People v. Maldonado CA2/6 ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • Filed 9/23/21 P. v. Maldonado CA2/6
    Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    THE PEOPLE,                                                   2d Crim. No. B306808
    (Super. Ct. No. 1434089)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Santa Barbara County)
    v.                                                           OPINION FOLLOWING
    TRANSFER FROM
    RAMON DAVID                                                    SUPREME COURT
    MALDONADO,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Ramon David Maldonado appeals from the trial
    court’s postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing.
    (Pen. Code,1 § 1170.95.) He contends the court erred when it
    summarily denied his petition without appointing counsel. We
    affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In May 2015, a jury convicted Maldonado and four
    codefendants of first degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd.
    1 Statutory        references are to the Penal Code.
    1
    (a)), and found true a special circumstance allegation that they
    committed murder during the commission of a kidnapping
    (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B)). (People v. Gonzales (Aug. 7, 2018,
    B264384) 
    2018 WL 3737940
     at p. *1 (Gonzales) [nonpub. opn.].)
    As to Maldonado only, the jury also found true a special
    circumstance allegation that the murder was intentional and
    involved the infliction of torture (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)).
    (Gonzales, at p. *1.) In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court
    found true allegations that Maldonado served three prior prison
    terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). (Gonzales, at p. *1.) It sentenced him
    to life in state prison without the possibility of parole plus three
    years. (Ibid.)
    Maldonado did not challenge the jury’s true finding
    on the torture special circumstance on appeal, but did challenge
    the kidnapping special circumstance finding. (Gonzales, supra,
    
    2018 WL 3737940
     at pp. *7-8.) We rejected his challenge. (Id. at
    p. *17.)
    After the case was final, Maldonado petitioned the
    trial court to resentence him pursuant to section 1170.95. In his
    petition, Gonzales declared that: (1) the information filed against
    him allowed the prosecution to proceed on a felony murder
    theory, (2) he was convicted of first degree felony murder, (3) he
    could not now be convicted of first degree murder based on
    amendments to sections 188 and 189, and (4) he was not the
    actual killer. Maldonado also requested the appointment of
    counsel to assist him during the resentencing process.
    Prosecutors filed an “initial response” to Maldonado’s
    petition. The response set forth the facts of the case and the
    prosecutors’ preferred procedure for evaluating a resentencing
    petition. It also argued that Maldonado failed to make a prima
    2
    facie showing of entitlement to relief because, in finding true the
    torture special circumstance allegation, the jury determined that
    he acted with the intent to kill. Attached to the response was a
    copy of our opinion in Maldonado’s direct appeal.2
    The trial court summarily denied Maldonado’s
    petition because he did not “make a prima facie case for eligibility
    as a matter of law.” Although he was not the actual killer, he
    “intended to kill the victim and/or was a major participant and
    acted with reckless disregard for human life” based on the jury’s
    true findings on the kidnapping and torture special circumstance
    allegations. Maldonado was therefore not entitled to the
    appointment of counsel or a hearing on his resentencing petition.
    On appeal, Maldonado contended the trial court erred
    when it summarily denied his section 1170.95 resentencing
    petition without appointing counsel. (People v. Maldonado (June
    21, 2021, B306808) 
    2021 WL 2525124
     at p. *1 [nonpub. opn.].)
    We disagreed, concluding that appointment of counsel was not
    required because Maldonado was statutorily ineligible for section
    1170.95 relief. (Id. at pp. *2-3.) The Supreme Court
    subsequently granted Maldonado’s petition for review, and
    ordered us to vacate our decision and reconsider the matter in
    light of People v. Lewis (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 952
     (Lewis).
    DISCUSSION
    Maldonado contends the trial court erred when it
    summarily denied his section 1170.95 resentencing petition
    without appointing counsel. Having reconsidered the matter, we
    2 The trial court deemed prosecutors’ response to
    Maldonado’s petition a “discretionary filing, with no procedural
    significance under the statutory scheme, as it included as an
    attachment [our] opinion on direct appeal.”
    3
    agree. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 961-970.) But the error
    was harmless.
    If a trial court erroneously denies a section 1170.95
    resentencing petition without appointing counsel, the error is
    prejudicial and requires reversal only if the petitioner shows a
    reasonable probability that the “‘“petition would not have been
    summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing”’” had the
    court appointed counsel. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974; see
    People v. Watson (1956) 
    46 Cal.2d 818
    , 836.) Here, the jury found
    true a torture special circumstance allegation, a finding
    Maldonado did not challenge on direct appeal. That finding—
    which is now law of the case (Conservatorship of Edde (2009) 
    173 Cal.App.4th 883
    , 889)—required the jury to determine that
    Maldonado acted with the intent to kill. (People v. Davenport
    (1985) 
    41 Cal.3d 247
    , 271.) A defendant who acts with the intent
    to kill can still be convicted of murder under the amended
    versions of sections 188 and 189. (See § 189, subd. (e)(2).) They
    are thus ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
    (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).) Accordingly, Maldonado has failed to
    show a reasonable probability that his petition would not have
    been summarily denied even if the trial court had appointed
    counsel. The error was harmless. (People v. Simmons (2021) 
    65 Cal.App.5th 739
    , 749-750, review granted Sept. 1, 2021, S270048
    (Simmons).)
    And to the extent the court erred when it accepted
    prosecutors’ response to Maldonado’s petition, that error was also
    harmless given his ineligibility for resentencing. (Simmons,
    supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 749-750, review granted.)
    4
    DISPOSITION
    The trial court’s order denying Maldonado’s petition
    for resentencing, entered June 1, 2020, is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    TANGEMAN, J.
    We concur:
    GILBERT, P. J.
    PERREN, J.
    5
    John F. McGregor, Judge
    Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
    ______________________________
    Leonard J. Klaif, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
    Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
    Assistant Attorney General, Amanda Lopez and Stacy S.
    Schwartz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
    Respondent.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B306808A

Filed Date: 9/23/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/23/2021