P. v. Cisneros CA2/3 ( 2013 )


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  • Filed 3/6/13 P. v. Cisneros CA2/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    THE PEOPLE,                                                              B244211
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. KA098761)
    v.
    RICKY HENRY CISNEROS,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
    Mike Camacho, Judge. Modified, and as modified, affirmed.
    California Appellate Project, Jonathan B. Steiner and Richard B. Lennon, under
    appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    _________________________
    Defendant and appellant Ricky Henry Cisneros appeals from the judgment entered
    following his plea of no contest to unlawfully carrying a dirk or dagger (Pen. Code,
    § 21310)1 and his admissions that he previously had been convicted of attempted murder
    (§§ 664, 187) within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),
    1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The
    trial court sentenced Cisneros to eight years in prison. We affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    1. Facts.2
    On July 23, 2012, Cisneros was riding his bicycle down the street. It appeared to
    some police officers who were on patrol in the area that the bicycle did not have
    functional brakes. The officers stopped Cisneros and asked him if he was on probation or
    parole. Cisneros told the officers that he had been released from prison five days earlier
    and was on parole. He admitted that he had no identification and that he had in his
    possession a knife which he was carrying for protection. After the officers removed from
    Cisneros’s pants pocket a knife and a capped syringe, they placed him under arrest and
    took him into custody.
    2. Procedural history.
    On July 25, 2012, a felony complaint was filed charging Cisneros with unlawfully
    carrying a dirk or dagger on his person (§ 21310) (count 1) and the misdemeanor of
    1
    All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
    2
    As Cisneros waived his right to a preliminary hearing, the facts have been taken
    from the probation report.
    2
    possession of an opium pipe (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364.1, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2). It
    was further alleged that, in 1996, Cisneros had been convicted of the serious or violent
    felonies of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187), attempted robbery (§§ 664, 211) and first
    degree burglary (§ 459) within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-
    (i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and for purposes of section 1170, subdivision (h)(3). Finally,
    it was alleged pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b) that Cisneros had served prison
    terms for attempted murder (§§ 664, 187), the battery of a custodial officer while in the
    performance of his or her duties (§ 243.1) and the unauthorized possession of drugs or
    alcoholic beverages in prison (§ 4573.8).
    At a hearing held on July 25, 2012, the trial court indicated that it was in
    possession of “an advisement of rights, waiver, and plea form indicating that [Cisneros
    was] interested in resolving his case at [that] very early stage [of the proceedings] by
    entering a plea of guilty or no contest to count 1, . . . carrying a dirk or dagger.” The
    court noted, however, that “[w]hat aggravate[d] his case [was] his criminal history which
    [was] significant. [But] [t]he People [were evidently] willing to overlook what otherwise
    could [have been] a life sentence and [instead to] strike at least two strikes to allow
    [Cisneros] to take advantage of a second-strike case settlement [and] receive an eight-
    year commitment [to] the state prison.”
    Counsel for Cisneros then inquired of the trial court whether it would consider a
    sentence of less than eight years. The court responded by addressing Cisneros and
    stating, “Well, before I could even consider that, Mr. Cisneros, you would have to enter
    an open plea, meaning that you would plead guilty to everything charged, admit the truth
    3
    of all strikes and take your chances in terms of convincing me at a sentencing hearing that
    you are worthy [of being] treated . . . as a second or even non-strike offender.” After
    indicating that it would “look at a variety of things,” including the seriousness of the
    present offense, the number and significance of Cisneros’s priors and his record while on
    parole, the trial court indicated that it “very well could [impose] a life sentence.” On the
    other hand, the court stated that “[w]hether or not [it] could do better than [eight years
    was] uncertain.” The court continued, “If you want to gamble, it could be worse. It
    could be better. But I cannot guarantee you exactly what I would do . . . [s]o you may
    want to take advantage of the People’s offer.”
    After conferring with his counsel, Cisneros decided to accept the disposition being
    offered by the People. He completed and signed a form in which he indicated that, in
    exchange for a term of eight years in prison, he was willing to waive his right to a
    preliminary hearing, his right to a jury trial, his right to a court trial, his right to confront
    and cross-examine the witnesses against him, his right to use the subpoena power of the
    court to produce and present evidence favorable to him, his right to testify on his own
    behalf and his right to remain silent. In addition, Cisneros “stipulate[d] and agree[d] that
    there [was] a factual basis for [his]” plea and admissions. Cisneros then entered a plea of
    no contest to “count 1, . . . a violation of . . . section 21310, . . . carrying a dirk or dagger,
    a felony” and admitted the truth of one prior felony conviction, a 1996 attempted murder,
    within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-
    (i)). Cisneros also admitted, for purposes of section 667.5, subdivision (b), that in April
    2005, he had been convicted of and served a prison term for battery against a custodial
    4
    officer while he was in the performance of his duties (§ 243.1) and that in 1996 he was
    convicted of and sentenced to prison for attempted murder (§§ 664, 187). Cisneros’s
    counsel “join[ed] in the waivers, concur[red] in the plea and admissions [and] stipulate[d]
    to a factual basis [for the plea] based upon [his] review of arrest reports.”
    The trial court accepted the plea and admissions and found that they had been
    freely and voluntarily made in that Cisneros had “expressly, knowingly, [and]
    intelligently waived his constitutional rights.” The court found a factual basis for the plea
    and admissions “based upon arrest reports,” and found Cisneros guilty “based upon his
    plea to count 1.” The court also found true the allegations of prior felony convictions and
    prison terms.
    After Cisneros waived arraignment for judgment and sentencing, the trial court
    deemed the complaint an information “for purposes of plea and sentence.” The court
    imposed the high term of three years for Cisneros’s conviction of carrying a dirk or
    dagger (§ 21310), then doubled the term to six years pursuant to the Three Strikes law
    (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). “In addition and consecutive,” the court
    imposed “one additional year for each of two state prison priors admitted pursuant to
    [section] 667.5, subdivision (b), for a total aggregate sentence of eight years.” After it
    awarded Cisneros presentence custody credit for three days actually served and three
    days of good time/work time, for a total of six days,3 the trial court dismissed the
    remaining count and allegations.
    3
    The abstract of judgment indicates Cisneros was awarded presentence custody
    credit for six days actually served and six days of good time/work time. The trial court is
    5
    The court imposed a $240 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a stayed $240
    parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45), a $40 court operations assessment
    (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) and a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373).
    The court then “remanded” Cisneros and set a “post-sentence nonappearance” hearing for
    August 8, 2012.
    On August 6, 2012, the case was called for “further proceedings.” Cisneros,
    however, failed to appear and the matter was continued to the following day, August 7.
    On August 7, Cisneros was still not present, but was represented by counsel. Cisneros
    had made a motion to withdraw his plea and the trial court denied it without prejudice,
    indicating that it could be re-filed “within the statutory time.”
    On August 21, 2012, Cisneros wrote to his trial counsel a letter in which he
    indicated that he was “not satisfied with the 8 year plea agreement.” Cisneros asserted
    that he was “completely incompetent” at the time he entered the plea as he was going
    through “drug withdrawal[].” Cisneros believed that “a lot of options were ‘overlooked’
    ” and that counsel had been ineffective. He wished to appeal the judgment on those
    grounds as well as on the basis that there had been an “illegal search and seizure” and
    “wrongful sentencing.” Counsel forwarded the letter and two exhibits attached to it to
    the superior court, which received it on August 31, 2012.
    directed to correct the abstract to show that Cisneros served three days of actual time and
    was awarded three days of good time/work time, for a total of six days, and to forward a
    corrected copy to the Department of Corrections.
    6
    At a hearing held on September 21, 2012, the trial court indicated that it had read
    and considered the requests made by Cisneros in his letter. The court denied Cisneros’s
    “motion” based on its conclusion that “[a] review of the record clearly show[ed] that
    [Cisneros] freely and voluntarily entered into a plea agreement with the prosecution.”
    The court indicated that “[t]here [was] absolutely no evidence that [Cisneros] lacked the
    exercise of free judgment.”
    Cisneros filed a timely notice of appeal and request for a certificate of probable
    cause on September 24, 2012. In his request for a certificate, he asserted that his counsel
    had been ineffective and that he had been unlawfully sentenced. Cisneros urged that,
    under those circumstances, he should be allowed to withdraw his plea. However, on the
    same day that it was filed, the trial court denied Cisneros’s request for a certificate of
    probable cause. Then, on October 2, 2012, this court issued an order stating that “[i]n
    light of the fact that the certificate of probable cause was denied, the appeal filed on
    September 24, 2012, is limited to non-certificate issues.”
    CONTENTIONS
    After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief which raised no
    issues and requested this court to conduct an independent review of the record.
    By notice filed November 30, 2012, the clerk of this court advised Cisneros to
    submit within 30 days any contentions, grounds of appeal or arguments he wished this
    court to consider. No response has been received to date.
    7
    REVIEW ON APPEAL
    We have examined the entire record and are satisfied counsel has complied fully
    with counsel’s responsibilities. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 
    528 U.S. 259
    , 278-284; People
    v. Wende (1979) 
    25 Cal.3d 436
    , 443.)
    DISPOSITION
    The trial court is directed to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect an award of
    presentence custody credit of three days actually served and three days of good
    time/work time, for a total of six days. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    CROSKEY, J.
    We concur:
    KLEIN, P. J.
    KITCHING, J.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B244211

Filed Date: 3/6/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021