistent with her
testimony that she was surprised when she turned around and
realized there was a fire on the floor of the classroom. (See In re
V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1031.)
Based on this evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably
infer that appellant intended to encourage and promote E.S.’s
actions in starting the fire, even without prior knowledge of her
intent. “‘Aiding and abetting may be committed “on the spur of
the moment,” that is, as instantaneously as the criminal act
itself. [Citation.]’” (People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th
1126, 1148; People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 531-
532.)
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Appellant’s conduct in fleeing the scene with E.S. afterward
without calling for help and continuing to record the fire from
E.S.’s backyard further supports a finding that appellant took
affirmative action to promote and encourage the commission of
arson. (See In re Lynette G., supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1094-
1095.) Considering the totality of appellant’s actions that night,
the juvenile court did not believe she was “just a bystander.” Nor
did it find her testimony credible. As the juvenile court opined,
appellant’s “self-serving statements . . . do not support all [of] her
claims.” Indeed, “[t]he court’s decision to sustain the petition
indisputably reflects its conclusion appellant was not a credible
witness.” (In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5-6.)
Accordingly, we conclude sufficient evidence supports the
juvenile court’s true finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
appellant aided and abetted E.S. in the commission of arson.
Because we so find, we do not address the natural and probable
consequences theory of vicarious liability.
Appellant makes several arguments in response. First,
she contends the Snapchat videos are insufficient to
“retroactively infer” an intent to aid and abet E.S. in the
commission of arson because she took those videos
“indiscriminately” and are more reflective of “bravado” and a
desire to be perceived as “cool.” However, we will not disturb the
juvenile court’s findings merely because the circumstances might
also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. (In re V.V.,
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1026.)
Second, appellant contends that evidence of her “severe
intoxication” suggests that she lacked the intent to aid and abet
arson. But arson is a general intent crime. (People v. Booker
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 177, citing People v. Atkins (2001) 25
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Cal.4th 76, 87-89.) An aider and abettor of arson need only to
intend the encouraging or facilitating of the arson, as well as the
arson itself. (Atkins, at pp. 86, 93.) Here, the juvenile court
questioned appellant’s recollection of events based on her
intoxication, but nevertheless found she acted with the requisite
intent to find her liable as an aider and abettor.
Finally, appellant contends there is not a sufficient nexus
between her actions and the commission of arson. However, for
the reasons we have already discussed above, this contention is
unpersuasive.
Disposition
The judgment (findings and order) is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
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Manuel J. Covarrubias, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Richard B. Lennon, Executive Director, and Olivia Meme,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Stefanie Yee, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.