Turnbull v. Lucerne Valley Unified School Dist. ( 2018 )


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  • Filed 6/13/18
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    DAWN D. TURNBULL,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                E067436
    v.                                                (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1605634)
    LUCERNE VALLEY UNIFIED                            OPINION
    SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.,
    Defendants and Appellants.
    APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Gilbert G. Ochoa,
    Judge. Affirmed.
    Cummings, McClorey, Davis, Acho & Associates and Ryan D. Miller for
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Law Offices of Robert D. Conaway and Robert D. Conaway for Plaintiff and
    Respondent.
    Plaintiff and respondent Dawn D. Turnbull sued defendants and appellants the
    Lucerne Valley Unified School District (LVUSD), Tom Courtney, Suzette Davis, John
    Buchanan, and Keri Gasper. Turnbull brought causes of action for (1) disclosing her
    1
    private medical information (Civ. Code, § 1798.63); (2) invading her privacy (Pen.
    Code, § 637.2); (3) interfering with her constitutional rights (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd.
    (b)); (4) violating her civil rights (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983); and (5) conspiring to deprive
    her of her right of privacy or right of free speech (42 U.S.C.A § 1985(3)).
    LVUSD, Courtney, and Davis brought an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial
    court denied. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.)1 LVUSD, Courtney, and Davis contend the
    trial court erred by denying their motion. We affirm the order denying the anti-SLAPP
    motion.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    A.     COMPLAINT
    The facts in this subsection are taken from Turnbull’s complaint. Davis is the
    superintendent of LVUSD. Turnbull and Courtney were members of the LVUSD
    board. Although not explicit, it can be inferred from the complaint that Buchanan was
    also a member of the LVUSD board. Gasper was an LVUSD volunteer.
    Turnbull opposed Davis’s alleged misappropriation of LVUSD funds. In
    retaliation for Turnbull’s opposition, Davis (1) obtained confidential medical
    information about Turnbull from Turnbull’s employer; (2) generated false reports from
    the California Longitudinal Pupil Achievement Data System (CALPADS), concerning
    school lunch program eligibility; and (3) on July 8, 2015, falsely told LVUSD board
    members that evidence strongly suggested Turnbull illegally accessed CALPADS.
    1
    All subsequent statutory references will be to the Code of Civil Procedure
    unless otherwise indicated.
    2
    Shortly after the July 8, 2015, LVUSD board meeting, Courtney and Buchanan, as
    private citizens, called Turnbull’s employer to report Turnbull’s allegedly unlawful
    access of CALPADS. Turnbull had legally accessed CALPADS to obtain a report
    concerning her stepchild.
    Courtney used his position as a LVUSD board member to obtain access to
    Turnbull’s private medical information. Courtney, as a private citizen, caused
    Turnbull’s private medical information to be published on social media or gave the
    information to people who published it on social media. Courtney intended to
    intimidate Turnbull to stop her from opposing Davis’s acts of misappropriation. Gasper
    received Turnbull’s private medical information from Courtney, Davis, or Buchanan.
    Gasper published the information on social media.
    In Turnbull’s first cause of action, she alleged all of the defendants disclosed her
    private medical information, in particular an off-work note from Turnbull’s doctor.
    (Civ. Code, § 1798.63.) In the second cause of action, against all of the defendants,
    Turnbull alleged the release of her medical off-work note constituted an invasion of
    privacy, which led to the loss of her job with Oro Grande Unified School District
    (OGSD).
    In Turnbull’s third cause of action, she alleged all of the defendants retaliated
    against her for a variety of actions including opposing Davis’s misappropriation of
    funds. Courtney pressured Turnbull to resign and then threatened to have Turnbull
    recalled. Turnbull alleged all of the defendants used their official authority or influence
    to intimidate and coerce Turnbull, which ultimately led to Turnbull losing her job at
    3
    OGSD. Additionally, to the extent LVUSD resources were used to retaliate against
    Turnbull, that was also wrongful.
    In Turnbull’s fourth cause of action, she alleged all of the defendants retaliated
    against her for a variety of actions including opposing Davis’s misappropriation of
    funds. Turnbull asserted defendants violated her expectation of privacy. Turnbull
    alleged she lost her job with OGSD as a result of defendants’ actions.
    In the fifth cause of action, Turnbull alleged the superintendent of OGSD
    (Griggs) accessed Turnbull’s private medical information and gave it to Davis. Davis
    conspired to violate Turnbull’s right of privacy for the purpose of chilling Turnbull’s
    exercise of free speech. Turnbull sought general damages, special damages, statutory
    damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, costs, and any other proper relief.
    B.     ANTI-SLAPP MOTION
    LVUSD, Courtney, and Davis (collectively, defendants) filed an anti-SLAPP
    motion. (§ 425.16.) The first issue in an anti-SLAPP analysis is whether the allegations
    in the complaint arise from protected activities. Defendants asserted Turnbull’s first
    and second causes of action concerned the disclosure of Turnbull’s medical off-work
    note. Defendants contended Turnbull’s off-work note was a matter of public interest
    because Turnbull failed to attend LVUSD board meetings, and thus, the disclosure
    constituted a protected activity.
    As to the third cause of action, defendants asserted Turnbull’s allegations
    concerned statements and deliberations at LVUSD board meetings, and thus were
    protected activities. In regard to the fourth and fifth causes of action, defendants
    4
    asserted no new facts were alleged and therefore the analysis pertaining to the first,
    second, and third causes of action also applied to the fourth and fifth causes of action.
    The second prong of an anti-SLAPP analysis concerns whether the plaintiff has a
    probability of prevailing on the merits of her claims. In regard to the first and second
    causes of action, defendants asserted Turnbull could not prevail because defendants
    have immunity for discretionary acts. (Gov. Code, § 820.2.) Defendants asserted that
    even if they disclosed Turnbull’s medical off-work note to embarrass and humiliate
    Turnbull, they would be immune from liability because malicious acts are within their
    discretion.
    Next, defendants asserted Turnbull could not prevail on her first and second
    causes of action because OGSD independently decided to terminate Turnbull’s
    employment and the voters in LVUSD independently decided to recall Turnbull.
    Therefore, defendants were not the proximate cause of Turnbull’s damages.
    Additionally, defendants contended Turnbull could not demonstrate an invasion of
    privacy because there is no privacy interest in a medical off-work note, which contains
    no medical information.
    In regard to the third cause of action, defendants asserted Turnbull could not
    prevail because defendants were not the proximate cause of her damages, e.g., OGSD
    independently decided to terminate Turnbull’s employment and LVUSD voters
    independently decided to recall Turnbull. Next, defendants contended Turnbull could
    not demonstrate she was subjected to threats of violence as required for a violation of
    Civil Code section 52.1. In regard to the allegation that LVUSD resources were used to
    5
    retaliate against Turnbull, defendants asserted the claim failed because Turnbull failed
    to allege what resources, if any, were used.
    As to the fourth and fifth causes of action, defendants asserted Turnbull could not
    prevail because she lacked standing since defendants did not cause Turnbull’s injury, in
    that they did not terminate Turnbull’s employment or recall her board membership.
    Next, defendants contended Turnbull could not succeed on her fourth and fifth causes of
    action because she failed to allege sufficient facts to support the causes of action.
    C.     OPPOSITION
    Turnbull opposed defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. Turnbull asserted the anti-
    SLAPP motion did not comply with the timing provisions for filing a motion and
    therefore should be denied. (§ 425.16, subd. (f).) Turnbull asserted the anti-SLAPP
    motion did not comply with the rule requiring the notice of motion to set forth the
    nature of the order being sought and the grounds for issuance of the order, and therefore
    the motion should be denied. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(a).)
    The first prong of anti-SLAPP analysis concerns whether the claims arise from
    protected activity. As to the first and second causes of action, Turnbull asserted they
    were based upon defendants accessing her medical off-work note, providing the medical
    information to the public, calling OGSD to accuse Turnbull of illegally accessing
    CALPADS, and having Turnbull removed from an unrelated nonprofit board. Turnbull
    contended none of the acts alleged in the first and second causes of action concerned
    protected activities because none of the acts were done by defendants in their official
    capacities.
    6
    As to the third cause of action, Turnbull argued her claim for retaliation was not
    based upon LVUSD board actions. Turnbull contended the retaliation occurred on
    social media and in personal telephone calls to OGSD. Turnbull asserted the personal
    acts were not protected activities.
    The second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis concerns the plaintiff’s probability
    of prevailing. Turnbull contended her allegations did not concern defendants’ acts at
    LVUSD board meetings and therefore defendants were not immune from liability. In
    regard to the alleged lack of proximate causation, Turnbull asserted her allegations did
    not concern the recall. Turnbull alleged Courtney, Davis, and Buchanan, falsely (1) told
    OGSD, (2) wrote on social media, and (3) e-mailed a nonprofit that Turnbull illegally
    accessed CALPADS. The falsehoods were communicated for the purpose of causing
    Turnbull to lose her job with OGSD and her position with the nonprofit board. Turnbull
    asserted defendants were the proximate cause of her damages.
    Turnbull contended she had an expectation of privacy in the medical off-work
    note because it was given to OGSD, i.e., her employer. Turnbull did not expect the note
    to be published in the LVUSD area. In regard to insufficient facts in the complaint,
    Turnbull contended defendants should have demurred if the facts were insufficient. In
    regard to the fourth and fifth causes of action, Turnbull asserted she had standing to
    bring the causes of action because defendants were the cause of her harm. Turnbull
    explained that defendants caused Turnbull to lose her job with OGSD by falsely telling
    OGSD that Turnbull illegally accessed CALPADS.
    7
    D.     HEARING
    The trial court held a hearing on defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants
    argued that Turnbull’s illness was matter of public interest because Turnbull failed to
    attend LVUSD board meetings. Turnbull asserted her lawsuit did not concern activities
    at LVUSD board meetings. Turnbull argued that her job with OGSD was not a matter
    of public interest. Turnbull contended defendants fabricated the CALPADS allegation
    and communicated the false allegation to OGSD so as to cause Turnbull to lose her job
    with OGSD. Turnbull asserted the alleged acts took place in Davis’s and Courtney’s
    personal capacities.
    Defendants contended private communications concerning matters of public
    interest are protected activities. Defendants asserted the alleged acts were within “the
    normal realm of dirty politics” and therefore their alleged acts were protected—because
    they were political acts. The trial court took the matter under submission.
    E.     RULING
    The trial court found Turnbull’s causes of action arose from “defendants
    improperly obtain[ing] her confidential medical information, and ha[ving] that
    information disclosed on social media.” The trial court found defendants failed to
    demonstrate that Turnbull’s medical information was disclosed during a LVUSD board
    meeting or during LVUSD board discussions, or that it was matter of public interest.
    As a result, the trial court found defendants failed to prove the alleged acts were
    protected activities. The trial court denied defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion.
    8
    DISCUSSION
    A.     ANTI-SLAPP MOTION
    1.     LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The anti-SLAPP statute is designed to “encourage continued participation in
    matters of public significance” by stopping lawsuits that would otherwise chill a
    person’s public participation due to abuse of the judicial process. (§ 425.16, subd. (a).)
    There are two steps to determining if a lawsuit is designed to curb the defendant’s
    participation in matters of public significance.
    The first step is examining the causes of action to determine if they arise from
    any act in furtherance of the defendant’s “right of petition or free speech under the
    United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public
    issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b).) The second step is determining whether the plaintiff has a
    probability of prevailing on her claims. (§ 425.16, subd. (b).) If a cause of action arises
    from an act in furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech and the
    plaintiff does not have a probability of prevailing, then the cause of action will be
    stricken. (§ 425.16, subd. (b).) We apply the de novo standard of review. (Park v.
    Board of Trustees of California State University System (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067.)
    B.     PROTECTED ACTIVITY
    1.     LAW
    An “ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the
    United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes . . .
    (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a
    9
    public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in
    furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional
    right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
    (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
    “In deciding whether the initial ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court
    considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon
    which the liability or defense is based.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b).)” (Navellier v. Sletten
    (2002) 
    29 Cal. 4th 82
    , 89.) “ ‘The mere fact that an action was filed after protected
    activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of
    the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citation.] . . . In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical
    consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free
    speech or petitioning activity.’ ” (In re Episcopal Church Cases (2009) 
    45 Cal. 4th 467
    ,
    477.)
    2.     FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION
    a.     Contention
    Defendants contend Turnbull’s first and second causes of action arise from
    protected activity.
    Turnbull’s first cause of action is based upon the alleged disclosure of her private
    medical information. (Civ. Code, § 1798.63.) Turnbull alleged defendants disclosed
    her private medical information for the purpose of embarrassing Turnbull. As a result
    of the disclosure, Turnbull missed LVUSD board meetings and lost her job with OGSD.
    10
    Turnbull’s second cause of action is based upon an alleged invasion of privacy.
    (Pen. Code, § 637.2.) Turnbull alleged defendants disclosed her private medical
    information to embarrass her. As a result of the disclosure, Turnbull was unable to
    participate in LVUSD board meetings and lost her job at OGSD. In Turnbull’s general
    allegations, she asserts Courtney and/or Davis gave Turnbull’s private medical
    information to Gasper, who published the information on social media.
    We understand Turnbull’s first and second causes of action as faulting Courtney
    and Davis for giving Gasper Turnbull’s medical off-work note. The note written by
    Turnbull’s doctor is not a statement or writing made by Courtney or Davis. Further,
    defendants do not explain in what environment the note was given to Gasper. For
    example, it is unknown if the note was given to Gasper during an LVUSD board
    meeting.
    Courtney’s declaration was submitted in support of the anti-SLAPP motion. In
    Courtney’s declaration he declared Turnbull’s absence from LVUSD board meetings
    “was a topic of much conversation during Board meetings,” but “during board meetings
    [the board] did not discuss any medical conditions or medical history relating to
    [Turnbull].” It is unclear from this evidence if the off-work note was given to Gasper
    during an LVUSD board meeting or at another time. Accordingly, it has not been
    established that the giving of the note to Gasper is protected as a statement or writing
    made in a place open to the public or a public forum. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).)
    We now examine whether giving the off-work note to Gasper was an act “in
    furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional
    11
    right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
    (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) Defendants fail to explain what, if anything, Gasper wrote on
    social media. As a result, it is unclear if Gasper exercised her right of free speech in
    connection with a public issue or issue of public importance.
    The trial court granted defendants’ request for judicial notice concerning various
    online articles about Turnbull’s dispute with Davis and LVUSD board members and her
    recall. The trial court explained that the request for judicial notice was granted as to the
    existence of the articles, but not as to the truth of the articles’ contents. Thus, the
    contents of the articles cannot be used to explain what, if anything, Gasper wrote on
    social media. (Ragland v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn. (2012) 
    209 Cal. App. 4th 182
    , 194.)
    In sum, defendants have not explained how giving the off-work note to Gasper
    constitutes “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition
    or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of
    public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) Therefore, defendants have not shown the
    allegations in the first and second causes of action arise from protected activity.
    Defendants contend the first and second causes of action arise from protected
    activity because Turnbull’s absence from LVUSD board meetings was a matter of
    public interest, as shown by the judicially noticed newspaper articles. Defendants failed
    to explain what, if any, comments were made by Gasper. As a result, this court has no
    means of knowing whether Gasper made comments that concerned Turnbull’s
    attendance at LVUSD board meetings. Because defendants have failed to show there is
    a connection between (1) Gasper’s comments, if any; and (2) the alleged issue of public
    12
    importance, defendants have failed to show that the alleged act of giving the note to
    Gasper was an act “in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition
    or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of
    public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
    3.      FOURTH AND FIFTH CAUSES OF ACTION
    Defendants contend Turnbull’s fourth and fifth causes of action arise from
    protected activity.
    Turnbull’s fourth cause of action is based upon a deprivation of her right of
    privacy. (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.) Turnbull alleged Davis accessed Turnbull’s medical
    off-work note that was given to OGSD, i.e., Turnbull’s employer. Turnbull’s fifth cause
    of action alleges a conspiracy to deprive Turnbull of her right of privacy or right of free
    speech. (42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3).) Turnbull alleges Griggs, the OGSD superintendent,
    copied Turnbull’s medical off-work note and gave it to Davis. Griggs gave the note to
    Davis for the purpose of intimidating Turnbull into not pursuing her claims that Davis
    misappropriated LVUSD funds.
    The fourth and fifth causes of action concern Davis accepting the off-work note
    from Griggs. The act of accepting a note is not a statement or writing made by Davis.
    Additionally, there is no declaration from Davis or Griggs explaining where the note
    was given to Davis, assuming the allegation is true. As a result, there is nothing
    indicating the note was given to Davis in a place open to the public or in a public forum.
    As a result, defendants have not shown Davis’s acceptance of the note is protected as a
    13
    “written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public
    forum.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).)
    Next, we examine if Davis’s acceptance of the note was “conduct in furtherance
    of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free
    speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd.
    (e)(4).) As set forth ante, the off-work note was allegedly given to Gasper, who
    published the information on social media. It is unclear what, if anything, Gasper wrote
    on social media. As a result, we do not know if Gasper’s comments related to
    Turnbull’s absence from LVUSD board meetings. Therefore, defendants have failed to
    establish Davis’s alleged acceptance of the off-work note was conduct in furtherance of
    Gasper’s right of free speech in connection with a public issue or issue of public
    interest. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
    Defendants contend Turnbull’s fourth and fifth causes of action arise from
    protected activity because the allegations concern conduct that “occurred in a public
    forum, by public officials, during public meetings regarding a public matter.”
    Defendants do not provide a record citation (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)),
    nor do defendants explain what portion of the record reflects Davis accepted the
    medical off-work note from Griggs during a public meeting. Accordingly, we find
    defendants’ argument to be unpersuasive.
    14
    4.     THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
    a.     Procedural History
    The third cause of action is based upon an alleged violation of Civil Code section
    52.1 which prohibits interference “by threat, intimidation, or coercion . . . with the
    exercise or enjoyment by any individual . . . of rights secured by the Constitution or
    laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this
    state.” (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (a).) The alleged victim may sue the alleged harasser
    for civil damages. (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (b).)
    In the third cause of action, Turnbull alleged (1) Courtney pressured Turnbull to
    resign from the LVUSD board; (2) Courtney threatened to have Turnbull recalled from
    the LVUSD board; and (3) Courtney used LVUSD’s resources to support the efforts to
    recall Turnbull. Courtney allegedly used LVUSD’s resources in the following manner:
    (a) during the July 8, 2015, LVUSD board meeting board members discussed gathering
    signatures for the recall; (b) during the September 1, 2015, LVUSD board meeting
    board members insisted on proceeding with recall efforts; (c) during the September 15,
    2015, LVUSD board meeting Courtney said “that they needed to take steps to stop
    Dawn Turnbull which included ‘. . . report[ing] this to the authorities’ going to
    [OGSD]”; (d) Courtney and Buchanan telephoned OGSD several times concerning
    Turnbull; (e) Courtney posted, on his personal Facebook page, that Turnbull should be
    fired from OGSD.
    Turnbull alleged that using LVUSD’s resources to support the recall was a
    violation of Education Code section 7054, subdivision (a), which provides, “No school
    15
    district . . . funds, services, supplies, or equipment shall be used for the purpose of
    urging the support or defeat of any ballot measure or candidate, including, but not
    limited to, any candidate for election to the governing board of the district.” The statute
    further provides that any violation of the statute “shall be a misdemeanor or felony
    punishable by imprisonment in a county jail.” (Educ. Code, § 7054, subd. (c).)
    b.     Clarifying the Cause of Action
    We seek to clarify the basis of Turnbull’s third cause of action. A violation of
    Education Code section 7054 is a crime. Therefore, Turnbull is not suing for a violation
    of Education Code section 7054 because this case is a civil matter. As a result, the
    various ways in which Courtney allegedly used LVUSD resources to support the efforts
    to recall Turnbull are not pertinent to the third cause of action.
    Civil Code section 52.1 is the legal basis for the third cause of action. Civil Code
    section 52.1 concerns interfering with a person’s constitutional rights by threatening,
    intimidating, or coercing the person. (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (a).) The alleged acts
    associated with Civil Code section 52.1 are (1) Courtney pressured Turnbull to resign
    from the LVUSD board, and (2) Courtney threatened to have Turnbull recalled.
    Turnbull alleges Courtney pressured and threatened her because Turnbull
    objected to various misdeeds by Davis and LVUSD board members, such as (1) gifting
    thousands of dollars’ worth of ovens to friends of LVUSD board members; (2) failing to
    address missing student lunch funds; and (3) awarding a construction contract to
    Courtney’s family business without proper disclosures and recusals.
    16
    c.     Analysis
    Defendants contend the third cause of action arises from protected activity.
    We examine whether the threats and pressure are protected as statements or
    writings “made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an
    issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) It is unclear from the complaint when
    and where the threats and pressure allegedly occurred. It is possible that Turnbull is
    referring to the release of the medical off-work note as a threat and pressure. In the
    general allegations section of the complaint, Turnbull alleges the off-work note was
    published on social media for the purpose of intimidating Turnbull. Thus, it is possible
    Turnbull is alleging the release of the medical note constituted the pressure and/or
    threat.
    However, within the third cause of action, Turnbull alleges Courtney “threatened
    to recall [Turnbull].” That allegation implies that Courtney made a threat expressly
    concerning a potential recall. As a result, it is unclear if Turnbull is asserting the release
    of the medical note constituted the pressure and threats. Because the complaint is vague
    as to when and where the threats and pressure occurred, it cannot be concluded from the
    face of the complaint that the threats and pressure occurred in a place open to the public
    or in a public forum.
    In Courtney’s declaration, he explains that at the April 15, 2015, LVUSD board
    meeting, the board censured Turnbull and voted in favor of requesting Turnbull’s
    resignation. It is possible that the April 15 vote constitutes the pressure to resign, in
    which case the pressure occurred during an LVUSD board meeting, which means it
    17
    happened in a place open to the public or a public forum. (See Salma v. Capon (2008)
    
    161 Cal. App. 4th 1275
    , 1286 [using a declaration to understand a vague pleading];
    Dowling v. Zimmerman (2001) 
    85 Cal. App. 4th 1400
    , 1418-1420 [same].)
    Turnbull filed a declaration in opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion. In the
    declaration, Turnbull declared, “Defendant[s] by their retaliatory action, calculated to
    intimidate me, have violated California Civil Code [section] 52.1(b) as stated in the
    complaint.” It is unclear from Turnbull’s declaration when and where the pressure and
    threats allegedly occurred.
    In Turnbull’s respondent’s brief, when explaining the second prong of the anti-
    SLAPP analysis (probability of prevailing), she refers to a threat made by Courtney on
    Facebook. Courtney allegedly said he would like to see Turnbull publicly stoned and
    that he “could still throw a mean fastball.” It is unclear if this is the threat to have
    Turnbull recalled because there is no mention of a recall in the alleged threat. In
    Turnbull’s opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, she asserts defendants retaliated
    against her on social media and in personal e-mails.
    Turnbull’s third cause of action is vague, which means one can only speculate as
    to the basis for the third cause of action. Courtney’s declaration permits speculation
    that the “pressure” portion of the third cause of action concerns Courtney’s acts at an
    LVUSD board meeting; however, Turnbull’s documents reflect the claim could be
    based upon the release of the medical note, posts on social media, and/or personal e-
    mails.
    18
    Defendants assert websites open to the public are public forums, and therefore
    Facebook posts would be protected activities. Defendants do not cite to evidence
    reflecting these particular Facebook pages were open to the public, e.g., defendants do
    not provide a record citation to evidence regarding the privacy settings on the pages.
    Accordingly, it cannot be concluded that these particular Facebook pages were open to
    the public.
    Because Courtney does not assert that he only interacted with Turnbull at
    LVUSD board meetings or on publicly accessible websites, defendants have not
    established that the alleged pressure and threats occurred in a place “open to the public
    or a public forum.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3); Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause,
    Inc. (2002) 
    29 Cal. 4th 53
    , 67 [the moving defendant bears the burden of proving
    protected activity].) In sum, defendants have not met their burden of establishing the
    third cause of action arises from protected activity.
    Defendants assert Turnbull’s third cause of action arises from protected activities
    because “[e]ach and every factual allegation . . . involves deliberations and statements
    made during a Board meeting, by members of the Board.” Defendants cite to
    Turnbull’s allegations concerning the alleged misuse of LVUSD board resources (Educ.
    Code, § 7054, subd. (c)), which, as explained ante, is not the basis for Turnbull’s third
    cause of action.
    Further, the alleged misuse of resources took place after the pressure and threats.
    Turnbull alleged that she refused to resign despite pressure and threats, and then
    Courtney allegedly used LVUSD resources to support the recall effort against Turnbull.
    19
    Specifically, Turnbull alleged, “Courtney pressured [Turnbull] into resigning and when
    that failed, threatened to recall [Turnbull] and when that failed, putting [sic] [LVUSD’s]
    resources behind recalling [Turnbull] . . . .” Defendants’ argument is not persuasive
    because it focuses on what occurred at LVUSD board meetings after the alleged
    pressure and threats. Because defendants do not explain why the alleged pressure and
    threats constitute protected activity, we find their argument to be unpersuasive.
    D.     CONCLUSION
    Defendants have failed to establish that the allegations in the complaint arise
    from protected activities. Accordingly, we do not examine the second prong of the anti-
    SLAPP analysis, which is the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing on the merits.
    (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
    E.     DISMISSAL
    Turnbull contends defendants’ appeal should be dismissed because, in the clerk’s
    transcript, the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion is set forth in a minute
    order rather than a signed order, and a signed order is not attached to defendants’
    December 13, 2016, notice of appeal. On January 26, 2017, defendants filed an
    amended civil case information statement with this court that included a formal order
    denying the anti-SLAPP motion. The formal order denying the anti-SLAPP motion was
    filed in the trial court on January 23, 2017. On February 6, 2017, this court filed an
    order construing defendants’ notice of appeal as being from the formal order dated
    January 23, 2017. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d).) In other words, this court has
    20
    already addressed this issue. The error in the lack of formal order has been cured.
    Accordingly, we deny Turnbull’s request to dismiss the appeal.
    DISPOSITION
    The order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules
    of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    MILLER
    J.
    We concur:
    RAMIREZ
    P. J.
    CODRINGTON
    J.
    21
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E067436

Filed Date: 6/13/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/13/2018