U.S. Bancorp Investments v. Madison CA2/7 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 1/13/23 U.S. Bancorp Investments v. Madison CA2/7
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    U.S. BANCORP INVESTMENTS,                                     B309732
    INC. et al.,
    (Los Angeles County
    Plaintiffs and Respondents,                          Super. Ct. No. 19STCP05647)
    v.
    FARIBA MADISON,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County. Lia R. Martin, Judge. Affirmed.
    K&L Gates, Paul W. Sweeney, Jr., Christina N. Goodrich,
    Zachary T. Timm and Kate G. Hummel for Plaintiffs and
    Respondents.
    Law Offices of Steve A. Buchwalter, Steve Buchwalter; Law
    Offices of Scot D. Bernstein and Scot D. Bernstein for Defendant
    and Appellant.
    _______________________
    INTRODUCTION
    Fariba Madison appeals from the trial court’s judgment
    confirming an arbitration award dated November 27, 2019, in
    favor of her former employer U.S. Bancorp Investments, Inc.
    (USBI), David Matthew Terrell, and Sean Pong, and denying her
    motion to vacate the award. Madison contends the trial court
    erred because the arbitration award caused a waiver of her
    unwaivable statutory rights, the arbitration decision failed to
    provide adequate findings and conclusions, and she did not
    receive sufficient discovery. Finding no error, we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    A.    Madison’s Employment with USBI and Termination for
    Cause
    Madison worked for USBI as a financial advisor from
    February 2006 to October 2012. USBI employed her at-will and
    paid her a salary plus a commission as set forth in annual
    compensation plans that Madison signed each year. District
    sales manager Terrell supervised Madison from 2009 through
    2012. According to Terrell’s uncontradicted testimony, the plans
    had substantially similar language each year, and operated
    substantially the same. The plans described monthly “advances
    against future earned commissions” that Madison would receive
    based on prior production. The 2009 plan described that
    “commissions will be considered earned one year following the
    commissionable sale, to allow for reconciliation and offset of costs
    and chargebacks as provided in this plan. Until commissions are
    deemed earned, any advances will be subject to reduction, offset
    2
    or repayment as provided in this plan.” The monthly
    compensation could decrease based on “Revenue Adjustments”—
    deductions from the gross revenue—Madison had produced. The
    annual compensation plans also required Madison to share a
    percentage of her commissions with her sales assistant.
    On October 17, 2012, USBI terminated Madison’s
    employment. It concluded Madison had interfered with an
    internal compliance investigation into inconsistencies with
    Madison’s client account documents by attempting to obtain
    client signatures on paperwork subject to the investigation.
    Madison received her final paycheck on November 14, 2012.
    B.     Madison’s Arbitration Claims and Discovery
    On January 15, 2016, Madison initiated arbitration against
    USBI, which proceeded before a three-member panel of the
    Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Madison’s
    Statement of Claim asserted claims for unpaid wages (Lab. Code,
    § 201), back payment penalties (Lab. Code, § 203), unreimbursed
    expenses (Lab. Code, § 2802),1 unjust enrichment, breach of the
    implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of
    Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., defamation
    (specifically by Pong, a USBI employee also supervised by Terrell,
    in making derogatory statements about her after her
    termination), receipt of stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496,
    subd. (a)), failure to return employee bond payment (Lab. Code,
    §§ 400-410), and illegal contract (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16600).
    She also sought treble and punitive damages.
    1       Further undesignated statutory references are to the Labor
    Code.
    3
    In support of her wage claims, Madison alleged USBI failed
    to pay or credit her for various commissions, including for “trades
    made before [her] termination but settled afterward,” and failed
    to reimburse “expenses she reasonably incurred on behalf of
    USBI in the performance of her duties.” She also alleged that
    “[b]y withholding and keeping for itself the compensation legally
    earned and payable” to her, USBI unjustly enriched itself at her
    expense.
    During two years of litigation, Madison propounded and
    received a substantial amount of discovery, obtained two
    evidentiary hearing continuances, and filed three motions to
    compel. Prior to the panel ruling on her motions, she reached an
    agreement with USBI on production of documents related to her
    commission history and commission deductions (among other
    things). USBI ultimately produced over 20,000 pages of
    documents to Madison. The panel denied Madison’s motion for a
    third continuance prior to the evidentiary hearing and denied her
    renewed motion for a third continuance the first morning of the
    evidentiary hearing in September 2018. The parties proceeded to
    an evidentiary hearing, beginning with four days devoted to
    discovery matters. The panel denied Madison’s motion to compel
    further production of documents relevant to her wage claims.
    The panel chair stated, “I don’t see any evidence of documents
    being intentionally withheld other than those that are
    privileged,” and told Madison, “You certainly had the discovery
    for this issue.”
    4
    C.     The Evidentiary Hearing on the Merits and Motion To
    Dismiss
    In March 2019, the evidentiary hearing resumed. Madison
    spent 15 days presenting her case to the arbitration panel. As
    part of her case, Madison argued for the first time that USBI
    violated section 221 by imposing reversals and adjustments to
    her received compensation and by requiring her to share a
    percentage of her commission with her sales assistant.2 Madison
    contended she was entitled to $623,036.43 in “commission
    reversals” and $195,476.87 in “incentive statement summary
    reversals” shown as negative entries on her commission reports,
    which she characterized as improper wage deductions in violation
    of section 221. She also argued the sales assistant commission
    share was an improper business expense in violation of
    section 2802.
    After Madison rested, USBI moved to dismiss all of her
    claims pursuant to FINRA Rule 13504, subdivision (b). USBI
    argued Madison’s section 221 claim was procedurally improper
    and untimely. It also argued she had no legal right to recovery
    because the evidence established the reversals were adjustments
    to advanced commissions under the annual compensation plans
    signed by Madison, not deductions to earned wages. USBI also
    argued the sales assistant commission share did not violate
    section 2802 as an improper wage deduction and business
    expense. In support, USBI contended the compensation plans
    Madison executed allowed her to receive advanced commissions,
    which she did not actually “earn” until USBI completed all
    2      Section 221 provides, “It shall be unlawful for any employer
    to collect or receive from an employee any part of wages
    theretofore paid by said employer to said employee.”
    5
    adjustments and reconciliations, including the sales assistant
    commission share, meaning USBI never deducted a commission
    share for her sales assistant from Madison’s earned wages. USBI
    also moved to dismiss Madison’s Penal Code section 496 claims
    on the grounds that employment compensation disputes did not
    constitute a Penal Code violation and therefore could not support
    recovery of treble damages.
    After oral argument on the motion to dismiss, the panel
    issued an order dismissing Madison’s section 221 claim for
    improper wage deductions, her section 2802 claim for improper
    deduction of wages and business expenses relating to the sales
    assistant commission share, and her Penal Code section 496
    claims. The panel explained that it “struck the 221 claim simply
    because it wasn’t fair to have that in the case because it wasn’t in
    the Statement of Claim,” but that Madison could attempt to
    maintain a claim to recoup her alleged improper reversals of
    compensation under other Labor Code sections as part of her
    remaining claims. The arbitrators suggested that it would be
    “helpful to the panel” if USBI put on evidence why Madison was
    not entitled to the alleged reversals. The panel also explained
    that with regard to the sales assistant commission share, “[w]e
    agreed with the argument that it was a matter of contract and it
    was appropriate for her to agree to share her commissions with
    her assistant.”
    USBI presented its defense over four additional evidentiary
    hearing days. Madison’s former supervisor, Terrell, explained
    that USBI conditionally advanced commission payments to
    financial advisors prior to USBI receiving the actual revenue on
    the contract. USBI would then “chargeback,” reducing the
    advanced commission if the deal did not generate the expected
    6
    revenue. Terrell also explained Madison received monthly
    commission reports. These reports detailed Madison’s advanced
    commissions and negative adjustments that resulted from
    various types of required chargebacks pursuant to the terms of
    her compensation plan.3 USBI’s expert witness addressed the
    various transactions in these commission reports. He concluded
    Madison’s calculation of purported negative “reversals” ignored
    related transactions that reflected corresponding credits. The
    expert witness concluded that USBI owed Madison no damages
    for unpaid commissions or improper deductions.
    D.     The Arbitration Award
    On November 27, 2019, the panel issued a 10-page award
    in favor of USBI on all claims. The panel found that Madison
    failed to prove any of her claims by the necessary preponderance
    of the evidence. The claims based on sections 201, 203, and 2802
    failed because the compensation she claimed USBI did not pay
    was only an advance, “subject to appropriate deductions and
    adjustments made by USBI.” The advances became wages only
    after application of the deductions and adjustments, a process
    “explicitly provided for in USBI’s Financial Consultant
    Compensation Plan.” Regarding the claim for unpaid
    commissions, the panel credited USBI’s expert witness over
    Madison’s own testimony that USBI failed to pay any
    commissions Madison had earned. The panel similarly rejected
    3      The compensation plan contemplated “[r]evenue
    [a]djustments” for a variety of events, including (from the 2012
    plan) “services and transactions that were cancelled, that did not
    close, that were reversed or modified, that were incorrectly
    recorded or booked, and/or that USBI determines, in its
    discretion, violate USBI policy, this Plan, or business objectives.”
    7
    the unjust enrichment claim because Madison failed to prove
    USBI “unlawfully benefited from the deductions and adjustments
    to the advances.”
    E.    The Trial Court Confirms the Arbitration Award
    On December 26, 2019, USBI filed a petition in the trial
    court to confirm the arbitration award. Madison opposed and
    moved to vacate the award. USBI replied, opposed Madison’s
    motion to vacate, filed objections to Madison’s evidence, and
    submitted its own summary of events as part of its opposition to
    Madison’s motion.
    On September 2, 2020, the trial court sustained USBI’s
    objections to Madison’s evidence and issued a tentative ruling
    granting USBI’s petition to confirm the award and denying
    Madison’s motion to vacate. After a hearing on September 3,
    2020, the trial court adopted its tentative decision and issued an
    order confirming the award. The trial court’s order stated:
    “Madison argues that she was denied her substantive
    rights as the arbitrators failed to follow
    [Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare
    Services, Inc. (2000) 
    24 Cal.4th 83
     (Armendariz)].
    She was denied adequate discovery, did not receive a
    complete award as the arbitrators failed to rule on all
    issues before them, received an award which violated
    public policy and received an award which caused
    Madison to waive unwaivable statutory protections
    and rights.
    [¶]
    8
    “The documents Madison argues were not produced
    in discovery were the subject of at least three
    discovery hearings. USBI maintains that it produced
    all non-privileged documents in its possession,
    custody and control. Madison was unable to provide
    evidence that USBI did have documents it refused to
    produce, despite being granted continuances and
    evidentiary hearings to obtain such evidence.
    Madison did have adequate discovery.
    “As to Madison’s arguments that the award was
    based on a waiver of non-waivable rights and violated
    public policy, whether the monies at issue were
    wages is a factual issue. Evidence and authority was
    submitted by USBI that these were advances on
    commissions, which are not considered wages until
    earned and are subject to reconciliation, which
    includes deductions, prior to being considered wages.
    There was evidence explaining the deductions.
    Evidence was also submitted that sharing
    commissions is a standard industry practice which
    does not fall within the category of business expenses
    reimbursable by the employer. The sufficiency of
    that evidence is not subject to review. Madison has
    not established that the award requires a waiver of
    non-waivable rights or violated public policy.
    9
    “Pearson Dental Supplies, Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (2010)
    
    48 Cal.App.4th 665
    , 680,4 does not support Madison’s
    argument. In that case, the claimant was denied a
    hearing on the merits of his FEHA claims, due to a
    legal error by the arbitrator. The narrow exception
    in Pearson applies when there is the denial of a
    hearing due to a legal error in the framework of a
    non-waivable right. Here, Madison was given
    lengthy hearings, both on her discovery issues and on
    the merits on her claims. That issues were
    determined against her is not a ground to vacate the
    award.
    “Madison’s argument that she did not receive a fully-
    reasoned award as it did not include discussion of
    claims which were dismissed prior to the hearing is
    not persuasive. The arbitrators issued a lengthy
    award which addressed the ruling on the motion to
    dismiss.”
    The trial court entered judgment on October 19, 2020.
    Madison timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    A.   Standard of Review
    “‘“On appeal from an order confirming an arbitration
    award, we review the trial court’s order (not the arbitration
    award) under a de novo standard. [Citations.] To the extent that
    4    The correct citation is Pearson Dental Supplies, Inc. v.
    Superior Court (2010) 
    48 Cal.4th 665
    .
    10
    the trial court’s ruling rests upon a determination of disputed
    factual issues, we apply the substantial evidence test to those
    issues.”’” (ECC Capital Corp. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP
    (2017) 
    9 Cal.App.5th 885
    , 900; accord, Roussos v. Roussos (2021)
    
    60 Cal.App.5th 962
    , 973 (Roussos); Douglass v. Serenivision, Inc.
    (2018) 
    20 Cal.App.5th 376
    , 386 (Douglass); see Advanced Micro
    Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 
    9 Cal.4th 362
    , 376, fn. 9
    [reviewing de novo whether arbitrator exceeded his or her
    powers].) “[I]n reviewing a judgment confirming an arbitration
    award, we must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if
    substantial evidence supports them.” (Alexander v. Blue Cross of
    California (2001) 
    88 Cal.App.4th 1082
    , 1087; accord, Douglass, at
    p. 386.) “We also review de novo ‘legal issue[s] involving
    statutory construction and the ascertainment of legislative
    intent.’” (Roussos, at p. 973.)
    We apply a different, “highly deferential standard of review
    to the award itself.” (Cooper v. Lavely & Singer Professional
    Corp. (2014) 
    230 Cal.App.4th 1
    , 11-12 (Cooper).) Ordinarily
    “‘[t]he merits of the controversy between the parties are not
    subject to judicial review.’” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992)
    
    3 Cal.4th 1
    , 10-11 (Moncharsh).) Instead, the reviewing court
    “‘restrict[s] [its] review to whether the award should be vacated
    under the grounds listed in [Code of Civil Procedure]
    section 1286.2.’” (EHM Productions, Inc. v. Starline Tours of
    Hollywood, Inc. (2018) 
    21 Cal.App.5th 1058
    , 1064.) Accordingly,
    we do not review the arbitrator’s reasoning or the sufficiency of
    the evidence, and “an arbitrator’s decision cannot be reviewed for
    errors of fact or law” absent “narrow exceptions.” (Moncharsh, at
    p. 11; accord, Cooper, at p. 12.) “These exceptions do not
    encompass all errors that are apparent on the face of the award
    11
    and cause substantial injustice.” (Cooper, at p. 12; accord
    Moncharsh, at p. 11.)
    B.    The Trial Court Properly Confirmed the Arbitration Award
    The trial court may vacate an arbitrator’s award if “[t]he
    arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be
    corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the
    controversy submitted.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (a)(4).)
    “Arbitrators may exceed their powers by issuing an award that
    violates a party’s unwaivable statutory rights or that contravenes
    an explicit legislative expression of public policy.” (Richey v.
    AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 
    60 Cal.4th 909
    , 916; see Moncharsh,
    
    supra,
     3 Cal.4th at p. 32 [the “limited and exceptional
    circumstances” where judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision is
    appropriate “include those in which granting finality to an
    arbitrator’s decision would be inconsistent with the protection of
    a party’s statutory rights”].)
    Madison argues that because sections 201, 203, 221, and
    2802 are unwaivable pursuant to sections 219 and 2804,5 the
    5      Section 219 provides, “[N]o provision of this article
    [section 200 et seq.] can in any way be contravened or set aside
    by a private agreement, whether written, oral, or implied.”
    Section 2804 provides, “Any contract or agreement, express or
    implied, made by any employee to waive the benefits of this
    article [section 2800 et seq.] or any part thereof, is null and void,
    and this article shall not deprive any employee or his personal
    representative of any right or remedy to which he is entitled
    under the laws of this State.” “Labor Code section 2804 voids any
    agreement to waive the protections of Labor Code section 2802 as
    against public policy. . . . Courts have interpreted Labor Code
    section 2804 to apply to Labor Code section 2802, making all
    contracts that waive an employee’s right to indemnification null
    12
    arbitration panel exceeded its authority by issuing an award that
    violated her unwaivable statutory rights and contravened public
    policy. Madison’s argument fails.
    1.     The arbitration award did not waive Madison’s
    unwaivable rights under Labor Code sections 201,
    203, and 2802
    Madison contends she had the right to immediate payment
    of her final paycheck under section 201. Because USBI delivered
    her final paycheck 28 days after it terminated her employment,
    Madison sought waiting time penalties under section 203.
    Madison also asserted that USBI violated sections 201 and 2802
    by failing to reimburse her for all wages and costs incurred in
    furtherance of her duties as an employee by not including in her
    final paycheck all amounts taken back from her past paychecks
    and all deductions previously directed to her sales assistant.
    Section 201 provides that when an employer discharges an
    employee, “the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge
    are due and payable immediately.” “‘Wages’ includes all amounts
    for labor performed by employees of every description, whether
    the amount is fixed or ascertained by the standard of time, task,
    piece, commission basis, or other method of calculation.” (§ 200,
    subd. (a).) Section 203 provides that if an employer willfully fails
    to pay in full any wages of a discharged employee, for up to
    30 days “the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty
    from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an
    action therefor is commenced.” Section 2802 entitles an employee
    to reimbursement from an employer “for all necessary
    and void.” (Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP (2008) 
    44 Cal.4th 937
    , 951.)
    13
    expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct
    consequence of the discharge of his or her duties, or of his or her
    obedience to the directions of the employer.”
    So long as it does so in writing, an employer can deem
    commissions not “earned” (for purposes of section 201) until the
    satisfaction of certain conditions precedent, including
    chargebacks. (DeLeon v. Verizon Wireless, LLC (2012)
    
    207 Cal.App.4th 800
    , 810 (DeLeon); accord, Sciborski v. Pacific
    Bell Directory (2012) 
    205 Cal.App.4th 1152
    , 1166-1167 [“‘“A
    commission is ‘earned’ when the employee has perfected the right
    to payment; that is, when all of the legal conditions precedent
    have been met.”’”].) “An advance is not a wage.” (Semprini v.
    Wedbush Securities, Inc. (2020) 
    57 Cal.App.5th 246
    , 255; accord,
    Steinhebel v. Los Angeles Times Communications, LLC (2005)
    
    126 Cal.App.4th 696
    , 705.) An advanced commission is not a
    wage because, by definition, “at the time of payment the
    employer cannot determine whether the commission will
    eventually be earned” and if the conditions on the employee’s
    right to the commission will occur. (Steinhebel, at p. 705.)
    The written incentive compensation plan approved by the
    DeLeon court resembles the ones at issue here and illustrates
    these principles. The DeLeon plans “clearly and expressly stated”
    that commissions were not earned at the time a salesperson sold
    a cell phone service plan. (DeLeon, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 810.) As here, “[w]hile commission payments were made in
    advance, commissions were earned only if the customer did not
    cancel the cell phone service before the expiration of the
    chargeback period.” (Ibid.) Thus, as in the DeLeon plan,
    Madison’s commissions became wages only after calculation of
    the final net revenue amount, accounting for any adjustments.
    14
    (See Prachasaisoradej v. Ralphs Grocery Co., Inc. (2007)
    
    42 Cal.4th 217
    , 229 [only final net profit figure for each store
    determined incentive compensation for store employees, and
    “[t]his final figure, and this figure only, once calculated, was the
    amount offered or promised”].)
    The arbitration panel determined, “[Madison]’s claims
    based upon California Labor Code §§ 201, 203, and 2802 are not
    applicable to her case because her compensation for her sales
    transactions were only advances, subject to appropriate
    deductions and adjustments made by USBI, and became wages
    only after such deductions and adjustments were made, which
    was explicitly provided for in USBI’s Financial Consultant
    Compensation Plan.” The trial court concluded: “As to Madison’s
    arguments that the award was based on a waiver of non-waivable
    rights and violated public policy, whether the monies at issue
    were wages is a factual issue. Evidence and authority was
    submitted by USBI that these were advances on commissions,
    which are not considered wages until earned and are subject to
    reconciliation, which includes deductions, prior to being
    considered wages. There was evidence explaining the deductions.
    Evidence was also submitted that sharing commissions is a
    standard industry practice which does not fall within the
    category of business expenses reimbursable by the employer. The
    sufficiency of that evidence is not subject to review. Madison has
    not established that the award requires a waiver of non-waivable
    rights or violated public policy.”
    We agree up to a point. USBI certainly presented evidence
    that Madison signed a compensation agreement providing for
    advances. USBI also established, pursuant to the compensation
    agreement, that Madison did not “earn” the commissions
    15
    reflected by those advances until the occurrence of certain
    conditions over time. As a factual matter, USBI proved that it
    paid Madison in accordance with the provisions of the
    compensation plans; that is, it made deductions from the
    advances and finalized Madison’s earned commission pursuant to
    the compensation plan provisions. The panel found that the
    disputed deductions and post-payment reversals constituted
    standard adjustments—not unlawful deductions from earned
    wages—to Madison’s advanced commissions and permissible
    commission sharing with her sales assistant, all as specified by
    the compensation plans. We take “as correct” these factual
    findings. (Panoche Energy Center, LLC v. Pacific Gas & Electric
    Co. (2016) 
    1 Cal.App.5th 68
    , 99.)
    On the other hand, whether USBI paid Madison advances
    or wages when it made the monthly payments to her presents at
    least a mixed question of fact and law. Per the arbitration panel,
    Madison’s commissions became earned wages only after USBI
    charged back the deductions and adjustments. The panel also
    made a finding, largely by crediting Terrell’s testimony about the
    compensation plans and their implementation, that Madison’s
    paychecks constituted advances of her sales commissions, not
    wages. Regardless of whether this presents a factual issue, a
    legal issue, or a mixture of the two, we agree with the arbitration
    panel and the trial court that Madison signed an agreement to
    receive advances, with the express understanding that the
    advances would not become earned wages until USBI made the
    adjustments specified in the plan. (See DeLeon, supra,
    207 Cal.App.4th at p. 810.) We also agree that USBI’s initial
    payments to Madison amounted to advances that Madison did
    not earn until the occurrence of certain conditions as specified in
    16
    the plans. Because Madison’s compensation initially consisted of
    advances and not earned wages, she may not pursue claims
    invoking sections 201, 203, and 2802 because those sections apply
    only to earned wages. (See Sciborski v. Pacific Bell Directory,
    supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1166-1167.)
    Madison concedes UBSI’s compensation plan designates
    commission compensation as an advance until certain conditions
    occur, but she disputes the panel’s determination that her final
    compensation consisted of an advance. She also argues “the
    arbitrators’ ruling that Ms. Madison’s final paycheck was an
    advance makes no logical sense whatsoever,” and that the
    commissions reflected in her final paycheck should be considered
    earned wages, not an advance. As it did in the trial court, this
    argument goes to the merits of her dispute with USBI by
    relitigating the panel’s reasoning and conclusions. We do not
    review the arbitrators’ reasoning. (Moncharsh, 
    supra,
     3 Cal.4th
    at pp. 10-11.) Simply because Madison did not receive a
    favorable determination on the merits does not mean the
    arbitration award violated her statutory rights. Generally “it is
    within the ‘powers’ of the arbitrator to resolve the entire ‘merits’
    of the ‘controversy submitted’ by the parties[;]” including “all the
    contested issues of law and fact submitted to the arbitrator for
    decision. The arbitrator’s resolution of these issues is what the
    parties bargained for in the arbitration agreement[;] . . . the
    arbitrator’s award does no more than resolve that dispute.” (Id.
    at p. 28.) Under the circumstances here, the panel did not exceed
    its powers in resolving the questions of law and fact presented to
    it, and the trial court did not err in concluding that no statutory
    ground asserted by Madison warranted vacating the arbitration
    award.
    17
    2.     The arbitration panel did not improperly shift the
    burden of proof onto Madison or waive Madison’s
    unwaivable rights under section 221
    Madison contends the arbitration panel “reversed” the
    burden of proof on her statutory wage claims, depriving her of the
    ability to vindicate her unwaivable statutory rights. As USBI
    points out, section 221 is the only statute asserted by Madison
    where the burden of proof may shift to the employer. “An
    employee seeking to recover under Labor Code section 2802 for
    business expenses paid out of pocket must show that the
    expenditures were ‘necessarily expend[ed] in direct consequence
    of the discharge of the employee’s duties[.]’” (Davis v. Farmers
    Ins. Exchange (2016) 
    245 Cal.App.4th 1302
    , 1337 (Davis).)
    However, where an employee establishes her employer deducted
    “apparently business-related expenses” from her paychecks,
    “[u]nder Labor Code sections 221 and 224, the employer bears the
    burden of establishing that such deductions are authorized by
    law.” (Davis, at p. 1337.)
    As the panel found, Madison failed timely to assert a
    section 221 claim that would trigger a burden-shifting analysis.
    Although Madison relies on section 221 for her argument about
    improper wage deductions, she did not assert a claim for
    improper wage deductions in violation of section 221 in her
    Statement of Claim or pursue a section 221 claim for improper
    wage deductions during discovery, and she never filed an
    amended Statement of Claim adding any causes of action based
    on section 221. Rather, she argued for the first time at the
    evidentiary hearing that various post-paycheck adjustments to
    compensation, and her commission shared with her sales
    assistant, constituted improper wage deductions in violation of
    18
    section 221. The panel dismissed the section 221 claim as
    improper because Madison did not include it in her Statement of
    Claim, but the panel did permit her to maintain a claim to recoup
    her alleged improper reversals of compensation under her
    remaining Labor Code causes of action. Because Madison neither
    sought nor obtained leave to amend her Statement of Claim, the
    panel acted well within its authority to dismiss the section 221
    claim. (See FINRA rule 13309(b) [party may only amend
    pleading if panel grants a motion that includes with it copy of the
    proposed amended pleading].) We do not revisit that decision
    here.
    In any event, even if Madison properly had presented a
    section 221 claim for improper wage deductions, it would suffer
    the same flaw as Madison’s other claims. The panel found
    Madison’s compensation prior to adjustment consisted of
    advances, not earned wages. These commissions did not become
    earned wages until USBI adjusted them with the chargebacks.
    We do not second guess or disturb these findings on appeal.
    (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 11.)
    C.    Madison Conducted Adequate Discovery To Arbitrate Her
    Statutory Claims
    An arbitration “permits an employee to vindicate his or her
    statutory rights” only if it “meet[s] certain minimum
    requirements, including neutrality of the arbitrator, the provision
    of adequate discovery, a written decision that will permit a
    limited form of judicial review, and limitations on the costs of
    arbitration.” (Armendariz, 
    supra,
     24 Cal.4th at pp. 90-91
    [addressing arbitration of FEHA claims]; see Mercuro v. Superior
    Court (2002) 
    96 Cal.App.4th 167
    , 180 (Mercuro) [“[W]e see no
    19
    reason why Armendariz’s ‘particular scrutiny’ of arbitration
    agreements should be confined to claims under FEHA. Rather,
    under the Supreme Court’s analysis, such scrutiny should apply
    to the enforcement of rights under any statute enacted ‘for a
    public reason.’”].) “These requirements were founded on the
    premise that certain statutory rights are unwaivable.” (Little v.
    Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 
    29 Cal.4th 1064
    , 1076.) Parties to an
    arbitration must have discovery “sufficient to adequately
    arbitrate their statutory claim, including access to essential
    documents and witnesses, as determined by the arbitrator(s) and
    subject to limited judicial review pursuant to Code of Civil
    Procedure section 1286.2.” (Armendariz, at p. 106.)
    Here, over two years of discovery, Madison propounded
    more than 80 written discovery requests on USBI, obtained two
    evidentiary hearing continuances, and reached agreement with
    USBI after she filed three motions to compel to produce specific
    documents relating to her commission history and deductions.
    USBI produced over 20,000 pages of documents. This discovery
    included USBI’s annual compensation plans signed by Madison
    detailing how financial advisors earned commissions and other
    incentive pay, Madison’s entire detailed pay history and monthly
    incentive pay detail, and Madison’s 2010-2012 monthly
    commission reports showing revenue, deductions and
    adjustments made to Madison’s advanced commissions. Over
    USBI’s objections, and with the benefit of multiple continuances,
    Madison participated in four days of discovery hearings.
    Ultimately, the panel concluded USBI did not improperly
    withhold any documents.
    20
    Notwithstanding USBI’s voluminous document production
    Madison contends she still did not receive sufficient discovery
    regarding the adjustments and reconciliations made to her
    advance commissions or “evidence that would enable her to show
    that USBI did not have a legitimate reason for taking back her
    earned wages.” “‘[A]dequate’ discovery does not mean unfettered
    discovery,” and “[u]ltimately it is up to the arbitrator and the
    reviewing court to balance the need for simplicity in arbitration
    with the discovery needs of the parties.” (Mercuro, supra,
    96 Cal.App.4th at p. 184.) Madison propounded and received
    more than adequate discovery to vindicate her statutory rights as
    required under Armendariz.
    D.     The Arbitration Decision Was Sufficiently Detailed To
    Permit Judicial Review
    Madison contends the written arbitration decision further
    violates Armendariz because it lacked sufficient detail and failed
    to set forth reasons for the rulings made. As noted, Armendariz
    requires arbitrations to result in “a written decision that will
    permit a limited form of judicial review.” (Armendariz, supra,
    24 Cal.4th at p. 91.) The arbitrator “must issue a written
    arbitration decision that will reveal, however briefly, the
    essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based.”
    (Id. at p. 107.)
    The arbitration award in this case satisfies that
    requirement. The 10-page decision includes sufficient clarity and
    detail that we can review the panel’s conclusion rejecting
    Madison’s claims under sections 201, 203, and 2802 based on its
    finding that Madison’s paychecks consisted of commission
    advances rather than earned wages, and its conclusion that she
    21
    received adequate discovery. As did the trial court, we also find
    unpersuasive Madison’s argument she did not receive a fully
    reasoned award because it did not include discussion of her Penal
    Code section 496, subdivision (a), claims or attempted section 221
    claim that the panel dismissed. The award noted the panel’s
    rulings on USBI’s motion to dismiss the Penal Code and
    section 221 claims, which adequately reveals the panel’s reason
    for not discussing those claims further. Regarding the
    section 221 claim, Madison cites no authority requiring an
    arbitration decision to discuss a claim not asserted in the
    Statement of Claim and dismissed after being untimely raised at
    the arbitration hearing, and where the panel explained its
    reasoning for the dismissal on the record.
    The panel’s decision allows judicial review sufficient to
    ensure the panel complied with the requirements of the statutes
    on which Madison based her claims.
    22
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment confirming the arbitration award is affirmed.
    USBI shall recover its costs on appeal.
    HOWARD, J.*
    We concur:
    SEGAL, Acting P. J.
    FEUER, J.
    *     Judge of the Marin County Superior Court, assigned by the
    Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
    Constitution.
    23