Lethermon v. Lawrence CA1/2 ( 2023 )

Filed 1/27/23 Lethermon v. Lawrence CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
KIMBERLY PINSON-
LETHERMON,
A161920
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Alameda County
SHARALYN LAWRENCE, Super. Ct. No. RG19034889)
Defendant and Respondent.
SHARALYN RENEE LAWRENCE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A164153
v.
KIMBERLY PINSON- (Alameda County
LETHERMON, Super. Ct. No. HG19035385)
Defendant and Appellant.
KIMBERLY PINSON-
LETHERMON,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A164268
v. (Alameda County
ROBBIE WILSON, Super. Ct. No. RG19034896)
Defendant and Respondent.
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These consolidated appeals involve three related cases. Two neighbors
who live across the street from each other, Kimberly Pinson-Lethermon and
Sharalyn Lawrence, filed separate cases against each other in Alameda
County Superior Court, each seeking a civil harassment restraining order
against the other. The matters were heard together and, after taking
evidence, the trial court denied Pinson-Lethermon’s request for a restraining
order against Lawrence and granted Lawrence a restraining order against
Pinson-Lethermon. Pinson-Lethermon also filed a related case against
Lawrence’s ex-partner, Robbie Wilson, requesting a civil harassment
restraining order against Wilson as well. The trial court dismissed that other
case without prejudice on stipulation of the parties.
Pinson-Lethermon now appeals the orders in all three related cases.
We hereby consolidate the three appeals and affirm all three orders.
BACKGROUND
The record does not contain a complete set of the papers filed in
support of Pinson-Lethermon’s request for a restraining order against
Lawrence (at a minimum, missing is the petition itself, filed on
September 12, 2019, and the register of actions). But from our review of the
hearing transcript, it appears Pinson-Lethermon sought a restraining order
against Lawrence principally based on allegations that Lawrence had been
harassing her by filming Pinson-Lethermon at her home at various times,
and also based on allegations Lawrence falsely accused her son of knocking
Lawrence’s daughter off her bicycle.
For her part, Lawrence sought a restraining order against Pinson-
Lethermon based on allegations that Pinson-Lethermon had been verbally
harassing her and her young daughter both in person and on social media,
including with homophobic rants and threats of violence. She also alleged
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that Pinson-Lethermon’s son had crossed the street to push her daughter off
of her bicycle.
The two cases were heard together on November 10, 2020, and at the
hearing, both Pinson-Lethermon and Lawrence testified. Four other
neighbors testified on Lawrence’s behalf. Collectively, Lawrence and her
witnesses testified about various acts of intimidation carried out by Pinson-
Lethermon, including igniting loud fireworks on multiple occasions, playing
her car music at loud volumes, shining headlights into homes late at night
and shouting obscenities (for example, calling Lawrence—who is a lesbian—a
pedophile and a racist). Pinson-Lethermon denied harassing Lawrence and
her family, accused Lawrence of harassing her and her son by watching and
filming them, testified that Lawrence’s witnesses are racist and mentally ill
and admitted lighting fireworks on only one occasion. She also testified
Lawrence had been posting about her on Facebook and that when she tried to
discuss the situation, Lawrence’s ex-wife Wilson drove up and scared her.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Pinson-
Lethermon’s request for a restraining order and granted Lawrence’s request
for a three-year restraining order against Pinson-Lethermon. The court
made an adverse credibility finding against Pinson-Lethermon, commenting
that it found her allegations to be “unconvincing.” It found that “a lot of her
motivation was to retaliate [against Lawrence] for what she perceives to be
wrongful claims against her son,” she “seems to harbor a disdain for lesbians”
and she harbored a “perception that her neighborhood is racist against her.”
The court found she had both shouted and also posted on social media hateful
comments about Lawrence and had been lighting off firecrackers multiple
times.
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As noted, Pinson-Lethermon had also filed a separate case against
Wilson arising from the same basic neighborhood controversy, alleging
Wilson would come over to Lawrence’s house and try to physically attack
Pinson-Lethermon and her son. She was initially granted a temporary
restraining order against Wilson. Ultimately, however, in a separate hearing
also held on November 10, 2020, Pinson-Lethermon’s request for a
restraining order against Wilson was dismissed. The minute order from the
November 10, 2020 hearing in that related case states in relevant part: “The
Court takes notice that this is a compliance hearing after the settlement
agreement filed on 03/12/2020. [¶] Petitioner states that there is no violation
by the Respondent of the settlement agreement. [¶] In view thereof, the Court
dismissed the case without prejudice. [¶] Petition for Injunction Prohibiting
Harassment dismissed by Court without Prejudice—Pursuant to Stipulation
of Parties.”
Pinson-Lethermon then filed timely appeals in all three cases, which
were docketed separately in this court as case numbers A161920, A164153
and A164268. She then filed a motion asking us to consolidate all three
appeals which we took under submission. No respondent’s brief has been
filed in any of the appeals. Having reviewed the records and briefing, we
hereby order case numbers A161920, A164153 and A164268 consolidated for
all purposes.
DISCUSSION
Our ability to afford relief on appeal is limited and is governed by rules,
some of which bear mention here. The most basic rule on appeal is that an
appellate court must begin by assuming that the trial court’s ruling is correct,
and from that starting point the burden is on the party appealing to
demonstrate that the trial court committed an error. (See Grappo v. McMills
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(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1006.) Our starting presumption that there was
no error includes the assumption, unless the appellant demonstrates
otherwise, “ ‘ that the record contains evidence sufficient to support the
[order].’ ” (City of Calexico v. Bergeson (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 180, 185.) The
appealing party demonstrates error only if he or she does all of the following:
(1) provides an adequate record on appeal that contains all of the relevant
matters that were before the trial court (see Jameson v. Desta (2018)
5 Cal.5th 594, 609); (2) provides a citation to the record for every factual
statement in its brief (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 156); and (3) makes an argument that is both
understandable and supported by a discussion of relevant law. (See United
Grand, at p. 153; Doe v. McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 640, 654.)
Furthermore, even where those rules are followed, an appellate court has no
power to “ ‘reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or
resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ ” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640.)
The powers to make factual findings, and to believe or disbelieve witnesses,
belong solely to the trial court. We review the court’s ruling principally to
decide if the trial court applied the law correctly to the facts it found to be
true, and that is all.
Here, we are unable to discern a meaningful appellate argument in
Pinson-Lethermon’s appellate briefing. Her briefs in all three appeals largely
re-argue the facts and make conclusory points that are not developed in any
way or supported by any discussion of California law. (For example, in her
appeal of the restraining order Lawrence secured against her, she asserts
among other things that the trial judge was biased against her because of her
language, pre-judged the case and admitted hearsay evidence.) Pinson-
Lethermon has asked us to review the transcript of the November 10, 2020
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hearing. We have done so, and we discern no error. There is no indication of
bias or any other judicial impropriety in the way these cases were handled,
and the rest of Pinson-Lethermon’s points are unmeritorious.
Finally, her appeal from the dismissal of her case against Wilson fails
for an additional reason. The minute order from the hearing shows that
Pinson-Lethermon consented to the dismissal of her request for a restraining
order against Wilson, and so there is no basis for us to disturb the court’s
ruling in that case. A party who consents to a trial court action cannot
complain of error on appeal. (Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v.
Hildebrand (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 859, 861 [“[i]t is . . . an elementary rule of
appellate procedure that a judgment or order will not be disturbed on an
appeal prosecuted by a party who consented to it”].)
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
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STEWART, P.J.
We concur.
RICHMAN, J.
MILLER, J.
Pinson-Lethermon v. Lawrence (A161920), Lawrence v. Pinson-Lethermon
(A164153), Pinson-Lethermon v. Wilson (A164268)
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